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[2011] VCAT 858
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2011-05-10
Original judgment source is linked above.
(1) After hearing the matter, the responsible tribunal may -
(c) substitute another decision for the appellable decision.
(2) In substituting another decision for the appellable decision, the responsible tribunal has the same powers as the entity that made the appellable decision.
(2) In determining a proceeding for review of a decision the Tribunal may, by order -
(c) set aside the decision under review and make another decision in substitution for it; or
(d) set aside the decision under review and remit the matter for re-consideration by the decision-maker in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.
(3) Subject to sub-section (4), a decision of a decision-maker as affirmed or varied by the Tribunal, or a decision made by the Tribunal in substitution for the decision of a decisionmaker -
(a) is deemed to be a decision of that decisionmaker; and
(b) subject to any contrary order by the Tribunal, has, or is deemed to have had, effect from the time at which the decision under review has or had effect.
The tribunal's functions in reviewing a determination of the Board are not appellate. On review the tribunal stands in the shoes of the original decision-maker and must determine the correct decision on the material before it. The review is conducted without any presumption as to the correctness or otherwise of the decision subject to review and the tribunal is not confined to the material upon which the original decision was made and may receive evidence or material which was not before the original decision-maker.[2]
...in the Board's opinion, the individual is for any other reason -
(i) not a fit and proper person for general registration in the profession; ...
The issue whether an appellant has shown himself to be 'a fit and proper person', within the meaning of s16(1) of the Act, is not capable of being stated with any degree of precision. But for the purposes of the case under appeal, I think all I need to say is that, in my opinion, what is meant by that expression is that an applicant must show not only that he is possessed of a requisite knowledge of the duties and responsibilities devolving upon him as the holder of the particular licence under the Act, but also that he is possessed of sufficient moral integrity and rectitude of character as to permit him to be safely accredited to the public, without further inquiry, as a person to be entrusted with the sort of work which the licence entails ...
The expression 'fit and proper person' is of course familiar enough as traditional words when used with reference to officers and vocations. But their very purpose is to give the wider scope for judgment and indeed for rejection. 'Fit' (or 'idoneus') with respect to an office is said to involve three things, honesty, knowledge and ability... When the question was whether a man was a fit and proper person to hold a licence for the sale of liquor it was considered that it ought not to be confined to an inquiry into his character and that it would be unwise to attempt any definition of the matters which may legitimately be enquired to; each case must depend on its own merits.
The weight that should be attached to any finding made by the Board on an inquiry or its decision on penalty will depend upon the particular circumstances. The issue before the Board may be such that experienced members of the profession are in the best position to make an assessment as to the gravity of the misconduct and what is an appropriate penalty, not only in the public interest but in order to protect the reputation of the profession. On the other hand, the particular issue may be a matter which the court is in just a good a position as members of the Board to make the assessment of the seriousness of the misconduct and the appropriate penalty.
I should have written to you long ago to apologise for my actions towards you. You came to me as a patient with problems and in need of help. You placed your trust in me to offer that help in a professional and caring manner. I abused that trust for my own selfish ends. Any help that I may have or could have given you in a medical sense was over-shadowed by the damage I caused you emotionally...
I also must tell you how sorry I am for putting you through the ordeal of appearing before the Medical Board and having to suffer the public humiliation and stress of your truthfulness being questioned and challenged. I know this must have been a very painful and traumatic time for you. This is entirely my fault for not having the courage to make an honest confession to the Medical Board before the hearing. I was frightened by everything that was happening at the time and I made a stupid and cowardly decision to not tell the truth and to engage a lawyer to defend me. From that decision events snow-balled out of control going from bad to worse and I was caught up in the web of my own deceit. I will regret my dishonesty for the rest of my life, not merely because of the shame it has brought to my name, but more importantly because of the unnecessary pain and trauma it caused to you and the others involved. [this paragraph appears in three of the five letters]
It has been a long slow process for me to come to the understanding of my full responsibility for everything that happened and to stop making excuses for my actions. You were in no way responsible for anything that occurred. You were the victim of my irresponsible and predatory behaviour and in my position as a doctor there are no excuses to be made.
I know that forgiveness is too much to ask for, but I hope you can accept my sincerest apology. I hope you have been able to move on and find some happiness and fulfilment in your life. I have had to forward this letter through the Medical Board, as I do not know how else to get it to you. I hope they will be able to find you.
(i) Two references from a pharmacist who had a professional association with Mr Drury in the early 1990's - which was renewed in the late 1990's - for a time, they were neighbours.
(ii) A doctor with whom Mr Drury worked in the non-emergency ambulance industry in 2005-2009.
(iii) Another former colleague with whom he worked in the non-emergency ambulance industry, who states he has known Mr Drury since April 2005.
(iv) An ambulance paramedic with whom Mr Drury worked for 2 years from 2005-2007.
(vi) A medical practitioner who states he worked in close proximity with Mr Drury in Bendigo for 3 years.
(vii) A friend who was a former patient when Mr Drury was in practice in Northern Victoria in the mid 1990's.
(viii) A registered nurse who worked with Mr Drury at the Men's Clinic in 2000.
(ix) A former colleague who states he worked with Mr Drury in patient transport for approximately 6 years.
(x) We also heard oral evidence from a semi-retired doctor working in aged care facilities who indicated he was prepared to act as a Mentor to Mr Drury if his application was successful.
In my view this is a healthy relationship and one that would serve as a degree of protection for any relapse into inappropriate behaviour.
During the hearing Professor Ogloff confirmed that Mr Drury was not at risk of re-offending whilst he remained in this stable married relationship.
I concur with Professor Ogloff that Mr Drury is at low risk of further misconduct. His insight is significantly improved and it is difficult to determine how to demonstrate that improvement in any situation other than clinical practice. There are certainly no other indications of instability which would raise a concern about further exploitation of patients if he was registered. His advancing age is a protective factor but it is predominantly the formation of a supportive relationship which is protective**.** I consider that any public risk would increase if his relationship ended. [emphasis added]
...Medical practitioners occupy a position of considerable trust, and it is in the public interests that they should merit that trust. Accordingly, it is to be expected that medical practitioners will be scrupulously honest...
[1] Ballavale v Ballarat [2003] VCAT 1756.
[2] See s51 of the VCAT Act, McDonald v Guardianship Board [1993] VicRp 36; [1993] 1 VR 521 at 528; Davidson v Victorian Institute of Teaching [2006] VSCA 193 (6 September 2006).
Drury
Medical Board of Australia