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[2010] VCAT 372
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal
2010-03-19
Original judgment source is linked above.
Mr Drew says that says that the requirement or practice imposed is that he and other adult males cannot use the wet change rooms when school groups are having lessons unless there is male supervision available for any male students. On his behalf it is contended further that the requirement or practice is, due to the way the Policy is implemented, that even when there is supervision for the male students, he and other adult males are not able to use the wet change rooms.
The Council and Ms Irvine say that the most that can be said is that a requirement is imposed on Mr Drew that in accessing the services at Aqualink, he is required to use the dry change rooms where:
As discussed earlier, I have determined the issue to be whether there was same sex supervision available, rather than looking to whether there was same sex supervision by teachers as opposed to other staff, volunteers or parents.
Due to the analysis called for by the definition of indirect discrimination, it is important that the requirement, condition or practice in issue is clearly identified. Mr Drew describes it in terms of being stopped from using the wet change rooms while the Council and Ms Irvine refer to the obligation to use the dry change rooms.
In my view it is more accurate to describe the requirement being imposed on Mr Drew as him being required to use the dry change rooms rather than being banned from the wet change rooms. The usual position is that the wet change rooms may be used but when primary school children are having lessons and there are no male supervisors, that option is unavailable and in its place is the option of using the dry change rooms. At all times change rooms are available - what is different is their location in relation to the pool and other wet activity areas and their attributes.
Is the requirement, condition or practice reasonable?
I have turned first to the question of reasonableness.
When determining the reasonableness or otherwise of the requirement the following principles arise:
Matters to be taken into account when considering reasonableness include those listed in section 9(2) and other relevant circumstances.
In contending that the requirement is not reasonable, Mr McKenna for Mr Drew pointed to the following matters:
Mr Felman on behalf of the Council and Ms Irvine says that the Policy is reasonable for a number of reasons including:
Earlier I concluded that the reason for the Policy was based on concerns expressed by schools about being able to meet their obligation to supervise students.
The evidence was that these reasons were communicated to Mr Drew as being the basis for the Policy both verbally and in writing.
The evidence before the Tribunal, which is accepted, was that school representatives told Ms Irvine that they would have to consider using an alternative facility for swimming lessons if they could not have exclusive access to a change area when same sex supervision was not available. Ms Irvine's evidence was that the income generated by Aqualink for the benefit of the Council from swimming lessons was 10%. The evidence regarding the income from swimming lessons has not been contradicted.
Mr Drew's position was that he had seen staff, in particular Mr Young, act as supervisors in the past. He contends that the students can be supervised by either Aqualink or SPSC staff who are present. Ms Irvine's response was that it was not the role of the staff of Aqualink or SPSC to act as supervisors and that, if that had occurred in the past, it must have been an emergency situation. Mr Drew stated that there was no emergency when he saw Mr Young supervising school students. No other evidence was available as to when that occurred or what the circumstances were.
Ms Irvine's evidence was that staff with childcare duties in the crèche must have such a Working with Children Check but that the lifeguards and part time duty officers do not have those checks. Her evidence regarding SPSC staff was that, it was responsible for ensuring that staff had all relevant qualifications, apparently including where required Working with Children Checks and that it was only responsible for the children during the lessons.
I accept Ms Irvine's evidence that it is not the role of Aqualink or SPSC staff to supervise children while they are changing other than on an emergency basis.
It was suggested that the schools themselves be required to provide the supervisors they consider appropriate to meet their own needs. This would mean that schools would have to ensure that male supervisors attended each swimming lesson and so the male wet change rooms would be always open.
Although this alternative is attractive there was no evidence that it was viable. Indeed the evidence was that there are few male teachers in primary schools and that it was unusual for male parents to attend lessons. I am not persuaded that this alternative was open to Aqualink.
Mr Drew believes that the Council has given undue primacy to the financial benefits from offering the swimming lessons as compared to making available the facilities to patrons such as himself. In my view it is inaccurate to suggest that the Council and Ms Irvine have placed on opposing sides the interests of patrons such as Mr Drew and the schools.
Mr Drew is still able to attend the centre and use the facilities he prefers. Other males can continue to do the same. The swimming lessons are not offered every day of the year - they are held on week days of the school year between 10am and 2pm. In school Terms 2 and 3 the lessons are held less often. During those hours Mr Drew is required to use change rooms other than those he prefers. Alternatively, Mr Drew can chose to use Aqualink at times when lessons are not scheduled and so avoid entirely the operation of the Policy.
The evidence was that the dry change rooms were approximately 40 metres from the swimming pool while the wet change rooms were within around 8 metres of the pool. The spa and sauna are located near the pool but further away from the dry change rooms than the pool. While Mr Drew said that the dry change rooms were smaller and were cramped by comparison, there was no suggestion that the dry change rooms were so overcrowded as to not be able to be used when Mr Drew needed to change.
Mr Drew produced no evidence of disadvantage other than his personal embarrassment and distress. While his concerns are understandable to a point, any person using the swimming pool, spa or sauna may be observed in a state of undress by other patrons. Those patrons may have just arrived at the centre, may themselves be swimming or using the other wet facilities or may have changed and are about to leave. It is not uncommon for patrons of such facilities to walk around in swim wear, covered by a towel or not.
Mr Drew has physical access to the wet change rooms and may cover himself to protect his modesty. I make this comment mindful that other patrons are required to use change rooms which are not located as close to the swimming pool as compared to the wet change rooms. In particular, patrons with disabilities and family groups wishing to use the access change rooms are also required to walk an approximately 40 metres extra distance.
I accept that the male patrons cannot change the gender of the teachers or other supervisors sent from the schools but I accept that the requirement is reasonable having regard to the evidence about the alternatives trialled and the layout of centre. I am satisfied that Mr Drew and other male patrons can comply with the requirement to use the wet change rooms and that the cost of not providing exclusive access to the schools may have been to lose the important income earned from lessons. These matters also demonstrate that the Policy is reasonable.
Being satisfied that the Policy is reasonable, the claim of indirect discrimination cannot succeed.
[1] Waters v Public Transport Corporation [1991] HCA 49; (1991) 173 CLR 349 at 372 per Dawson and Toohey JJ
[2] Morgan v Austin Health & Anor [2007] VCAT 2229 at [22] per Harbison J
[3] Purvis v State of New South Wales and Anor [2003] HCA 62; [2003] 217 CLR 92
[4] (1987) 8 NSWLR 442 at 471
[7] Richards v State of Victoria (1969) VR 136
Schou (No 2) [2004] VSCA 71; (2004) 8 VR 120; State of Victoria v Turner [2009] VSC 66
[9] Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade v Styles [1989] FCA 342; (1989) 88 ALR 621; Commonwealth v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 63 FCR 74
[10] Styles; Waters; Schou; Catholic Education Office v Clarke [2004] FCAFC 197; (2004) 138 FCR 121
Drew
Whitehorse City Council
(1987) 8 NSWLR 442
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(1989) 88 ALR 621
(1995) 63 FCR 74
(1991) 173 CLR 349
(2004) 8 VR 120
(2004) 138 FCR 121