DRM20 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 211

1. By application filed on 6 August 2020, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) dated 15 July 2020. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate (the delegate) of the First Respondent (Minister) in refusing to grant the applicant a Protection (Class XA) (Subclass 866) visa (the protection visa) under s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

1. The background to the matter is derived from the Court Book and the Minister's submissions and, unless otherwise stated, is not in dispute.
2. The applicant is a citizen of China. She arrived in Australia on 22 July 2017 as a holder of a visitor visa.
3. The applicant applied for the protection visa, subject of the review, on 30 August 2017.
4. On 12 December 2017, the Department sent a request to the applicant to attend an interview on 4 January 2018. The applicant did not attend the interview.
5. On 5 January 2018, the delegate refused to grant the applicant the visa.
6. On 19 January 2018, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision.
7. On 9 July 2020, the applicant appeared at a Tribunal hearing by telephone.
8. On 15 July 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision.

1. The issue before the Tribunal was whether the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia had protection obligations under the refugee criterion or the complementary protection criterion.
2. Firstly, the Tribunal set out the background to the matter, the evidence before the Department, including her claims for protection, and that before the Tribunal: at [2]-[13].
3. At [4], the Tribunal summarised her protection claims as follows:

a. She left China because she was persecuted by the Chinese government as she made a petition to reveal government officials' corruption.

b. The local government sent a notice for her old house to be demolished and she did not receive any compensation. She refused to sign the agreement. One day the local government sent people to remove the house. They smashed all the goods in her home, threated her, forced her to sign the unfair agreement and beat her because she refused to sign. She sought help from the police, but they ignored her case.

c. She and other residents wrote a public letter to distribute hoping to get a reasonable explanation and compensation. However, once officials found out, they sent the police to catch her. She was scared so she escaped China and fled to Australia. She fears that if she returns to China, she will suffer persecution by the police, go to prison and die.

d. She does not believe the authorities in China will protect her because the government is corrupt, government officials collude with the police and they only care about their own benefits. She does not believe she can relocate to another part of China as the situation is the same in the whole of China.

1. Prior to its consideration of her claims, the Tribunal set out the relevant legislative provisions against which the applicant was assessed, namely the refugee and complementary protection criteria, alongside the mandatory considerations under Ministerial Direction No. 84.
2. The Tribunal found the applicant's evidence about key aspects of her claims, particularly surrounding the alleged demolition of her house and her subsequent actions to be vague, lacking in detail, and inconsistent. This raised doubts about her truthfulness and the general credibility of her evidence: at [25]. For instance, the applicant made claims before the Tribunal not raised at the hearing; in her Tribunal evidence, she made no mention of her petitioning public letters or being beaten, saying only that government officials threatened to beat her because she refused to sign the agreement to move out of the house and that they demolished her house by force.
3. The Tribunal had regard to the applicant's claim that the old house was given to her by her father, noting she had provided no evidence of ownership. The Tribunal found it implausible that government officials would require the applicant to sign an agreement for the house demolition when, by her evidence, the owner of the house was her father: at [27].
4. The Tribunal noted that the applicant was also vague in her account of events surrounding the alleged demolition of the house, she could not recall when she was notified of the demolition and denied compensation, other than in 2015 and the start of 2016, and did not recall why the house had to be demolished or what replaced it: at [28].
5. The applicant left China and travelled to Australia in July 2017, leaving behind her son and husband. The Tribunal did not find persuasive the applicant's various explanations as to why she left her family behind, including that her husband was very worried about their son and consequently remained in China to look after him and that she did not have enough money to bring the son with her. The Tribunal noted the applicant's comment that after visiting Japan, she felt that Japan was not a place for her to live further and found it undermined the extent to which she feared harm. In the Tribunal's view, the applicant left China in search of opportunity: at [30]-[31].
6. In her written application, the applicant claimed she was afraid that if she returned to China, she would suffer persecution by the police, go to prison and die. The Tribunal did not find it plausible that the authorities would have any interest in her, given her evidence that they had already demolished her house in 2016: at [32].
7. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant gave a truthful account of her experiences in China or that any of her evidence could be relied upon. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant owned a house in Guangxi province, which was demolished by local government officials who gave her no compensation for it; nor that they beat her or threatened to beat or kill her. The Tribunal also did not accept that the applicant was persecuted by the government for making a petition to reveal government officials' corruption or that she wrote a public letter to distribute hoping to get a reasonable explanation and compensation for her house, or that officials sent the police to catch her for this: at [34].
8. The Tribunal was not satisfied that if the applicant were to return to China now or in the reasonably foreseeable future, she would be pursued by the local government officials or the police: at [35].
9. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was a person in respect of whom Australia owed protection obligations: at [38]. The Tribunal concluded that the applicant did not satisfy the criterion in s 36(2) of the Act: at [40].
10. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the decision not to grant a protection visa.

1. On 6 August 2020, the applicant filed the originating application for judicial review in which she advanced seven grounds of review.
2. On 6 March 2025, a Registrar of the Court dismissed the judicial review application for non-appearance at a callover.
3. On 5 April 2025, the applicant filed an application for reinstatement, which was heard by the Registrar on 27 May 2025. The Registrar made orders listing the matter for final hearing.
4. No written submissions were filed by the applicant. The Minister filed their written submissions on 13 January 2026. At the hearing, leave was granted for the Minister to rely on those written submissions.
5. The parties appeared at a hearing before me on 21 January 2026 at the Parramatta registry of the Court. The applicant appeared in person with the assistance of an interpreter in the English and Mandarin languages. The Minister was represented by Ms Leonard of the Australian Government Solicitor.
6. At the hearing, the Court Book, filed by the Minister on 12 October 2020, was tendered into evidence and marked Exhibit CB.
7. Being mindful that the applicant was unrepresented, the Court explained to her how the hearing would proceed and the role and powers of the Court in judicial review proceedings.
8. The applicant was invited to make oral submissions in support of the grounds of review raised in her application.

1. The Court can only grant relief if it can be established that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by a jurisdictional error: Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia (2003) 211 CLR 476.
2. In LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321 (LPDT) at [3], the High Court per Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson, and Jagot JJ, explained that:

... Jurisdictional error on the part of a statutory decision-maker in making a decision can include: misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness. [citations omitted]

1. To constitute jurisdictional error, the error must be material, in the sense that it could have realistically deprived the applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: LPDT at [32].
2. Further, as explained to the applicant at the hearing, it is not for the Court to review the merits of the Tribunal decision: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Wu Shan Liang).

1. The originating application advanced the following seven grounds (without alteration):

1. AAT is not fair in considering my situation due to lack of knowledge.

2. In the countryside, we don't have land certificate for our land but it is recogonized by the traditional agreement.

3. It is also legal for people like us to be compensated even we don't have a land certificate.

4. AAT didn't consider the reasonableness of this tradition existed in the countryside in my country.

5. It is also our tradition that even the land is under my father's name I could still go to protest against the government's taken away of our land.

6. AAT didn't consider the facts that I could not take my husband and my children with me to Australia as we didn't have enough monies.

7. AAT said I couldn't get passport if the government really want to torture me. I got the passport from town level government not the local village government. It is the difference that AAT fails to consider.

1. By ground one the applicant alleges that the Tribunal's decision was not fair in considering her situation 'due to [her] lack of knowledge'. No particulars were provided in support of this ground, and the applicant was unable to provide any further details at the hearing as to why she believed the Tribunal's decision was unfair.
2. To the extent that this ground contends a failure on the part of the Tribunal to comply with procedural fairness obligations, this is not made out. As required by s 425 of the Act, being the relevant provision at the time of the review, the Tribunal invited the applicant to appear before it at a hearing to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. The applicant attended the hearing and was assisted by an interpreter. There is no evidence before the Court, and the applicant has not provided any further particulars, which suggest that the applicant was not afforded a real and meaningful opportunity to give evidence and present arguments in support of her claims.
3. As contended by the Minister, it is for the applicant to advance any evidence or arguments she wishes to advance in support of her contention that she is entitled to the visa.
4. A fair reading of the Tribunal decision demonstrates that the applicant was given an opportunity to provide evidence about her claims and that the Tribunal discussed those claims with her at length at the hearing. The mere fact that the Tribunal decided not to accept the applicant's claims, does not render the decision unfair.
5. The Tribunal, after having considered the evidence before it, concluded that the applicant's claims were not credible based on the inconsistent evidence in the applicant's visa application and her oral evidence at the Tribunal hearing, and the vagueness of her recollections about key events. In the circumstances, it was open for the Tribunal to reject the factual basis of the applicant's claims and to find that the applicant did not satisfy the criteria for the grant of the visa.
6. It cannot be said the Tribunal did not afford the applicant procedural fairness. Nor could it be said that the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence or its conclusions were not open to it. Accordingly, ground one does not establish any jurisdictional error by the Tribunal.

1. These grounds raise contentions about the system of land ownership and compensation for land acquisition in the Guangxi province and the applicant's view that even if the land was in her father's name, she could protest its acquisition.
2. The applicant's claims were considered by the Tribunal at [27]-[34] of its reasons. Grounds two and three do not identify an error in the Tribunal's reasoning and appear to be a mere disagreement with the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence and its reasons.
3. Grounds four and five contend the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable because it did not consider the traditional agreement she had with her father for the land and therefore she could protest its acquisition by the government. These grounds also amount to no more than a disagreement with the Tribunal's findings and seek to engage the Court in impermissible merits review.
4. I accept that the Tribunal properly considered the applicant's claims regarding ownership of the land and compensation. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant owned a house that was demolished by government officials who failed to compensate her: at [34]. The Tribunal also found it was implausible that the applicant would be asked to sign an agreement for the demolition of the house as her evidence was contradicted by country information, which it invited the applicant to comment on: at [27]. The Tribunal considered the applicant's response in its reasons.
5. It was for the Tribunal to rely on the country information it relied upon and to attribute weight to it. The Tribunal's reliance on country information was not unreasonable or illogical. I am unable to discern any error in the Tribunal's reasoning. The findings made were open to the Tribunal on the evidence before it and for the reasons it gave.
6. For these reasons, grounds two to five do not establish jurisdictional error.

1. By ground six, the applicant contends that the Tribunal did not consider that the applicant could not take 'her husband and children' with her to Australia because she did not have enough money. To the extent this ground alleges a failure by the Tribunal to consider a claim, this is not made out.
2. As submitted by the Minister, the Tribunal considered the applicant's evidence in this regard and made an express finding at [30]:

[t]he Tribunal does not find persuasive the applicant's various explanations as to why she left her family behind, including that her husband was very worried about their son so stayed in China to look after him and that she did not have enough money to bring the son with her.

1. Ground six does not disclose jurisdictional error.

1. By ground seven, the applicant alleges that the Tribunal found she could not obtain a passport if the government wanted to torture her, and that the Tribunal failed to consider that she got the passport from the town level government and not the local village government.
2. As contended by the Minister, this ground misinterprets the Tribunal's reasons and is inconsistent with the decision record, which states that the applicant 'obtained her passport from the government office in her town in October 2016': at [31].
3. The Tribunal made no finding that the applicant could not obtain a passport if the government wanted to torture her. In its reasons, the Tribunal referred to the circumstances of the applicant obtaining the passport and her immigration history immediately thereafter.
4. In considering these circumstances, the Tribunal concluded at [31] that the applicant was not of adverse interest to the Chinese authorities at the time of her departure from China and there was no reason to believe she would be upon her return to China. This finding was open to the Tribunal for the reasons it gave.
5. Gound seven does not disclose jurisdictional error.

Issue raised by Registrar: Credibility findings

1. For completeness, the First Respondent noted that at the reinstatement hearing on 27 May 2025, the Registrar queried whether there was any error in the Tribunal relying on the inconsistency between the written claims and the oral evidence of the applicant given at the hearing, in circumstances where the applicant had told the Tribunal that she was assisted by an agent in preparing her application and the application form was not read back to her: at [23].
2. In its reasons, the Tribunal found the applicant's evidence could not be relied upon and that she did not provide a truthful account of her experiences in China as her evidence was: not consistent with country information; not plausible taking into account different aspects of her claims; vague and lacking in detail; and inconsistent. The Tribunal also expressed concern that the written claims, that she was beaten in China and had attempted to expose government corruption, were not raised by the applicant at the hearing.
3. As noted by the Minister, the applicant has not filed any amended application articulating any ground of review impugning the Tribunal's credibility findings on this basis. However, given the applicant is not represented in the proceeding, it is appropriate to consider whether any error arises in relation to the Tribunal's credibility findings.
4. Credibility findings made by an administrative decision maker can be challenged on recognised grounds, including but not limited to a failure to afford procedural fairness, reaching a finding without a logical or probative basis, or unreasonableness: CQG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 146; (2016) 253 FCR 496 (CQG15) at [38].
5. The Minister relied upon Minister for Immigration v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 (SZMDS) to contend that where an assertion that factual findings of a decision-maker are 'legally unreasonable', the issue is better characterised as whether or not the delegate's decision was illogical or irrational: SZMDS at [128]-[130] per Crennan and Bell JJ. It was contended that a claim of illogicality or irrationality can only be made out if it could be demonstrated that the Tribunal formed a view that no rational or logical decision maker could have arrived at on the same evidence: SZMDS at [130].
6. As submitted by the Minister, for a decision to be vitiated for jurisdictional error based on illogical or irrational findings of fact or reasoning, 'extreme' illogicality must be shown: CQG15 at [60]-[61], citing Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZUXN [2016] FCA 516; (2016) 69 AAR 210 at [52], [54]-[56]. The Full Court has stated that caution must be exercised before concluding that errors in an adverse credibility assessment result in the decision being affected by jurisdictional error, in order to avoid judicial review transgressing into the impermissible area of merits review: AVQ15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCAFC 133; (2018) 266 FCR 83 at [41].
7. Turning to the Tribunal's reasons, at [23], the Tribunal set out its discussion with the applicant in relation to her written application:

At the start of the hearing, the applicant confirmed that all the information in her application form was true and correct and that she did not wish to make any changes or to add anything. She said the application form had been filled in by her migration agent, whose name she provided, and that she paid $2000, although the form stated that no money was paid. The applicant said she told the agent what happened in general terms but that the information was not read back to her and she did not remember if she signed the application. She accepted that she had declared in her form that she had 'provided complete and correct information in every detail on this form'.

1. While the Tribunal noted that the application form was not read back to the applicant, it also noted that the applicant had confirmed that the information in her application form was true and correct, and that she had declared in her form that the information provided was complete and correct.
2. I accept that the mere fact that the applicant's written application was not read back to her by her agent does not of itself disclose any unreasonableness in the Tribunal's credibility findings.
3. The Tribunal decision demonstrates that the applicant was questioned about her written claims and at no point did the applicant suggest that she was unaware of the content of her written claims, that any of her written claims were wrong or that they needed to be corrected, or make any complaint about the conduct of her agent. As noted above, the applicant expressly confirmed that her claims were correct. Further, the applicant's written claims were set out in the delegate's decision which she provided to the Tribunal with her application for review.
4. I accept that there was no extreme illogicality in the Tribunal's conclusion that the applicant's evidence was not credible. I accept that the Tribunal had regard to the manner in which the protection application was prepared, including that the application was not read back to the applicant, as set out at [23]. However, as the Minister submitted, it was also open to the Tribunal to accept the applicant's own evidence that the information in the application form was true and correct, and to consider the written claims on that basis: AVW16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCCA 932 at [38].
5. I accept that no error arises from the Tribunal's reliance on inconsistencies between the written application and oral claims.
6. For the above reasons, no jurisdictional error is disclosed with respect to the Tribunal's credibility findings.

1. As none of the grounds raised establish jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal, the application for judicial review must be dismissed.

1. At the hearing, the Minister sought an order that the applicant pay their costs fixed in the sum of $6,750.00, inclusive of the costs in respect of the reinstatement application. The applicant was invited to make submissions with respect to costs, but she did not wish to do so.
2. There is no reason why costs should not follow the event. Having regard to the work undertaken and the scale costs for a standard migration matter, I am satisfied that the costs sought in this matter are reasonable and will so order.

I certify that the preceding seventy-one (71) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Skaros.