1. The applicant has completed psychology and criminology bachelor degrees and has enrolled in an honours year this year. She also works as a Positive Behaviour Support practitioner through the Department of Child Protection working with children with complex needs. The applicant has a diagnosed mental health condition, some details of which are given in these reasons for decision. She submits that it would be prejudicial to her in the performance of her professional role for her patients and their carers to have access to these reasons.
2. No objection to the non-disclosure application was raised by the respondent.
3. In my view, in circumstances where the applicant's identity is not of any significance to the issues raised by this proceeding (as distinct from her personal circumstances, her proposal regarding her dog, and the environment presented by her residence in a strata titled community), I consider that the potential for difficulties arising in her important professional role were these reasons to identify the applicant are real and sufficient under either or both of the s 61(4) circumstances to which I have referred to justify the suppression of her name.
4. For the above reasons, the name of the applicant in the title to these reasons and the final order will be anonymised, and I will refer to her in these reasons as 'the applicant'.

1. On 7 November 2025, the applicant acquired an interest in a lot in a strata titled scheme known as Civic Square Apartments (CSA or, in context, strata company) in Beaufort Street, Perth. The complex comprises 59 residential and 3 retail lots.
2. The applicant has been diagnosed with mental health conditions including ADHD and anxiety. She seeks to be able to keep a Golden Retriever dog, currently a puppy, on her lot. Her health practitioners have advised that this would benefit her by assisting with the management of her conditions.
3. The by-laws of CSA, by Sch 2 by-law 15, permit the keeping of 'domestic pets' on the scheme, but only where a lot proprietor:[1]

... makes a written application to the council of owners for permission to keep a pet on a lot. The council of owners may approve of an application for a pet to be kept on a lot provided that the pet does not interfere with the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of other proprietors and occupiers.

1. On 1 November 2025, the applicant submitted her written application to the council of CSA 'for approval to keep a Golden Retriever under (by-law) 15...'. On 3 November 2025, she was informed by the strata manager that her application was refused.
2. As Ms Saragih, the legal representative of the strata company, points out, the applicant's application to the council was made prior to her becoming a lot owner, and significant doubt exists regarding her standing to both make the application and commence the Tribunal proceeding on 6 November 2025. However, the council reconsidered the matter, at the applicant's request, on 11 November 2025, four days after attaining owner status. The council again refused her application.
3. The applicant seeks the Tribunal's intervention pursuant to s 197 and s 200 of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA) (ST Act) to allow her to keep her puppy in her lot. For the reasons that follow, I have decided to grant her application subject to conditions.

1. The applicant's claim is a 'scheme dispute' under s 197(1) of the ST Act, and specifically:

...

(a) a dispute between scheme participants about -

(ii) the performance of, or the failure to perform, a function conferred or imposed on a person by this Act or the scheme by-laws; or

(iv) a resolution or decision of a strata company or the council of a strata company, including its validity ...

1. 'Scheme participants' are defined by s 197(2) of the ST Act to include the strata company, a member of the strata company and the occupier of a lot in the strata titles scheme. Although some issue was sought to be raised by the strata company arising from the fact that the applicant holds a 1% share in the ownership of her lot, any share in the title to the lot is sufficient for membership of the strata company.[2] In addition, the applicant is an occupier of a lot in the scheme.
2. Applications for resolution of a scheme dispute can be made to the Tribunal under s 197(4) of the ST Act.
3. The Tribunal is authorised by s 200(1) of the ST Act to make any order it considers appropriate to resolve the dispute. Sub-section 200(2) goes on (sub-sub s (l)) to make specific provision relevant to applications concerning the keeping of pets, enabling the following order:[3]

...

an order requiring a strata company to take specified action or to refrain from taking specified action in the performance or exercise of its functions, including the following -

...

(v) an order to allow the keeping of an animal on specified conditions or prohibit the keeping of an animal on a lot or common property;

...

1. Section 204 of the ST Act provides for various limitations on the Tribunal's powers under the ST Act, including that the Tribunal cannot:

(d) make an order to allow the keeping of an animal on specified conditions or prohibit the keeping of an animal on a lot or common property unless satisfied that the strata company has acted unreasonably ...

1. In considering and determining the ultimate question of whether to grant the applicant the relief she seeks, it will be necessary to deal with the following issues:
   1. What do the strata company's by-laws require?
   2. How is the application to allow the dog to be assessed against those requirements?

For reasons I will come to, this issue encompasses consideration of the applicant's stated intention concerning the dog for which approval is sought.

1. Has the strata company acted unreasonably?
2. What conditions should be attached if approval is granted?
3. I will deal with each issue in turn.

1. My consideration of the matter will proceed through the lens of by-law 15, having regard to the factors upon which the applicant relies to support her application, and the matters advanced by the strata company as justifying its refusal.
2. For ease of reference, I reproduce the entire by-law here:

1. Ms Saragih submits that by-law 15(1) contains a presumption against the granting of permission to keep a pet, arising from the language of the first sentence, which she characterises as 'prohibitive' and creating a presumption against approval.[4] In relation to the council's discretion referred to in the second sentence, she submits:[5]

So there is nothing to say that the council of owners should have actively considered the applicant's circumstance, when the council of owners was primarily concerned with all of the lot holders.

1. I disagree with Ms Saragih's submissions, for the following reasons:
   • The first sentence of by-law 15 prescribes the procedural requirement of a written application to the council; no more. The second sentence vests in the council a discretion to approve, conditioned by a limitation to preserve quiet and peaceful enjoyment. Contrary to Ms Saragih's submission, in my view, a proper construction of the second sentence reveals a bias in favour of approval in cases where interference with quiet and peaceful enjoyment is absent.
   • The presumption for which Ms Saragih contends runs counter to the distinct shift in community attitudes in Australia in recent years towards the acceptance of domestic animals in high density living environments.[6]
   • The combined effect of the constructions contended for by Ms Saragih would likely sound the death-nell to any application for approval to keep a pet on a scheme. As will be seen, those in council and management roles have adopted a 'no dog policy', seemingly underwritten by the constructions advanced on the strata company's behalf.
2. The meaning of the words used in by-law 15(1) is, to my mind, clear. Before any proprietor keeps a pet on the strata scheme, he or she must apply for permission from the council (although unstated, the additional requirement that the council grants its approval can be inferred). On the making of an application, the council may approve it, but not where it considers the pet would compromise the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of other proprietors and occupiers. In practice, this limiting condition is likely to be the battleground upon which most disputation occurs. It adequately describes the bulk of the overt reasons for the council's refusal to approve in this case.
3. By-law 15(2) is a facilitative provision allowing the council to instruct the strata manager as to the 'types of pets' permitted. Although it is unnecessary for me to explore them, the sub-by-law raises interesting questions about the connection between it and by-law 15(1), and the meaning of 'types' - is this concerned with different species (dogs, cats, birds, reptiles), or does it extend to different breeds of the same species? Based on evidence adduced by the strata company, I am satisfied that there has been no instruction given by the council of the by-law 15(2) type.
4. By-laws 15(3), 15(4) and 15(5) all regulate the occasions upon which pets are present on common property.
5. By-law 15(6) prescribes a procedure, in the event of a pet causing a nuisance, for the giving of notice and the removal of the pet.

Issue 2 - How is the applicant's application to be assessed?

1. The applicant's application to the council was made under, and with reference to, the by-law which is concerned with the keeping of domestic pets. However, it is replete with references to her intention to train her dog so as to fulfil the requirements of certification as an assistance animal and obtain that certification.
2. 'Assistance animal' is defined in s 3(1) of the ST Act as having the meaning given in the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) (DD Act) s 9(2). That meaning is:

... an assistance animal is a dog or other animal:

(a) accredited under a law of a State or Territory that provides for the accreditation of animals trained to assist a person with a disability to alleviate the effect of the disability; or

(b) accredited by an animal training organisation prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph; or

(c) trained:

(i) to assist a person with a disability to alleviate the effect of the disability; and

(ii) to meet standards of hygiene and behaviour that are appropriate for an animal in a public place.

1. At the hearing, the applicant clarified that she was not contending that her puppy is currently an assistance animal. Were the subject dog an assistance animal, the inevitable consequence would be that approval subject to reasonable conditions must be given, provided that the applicant satisfies the requirements of a person with a disability.[7] I will return to this issue.
2. In the current proceeding, the applicant relies upon a document she produced titled 'Assistance Dog Training and Development Plan' (applicant's plan or plan)[8]. An earlier version of the applicant's plan was included as part of the applicant's application to the council. Apart from some minor changes, the current plan includes a locally based training pathway to assistance animal accreditation.
3. I note the following contents of the applicant's plan:
   • Under 'About me and why I need this dog', the applicant refers to her mental health conditions, which she describes as a neurodevelopmental disability with psycho social disabilities, and the recommendation of her psychiatrist that she have an assistance dog to help manage the effects of her disability.
   • The applicant states:

Getting a puppy now means that by late 2026/early 2027, I'll have a fully trained, certified assistance animal.

• Under 'The puppy', she refers to the breed of her puppy, being a 'purebred Golden Retriever'.
• The applicant's plan provides the following response to the question posed of 'Why Golden Retriever(?)':
  • Quiet breed (they don't bark much)
  • Great for apartments
  • Perfect temperament for therapy work
  • Easy to train
  • Calm and gentle
• The applicant states:

I have a plan to engage in professional training through K9 Care and Obedience program and PATS certification course.

• The applicant's plan sets out the following training sequence:

A 'focus' of getting settled, house training and bonding associated with practical steps to be taken by the applicant, including taking the puppy to the balcony grass area every 1 - 2 hours for toilet crate training at night in the applicant's bedroom and basic handling in preparation for future grooming and veterinary appointments. The puppy will be carried in common property areas on the parcel including the elevator.

After some initial 'puppy classes', a 3-month 'Foundational Skills' course provided by K9 Care and Obedience Training, teaching the puppy name recognition, basic obedience, lead walking, meeting people calmly without jumping and retaining focus in the presence of distractions. Apart from taking the puppy to weekly classes, the applicant and puppy will regularly practice at home and build up toilet training. She will continue mostly to carry the puppy in the elevator but commence short leash walks in hallways.

The applicant and dog will undertake the PATS (Perth's Animal Training Specialists) training and accreditation plan. The applicant's plan provides[9] details of the stages required to be completed before certification as an assistance animal is achieved. As described in the applicant's plan, those stages are:

• Family interview and puppy evaluation, involving amongst other things assessment of the private trainer, household and puppy for the PATS course;
• Core development (1 - 3 hours per week for 1 - 2 years), covering, among other things, behaviour shaping, understanding stress, intensive socialisation, house training, obedience, public access behaviour and desensitisation to triggers;
• Public access preparation (1 session per week in year two), covering, among other things, advanced obedience under heavy distraction, recall in public, ignoring dogs, noise and other distractions, behaviour in community environments, handler consistency and skill development; and
• Seminar days (handler education), comprising up to four seminars covering, among other things, disability-specific task planning, advanced handling skills and training maintenance.
• After completion of the training, the applicant shall undertake the following assessments:
  • Behaviour and Obedience Test (BOA)
  • Public Access Test (PAT)
  • Annual/ biannual Public Access reassessment
• Implementation of the applicant's plan will result in significant expense for the applicant, including training and assessment costs. In addition, she is proposing subscribing to a no smell, odourless premium food supply costing $200 per month which is 'clean as my own food' and purchasing a 'Porch Potty Premium' system costing $500 which comprises a self-draining real grass system, replaceable monthly, with measures to prevent odour and keep waste free.
• The applicant's plan commits the applicant to addressing any noise or behaviour issues immediately, obtaining professional help if needed, being responsive to neighbour's concerns and fixing any problems. However, according to the applicant, the likelihood of there being any problems is realistically low given the training of the dog to BOA/PAT level.
• The applicant's plan emphasises that her principal objective is to be able to keep an assistance animal, not a pet.

1. The applicant further relies upon the written evidence of Charlotte Smithson of PATS. Among other qualifications, Ms Smithson is a veterinary nurse, companion animal behavioural practitioner and approved assessor for assistance dogs.
2. Ms Smithson's written evidence includes:
   • The standard pathway for privately trained assistance animals aligns with the applicant's plan;
   • the Golden Retriever breed is an appropriate choice, given that it is widely utilised for assistance dog work based on intrinsic qualities such as stable temperament and strong trainability;
   • the early training and foundational development parts of the applicant's plan are consistent with accepted developmental protocols for assistance dogs;
   • the adoption of the full PATS structure in the applicant's plan is a robust and credible assistance dog training pathway;
   • the applicant's plan demonstrates appropriate behavioural learning goals which meet accepted standards for assistance dog progression;
   • the plan's adoption of comprehensive mitigation strategies is appropriate to prevent nuisance noise;
   • the plan's reference to hygiene management measures adequately addresses hygiene risks;
   • the plan's strategies to control behaviour in common areas minimise resident interaction and risk;
   • the plan demonstrates safe and practical management of the environment in which the dog will be housed, and
   • the aspects of the plan relating to exercise and enrichment reduces risks such as barking or destructive behaviour.
3. Ms Smithson provides the following professional opinions:
   1. The applicant's approach is consistent with best practice methods for developing a safe, well-trained and behaviourally reliable assistance animal;
   2. The applicant's plan is appropriate, sufficient and safe for the development of an assistance animal in a multi-residential building.
4. As was the case with the applicant's written medical evidence, Ms Saragih objected to any acceptance of Ms Smithson's report on the basis that the witness was not available for cross-examination.
5. In an ideal world, every author of a witness statement should be available to answer questions that the party opposing the party relying on the witness, and the Tribunal, may wish to put to that witness. I reject the applicant's submission (made specifically in relation to the written evidence of her treating medical practitioners, but which presumably she would extend to Ms Smithson) that the respondent 'has no right' to question her expert witnesses in relation to matters within their expertise about which they have given evidence. Obviously it has every right to do so. However, that does not render the value of Ms Smithson's evidence nugatory. The issue becomes one of the weight to be given to that evidence.
6. Ms Smithson's statement is effectively a desk-top audit of the applicant's plan. As an approved assessor for assistance dogs, she is well qualified to provide such an audit in this case, given the applicant's principal objective to train the puppy to assistance animal level. In the absence of any asserted susceptibilities, in my view, her statement provides expert opinion about the appropriateness of the applicant's plan and the fundamentals upon which it is based to which substantial weight should be attached.
7. In her oral evidence at the hearing, the applicant provided further clarification and information relevant to her proposal, as follows:
   1. She engaged in months of research in relation to various aspects of the plan prior to purchasing her lot.
   2. Her apartment, which she shares with her partner, is, at 93 sq m, considerably larger than one bedroom apartments in which some people keep a dog.
   3. According to her research, factors such as activities undertaken, toys and objects of interest are more important than the size of living area.
   4. Her apartment's balcony is not shared with any other lot, and there are two means of access through the living room and a bedroom.
   5. The balcony access doors are double glazed.
   6. The apartment is on the fifth floor, and it takes five steps to go from the front door to the lift.
   7. She can see and hear people accessing the lift and is able to take avoidance measures. No bottlenecks exist.
   8. On exiting the lift at the carpark level, she walks a short distance straight to her car without interacting with other people or cars.
   9. In combination, her own availability, that of her partner, and where necessary, of her parents who live close by, mean that the dog will never be alone.
   10. In cross-examination, when asked whether she had applied for a certified assistance animal, she referred to advice she received from the PATS assessor that it is preferable for the animal earmarked to become an assistance animal 'to grow up with you'.
   11. She said that her dog will not hear sirens from the nearby road when inside, which she will be during the day.
   12. She also disagreed with the proposition put to her in cross-examination that she would not be able to manage all of the demands on her time when the time involved in the training, exercising, and otherwise carrying out the plan were taken into account.

1. Accepting, as I do, that the initial 'decision' of the council is not the final nor actionable decision, I will commence with the council's decision on 11 November 2025 to reject the applicant's request to reconsider its initial decision.
2. The council's decision is recorded in the minutes of the council of owners meeting dated 11 November 2025 tendered by the strata company[10] (council minutes) in the following terms:

Result: The COO provides a unanimous vote that it is a no to the application for a Labrador puppy to be allowed in the complex.

Reasons

1. Many residents bought into the complex, as it has a general no dog or cats policy - strata informed the applicant that we allowed cats - this is misleading - we allowed one elderly cat who never leaves the property so is no issue for any other owner. In general cats and dogs are a no, unless registered, appropriately trained, mature service animals.
2. The hallways and lifts in the buildings are carpeted and not appropriate for a dog or cat.
3. Other residence in the complex when we are in close living may/do have allergies to animals.
4. Disposal of waste in bin rooms creates unhealthy and unpleasant odours and possible extra expenses for all owners on cleaning bins -we do not have appropriate facilities for the disposal of animal dog or cat droppings, dog waste or canine faeces.
5. Possible safety risks in elevators, small, enclosed spaces like hallways and elevators can be stressful for dogs, leading to behavioural problems like fear and reactivity, especially in high-traffic areas with multiple people. Elevators pose a significant danger to dogs, as their leashes, paws, or fur can get caught in the doors, leading to serious injury. In addition, for dogs that are afraid of elevators, the close quarters and movement can be very frightening.
6. Behavioural challenges - Increased reactivity: High-rises can exacerbate or create aggression and fear in dogs due to limited space in hallways, elevators, and lobbies, where they are in close proximity to triggers like other people. When dogs cannot create distance from things that scare them, they may resort to barking or other defensive behaviours. Not appropriate for ALL residents.
7. Noise: Excessive barking from a dog can lead to complaints from other residents, especially if the dog is a high-anxiety breed. Especially while owners are at work and animals are left alone.
8. Limited space: 378 Beaufort Street in block C and D are High-rise living making it difficult to provide a large enough space for a dog to run and play freely, which can cause them to become hyperactive or destructive. Furthermore, going outside for potty breaks may be inconvenient and time-consuming, especially for dogs that need to be taken out frequently.
9. Dogs in particular may experience separation anxiety more frequently in a highrise environment, especially if they are not used to being alone. In addition, the COO is aware that the altitude of a high-rise building could affect some dogs, leading to symptoms of altitude sickness.
10. There is no facility in 378 Beaufort Street complex for a dog run, toilet or exercise area.
11. Ms Delma Davies, the chairperson of the council, gave both written[11] and oral evidence.
12. Although in her written statement Ms Davies suggests her submission is of her personal position and not that of the council, it does go to some extent into the council's consideration of the applicant's reconsideration request. Thus, at para 9, it states:

During the process of this application, the CoO did research on the differences in the way that we should treat Service Animals and Emotional Support Animals - the application is for neither.

1. Her statement, at para 5, also refers to a 2022 council decision approving an application for a dog, and the council's reasons for doing so, including its small size, the temporary nature of the approval sought, and that block A in which it was to be housed had cement stairs and landings and no lift, in contrast with the applicant's block C. Other factors she referred to as distinguishing the applicant's application were the 'much tighter living' in block C, proximity to Beaufort Street where noise in the form of loud sirens and yelling party goers occurs often, and the size of the dog when fully grown of around 35 kilograms.
2. Ms Davies says in her statement at para 7:

I personally bought into the complex after checking with Strata that in general, unless a mature trained licensed service animal the Co0 does not approve applications for large animals. I do not wish to live in a complex with this dog or any other dogs that may come if this application sets a precedent.

1. In her statement at paras 8 - 12, Ms Davies:
   • opines that 'the applicant is weaponizing her health conditions to insist that an 8-week-old puppy is somehow a service animal as it is or is proposed to be in training';
   • asserts, as the 'key takeaway for WA', that an animal trained to perform a specific disability-related task which passes rigorous standards is an assistance dog with public access rights, and that otherwise, it is a pet providing emotional support, 'lacking those same legal privileges'.
2. Ms Davies' statement, under 'Applicant's conduct', repeats her claim that the applicant is using her mental health diagnosis to 'force' the council 'to accept that an 8-week-old puppy is an Assistance Animal', before launching into a series of complaints about the applicant's conduct generally in relation to the matter. The final one reads:[12]

The applicant has mechanisms at her disposal in the Strata scheme such as calling an EGM, to have the bylaws altered. Instead, she chose to take the Strata Company to SAT prior to even settling in the building.

1. This statement is consistent with the prevailing view within the strata company that the applicant's application to the council was doomed to fail by reason of by-law 15 in its current form.
2. In her oral evidence, Ms Davies said the council gave 'incredibly in-depth consideration' to the applicant's application. She said that the council 'was there for hours' (I note that according to the council minutes, its duration was 1 hour 15 minutes, and the applicant's application was one of three items on the agenda). She said that all aspects of the applicant's plan were discussed, the council did not accept that the plan would be carried out in full, and one council member suggested that there is quite a high fall out rate for candidates under similar training regimes.
3. Ms Davies elaborated on some of the reasons listed in the council minutes and other matters which are not, to the following effect:
   • the applicant's car park is the only one in the block C carpark not covered by CCTV monitoring;
   • the applicant and the dog would have to go past the bike racks, placing children in possible proximity with the applicant's dog;
   • the reference to carpeted areas is relevant due to the propensity of the Golden Retriever breed to shed and carry fleas whose eggs can become embedded in carpet;
   • the council did not accept that the applicant would carry the puppy in carpeted areas;
   • Ms Davies did not accept that the dog's interaction with other residents would be limited in nature.
4. Ms Davies spoke of her personal experience of owning a Golden Retrievers in Indonesia. She commented on the 'unpredictability of animals' in Asia and, presumably based on that experience, said that she would not get into a lift with a fully grown Golden Retriever. Ms Davies described other canine experiences she has had in housing Labrador puppies under training to become assistance animals for visually impaired people. I find difficult to accept her professed aversion to travelling in the same lift as an adult Golden Retriever, theoretically well on the way, if not there already, to becoming a certified assistance dog.
5. Mr Kim Clifton, of Westralian Strata Services, the strata manager of the scheme, also gave written[13] and oral evidence.
6. In his statement, Mr Clifton repeats the 'general practice' adopted by the strata company that applications for large dogs are 'typically not approved unless the animals are mature, properly trained, and licensed as service animals'. In his oral evidence, he stated that this comment applied to all schemes with which he was familiar in a career dating back to 2004.
7. Mr Clifton's statement states that many current lot owners maintain that the council's reluctance to approve pets influenced their decision to invest in the property.[14] His statement annexes emails from six owners voicing their opposition to the applicant's application. Of those six, four are members of council, and three attribute the author's decision to purchase their lot at least in part to advice received that pets were not allowed[15] or that there was a general no pet policy in the absence of council approval which (by inference) would normally occur only in the case of a registered mature and trained service animal.[16]
8. Despite being included as a reason for rejecting the applicant's application in neither the council minutes nor the email communicating the council's initial rejection prior to the applicant becoming an owner, Mr Clifton's statement includes, as a reason for the rejection, that certain residents have phobias concerning dogs. When asked about this in cross-examination, he said that he relied upon his own experience. There is a similar reference to such a phobia in one of the lot owner's emails annexed to Mr Clifton's statement[17] which goes no further than stating 'Other considerations would be other residents may have a phobia to dogs ...'.

1. After weighing all the matters to which I have referred, I consider that the approval sought by the applicant to keep the Golden Retriever on her lot should be granted. With specific reference to by-law 15(1), I do not consider that the application should be refused on the basis of the risk of the applicant's dog interfering with the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of other proprietors and occupiers on the basis that all risk factors will be the subject of conditions on the approval and/or appropriate mitigation strategies. I will come shortly to the various risk factors referred to in the council's decision, and additional ones relied upon by the strata company in this proceeding. Under a subsequent heading, I will deal with the question of appropriate conditions.
2. Although not yet an assistance animal, the applicant's puppy would, assuming the current application is granted, be set on the path to becoming one. Its training will be to the highest standards. Most if not all areas of potential interaction with (in particular) humans are contemplated, and any adverse impacts addressed. The applicant, as an intelligent professional woman trained in psychology and well credentialed in dealing with people, particularly in the disability space, is in my view an exemplar for a dog owner in a communal living environment.
3. Ms Saragih submits, and I agree, that the applicant bears an onus of addressing the impacts having the dog on the parcel might have on the strata scheme and other lot proprietors.[18] I am satisfied the applicant has met this onus. But it is not, in my view, incumbent upon her to provide on-the-spot answers to matters raised with her in cross-examination about which the council minutes referring to the reasons for the council's decision were silent, or for which any evidence of the existence of a potential issue is lacking.[19]
4. The evidence indicates that the strata company, the council and the strata manager have consistently acted in accordance with a policy that no dog will be permitted within the scheme unless it is a certified assistance animal. I refer to the witness statements of Ms Davies and Mr Clifton; three of the statements annexed to Mr Clifton's witness statement referring (as does Ms Davies' witness statement) to such a policy influencing the authors' decisions to invest in the scheme; the written advice to the applicant in 4 November 2025 of a negative response to her initial application, the council having 'resolved unanimously that they do not allow dogs within the Strata Property'; and the first reason given in the council minutes for rejecting the applicant's application referring to 'a general no dog or cats policy'. The attempt of Ms Davies, as Chair of the council, to disassociate herself from the iteration of the policy in the council minutes for which she had clear responsibility did little more than raise further doubts about her credibility. Mr Clifton's similar attempt to deny responsibility as strata manager for the 4 November 2025 email prepared by a member of his staff descended into farce, with Mr Clifton stating that 'the input would have come from the council of owners'[20] and Ms Davies saying, in relation to the same email, 'there would be no directive from the council of owners'.[21]
5. This consistent expression of a 'no dog policy' accords, it would seem, with the construction of by-law 15 advanced at the hearing by Ms Saragih.
6. The adoption of such a policy reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the effect of the by-law and imposes an unreasonable fetter upon it. It cannot be the case that any dog which is not a certified assistance animal represents too great a risk to the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of other proprietors and occupiers to prevent the council giving approval. Were it so, the by-law would be rendered illusory. Every case will be different and needs to be considered on its merits, having regard to the interests of all members of the strata company and residents of the scheme, including the applicant.
7. This case contains the particular feature that the applicant, a person with a mental health condition, intends to train her dog, currently a puppy, within the next two years or so to the level of qualification as an assistance animal as that expression is defined in the ST Act and the DD Act. Her written plan, which includes this objective, is detailed, specific to the strata building and her lot, and endorsed by an expert in the field. It is also capable of setting the standard against which her own conduct and the behaviour of the trainee dog might be judged from time to time.
8. On the assumption that the animal's training proceeds according to the plan and its objectives are met, and subject to the question of the applicant's disability, the dog will be an assistance animal, which the strata company accepts must be approved (subject to conditions).
9. Ms Saragih made some attempts to join issue on the disability question. A line of cross-examination of the applicant on the subject was commenced but subsequently withdrawn. The issue then resurfaced in the strata company's closing submissions.
10. I indicate for the sake of clarity my satisfaction on the balance of probabilities that the applicant is, or will be if and when her dog is an assistance animal, 'a person with a disability' for the purposes of s 9(2) of the DD Act, and therefore a person who may conceivably be entitled to the benefit of an assistance animal.
11. The applicant has a recorded medical history of ADHD, anxiety disorder and depression.[22] Her treating General Practitioner, who has been seeing her since March 2024, notes that the applicant is under psychiatric care and advises that he has recommended the use of an assistance animal as part of her treatment plan to alleviate symptoms of her disabilities, including functional impairments in emotional regulation, executive functioning and daily living. His report goes on:[23]

There is a medically recognised basis to support (the applicant's) assertion that:

- Her disabilities substantially affect daily functioning

- The assistance animal is clinically necessary

- Preventing her from obtaining and housing the dog will materially interfere with her ability to engage in the disability-mitigating process.

1. Given that the advice of the applicant's GP fits squarely within the four walls of the characterisation of 'person with a disability' referred to in the 'assistance animal' definition,[24] as I said at the time, I consider inappropriate Ms Saragih's attempt to open up the issue for the first time in cross-examination of the applicant, which clearly upset her, and thankfully was not pursued. Ms Saragih's return to the same issue in her closing submissions was also inappropriate.
2. Even if I am wrong in finding that the applicant is a person with a disability, that would not doom the proceeding to fail. The merits of the application for approval of the applicant's dog still requires assessment under the terms of by-law 15. A successful application before the Tribunal will entail an approval, subject to conditions including adherence to the applicant's plan, regardless of the dog's ultimate status as an assistance animal.
3. I now turn to each of the factors referred to in the council's minutes as a reason for its decision, with the exception of both aspects of the first. I have already dealt with the 'no dog or cats policy'; advice provided to lot owners before buying into the scheme of a policy based upon such a fundamental misinterpretation of the by-law can hardly justify the council's decision.

1. The main concerns highlighted by Ms Davies in her oral evidence are the possibility of shedding and fleas. As part of the plan, the applicant refers to her using the 'Groomi' de-shed system said to vacuum up to 95% of hair before it sheds. The plan commits to daily brushing inside the apartment and professional grooming every 2 - 3 months.
2. The applicant's plan involves minimal time spent in hallways, carrying the puppy in the lift initially, and traversing the short distances from the lift to front door of the applicant's lot and the applicant's car respectively, quickly and on-lead.
3. Based upon Ms Smithson's opinion that the Groomi system and professional grooming plan form part of an adequate hygiene management strategy, I consider there is no significant prospect of a notable shedding issue.
4. As for fleas, a matter referred to in neither the plan nor in the council minutes (Ms Davies referring to it in her oral evidence), the grooming measures appear appropriate and proportionate to the risk.

1. No evidence has been produced of any resident having an allergy to dogs. The possibility remains however that one or more current and future residents may.
2. The fact that a resident is dog allergic should not automatically bar an approval. It would not do so in the case of a certified assistance animal; presumably, measures designed to minimise any affected resident's exposure could be implemented. And much would depend upon the proximity between the resident's lot and that of the dog owner.
3. Where, as here, the risk is pure speculation, I cannot see how it has any impact on the council's decision-making under the by-law. The same comment applies to the suggestion by Mr Clifton concerning phobias.

1. According to the council minutes, the scheme lacks appropriate facilities for disposal of dog waste, and disposal in bin rooms would create unpleasant odours.
2. The applicant's plan indicates that the primary repository for solid dog waste at home will be the premium real grass system. Upon any waste deposit occurring, the applicant will scoop it up immediately and put it into her apartment bin (not the general scheme bins). As the dog matures, according to the plan, most toileting occurs on walks away from the scheme. These measures are considered by Ms Smithson to adequately address hygiene risks. I agree with her opinion.
3. I accept the undesirability of any waste from the dog being deposited in the CSA bins and have fashioned a condition of the approval accordingly.

5. Safety risks in elevators and other small enclosed spaces

1. These two reasons are linked by their reference to confinement in small spaces.
2. It is suggested that such spaces can be stressful for dogs and lead to behavioural problems (such as fear of lifts) and physical injury. Further, where dogs cannot create distance from things that scare them (such as people) they may resort to barking or other defensive measures.
3. Two of the aims of the plan by six to eight months are that the dog walks calmly though the building (including hallways) and sits quietly in the lift. These are the antithesis of the scenarios contemplated by these reasons. Ms Smithson, after referring to the plan's strategies (carrying the puppy in early months, brief, controlled transit through hallways, elevator manners, 100% leash control, waiting for next lift or use stairs if another resident is uncomfortable) expressed the view that they would minimise resident interaction and risk. I accept her opinion in this regard.

1. The two aspects noted in the reason as increasing the risk of excessive barking are where the dog is a high-anxiety breed and where the animal is left alone.
2. Ms Smithson's report notes the appropriateness of Golden Retrievers for assistance work based upon their typical characteristics which include low reactivity and stable temperament. The applicant's plan makes clear that her dog will never be left unattended in her lot, and it commits the applicant to daily walks off the parcel, regular at-home practice sessions and off-site training and mental enrichment activities which reduce the risk of barking.
3. In my view, the plan deals adequately with the issue of barking.

1. This reason points to the difficulty in providing a large enough space for a dog to run freely (it is not clear whether the limitation of space relates to within or without the parcel). It also refers to the potential for outside potty breaks to be frequent and inconvenient.
2. The applicant's plan is to take the dog on twice-daily off-scheme walks in local parks and streets and weekly off-leash play in addition to training classes. This is hardly unusual in an apartment living context. The same can be said for the management of potty breaks. As already mentioned, early on these will generally be accommodated on the applicant's balcony; later, it is expected that they will occur on walks.

1. This reason asserts, without evidence, that dogs may experience separation anxiety more frequently in a high rise environment. Whether or not that is the case, the applicant's dog should not suffer it, because under the plan, it will never be alone.
2. The additional gratuitous assertion is made of the possibility of altitude sickness. I would need more than the mere assertion made here before regarding this as a serious issue to be considered.

1. This is largely repetitive of reason 8. The applicant is permitted when with her dog to use the common property only for ingress or egress, making any on-scheme facility for a dog run or toilet redundant. She accepts, and is committed to, walking her dog in the local area outside the parcel.
2. Some complaints by Ms Davies do not form part of the reasons in the council minutes, from which it might be inferred that the council was not generally concerned about them. For completeness' sake, I will comment on four of them:
   • While a dog's potential size will in some circumstances be of significance, in the case of a dog being trained as an assistance animal, its size needs to be considered along with many other aspects. Golden Retrievers are widely utilised for assistance work due to the characteristics referred to by Ms Smithson.[25] A well trained dog having exemplary behaviour will fit into a strata scheme environment regardless of its size.
   • On my inspection of the strata complex on the morning of the hearing, I was able to see the size of the applicant's lot, hallways, the lift and the carpark. Although I did not view the interior of block A, and therefore did not compare it with the block C's interior, my impression of block C was of a modern multi-level living environment of reasonable proportions which might accommodate the transit of a well-behaved leashed dog of the size of a mature Golden Retriever without undue difficulty.
   • The potential prejudice arising from the lack of monitoring of the area adjacent to applicant's car is elusive, but presumably relates to a perceived inability to obtain real time evidence of any poor behaviour or outcomes as the applicant takes the animal to and from her car. It does not seem to me to be an issue for which the applicant is answerable, and certainly not to the extent to deny her application.
   • The aspects of the plan about which Ms Davies expressed doubt include the applicant's undertaking that she would carry the dog while still a puppy in the lift and the limited level of interaction the applicant suggested would be the case. Both aspects, which are of course currently speculative, can in my view be addressed adequately by either or both of conditions of approval and potential breach action under by-law 15.
3. Many of the council's written reasons recorded in the council minutes may well have been informed by the research and in-depth consideration which Ms Davies attributed to the council members. However, tellingly, the reasons are completely silent as to the various matters raised in the applicant's plan and pay no apparent regard to them.
4. The whole exercise conducted by the council on its reconsideration of the applicant's application seems concerned more with vindicating its predisposed position to reject all applications for dogs which are not certified assistance animals than a realistic consideration of the applicant's application. This is perhaps to be expected given that of the seven members of council, at least three bought their lot or lots based upon a representation of a no pet policy.

Issue 3 - Has the strata company been unreasonable?

1. On the interpretation I have adopted of the various provisions cited under 'Relevant statutory framework', where a decision to refuse the keeping of an animal on a strata scheme is challenged, the limitation[26] on the Tribunal's ability to overturn the decision only where it is satisfied that the strata company has acted unreasonably applies. This limitation permits the strata company room to err on the merits of individual cases, so long as it does not act unreasonably in doing so.
2. Reasonableness (and its antonym unreasonableness) are words of common usage derived from 'reason'. 'Unreasonable' is defined[27] as 'not guided by reason or good sense', 'not agreeable to or willing to listen to reason' and 'not based on or in accordance with reason or sound judgement'.
3. In Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Li[28] (Li), French J considered the question of 'unreasonableness' in the sense used by Lord Greene MR in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation[29] (Wednesbury Corporation), and commented:[30]

In Wednesbury Corporation, Lord Greene MR observed that the word 'unreasonable' in administrative law was used to encompass failure by a decision-maker to obey rules requiring proper application of the law, consideration of mandatory relevant matters and exclusion from consideration of irrelevant matter:

"If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting 'unreasonably'."

1. On the present facts, the strata company acted through the agency of the council until its decision on 11 November 2025 not to approve the applicant's application. Therefore, the council's conduct antecedent to its decision is to be considered on the question of unreasonableness. Further, there is no reason why my consideration should stop there, so that the strata company's conduct as a party in the current proceeding can also be taken into account.
2. The council and the strata company have, in my opinion, consistently acted in a manner not guided by or based upon reason and have demonstrated an unwillingness to listen to reason. I refer to the following facts and circumstances:
   1. Section 112 of the ST Act provides:

A strata company has the function of complying with the scheme by-laws and enforcing compliance with those by-laws and enforcing compliance with those by-laws by others to whom they apply.

Hence, the strata company was charged with ensuring that the applicant complied with the requirements of by-law 15(1) in connection with her desire to keep her dog on her lot, and was itself compelled to comply with the same requirements.

1. Despite the contents of by-law 15, as I have already said, the council and strata company have continued to maintain the existence of a no dog policy, with the possible exception in the case of a certified assistance animal (there having been no case involving application of the exception).
2. The advice underlying the submission by Ms Saragih of a presumption arising from the language of by-law 15 against granting approvals, with no obligation on the council to even consider the applicant's circumstances, has no doubt further encouraged the strata company to maintain its opposition to the current proceeding.
3. The council's failure to correctly apply the by-law's provisions in favour of persevering with its no dog policy is unreasonable having regard to the Wednesbury Corporation test espoused by French J in Li in the administrative law context.
4. The lack of any reference in the council's reasons for its decision to the applicant's plan is further evidence, if any is needed, of the council's failure to consider the applicant's application on its merits.
5. A number of submissions and cross-examination topics of the strata company's lawyer at the hearing perpetuated the no dog policy myth.[31] Further, in reliance upon the discredited construction of the by-law she continued to espouse, Ms Saragih questioned the applicant's motives in pursuing the matter when she 'knew about the by-laws requirement and the position of the council of owners and the strata company prior to purchasing the property',[32] and raised the spectre that the outcome in this proceeding might set an undesirable precedent across the strata titles sector around Perth, and in so doing:

... effectively override and leapfrog the established by-laws that are faithfully implemented by the strata companies.[33]

1. The proposed conditions lodged on the strata company's behalf as being appropriate in the event of the application succeeding are prolix to the point of oppressiveness.
2. Based on my consideration of all the above matters, separately and cumulatively, I find that the strata company has acted unreasonably in relation the applicant's application.

1. At the conclusion of the hearing, I ordered that the strata company provide a set of conditions sought to be placed on any approval of the applicant's dog being granted, and that the applicant provide a response.
2. Ms Saragih was initially opposed to her client having to go first. Any reluctance in initiating the process appears to have dissipated however, the strata company filing no fewer than 35 proposed conditions. They are grouped under 12 separate headings, and go to matters as varied as the strata company's monitoring and enforcement role; access to the Tribunal for urgent revocation of approval; a time restriction when the dog must remain in the applicant's lot; action the applicant must take in response to barking or vocalisation of different kinds; a requirement to obtain alternative accommodation if a resident in the same building 'provides a medical certificate evidencing allergies consistent with the presence of the dog' during the affected resident's occupancy; and requirements for a pet bond and public liability insurance.
3. The applicant filed a response which asserts that the strata company's proposed conditions are excessive, duplicative, and in several respects impractical or incapable of compliance. It proposes seven conditions which the applicant submits are reasonable, proportionate and sufficient.
4. In determining the conditions which are appropriate, I will have regard to the considerations applying in the context of local government planning approvals, adjusted as required to the strata titles context.[34] In summary, those adjusted considerations are:
   • the condition should be for a purpose appropriate to the regulation of a strata scheme and not for any ulterior purpose;
   • the condition should reasonably and fairly relate to the approval of the applicant's animal; and
   • the condition must not be so unreasonable that no reasonable strata company could have imposed it.
5. In addition, the conditions should be enforceable, workable, not replicative of pre-existing obligations and final in their operation.
6. I will not deal, condition by condition, with the strata company's 35 proposals. Suffice to say that to the extent that I have rejected any of them, I have done so based upon the above considerations.
7. The applicant is approved to keep her dog in her lot; she is entitled to the benefit of that approval without what would have been almost continual reference to the pervasive suite of conditions being suggested. In addition, many conditions repeat or purport to override the contents of the by-law and the enforcement provisions in the ST Act, and some others are unnecessarily coercive in nature.
8. The conditions which form part of the order are those which I have adjudged appropriate to the applicant's keeping of the dog on the strata complex having regard to the potential for interaction with the scheme's occupants and visitors, bear a sufficient nexus to the approval and the reasons for it, and are not disproportionate to the risks such as they are.

1. Pursuant to s 62(3) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), the applicant's name is not to be published in the Tribunal's reasons for decision published 27 February 2026 nor in this order.
2. Pursuant to s 200(2)(l)(v) of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (WA), the applicant is allowed to keep her Golden Retriever dog on lot 57, Civic Square Apartments, Strata Plan 64584 subject to the following conditions:

(a) The dog shall be trained and managed substantially in accordance with the applicant's Assistance Dog Training and Development Plan dated 8 December 2025.

(b) The applicant shall notify the strata company of any non-compliance with condition (a) as soon as practicable after it occurs.

(c) The applicant shall ensure the prompt and hygienic disposal of any waste caused be the dog and not utilise common property bin facilities for this purpose.

(d) The applicant shall take reasonable steps to address any complaints about the dog's behaviour as soon as practicable after becoming aware of the complaint.

(e) The applicant shall rectify any damage to the common property caused by the dog as soon as practicable after becoming aware of it.

(f) The applicant shall ensure that the dog is at all times registered, microchipped, vaccinated, and otherwise kept in accordance with relevant local government requirements.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[1] Hearing Book (HB), Exhibit 1, at page 12.

[6] This is manifest in Western Australia in the 2020 amendments to the ST Act which deleted the former standard by-law granting councils a power to require the removal of pets from the parcel, the same standard by-laws omitting any power to allow them.

[11] Witness statement of Dema Davies - HB at pages 95 - 100.

[12] Witness statement of Ms Davies at para 27.

[18] Bramley and The Owners of 52 Wickham Street Strata Plan 59237 [2013] WASAT 127.

[19] Examples are at ts 28 and ts 42 - 43, 27 January 2026.

[22] Patient Health Summary, HB at page 53.

[28] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Li [2013] HCA 18.

[29] Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223.

[31] See ts 34, ts 36, ts 38 - 41, ts 104, 27 January 2026.

[34] See Western Australian Planning Commission v Temwood Holdings Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 63; (2004) 221 CLR 30, where the High Court endorsed the validity of planning approval conditions set out in Newbury District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 578.