Dubroja v Kabir

1. There is a history of disputes between the parties concerning the leased premises. It is necessary to set out this history to understand the Appellants' ground of appeal.
2. The parties entered into a residential tenancy agreement in April 2019.
3. On 22 November 2023, the Tribunal made orders in application 2023/375759 lodged by the Appellants. The orders included an order that the Respondent pay $15,000 to the Appellants as compensation for a breach of s 63 of the RT Act. Section 63 makes it a term of a residential tenancy agreement for the landlord of the residential premises to provide and maintain the premises in a reasonable state of repair, having regard to the age of, rent payable for and prospective life of the premises.
4. On 19 March 2024, the Tribunal made the following orders in application 2024/45005 lodged by the Respondent (the March 2024 decision):

1 Sadia Afrin Tania is removed as a party to the proceeding.

2 The Tribunal orders the Residential Tenancy Agreement is terminated immediately and vacant possession is to be given to the landlord on the date of termination.

3 The Tribunal makes an order under section 114(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2010, that the order for possession is suspended until 30 April 2024.

4 The tenant is to pay the landlord a daily occupation fee, at the rate of $46.42, per day from the day after the date of termination, 20 March 2024 until the date vacant possession is given.

5 The Tribunal orders that the respondents Boris Dubroja, Viktorija Dubroja, is to pay the applicant Mohammad Tarikul Kabir, the sum of $2,000.00, on or before 27 March 2024.

Details of the Money order:

1. rental arrears up until today as agreed by the parties $2,000.00

NOTATION

The landlord is claiming in excess of $15,000.00 rent and other charges.

The tenant maintains that the premises are not habitable.

The parties have agreed to reduce the rent to $325.00 per week until the tenant vacates.

The parties have agreed to a rent arrears figure of $2000.00.

This agreement resolves all disputes between the parties and is in full and final settlement.

(emphasis added)

1. The Appellants vacated the leased premises in May 2024.
2. The application before the Tribunal below was lodged by the Respondent on 15 July 2024. The application sought orders for rent and water arrears and compensation for end-of-tenancy damage and cleaning of the premises. The application was heard by the Tribunal below on 13 November 2024. The Tribunal was constituted by General Member K A Ruschen. The Appellants appeared in person and the Respondent's agent appeared on behalf of the Respondent.
3. On 13 November 2024, the Tribunal below made the following orders:

1 The Tribunal orders that the respondents Viktorija Dubroja, Boris Dubroja, is to pay the applicant Mohammad Tarikul Kabir, the sum of $3,947.70, on or before 11 December 2024.

Details of the Money order:

1. rent arrears 7 May 24 to 17 May 24 (after $296.41 part payment) $214.30

2. Plumbing works $378.40

3. Painting (partial allowance) $1,320.00

4. Cleaning and rubbish removal $1,430.00

5. Blind repairs $205.00

6. handyman (partial) $400.00

2 The balance of the application for water usage, mowing, electrical works (x2), pest control and handyman works for showerhead and front door seal replacement is dismissed after hearing.

NOTE: bond has been received by landlord and eroded by rent arrears owing up to 6 May 2024.

1. The orders record that oral reasons were given for the decision.
2. On 4 December 2024, the Appellants lodged application 2024/00452656 seeking compensation from the landlord due to repair issues.
3. On 13 December 2024, the Appellants lodged another application 2024/00458991 seeking compensation from the landlord for medical conditions and expenses.
4. On 20 February 2025, the Tribunal constituted by General Member S Smith dismissed both applications (the February 2025 decisions). The Tribunal gave the following reasons for dismissing the claims in each application:

There have been multiple claims commenced in the Tribunal relating to this tenancy. This claim was filed on 4 December 2024.

However on 19 March 2024 orders were made (I expect by consent) in matter 2024/45005 where the parties agreed to a compromise of the quantum of arrears of rent and the quantum of the rent to be paid until vacate. The learned presiding member added a notation "This agreement resolves all disputes between the parties and is in full and final settlement".

There could not be clearer indication that the orders made on that day were a complete bar to any further proceedings relating to this tenancy.

As a result the claim must be dismissed.

1. Mrs Dubroja lodged a notice of appeal on 21 February 2025 against the orders of the Tribunal below. She also applied for a stay of the orders under appeal. The stay application was dismissed by a differently constituted Appeal Panel in orders made on 14 March 2025. The Appeal Panel corrected those orders on 18 March 2025 to include an order adding Mr Dubroja as an Appellant.

1. The notice of appeal states the following ground of appeal:

"Member KA Rushden did not take into account previous order made that neither party could make any application in regards to the property after 19th March 2024 case no 2024/45005."

1. The section of the notice of appeal concerning applications for leave to appeal was also completed on essentially the same ground. However, for the reasons that follow, leave is not required for the ground because it raises a question of law.
2. The notice of appeal also seeks an extension of time to lodge an appeal. It states:

"Today the 20/02/2025 I was told by member S Smith that neither party was allowed to put on applications and as a result my applications were dismissed case number 2024/00458991 and 2024/00452656. It is completely unfair and unjust that one party was allowed to make application whilst the other was dismissed. Both applications for both parties should be dismissed not just one."

1. The Respondent did not lodge a reply to appeal.

1. The Appeal Panel has had regard to the following in considering the appeal:

(1) The notice of appeal dated 20 February 2025 and lodged on 21 February 2025.

(2) A bundle of documents lodged by the Appellants on 11 April 2025, which includes the Appellants' written submissions and a transcript of the proceedings before the Tribunal below.

(3) A bundle of documents lodged by the Respondent on 13 May 2025, which includes the Respondent's written submissions in response.

(4) Documents lodged by both the Appellants and the Respondent in connection with the application for a stay of the orders under appeal.

(5) The oral submissions made by the parties at the appeal hearing.

1. We note that the transcript of the proceedings before the Tribunal below was prepared by the Appellants and accompanied by a copy of the sound recording. The Respondent's agent indicated at the appeal hearing that the Respondent did not challenge the accuracy of the transcript.

1. Given that the appeal ground is limited to whether the Tribunal below was wrong to make the orders under appeal because of the March 2024 decision, it is not necessary for us to set out in detail the substantive reasons given by the Tribunal for the orders. It is sufficient to set out relevant excerpts from the transcript of the proceedings supplied by the Appellants.
2. The following exchange recorded at p 20 of the transcript occurred between the member constituting the Tribunal and Mrs Dubroja concerning whether the bond covered the rent and water arrears claimed by the Respondent:

"Tribunal Member: Anything else you'd like to say about that? Um, the next is the water. What would you like to say about the water?

Viktorija Dubroja: That was all done with um when we- when we went to the tribunal um at the last tribunal, that 2,000 and the water arrears was calculated with that. So, that was calculated with that at the last tribunal. So .. And at the tribe- at the last tribunal, it was stated that we can't make further claims and nor can they, That that settles all disputes.

Tribunal Member: Okay. Well um the um it can only resolve disputes up until that date. Alright? This is a dispute that has arisen after that date because it arose after you vacated the tenancy and how you left the condition of the property.

Viktorija Dubroja: We didn't live it in the condition that they stated."

1. This exchange occurred before the Tribunal gave oral reasons for the orders under appeal at the end of the hearing (which are recorded at pp 43−55 of the transcript). The effect of the March 2024 decision is not canvassed again in the later oral reasons. Nevertheless, the later reasons can only be properly understood with the exchange in mind.
2. The exchange illustrates 2 significant matters.
3. Firstly, the exchange indicates that the Tribunal was aware of, and took into account, the March 2024 decision when deciding whether it could make the orders under appeal.
4. Secondly, the exchange indicates that the Tribunal provided the Appellants with a reason about why the Tribunal considered that it was not precluded by the March 2024 decision from making the orders under appeal. The reason was that the Tribunal construed the March 2024 decision as resolving disputes up until the date of that decision. The Tribunal considered that the amounts in dispute before it related to matters arising after that date as a consequence of the Appellants vacating the leased premises.

1. The Appellants submit that the March 2024 decision precluded both parties from making any further claims concerning the tenancy over the leased premises. The Appellants point to the notation for the orders set out in the March 2024 decision which notes that certain amounts were agreed by the parties and "[t]his agreement resolves all disputes between the parties and is in full and final settlement". As a result, the Appellants submit that the Tribunal below was wrong to make the orders under appeal. Rather, the Tribunal should have dismissed the Respondent's application.
2. The Appellants also point to the February 2025 decisions in support of their construction of the March 2024 decision. The reason given by the Tribunal for the February 2025 decisions was that the orders made in the March 2024 decision "were a complete bar to any further proceedings relating to this tenancy". The Appellants submit that it is unfair and unjust for them to be precluded from making further claims when the Respondent has not been precluded.
3. Consequently, the Appellants ask the Appeal Panel to set aside the orders under appeal and to dismiss the application before the Tribunal below.
4. In her oral submissions on the Appellants' application for an extension of time to lodge an appeal, Mrs Dobruja submitted that an appeal was not lodged sooner because the Appellants wanted to have confirmation that new claims were precluded by the March 2024 decision. She submitted that the Appellants lodged the 2 further applications seeking compensation that were ultimately dismissed by the February 2025 decisions for the purpose of testing her view about the preclusive effect of the March 2024 decision. Mrs Dobruja said that she decided to lodge the appeal when she did (in a notice of appeal dated the same day as the February 2025 decisions) because the reasons given for the decisions confirmed her initial view that an appeal on this ground could be viable.

1. The Respondent submits that the correct reading of the March 2024 decision is that it precluded further claims relating to matters arising before the date of the decision. The claims in the application before the Tribunal below related to matters consequent on the Appellants vacating the premises, which occurred after the March 2024 decision.
2. The Respondent also submits that the February 2025 decisions, like the March 2024 decision, concerned claims relating to matters arising before the date of the March 2024 decision.
3. The Respondent opposes an extension of time for the Appellants to lodge an appeal.

1. Section 80 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (NCAT Act) allows a party to proceedings in which the Tribunal makes an internally appealable decision to appeal the decision to an Appeal Panel. A general decision of the Tribunal is an internally appealable decision: NCAT Act, s 32(1)(a) and (4). The orders under appeal are general decisions because they were made in exercise of the Tribunal's original jurisdiction under the RT Act: NCAT Act, s 29(1). Consequently, the Appeal Panel would have jurisdiction to determine the appeal if it was lodged within time.
2. Section 80(2)(b) of the NCAT Act provides that there is an appeal as of right on questions of law for appeals against internally reviewable decisions that are not interlocutory decisions. However, it provides that leave to appeal is required from the Appeal Panel for an appeal on any other grounds.
3. Clause 12(1) of Sch 4 to the NCAT Act provides that generally an Appeal Panel can grant leave to appeal against decisions of the Tribunal in the Consumer and Commercial Division that do not raise a question of law only if it is satisfied that the appellant may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice because:

(1) the decision under appeal was not fair and equitable; or

(2) the decision under appeal was against the weight of evidence; or

(3) significant new evidence has arisen (being evidence that was not reasonably available at the time the proceedings under appeal were being dealt with).

1. A question of law must be a "pure" question of law: Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force v White [2025] NSWCATAP 30 at [22](3). Generally, a question is a "pure" question of law if its answer does not require the Appeal Panel to resolve disputed facts: Damico v Secretary, Department of Customer Service [2025] NSWCATAP 109 at [43].
2. An example of a question of law that is presently relevant is whether the Tribunal was correct in its view concerning the principles of res judicata and issue estoppel and whether those principles applied in the case before it: Lane v AGY Global Wealth Pty Ltd t/as Skylight Energy [2024] NSWCATAP 83 at [44]−[45].
3. The Appellants do not expressly invoke the principles of res judicata (also called cause of action estoppel) and issue estoppel in the notice of appeal. However, as the Appellants are self-represented, it is appropriate for the Appeal Panel, in conformity with long-standing practice, to look at the substance of their appeal ground to discern whether it raises a question of law: Cominos v Di Rico [2016] NSWCATAP 5 at [13].
4. The Appellants' appeal ground is that the Tribunal below was precluded from making the orders under appeal because of the March 2024 decision. Whether a previous decision of a court or tribunal operates to preclude (or estop) a subsequent court or tribunal from making another decision is the central concern of the principles of res judicata and issue estoppel. In our view, the Appellants' appeal ground raises in substance the application of those principles.
5. Accordingly, the Appellants' appeal ground raises a question of law. We therefore do not need to consider whether leave to appeal is required.

1. Although we consider that the appeal ground in the notice of appeal raises a question of law, there is no dispute that the appeal was not lodged within time.
2. Rule 25(4)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 (NSW) (NCAT Rules) requires an internal appeal against a decision made in residential proceedings to be lodged within 14 days from the day on which the appellant was notified of the decision or given reasons for the decision (whichever is the later). The day on which the appellant is notified or given reasons is to be counted in reckoning the 14-day period: NCAT Rules, r 6(2).
3. The term "residential proceedings" is defined to include proceedings allocated to the Consumer and Commercial Division of the Tribunal arising under the RT Act: NCAT Rules, r 3(1) (definition of "residential proceedings"). The proceedings before the Tribunal fall within this definition: NCAT Act, Sch 4, cl 3(1). Accordingly, the 14-day period mentioned in r 25(4)(b) applies to the Appellants' appeal.
4. The Tribunal below gave oral reasons for the orders under appeal on 13 November 2024. As a result, the notice of appeal should have been lodged on or before 27 November 2024 (excluding 13 November 2024). However, the notice of appeal was not lodged until 21 February 2025. Consequently, the notice was lodged after 14 weeks (or 3 ½ months) rather than within the requisite 2 weeks. In other words, it was lodged 12 weeks' (or 3 months') late.
5. Section 41 of the NCAT Act confers a discretion on the Tribunal to extend the period of time for doing something for proceedings in the Tribunal. It provides as follows:

41 Extensions of time

(1) The Tribunal may, of its own motion or on application by any person, extend the period of time for the doing of anything under any legislation in respect of which the Tribunal has jurisdiction despite anything to the contrary under that legislation.

(2) Such an application may be made even though the relevant period of time has expired.

1. As mentioned above, the Appellants seek an extension of time to lodge an appeal.
2. The relevant considerations applicable to the exercise of the discretion conferred by s 41 of the NCAT Act for a late internal appeal were stated by the Appeal Panel in Jackson v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2014] NSWCATAP 22 (Jackson) at [22]:

"The considerations that will generally be relevant to the Appeal Panel's consideration of whether to grant an extension of time in which to lodge a Notice of Appeal include:

(1) The discretion can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the appellant - Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30, 93 ALR 479 at [2], Nanschild v Pratt [2011] NSWCA 85 at [38];

(2) The discretion is to be exercised in the light of the fact that the respondent (to the appeal) has already obtained a decision in its favour and, once the period for appeal has expired, can be thought of as having a "vested right" to retain the benefit of that decision - Jackamarra v Krakouer (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [4], Nanschild v Pratt [2011] NSWCA 85 at [39] and, in particular, where the right of appeal has gone (because of the expiration of the appeal period) the time for appealing should not be extended unless the proposed appeal has some prospects of success - Jackamarra at [7];

(3) Generally, in an application for an extension of time to appeal the Appeal Panel will be required to consider:

(a) The length of the delay;

(b) The reason for the delay;

(c) The appellant's prospects of success, that is usually whether the applicant has a fairly arguable case; and

(d) The extent of any prejudice suffered by the respondent (to the appeal),

- Tomko v Palasty (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 369; (2007) 71 NSWLR 61at [55] (per Basten JA) but note also [14], Nanschild v Pratt [2011] NSWCA 85 at [39] to [42]; and

(4) It may be appropriate to go further into the merits of an appeal if the explanation for the delay is less than satisfactory or if the opponent has a substantial case of prejudice and, in such a case, it may be relevant whether the appellant seeking an extension of time can show that his or her case has more substantial merit than merely being fairly arguable - Tomko v Palasty (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 369; (2007) 71 NSWLR 61 at [14] (per Hodgson JA, Ipp JA agreeing at [17]) and Molyneux v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2012] NSWADTAP 53 at [58] - [59]."

1. We will consider the Appellants' application for an extension of time by reference to the 4 matters identified in Jackson at [22](3) that an Appeal Panel Tribunal is generally required to consider in granting an extension.

1. As mentioned above, the delay is very lengthy. The notice of appeal was lodged 14 weeks (or 3 ½ months) after the orders under appeal were made.

1. We consider the explanation for the delay given by the Appellants to be less than satisfactory.
2. The Appellants clearly entertained the view, from at least the time of the hearing before the Tribunal below, that it was arguable that the March 2024 decision may have precluded the making of the orders under appeal. Indeed, this view was put to the Tribunal below in the excerpt from the transcript set out above.
3. Lodging further applications invoking the Tribunal's original jurisdiction concerning the leased premises was not the appropriate way to challenge the orders under appeal. The appropriate way was to bring an appeal seeking to have the orders set aside. The fact that a differently constituted Tribunal at first instance came to a different conclusion concerning the effect of the March 2024 decision in the February 2025 decisions lends no greater credence to the view for which the Appellants contend. In this regard, it is important to note the February 2025 decisions have not been appealed. There was therefore no guarantee that, if challenged, the conclusion they reflect would be affirmed.
4. In addition, as the Respondent submits, the February 2025 decisions could in any event be read as being consistent with the March 2024 decision because the decisions dealt with claims by the Appellants relating to matters arising before the date of the March 2024 decision.

1. An assessment of an appellant's prospects of success usually involves considering whether the appellant has a fairly arguable case: Jackson at [22](3)(c). However, it may be appropriate to go further into the merits of an appeal if the explanation for the delay is less than satisfactory: Jackson at [22](4). In such a situation, it may be relevant for the appellant to show its case has more substantial merit than merely being fairly arguable: Tomko v Palasty (No 2) [2007] NSWCA 369; (2007) 71 NSWLR 61 at [14] (per Hodgson JA, Ipp JA agreeing at [17]); Molyneux v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2012] NSWADTAP 53 at [58]-[59].
2. For the reasons given above, we consider the Appellants' explanation for the delay to be less than satisfactory. As a result, we will consider the Appellants' ground of appeal by reference to whether it has more substantial merit than merely being fairly arguable.
3. There has been some debate as to whether the principles of res judicata and issue estoppel apply to the exercise of administrative power by tribunals so as to preclude subsequent claims: Council of Australasian Tribunals, Guide to Tribunal Practice (6th ed, 2025) at [6.6.2.2]. This a debate that we need not enter. This is because the principles apply to exercises of judicial power by a tribunal because of the finality of decisions made in exercise of such power: The Administration of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea v Daera Guber (1973) 130 CLR 353 at 453; Tsolis v Health Care Complaints Commission [2024] NSWCA 284 at [37]. An exercise of power by the Tribunal to resolve a dispute under the RT Act involves an exercise of judicial power: Zistis v Zistis [2018] NSWSC 722 at [57]-[67]. It follows that the principles applied to all the proceedings before the Tribunal resolving claims concerning the residential tenancy agreement between the parties.
4. The relevant principles concerning res judicata and issue estoppel were usefully summarised by the Appeal Panel in Gleeson v The Owners - Strata Plan No 48226 [2018] NSWCATAP 204 at [18]-[20] as follows:

"18 The relevant principles appear in Halsburys (online version) at [190-45] and following. We summarise and paraphrase those principles as follows:

(1) res judicata is the principle of law which prohibits a party from bringing a further action in respect of a subject matter raised and determined in a prior final judgment before a competent tribunal between the same parties or their privies litigating in the same capacity; if made out, res judicata is a complete bar to the claim;

(2) res judicata is founded on the necessity of avoiding re-agitation of issues and of preventing the raising of issues which could have been and should have been decided in earlier litigation;

(3) res judicata is not restricted to courts of record. It applies to judicial decisions of a final nature of any court or tribunal upon any matter over which it has jurisdiction to give a final judicial decision, including arbitral tribunals and a consumer claims tribunal: Maganja v Arthur [1984] 3 NSWLR 561 at 563;

(4) in order to establish a plea of res judicata, it must be shown that the cause of action in the later proceedings is the same as that which was litigated in the former proceedings. "Cause of action" means (i) the series of facts which the plaintiff must allege and prove to substantiate a right to judgment, (ii) the legal right which has been infringed, and (iii) the substance of the action as distinct from its form: Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589 at 610;

(5) res judicata applies where there is an identity of parties. This occurs where the parties are literally the same or there is privity of interest or capacity. The determination of identity between litigants for the purpose of establishing privity is a question of fact. There are three classes of privies, blood, title and interest.

19 As to issue estoppel, the principle is that a final judgment by a competent tribunal creates an issue estoppel in that it forever binds the parties and all those who claim through them in respect of any issue of fact or law which was legally indispensable to that decision. For the doctrine of issue estoppel to apply in a second set of proceedings:

(1) the same question must have been decided;

(2) the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel was final; and

(3) the parties to the judicial decision or their privies were the same persons as the parties to the proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies.

20 The parties are bound in the sense that they are precluded in subsequent proceedings from asserting, as against other parties to the judgment, to the contrary of any issue fundamental to the judgment. The issue in the subsequent proceedings must be precisely the same as that decided in the earlier proceedings. However, unlike res judicata, the plea of issue estoppel may succeed although the causes of action in the two cases are entirely different (see Halsburys at [190-100])."

1. The first step in deciding whether res judicata or issue estoppel arises is to determine what was actually decided by the Tribunal in the March 2024 decision. In Marshall v Prescott (No 3) [2013] NSWSC 1949 (Marshall) at [137], Beech-Jones J (before his elevation to the High Court) said:

"To determine what issues a judgment has necessarily decided and whether any issue estoppel arises, the court will 'closely examine all such evidence, if any, as is available and admissible, and, by the aid of such materials, will ascertain whether any and what adjudication of matters in dispute was expressed, or necessarily involved, in the actual decision assented to' (Isaacs at 75, cited in Nau v Kemp at [65] per McColl JA; Rogers v R [1994] HCA 42; 181 CLR 251 at 263 per Brennan J). This will involve a consideration of the record of proceedings, including any terms of settlement (Isaacs at 75; Glazier v Australian Men's Health (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 6 at [73] per Austin J, reversed on other grounds in Meehan v Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 22; 54 NSWLR 146). However, in circumstances where neither the record nor any other objective background material sheds further light on the matters in dispute, '[i]t is not appropriate to look behind the orders and construct a chain of implied consents to various parts of [the other party's case]' (Glazier at [73])."

1. All we have before us is a copy of the orders made in the March 2024 decision, including the notation for the orders, which we set out earlier in these reasons. The parties have not provided us with any written reasons or a transcript of the proceedings (assuming either exists) concerning the orders to help us in construing them. In these circumstances, we cannot, as noted by Beech-Jones J in Marshall, "look behind the orders and construct a chain of implied consents to various parts of [the other party's case]": citing Glazier v Australian Men's Health (No 2) [2001] NSWSC 6 at [73].
2. Ascertaining the meaning of an order of a court or tribunal is an objective exercise. As the Victorian Court of Appeal explained in Laming v Jennings [2018] VSCA 335 at [123]:

"The meaning of a court order is to be derived from the language used, read fairly. The exercise is objective and does not involve delving into the subjective thought processes of the judge who made the order. At least in the case of ambiguity or where the language is susceptible of more than one meaning, it is open to have recourse to extrinsic material, including the reasons for judgment. Of course, the exercise remains one of interpretation and not reconstruction, and where recourse to such material is permitted, it is not admissible to contradict the plain meaning of the order."

1. In the absence of the reasons or a transcript for the March 2024 decision, we must focus on the words used for the orders made, read both fairly and reasonably. Moreover, the orders must be construed as a whole and given effect accordingly: Perry Herzfeld and Thomas Prince, Interpretation (3rd ed, 2024, Thomson Reuters) at [36.70]; Sandrin v W & M Riggs Mechanical Repairs [2006] NSWCA 194 at [44]-[45].
2. Looking at the terms of the orders made in the March 2024 decision, we note the following:

(1) The orders included an order removing a party, which is not presently relevant.

(2) The following orders were made concerning the termination of the residential tenancy agreement between the parties:

(a) An order terminating the agreement immediately and requiring vacant possession to be given to the landlord on the date of termination.

(b) An order under s 114(2) of the RT Act suspending the order for possession until 30 April 2024.

(c) An order requiring the Appellants to pay the Respondent a daily occupation fee at the rate of $46.42 from 20 March 2024 until the date vacant possession is given.

(3) An order was made requiring the Appellants to pay the Respondent the sum of $2,000 on or before 27 March 2024. The details for this money order indicated that it was for "rental arrears up until today as agreed by the parties". This suggests that the order was not intended to preclude the recovery of future rent arrears.

(4) Although it is true that the notation for these orders states "[t]his agreement resolves all disputes between the parties and is in full and final settlement", regard must be had to what was agreed by the parties as set out in the notation:

The landlord is claiming in excess of $15,000.00 rent and other charges.

The tenant maintains that the premises are not habitable.

The parties have agreed to reduce the rent to $325.00 per week until the tenant vacates.

The parties have agreed to a rent arrears figure of $2000.00.

1. The Appellants' contention that the March 2024 decision somehow precluded any further applications whatsoever cannot be sustained reading the orders as a whole and having regard to what we have noted above. If this were so, it would lead to consequences that the wording of the orders could not reasonably support.
2. The Respondent would be unable to bring proceedings for a failure by the Appellants to pay the occupation fees even though they had been ordered by the Tribunal. Also, the Respondent would be unable to bring proceedings to recover the agreed reduced rent noted by the Tribunal that became payable after its decision even if they fell into arrears. This is inconsistent with the order that the sum of $2,000 be paid for "rental arrears up until today as agreed by the parties" (the reference to today being the date of the decision, namely, 19 March 2024).
3. In our view, the most reasonable construction to place on the March 2024 decision is that it reflected an agreement by the parties to resolve all disputes concerning rental arrears and other charges that had arisen before the date of the decision. It was not intended to prevent the bringing of proceedings in relation to disputes that arose after the date of the decision. We consider the February 2025 decisions to be consistent with the construction we have given the March 2024 decision.
4. We are not satisfied that there is substantial merit to the Appellants' ground of appeal because the orders under appeal are concerned with matters in dispute that arose after the date of the March 2024 decision. Consequently, we do not need to decide whether the estoppel to which the decision gave rise is a cause of action estoppel (that is res judicata) or an issue estoppel in respect of disputes arising before the date on which it was made.

1. The Respondent has not made any submissions concerning the extent of prejudice he has suffered because of the delay in lodging an appeal.
2. We do not understand there to be any dispute that the Appellants have vacated the leased premises with the consequence that the Respondent regained possession.
3. The Respondent in his written submissions indicates that the Appellants have not yet paid the sum of $3,947.70 ordered by the Tribunal below. It is in unclear from the material before us whether the lodgment of the appeal has prevented the Respondent from enforcing the order for payment. That said, it is not unusual for the Sheriff to refuse to enforce a money order until an appeal is finalised: see, for example, Tadros v Dumond [2015] NSWCATAP 245 at [25].
4. In the absence of submissions, we consider the factor of prejudice to the Respondent to be neutral in the current proceedings.

1. On balance, we consider the factors discussed above point strongly towards refusing to grant the Appellants' application for an extension of time to lodge an appeal. Accordingly, the application is refused and the appeal must be dismissed.

(1) The application for an extension of time to lodge an appeal is refused.

(2) The appeal is dismissed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.