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[2025] NSWCA 137
respondent. Time to file the summons for leave to appeal was extended to 5 February 2025; DNK was directed to file a notice of appeal in the form of its draft within seven days; leave to appeal was granted;...
The Court of Appeal held that the 2021 COVID-19 Regulation did not require a tenant to proactively give the landlord proof of impacted-lessee status before the Regulation's protection against certain enforcement action applied. A tenant could provide the information early, but had to provide it within a reasonable time only if the landlord requested it. The Court also held that DNK's admission in its NCAT defence that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee meant he did not have to prove that fact, unless DNK obtained leave to withdraw the admission. DNK obtained leave to appeal, but lost the appeal.
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2,544 words · generated 06/10/2026
Dr N Kalokerinos Pty Ltd (DNK) was the lessor of commercial premises in Shellharbour leased to Abhishek Jain, who used them to operate a restaurant. On 24 November 2021, DNK served a notice terminating the lease, relying on alleged breaches that included failure to pay rent and outgoings. DNK re-entered the premises on 13 December 2021 and purported to terminate the lease [4].
14 cited instruments linked from this judgment.
Mr Jain began proceedings in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT), arguing that the termination was unlawful under the Retail and Other Commercial Leases (COVID-19) Regulation 2021 (NSW). That Regulation applied when DNK re-entered. Mr Jain claimed he was an “impacted lessee”, a status relevant to restrictions on a lessor’s ability to take enforcement action. DNK later brought its own NCAT claim for damages for alleged lease breaches [5].
The procedural history matters to the Court of Appeal’s reasoning. Mr Jain’s points of claim alleged he had received the 2021 COVID-19 Business Grant, that his business turnover for the 2020-2021 financial year was below $50 million, and that he was an impacted lessee [23]. DNK’s defence “generally admits” paragraphs 1 to 11, which included those allegations [24]. DNK did not seek leave to withdraw that admission [21(8), 62].
NCAT nevertheless found that Mr Jain was not an impacted lessee, reasoning in part that he had not provided information in compliance with cl 6A [30]. It found DNK’s termination valid and awarded it $60,025.34 plus interest [31]. The Appeal Panel took a different view. It concluded that cl 6A did not require the tenant to provide information unless the lessor requested it, and treated DNK’s admission as establishing the relevant facts [37]-[38]. The primary judge upheld the Appeal Panel’s decision.
DNK then sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Because the amount in issue was below $100,000, leave was required [2]. The Court extended the time for filing the summons and granted leave because the proposed grounds raised questions of public importance [46]. It then dismissed the appeal and ordered DNK to pay Mr Jain’s appeal costs [71].
The result should be described precisely: DNK succeeded in obtaining leave and an extension of time, but failed on both substantive grounds. The judgment is a decision about the construction of this particular Regulation and the effect of an admission in NCAT proceedings. It does not decide other factual disputes about the lease beyond the issues raised on appeal.
The first ground concerned the interaction between cls 6A and 6C. DNK argued that Mr Jain had to notify it of his impacted-lessee status for the Regulation’s protections to operate. Adamson JA separated two questions: what information cl 6A concerns, and when the lessee is required to provide it [48].
Clause 6A(1) specifies the information: a statement that the lessee is an impacted lessee and evidence of that status. But cl 6A(2) uses different language for different timings. The lessee “may” provide the information before or as soon as practicable after a prescribed breach, while it “must” provide it within a reasonable time after the lessor requests it [48]. Adamson JA rejected DNK’s submission that “may” should be read as “must”. The ordinary difference between those words was especially important because they appeared close together in provisions addressing the same subject [49]. The Court referred to Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v Lynwood in support of that approach [49].
The Court also rejected the suggestion that DNK could not make a request because it did not know Mr Jain claimed to be an impacted lessee. Clause 6A(3) allowed a lessor to request the information “at any time” if reasonably required, subject to the limit of no more than once every two weeks. In the Court’s view, a lessor considering re-entry had reason to ascertain whether the tenant was an impacted lessee, because that status could affect whether prescribed action was prohibited and mediation was required [50].
The text of cl 6C reinforced the conclusion. It did not say the lessor’s prohibition applied only where the lessee had supplied cl 6A information. Adamson JA contrasted that omission with cl 6D, which expressly addressed the consequence of a lessee’s non-compliance with cl 6A for the lessor’s obligations under that clause [51]. The Court considered that contrast a strong indication that cl 6C’s prohibition did not depend on the tenant having first provided information.
The Regulation’s earlier form also supported that interpretation. The 2020 COVID-19 Regulation imposed a positive obligation on an impacted lessee to provide a statement and evidence; if the lessee did not comply, the lessor was treated as having complied with the relevant clause [53]-[54]. Adamson JA considered the difference in the 2021 wording evidence of a legislative choice to put the onus on the lessor to request information and ascertain the tenant’s status [54]. That contextual point confirmed, rather than replaced, the Court’s reading of the 2021 text.
The second ground concerned DNK’s admission. The Court distinguished whether Mr Jain actually met the definition of an impacted lessee from whether he had informed DNK of that status. The former was a factual question that could be established by evidence or by admission. The latter was the separate notification question dealt with under the first ground [60].
DNK’s defence admitted the allegations that Mr Jain had received the relevant grant, had turnover below $50 million, and was an impacted lessee [61]. The Court treated the points of claim and points of defence as NCAT “quasi-pleadings”: NCAT is not a court of strict pleading, but these documents can identify what is in dispute and what case the other party must meet [63]. DNK could have admitted, not admitted, or denied the allegations. By admitting them, it indicated they were not in dispute and need not be proved [64].
The admission was not technically an agreed fact under s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). The Court accepted that the two concepts are distinct, but explained that their procedural effects are analogous [66]-[67]. A formal admission is different from an informal admission that forms part of the evidence and is weighed with other evidence. The party relying on a formal admission is entitled to shape its case accordingly, which connects the rule to procedural fairness [67]. DNK did not apply to amend its defence to withdraw the admission under s 53(1) of the NCAT Act [62]. The Court therefore held that Mr Jain did not need to call evidence to prove the admitted facts [61].
The judgment explains a contrast between two versions of the COVID-19 commercial leasing regulation. Under the 2020 Regulation provision quoted at [53], an impacted lessee had a positive obligation to give the lessor a statement and evidence. If the lessee failed to do so, the lessor was taken to have complied with the relevant clause. Adamson JA used that earlier wording as part of the legislative history of the 2021 Regulation [53]-[54].
For the 2021 Regulation at issue, cl 6A still described information that an impacted lessee must give, but its timing provisions distinguished between when the information may be given and when it must be given. The Court read cl 6A(2)(a) as permitting early provision, and cl 6A(2)(b) as imposing the obligation to provide it within a reasonable time after a lessor’s request [48]. The lessor’s right to request the information was provided by cl 6A(3) [48], [50].
The Court’s construction of cl 6C was that a lessee’s failure to provide cl 6A information without a request did not, by itself, remove the protection against prescribed action. The structure of cl 6C and the contrast with cl 6D supported that reading [51]. Adamson JA described this as a legislative choice that placed the onus on the lessor to seek information needed to determine whether enforcement action was permitted [52].
On admissions, the judgment clarifies how the Court treated documents filed in NCAT proceedings. It did not say that the Evidence Act’s formal agreed-fact provision applied directly to NCAT. Rather, it held that an admission in NCAT points of claim and points of defence could have an analogous effect: facts admitted in that way were not in dispute and ordinarily did not need proof [61], [66]. The judgment does not remove NCAT’s procedural flexibility under s 38 of the NCAT Act; it recognises that the function of these documents in identifying disputed issues can be significant [63].
At [48], Adamson JA said that a lessee “may” provide the information before or soon after a prescribed breach, but “is only required” to provide it within a reasonable time after a request. In plain English, the Court did not treat the tenant as having to volunteer the material in every case. A lessor’s request is the event that makes provision obligatory under the timing provisions.
At [50], the Court said that if DNK did not request the information before taking prescribed action, it “took the risk” that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee. In practical terms, the landlord’s lack of knowledge did not itself make the Regulation’s protection inapplicable. The Court considered that the Regulation gave the landlord a mechanism to obtain relevant information before acting.
At [51], Adamson JA relied on the absence of a condition in cl 6C requiring prior provision of cl 6A information. The plain-English point is that the Court would not add a qualification to cl 6C that its text did not contain, particularly where cl 6D expressly referred to non-compliance with cl 6A.
At [60], the Court said that impacted-lessee status is a question of fact that may be established by evidence or admitted by the other party. This separates the tenant’s underlying status from the question of whether the tenant told the landlord about it.
At [61], the Court concluded that DNK’s defence admitted the facts supporting Mr Jain’s status, and that he could rely on the admission unless DNK sought and obtained leave to withdraw it. In plain English, a party cannot ordinarily treat a pleaded fact as admitted and later insist that the other party prove it.
At [67], the Court explained that a formal admission differs from an informal admission that is simply part of the evidence. A formal admission has stronger procedural consequences because the other party may have relied on it when preparing and presenting its case.
The Regulation part of the reasoning is most directly engaged where a commercial lease falls within the 2021 Regulation, the tenant may meet the relevant definition of an impacted lessee, a prescribed breach is alleged, and the lessor is considering prescribed action during the relevant period. The judgment’s example was re-entry following alleged rent arrears [4]-[8]. The Court’s analysis depends on the particular language of cls 6A to 6D and should not be assumed to govern differently worded regulations [48]-[54].
The request issue becomes material where the tenant has not provided a statement or evidence and the lessor has not requested it. Under the Court’s construction, the question is not simply whether the tenant volunteered the information, but whether the lessor requested it and whether the tenant’s status brought the transaction within the relevant protections [48], [50]. The Regulation itself limited requests to circumstances where the information was reasonably required and restricted requests to no more than once every two weeks [10], [48].
The admission issue is relevant where NCAT has directed parties to file points of claim and defence, a party has admitted specific allegations in those documents, and the admission is not later withdrawn with leave. The Court placed weight on the purpose of those documents in clarifying issues and enabling each party to understand the case it must meet [63]-[65]. It also noted that the procedural context matters: the parties had been legally represented, the documents were filed after evidence had been exchanged, and DNK did not seek leave to withdraw the admission [21(8), 63].
The decision does not establish that every imprecise or qualified response in NCAT documents is necessarily a binding admission. The outcome concerned DNK’s admission to identified paragraphs, including the pleaded facts forming the basis for impacted-lessee status [61]. The judgment’s reasoning also recognises NCAT’s powers to determine procedure, subject to natural justice [16], [63].
The supplied judgment is dated 20 June 2025. It contains no account of decisions after that date, so later judicial treatment cannot be determined from this source. No later case can properly be described here as having followed, distinguished, or limited Dr N Kalokerinos Pty Ltd v Jain.
The Court itself referred to earlier authorities. It cited PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird for the threshold governing leave to appeal [42], and Be Financial Pty Ltd as Trustee for Be Financial Operations Trust v Das for the application of the “dictates of justice” and proportionality provisions to leave applications [43]. It applied the ordinary distinction between “may” and “must”, referring to Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v Lynwood [49].
For the admission issue, the Court applied the principle in Dare v Pulham that a party cannot contradict a formal pleading admission without leave, subject to the qualifications discussed in the judgment [65]. It also explained the distinction between formal and informal admissions by reference to The Nominal Defendant v Gabriel [67]. These are authorities used by Adamson JA in the reasons, not later treatment of the 2025 judgment.
The judgment resolves the meaning of the particular 2021 Regulation provisions considered in this appeal. It does not establish how differently worded regulations should be construed. The effect of a provision expressly making a protection conditional on prior notice, for example, was not decided. Adamson JA’s reasoning instead turned on the text and structure of cls 6A, 6C and 6D [48]-[54].
The judgment also does not specify a universal period that counts as a “reasonable time” for providing information after a request under cl 6A(2)(b). That question was not necessary to decide because DNK had made no request [21(2), 48]. The facts and circumstances relevant to reasonableness would therefore require consideration in a different case.
The case does not determine every procedural consequence of an admission in NCAT. The Court held that these points of claim and defence served a function similar to pleadings and that the unwithdrawn admission mattered in this proceeding [61]-[67]. It did not provide an exhaustive test for when an informal or qualified statement amounts to an admission, or for when parties have abandoned their quasi-pleadings. It noted the possibility of abandonment, but found no basis for it on the facts [65].
Finally, Adamson JA observed that the primary judge had considered what evidence existed about Mr Jain’s status, although the admission made that inquiry unnecessary [68]. The Court’s decision did not depend on resolving all possible disputes about that evidence. Its operative reasoning was that the admission established the relevant facts for the proceeding unless withdrawn with leave [61]-[68].
This is general legal information, not legal advice. Zoe can make mistakes. Before acting on this, relying on it, or using any draft, have a qualified Australian lawyer check it.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Dr N Kalokerinos Pty Ltd v Jain [2025] NSWCA 137
Hearing dates: 13 June 2025
Decision date: 20 June 2025
Before: Ward P at [1]
Adamson JA at [2]
Price AJA at [72]
Decision: (1) Extend the time within which the applicant is to file a summons for leave to appeal to 5 February 2025.
(2) Direct the applicant to file a notice of appeal in the form of the draft notice of appeal within 7 days.
(3) Grant leave to appeal.
(4) Dismiss the appeal.
(5) Order the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
Catchwords: APPEALS — leave to appeal — principles governing — where proceedings raise questions of public importance — leave to appeal granted — time limits — extension of time — extension of time granted
CIVIL PROCEDURE — effect of admission in points of defence in NCAT — where applicant admitted lessee was an impacted lessee under COVID-19 regulatory regime — Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), ss 38, 53 — Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 191
LEASES AND TENANCIES — retail leases — retail shop lease — termination of retail lease covered by COVID-19 Regulation — whether lessee an impacted lessee under COVID-19 regulatory regime — application of Retail and Other Commercial Leases (COVID-19) Regulation 2021 (NSW), cll 6A, 6B, 6C, 6D
Legislation Cited: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), ss 3, 36, 38, 53, 80, 83, Sch 4, cll 3, 12
Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), ss 58, 60
Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), s 129
Evidence Act 1995 (NSW), s 191
Retail Leases Act 1994 (NSW), s 87
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 101
Retail and Other Commercial Leases (COVID-19) Regulation 2020 (NSW), cl 7
Retail and Other Commercial Leases (COVID-19) Regulation 2021 (NSW), cll 3, 4, 5, 6, 6A, 6B, 6C, 6D
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), r 42.1
Cases Cited: Be Financial Pty Ltd as Trustee for Be Financial Operations Trust v Das [2012] NSWCA 164
Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v Lynwood [2017] NSWCA 317
Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658; [1982] HCA 70
Dokas v Gallagher (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 236
PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird [2019] NSWCA 48
The Nominal Defendant v Gabriel (2007) 71 NSWLR 150; [2007] NSWCA 52
Category: Principal judgment
Parties: Dr N Kalokerinos Pty Ltd (Applicant)
Abhishek Jain (Respondent)
Representation: Counsel:
J Mack / E Vuu (Applicant)
D Krochmalik / A Lim (Respondent)
Solicitors:
McGirr and Associates (Applicant)
Carter Ferguson Solicitors (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2024/451135
[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]
Dr N Kalokerinos Pty Ltd (DNK) entered into a retail lease with Mr Abhishek Jain (the lessee) concerning premises in Shellharbour used to operate a restaurant. On 24 November 2021, DNK issued a notice terminating the lease, alleging breaches including non-payment of rent, and re-entered the premises on 13 December 2021. Mr Jain commenced proceedings in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT), claiming the termination was unlawful under the Retail and Other Commercial Leases (COVID-19) Regulation 2021 (NSW) (the Regulation), as he was an “impacted lessee” entitled to protection. DNK filed a cross-application seeking damages of $100,000 for alleged breaches of the lease.
NCAT dismissed Mr Jain’s claim and awarded DNK $60,025.34 in damages. It found that Mr Jain had failed to establish he was an “impacted lessee” due to non-compliance with cl 6A of the Regulation. On appeal, the Appeal Panel found NCAT had misinterpreted the Regulation, held that Mr Jain was in fact an impacted lessee, and reduced DNK’s damages to $18,318.25. DNK then sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, and Mr Jain cross-appealed in relation to the reduced damages and costs. In the Supreme Court, Campbell J (the primary judge) dismissed DNK’s appeal and allowed Mr Jain’s cross-appeal. His Honour held that the Appeal Panel’s interpretation of the Regulation was correct. The damages were reduced to $4,134.53 and DNK was ordered to pay Mr Jain’s costs.
DNK sought an extension of time for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal against orders made by the primary judge. The two issues on appeal are: (i) whether the Regulation imposed an obligation on a lessee to provide a lessor with a statement or evidence that he was an “impacted lessee”; and (ii) whether the respondent was an “impacted lessee” on the basis of an admission on the pleadings.
The Court held (Adamson JA, Ward P and Price AJA agreeing) dismissing the appeal:
Whether leave to appeal and extension of time ought be granted
(1) The application turns in part on the true construction of the Regulation which sought to ameliorate the adverse financial effects on commercial lessees of the COVID-19 pandemic by providing a moratorium on enforcement of leases by lessors against “impacted lessees”: [46] (Adamson JA).
(2) The grounds raise questions of public importance: the first raises the question of the true construction of the Regulation and the second concerns the effect of an admission in quasi-pleadings. Therefore, leave to appeal and an extension of time ought be granted: [46] (Adamson JA).
PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird [2019] NSWCA 48; Be Financial Pty Ltd as Trustee for Be Financial Operations Trust v Das [2012] NSWCA 164, cited.
Alleged error in the construction of the Regulation
(3) Under cl 6A(1) of the Regulation, a lessee is required to provide a lessor with a statement or evidence that he is an “impacted lessee”. However, while a lessee may give the information to the lessor before or as soon as practicable after a prescribed breach occurs, a lessee is only required to give the information after the lessor has requested it: cl 6A(2). In that event, the lessee must provide the information within a reasonable time: [48] (Adamson JA).
(4) It is immaterial whether DNK was aware of Mr Jain’s status as an “impacted lessee”. Under cl 6A(3), DNK had a right to request the information at any time if the information was reasonably required. Consequently, DNK’s failure to request such information meant that it took the risk that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee, and that the prescribed action would constitute a breach of the Regulation: [50] (Adamson JA).
(5) The Regulation reflects a clear legislative choice to impose the onus on the lessor to request and receive the information from the lessee, in order to ascertain whether the lessor is prohibited from taking prescribed action and is obliged to mediate or renegotiate the lease. This conclusion is fortified by a consideration of the legislative history of the Regulation, where previously an impacted lessee had a positive obligation to provide a statement and evidence to the lessor regarding their status. Therefore, there was no error in the primary judge’s reasoning with respect to this ground: [52]-[55] (Adamson JA).
Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v Lynwood [2017] NSWCA 317, cited.
Alleged error in finding that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee
(6) Whether Mr Jain is an impacted lessee is a question of fact, which may be established by evidence or admitted by DNK. Paragraph 2 of the points of defence filed by DNK in NCAT indicated to both Mr Jain and NCAT that it admitted Mr Jain was an impacted lessee. The basis for this admission was that Mr Jain had received the 2021 Covid-19 Business Grant, and his business had a turnover of less than $50 million for the 2020-2021 financial year: [60]-[61] (Adamson JA).
(7) Accordingly, those facts were not in issue in the proceedings. Therefore, Mr Jain and NCAT could rely on that admission unless DNK sought, and was granted, leave to withdraw it. The effect of the admission was that Mr Jain was entitled to be found to be an impacted lessee irrespective of whether he adduced any evidence regarding that matter. Consequently, ground 2 has not been made out: [61]-[68] (Adamson JA).
Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658; [1982] HCA 70; The Nominal Defendant v Gabriel (2007) 71 NSWLR 150; [2007] NSWCA 52, cited.
WARD P: I agree with Adamson JA.
ADAMSON JA: Dr N Kalokerinos Pty Ltd (the applicant, or DNK) seeks leave to appeal against orders made by Campbell J (the primary judge) in the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court (the Court below), dismissing its appeal from a decision of the Appeal Panel of the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT). Leave to appeal is required under s 101(2)(r) of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) as the sum in issue does not amount to $100,000.
The applicant also needs an extension of time as the primary judge made substantive orders on 23 August 2024 although costs orders were not made until 6 November 2024. As the applicant seeks leave to appeal against the substantive orders, the material date is 23 August 2024. The applicant’s notice of intention to appeal was filed on 4 December 2024, which was outside the 28 day period allowed. Furthermore, it was ineffective as leave to appeal is required. The applicant’s summons for leave to appeal was ultimately filed on 5 February 2025, over five months after the material date. The question of whether time ought be extended will be addressed in the context of whether leave ought be granted.
At the relevant time, the applicant was the lessor of commercial premises at Shellharbour which were leased by Abhishek Jain (the respondent). On 24 November 2021, the applicant served a notice of termination of lease on Mr Jain, citing various breaches including failure to pay rent and outgoings. The applicant purported to terminate the lease on 13 December 2021 by exercising its right of re-entry.
This precipitated Mr Jain’s application to NCAT, filed on 20 December 2021, in which he alleged that DNK’s termination was unlawful and amounted to a repudiation of the lease, which Mr Jain alleged that he had accepted. Mr Jain relied on the Retail and Other Commercial Leases (COVID-19) Regulation 2021 (NSW), which was in force between 1 December 2021 and 12 January 2022 (the Regulation). This Regulation applied when the applicant purported to re-enter the premises and terminate the lease. On 18 January 2022, the applicant also filed an application in NCAT, claiming damages for breach of the lease. These two applications were heard together.
87 Regulation-making power
(1) The regulations under any relevant Act may provide for the following matters for the purposes of responding to the public health emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic—
…
(c) regulating or preventing the exercise or enforcement of another right of a lessor or owner of premises or land under the relevant Act or an agreement relating to the premises or land in particular circumstances,
…
(2) The Minister may recommend to the Governor that regulations be made under this section only if—
(a) Parliament is not currently sitting and is not likely to sit within 2 weeks after the day the regulations are made, and
(b) in the Minister’s opinion, the regulations are reasonable to protect the health, safety and welfare of lessees or tenants under the Act.
…
The Regulation applied to the exercise or enforcement of rights, defined as “prescribed action” for a “prescribed breach” of an impacted lease. A “prescribed breach” is one that occurred during the “prescribed period”, which cl 3 defines as the period from 13 July 2021 to 13 January 2022: cl 5 of the Regulation. The failure to pay rent fell within the definition of prescribed breach in cl 3. The right of re-entry and the eviction of a lessee fell within the definition of prescribed action in cl 3.
Pursuant to cl 6, the Regulation applied if, at any time during the prescribed period, a lessee was an “impacted lessee”. Clause 4(1) defined “impacted lessee” as being a lessee who qualifies for specified COVID-19-related grants or payments and whose turnover for the 2020-2021 financial year was less than $50 million.
Clause 3 defined “impacted lease” as being “a commercial lease to which an impacted lessee is a party.”
Clause 6A provided:
6A Provision of information
(1) An impacted lessee must give the lessor the following information in respect of the impacted lease—
(a) a statement to the effect that the lessee is an impacted lessee,
(b) evidence that the lessee is an impacted lessee.
(2) The information—
(a) may be given before, or as soon as practicable after, a prescribed breach occurs, and
(b) must be given within a reasonable time after it is requested by the lessor.
(3) The lessor may request the information under this clause at any time if the information is reasonably required to ensure that the lessee continues to be an impacted lessee, but may not request the information more than once every 2 weeks.
Nothing in this clause prevents a lessor and impacted lessee agreeing to action, including prescribed action, being taken in relation to the impacted lease without mediation or without complying with clause 6D.
If the impacted lessee does not comply with subclauses (3) or (4) or clause 6A, the lessor is taken to have complied with this clause.
The functions of NCAT under the Retail Leases Act are allocated to the Consumer and Commercial Division of NCAT: Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) (the NCAT Act), Sch 4, cl 3(1).
Section 3 of the NCAT Act sets out its objects, which include, in (d):
to enable the Tribunal to resolve the real issues in proceedings justly, quickly, cheaply and with as little formality as possible …
Section 36(1) of the NCAT Act identifies the guiding principle for the Act and procedural rules, in their application to proceedings in NCAT to be “to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings.”
Section 38 of the NCAT Act provides in part:
(1) The Tribunal may determine its own procedure in relation to any matter for which this Act or the procedural rules do not otherwise make provision.
(2) The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence and may inquire into and inform itself on any matter in such manner as it thinks fit, subject to the rules of natural justice.
Section 53(1) of the NCAT Act empowers NCAT to make any amendment to any document filed in connection with the proceedings that it considers to be necessary in the interests of justice.
Section 80(2)(b) provides that an internal appeal (for example, from a Senior Member to the Appeal Panel) may be made “as of right on any question of law, or with the leave of the Appeal Panel, on any other grounds.” Section 80(3) provides:
The Appeal Panel may—
(a) decide to deal with the internal appeal by way of a new hearing if it considers that the grounds for the appeal warrant a new hearing, and
(b) permit such fresh evidence, or evidence in addition to or in substitution for the evidence received by the Tribunal at first instance, to be given in the new hearing as it considers appropriate in the circumstances.
However, cl 12(1)(a) of Sch 4 of the NCAT Act limits the Appeal Panel’s power to grant leave under s 80(2)(b) for an internal appeal against a Division decision to circumstances where it is satisfied that the appellant “may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice because … the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable”.
Section 83(1) of the NCAT Act relevantly provides that a party to an internal appeal “may, with the leave of the Supreme Court, appeal on a question of law to the Court against any decision made by the Tribunal in the proceedings.” The relevant decision of the Tribunal for the purposes of s 83(1) is the decision of the Appeal Panel and thus the question of law must arise from the Appeal Panel’s decision: Dokas v Gallagher (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 236 at [1] and [59] (Kirk JA and Griffiths AJA).
The following matters were common ground:
The dispute arose in the second wave of COVID-19.
DNK did not at any time make a request for information from Mr Jain under cl 6A(2)(b) of the Regulation.
Mr Jain did not, at any time prior to the service of his points of claim (see below), ever provide to DNK the information referred to in cl 6A(1) of the Regulation.
No mediation between DNK and Mr Jain had taken place before the lease had terminated (either because of DNK’s re-entry on 13 December 2021 or as a result of Mr Jain’s acceptance on 20 December 2021 of DNK’s repudiation).
The parties did not make any agreement under cl 6C(2) of the Regulation.
Although DNK purported to terminate the lease for various breaches, ultimately the only breach relied on was the failure to pay rent as no valid notice under s 129(1) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW) had been given.
The parties could not contract out of the Regulation, which applied of its own force.
At no time did DNK apply for leave to withdraw the admission made in its points of defence.
On 24 March 2022, after their evidence had been filed, the parties were directed to file points of claim and defences in each of the applications.
In his points of claim dated 9 May 2022 and filed on 11 May 2022 in NCAT, Mr Jain relevantly alleged:
The Delta Outbreak
8 In June 2021, the Delta outbreak led to a lockdown in the Shellharbour Local Government Area.
9 [Mr Jain] received the 2021 COVID-19 Business Grant.
10 In the 2020-2021 financial year, Embers [Mr Jain’s business] had a turnover of less than $50 million.
11 In the premises, [Mr Jain] was an impacted lessee within the meaning of the [Regulation].
…
17 [DNK] did not request information pursuant to [cl] 6A of [the Regulation].
2. [DNK] generally admits paragraphs 1 to 11 of the Points of Claim.
…
- [DNK] admits paragraphs … 17 … of the points of claim.
The hearing in NCAT was conducted by Senior Member Bluth on 23 and 24 August and 23 September 2022.
In their written closing submissions, the parties addressed the effect of the admission made in DNK’s defence. Mr Jain submitted that DNK had admitted that he was an impacted lessee in its defence. In response, DNK submitted that Mr Jain had adduced no evidence that he was an impacted lessee. It said further:
41 The Tenant relies upon paragraph 2 of the Defence to Points of Claim where the Landlord "generally admits paragraphs 1 to 11 of the Points of Claim." Paragraph 11 of the Points of Claim alleged that the Tenant was an impacted lessee within the meaning of the Covid Regulation. It fails to articulate with precision, the relevant time that the Tenant was an impacted lessee. It fails to properly articulate under which Regulation it claimed to be an impacted lessee. It should be noted that the Points of Claim was filed 9 May 2022. The Defence to the Points of Claim was filed 14 July 2022. There can be no satisfactory explanation given for the Tenant's failure to put on evidence on this point. This is particularly so where all of the evidence predated the pleading documents.
(Footnote omitted.)
4. The Landlord complains that there has been no evidence adduced on a fact which it has admitted - namely that the Tenant was an impacted lessee under the Regulation. It would be antithetical to the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues if an issue that was not originally in dispute on the pleadings - that the Tenant was an impacted lessee - is now brought into dispute.
14 … any prohibition would only apply where the tenant was an impacted lessee. The Tenant did not identify as an impacted lessee during the currency of the Lease. The first mention of the Tenant being an impacted lessee was after the evidence had been exchanged between the parties when the Tenant filed its points of claim. There was no evidence led by the Tenant that he was, in fact, an impacted lessee.
15 In response to paragraph 10, “the admissions” in the Landlord's points of defence are of little moment. This is so for the reasons set out in the Landlord's submissions in chief. The fact that these allegations were set out in the points of claim that postdates the evidence renders any "admission" of very little import. There is no evidence of the fact that the Tenant is an impacted lessee and that evidence was led prior to pleadings being filed.”
In cross examination [Mr Jain] affirmatively stated that he did not take any steps to obtain relief pursuant to the COVID Regulations as he did not require such assistance.
52 The Tribunal agrees with the submissions from Mr Folino Galo that [Mr Jain] was not an impacted lessee as [Mr Jain] failed to state as such in compliance with Rule 6A in a reasonable time (or if at all) and chose to avail himself of what appears to have been a more beneficial regime as set out in Special Condition 9 of the Lease (a 50% rent reduction and 50% waiver, and no deferral of rent).
53 This means that the termination of the lease and eviction could proceed as [Mr Jain] was not an impacted lessee, and also means that the annual rent increases as set out in the lease were no[t] prohibited.
On this basis, NCAT found that the applicant’s purported termination of the lease was valid and it was entitled to arrears of rent amounting to $60,025.34 plus interest from Mr Jain.
The finding that Mr Jain was not an impacted lessee was made despite the applicant’s admission in paragraph 2 of its points of defence that he was. Further, the evidence given by Mr Jain in cross-examination was not inconsistent with his being an impacted lessee since cl 4(1)(a) of the Regulation is fulfilled when a person qualifies for one of three grants or payments. Thus, a person who is not in receipt of any of the specified grants or payments but who qualifies is nonetheless an impacted lessee.
At the hearing the Appeal Panel may proceed, if appropriate, to deal with the appeal by way of a new hearing, under the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), section 80(3). The parties should be prepared to put before the Appeal Panel any fresh evidence or evidence in addition to evidence received by the Tribunal at first instance and make any submissions in relation to the original application that they want to make.
Issue 5: whether Mr Jain was an impacted lessee within the meaning of the 2021 COVID-19 Regulation at the relevant time
Further, the Appeal Panel relevantly accepted that Mr Jain had an appeal as of right on the following ground of appeal because it was a question of law: “whether the Tribunal constructively failed to exercise jurisdiction by not addressing a material issue, namely the admission that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee in the DNK defence”.
In the alternative, the Appeal Panel found that, even if that question were not a question of law, it would have granted leave to appeal under s 80(2)(b) of the NCAT Act as the Appeal Panel “would have been satisfied that Mr Jain may have suffered a substantial miscarriage of justice on the basis that the decision of the Tribunal under appeal was not fair and equitable within cl 12(1)(a) of Sch 4 of the NCAT Act.”
The Appeal Panel relevantly found that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee. It addressed the provisions relating to pleadings in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) and s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW). It considered that an admission in points of defence in NCAT could not be equated with an admission in a pleading filed in the District or Supreme Courts. Further, the Appeal Panel noted that the rules of evidence do not apply in NCAT hearings. However, it found as follows:
115 While we acknowledge that the Tribunal pursuant to s 38(2) of the NCAT Act is not bound by the rules of evidence, we consider that the Tribunal should treat an admission in points of defence filed in proceedings in the Tribunal which is signed by a solicitor in the same manner as an agreed fact within s 191 of the Evidence Act and in accordance with the principles in PGP at [35]. This approach is permitted by s 38(1) of the NCAT Act which empowers the Tribunal to determine its own procedure in relation to any matter for which the NCAT Act or NCAT Rules do not otherwise make provision. This approach also gives effect to the guiding principle to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings pursuant to s 36(1) and (2)(a) of the NCAT Act. Such an admission of a fact will not be required to be proved by evidence.
116 We are satisfied that, by reason of the admission by DNK in the DNK defence at [2], the matters in the Jain points of claim at [9]-[11] were agreed facts before the Tribunal.
117 We do not accept the submission of DNK that the Jain points of claim at [11] fails to articulate with precision the relevant time that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee, or fails to properly articulate under which regulation he claimed to be an impacted lessee. Having regard to the Jain points of claim at [7], [9] and [10], and the amended wording of cl 4 of the 2021 COVID-19 Regulation, the agreed fact in the Jain points of claim at [11] was that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee within the meaning of the 2021 COVID-19 Regulation during the period from 13 August 2021 to 13 December 2021.
118 There is no reason why we should not accept this agreed fact as true. There was no contradictory evidence. It was not inherently incredible. While we accept that the Jain statement does not contain any evidence that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee and its date precedes the date of the Jain points of claim, this does not mean that we should not accept this agreed fact. In view of our acceptance of this agreed fact, this absence of any evidence by Mr Jain that he was an impacted lessee is irrelevant.
1 The Appeal Panel erred in law at J[128] in its construction of clauses 6A to 6D (inclusive) of [the Regulation].
…
3 In the alternative to 2, the Appeal Panel erred in law at J[115] by treating the phrase “generally admits” in a points of defence filed in proceedings in the Tribunal, in the same manner as an agreed fact within s 191 of the Evidence Act 1995 (NSW) and by accepting that it was true that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee [118].
(Emphasis added to indicate the part of the ground which was excised by the primary judge on the basis that it was a question of fact rather than a question of law.)
The primary judge relevantly upheld the Appeal Panel’s decision for the reasons it gave. His Honour found, at [62], that the Appeal Panel was not saying that DNK’s admission in its points of defence that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee was an agreed fact under s 191 of the Evidence Act. Rather, it considered that the admission had an analogous effect.
His Honour went on to say, in what was clearly obiter:
64 It may be that the Appeal Panel was incorrect in saying that there was no contradictory evidence in this case. But one needs to bear in mind the absence of a transcript of proceedings before the Tribunal at first instance. From Senior Member Bluth’s reasons, it appears that he permitted Mr Jain to be cross-examined about facts relevant to paragraphs [8], [9], [10] and [11] of his points of claim. But given that the Appeal Panel was exercising its powers under s 80(3) NCAT Act it was open to them to decide the facts for themselves and to afford, as they did, significant weight to the admission contained in the points of claim, given the circumstances in which it was made. Clearly, they did so. This was also entirely consistent was the principle stated in Lustre Hosiery.
65 It should also be borne in mind that whatever evidence Mr Jain himself gave, as I have pointed out, there was documentary evidence before the Appeal Panel which had been before the Tribunal at first instance which proved Mr Jain had received a benefit specified in cl 4 2021 COVID Regulation.
In order to obtain leave to appeal, the applicant must show that there is an issue of principle, a question of public importance or a reasonably clear injustice going beyond something which is merely arguable: see the authorities referred to in PPK Willoughby Pty Ltd v Baird [2019] NSWCA 48 at [6] (Bell P and Simpson AJA).
This Court (Basten JA, Tobias AJA agreeing) confirmed in Be Financial Pty Ltd as Trustee for Be Financial Operations Trust v Das [2012] NSWCA 164, that s 58 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW), which requires the Court to act in accordance with “the dictates of justice”, applies to leave applications, as does s 60 of the Civil Procedure Act which provides:
60 Proportionality of costs
In any proceedings, the practice and procedure of the court should be implemented with the object of resolving the issues between the parties in such a way that the cost to the parties is proportionate to the importance and complexity of the subject-matter in dispute.
The applicant, by draft notice of appeal, seeks leave to appeal on the following grounds which are, in substance, as follows:
alleged error in finding that the Regulation did not impose an obligation on a lessee to provide a lessor with a statement or evidence that he was an “impacted lessee” within the meaning of the Regulation; and
alleged error in finding that the respondent was an “impacted lessee” on the basis of an admission on the pleadings.
Proposed ground (1) broadly corresponds with ground 1 in the Court below and proposed ground (2) broadly corresponds with ground 3 in the Court below. Ground 2 in the Court below is not pressed in this Court.
The application in this Court turns in part on the true construction of the Regulation which sought to ameliorate the adverse financial effects on commercial lessees of the COVID-19 pandemic by providing a moratorium on enforcement of leases by lessors against “impacted lessees”. I consider these grounds to raise questions of public importance: the first raises the question of the true construction of the Regulation and the second concerns the effect of an admission in pleadings or quasi-pleadings. Accordingly, I consider that leave ought be granted on both grounds. I also consider that an extension of time ought be granted on the same basis. Mr Krochmalik, who appeared with Dr Lim for the respondent, did not identify any prejudice that would be suffered if such an extension were granted.
In the Court below, the applicant submitted that if Mr Jain wished to qualify as an “impacted lessee”, he was obliged to notify the lessor of his status under cl 6A in order to enliven the protections in cll 6B, 6C and 6D. The primary judge accepted Mr Jain’s submissions that, although he, as lessee, had an obligation to inform the lessor that he was an impacted lessee, this obligation only arose when the lessor requested it. In that event, the lessee had a reasonable time within which to provide it: J [26]-[27], [37]-[38].
This ground raises two questions of construction: (1) what is the lessee’s obligation to notify the lessor that he claims to be an impacted lessee; and (2) when does it arise. The first question is answered by cl 6A(1). It provides that an impacted lessee must give the lessor certain information – namely, a statement to the effect that the lessee is an impacted lessee, together with evidence of that fact that the lessee is an impacted lessee (the information). The second question is answered by cl 6A(2) and (3). While a lessee may give the information to the lessor before or as soon as practicable after a prescribed breach occurs (cl 6A(2)(a)), a lessee is only required to give the information within a reasonable time after the lessor has requested it (cl 6A(2)(b)). In turn, the lessor may request it anytime as long as it is reasonably required and not requested more than once a fortnight: cl 6A(3).
I reject the submission made by Mr Mack that the word “may” in cl 6A(2)(a) ought be read as “must”. There is good reason to attribute to Parliament the intention to use words advisedly. Where “may” and “must” are used in close proximity, dealing with the same subject matter, the distinction between the ordinary meaning of each becomes even more marked: see the discussion in Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v Lynwood [2017] NSWCA 317 at [8]-[10] (Basten JA, Simpson JA agreeing).
The applicant submitted that it was “never open” to the applicant to make a request under cl 6A(2)(b) because it “never knew” that Mr Jain was, or was purporting to be, an impacted lessee. I reject this submission. Clause 6A(3), when read with cl 6A(1), is plain in its terms: it entitles a lessor to request the information “at any time if the information is reasonably required”. When the applicant was considering exercising its right of re-entry on the basis of breach, it was important for it to know whether Mr Jain was, or was not, an impacted lessee. If he was the former, the applicant could go ahead with its proposed enforcement action. However, if he was the latter, the applicant was prohibited from taking that step and was required to submit to mediation. Thus, the applicant had a right under cl 6A(3) to request the information from Mr Jain and Mr Jain had an obligation under cl 6A(2)(b) to provide it within a reasonable time. If DNK failed to request the information from Mr Jain before taking prescribed action (such as re-entry), it took the risk that Mr Jain was, in fact, an impacted lessee, with the consequence that the prescribed action would constitute a breach of the Regulation and be, therefore, unlawful.
…
(1) A lessor under an impacted lease must not take or continue any prescribed action against the impacted lessee concerned on grounds of a breach of the impacted lease consisting of a failure to pay rent during the prescribed period unless the lessor has complied with this clause.
…
(3A) An impacted lessee must give the lessor the following in respect of the impacted lease—
(a) a statement to the effect that the lessee is an impacted lessee,
(b) evidence that the lessee is an impacted lessee.
(3B) If the impacted lessee does not comply with subclause (3A), the lessor is taken to have complied with this clause.
In this version, the impacted lessee had a positive obligation to give a statement and evidence to the lessor and failure by the lessee to comply with that obligation resulted in the lessor being freed from the prohibition in cl 7(1). The difference in wording between this earlier version and the Regulation which applied in the present case also demonstrates a clear legislative choice to put the onus on the lessor to request a statement and information and also to ascertain as a matter of fact whether the lessee was, or was not, an impacted lessee. This amendment shows that the intention of the Regulation in the form which applies in the present case was designed to protect impacted lessees, in accordance with the terms of the regulation-making power in s 87 of the Retail Leases Act.
No error in the primary judge’s reasoning with respect to this ground or the result has been made out.
The Appeal Panel found that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee on the basis of the applicant’s admission in its points of defence. It acknowledged that, under s 38(2) of the NCAT Act, it was not bound by the rules of evidence but considered that it could treat the applicant’s admission in the pleadings as akin to an agreed fact pursuant to s 191 of the Evidence Act that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee from 13 August 2021 to 13 December 2021.
The primary judge considered the evidence that was before his Honour from the Appeal Panel (which did not include the transcript of the evidence before NCAT) and said:
62 But I am not of the view that the Appeal Panel was stating that s 191 Evidence Act actually applied to DNK’s admission of paras [8], [9], [10] and [11] of Mr Jain’s points of claim. In my view it is clear that the Appeal Panel did not fall into error. They referred to s 38(2) NCAT Act and stated that admissions should be dealt with “in the same manner as an agreed fact within s 191 Evidence Act” (my emphasis). The Appeal Panel did not say that they were agreed facts under that provision. Moreover, the Appeal Panel based its approach squarely on s 38(1) under which it was entitled to determine its own procedure in relation to matters for which the NCAT Act or rules “do not otherwise make provision”. The guiding principle was invoked.
63 Quite clearly, the direction that legally represented parties in a commercial dispute of some complexity involving a retail lease exchange points of claim and points of defence was made for the purpose of clarifying the issues and reducing the matters in dispute. That the exchange of these documents was required after, and not before, the exchange of evidence enhanced rather than detracted from their utility. This circumstance enabled the parties to make proper admissions after having the opportunity for full consideration of the evidence on which the other side intended to rely. The Appeal Panel said (at APJ [115]), “such an admission of a fact will not be required to be proved by evidence”. At the same time, given the earlier reference to r 12.6(2) UCPR and having regard to the analogy drawn from s 191 Evidence Act, the Appeal Panel cannot be understood as denying the Tribunal’s power to grant leave for an admission so made or a fact so agreed to be withdrawn, challenged or contradicted.
64 It may be that the Appeal Panel was incorrect in saying that there was no contradictory evidence in this case. But one needs to bear in mind the absence of a transcript of proceedings before the Tribunal at first instance. From Senior Member Bluth’s reasons, it appears that he permitted Mr Jain to be cross-examined about facts relevant to paragraphs [8], [9], [10] and [11] of his points of claim. But given that the Appeal Panel was exercising its powers under s 80(3) NCAT Act it was open to them to decide the facts for themselves and to afford, as they did, significant weight to the admission contained in the points of claim, given the circumstances in which it was made. Clearly, they did so. This was also entirely consistent was the principle stated in Lustre Hosiery.
65 It should also be borne in mind that whatever evidence Mr Jain himself gave, as I have pointed out, there was documentary evidence before the Appeal Panel which had been before the Tribunal at first instance which proved Mr Jain had received a benefit specified in cl 4 2021 COVID Regulation.
Mr Mack submitted that “generally admits" was not a “hardcore admission” and could not be taken as effective to admit the paragraphs referred to, including because NCAT was not a court of strict pleading. Further, he submitted that it was significant that the points of claim and defence were ordered to be filed after the evidence had already been filed and served. Mr Mack also submitted that Mr Jain could not be an impacted lessee until he told DNK that he was and provided information to prove it, either before, or as soon as practicable after, a prescribed breach.
I reject these submissions. The last submission conflates two concepts: first, whether Mr Jain was an impacted lessee; and, second, whether Mr Jain was obliged to notify DNK that he was an impacted lessee and the consequences of his not doing so. The second concept is the subject of ground 1 which has been addressed above. The first concept is a question of fact which may be established by evidence or admitted by DNK. It is not affected by whether Mr Jain has informed DNK of his status as an impacted lessee or DNK’s state of mind as to whether Mr Jain is an impacted lessee.
Paragraph 2 of the points of defence filed by the applicant in NCAT indicated to Mr Jain and to NCAT that it admitted that Mr Jain was an impacted lessee (as alleged in paragraph 11 of Mr Jain’s points of claim). The basis for this admission was that Mr Jain had received the 2021 Covid-19 Business Grant (paragraph 9 of the points of claim) and that his business had a turnover for the 2020-2021 financial year of less than $50 million (paragraph 10 of the points of claim). Accordingly, those facts were not in issue in the proceedings. Mr Jain and NCAT could rely on that admission unless and until the applicant sought, and was granted, leave to withdraw it. The effect of the admission in the points of defence was that Mr Jain was entitled to be found to be an impacted lessee irrespective of whether he adduced any evidence regarding that matter.
Under s 53(1) of the NCAT Act, the applicant could have applied to amend its points of defence to withdraw the admission in paragraph 2 of its points of defence. As referred to above, it was common ground that it did not.
NCAT is not a court of strict pleading and is entitled, with some qualifications, to determine its own procedure, subject to the requirements of natural justice. However, the points of claim and points of defence filed in NCAT in a case such as the present serve a similar function to pleadings in litigation. Importantly, this includes identifying both the issues and the case the other party has to meet to accord natural justice. The points of claim put the applicant on notice of the way of which Mr Jain was putting his case and the material facts on which he relied (including that he claimed to be an impacted lessee because he had received the 2021 Covid-19 Business Grant and that his business had a turnover for the 2020-2021 financial year of less than $50 million).
For the reasons given above, I propose the following orders:
Extend the time within which the applicant is to file a summons for leave to appeal to 5 February 2025.
Direct the applicant to file a notice of appeal in the form of the draft notice of appeal within 7 days.
Grant leave to appeal.
Dismiss the appeal.
Order the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.
PRICE AJA: I agree with Adamson JA.
**********
Dr N Kalokerinos Pty Ltd
Jain [2025] NSWCA 137
(1982) 148 CLR 658
(2007) 71 NSWLR 150
Time to file the summons for leave to appeal was extended to 5 February 2025; DNK was directed to file a notice of appeal in the form of its draft within seven days; leave to appeal was granted; the appeal was dismissed; and DNK was ordered to pay Mr Jain's appeal costs.
It is also significant that cl 6C makes no mention of cl 6A. Had it been the intention of the legislature, cl 6C of the Regulation could have provided that a lessor must not take prescribed action against a lessee who has provided information under cl 6A(1). However, there is no such provision. The absence of such a provision is a strong textual indication that the prohibition against prescribed action was intended to apply with respect to impacted lessees, irrespective of whether information had been provided by them to the lessor. The wording of cl 6C is to be contrasted with the wording of cl 6D, which deems the lessor to have complied with cl 6D if the lessee, relevantly, does not comply with cl 6A (provision of information on request of the lessor). This is also another powerful textual indication that the prohibition in cl 6C against prescribed action by the lessor does not depend on the lessee’s compliance with cl 6A.
I reject DNK’s submission that this result is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable”. I consider the wording of the Regulation to be unambiguous on this point. The Regulation reflects a clear legislative choice to impose the onus on the lessor to request the information and receive it from the lessee in order to ascertain whether the lessor is prohibited from taking prescribed action and is obliged to mediate or renegotiate the lease. While the effect of the Regulation was to impose a temporary moratorium on the usual rights of enforcement of lessors, it is plain that this was its intention, in the circumstances which applied during relatively short periods during the COVID-19 pandemic.
This conclusion is fortified by a consideration of the legislative history of the Regulation. The version of the Retail and Other Commercial Leases (COVID-19) Regulation 2020 (NSW), which was in force between 3 July 2020 and 23 October 2020, relevantly provided, in cl 7:
When filing its defence, the applicant had a choice whether to:
admit these allegations (thereby indicating that they were not in dispute and need not be proved);
not admit the allegations (thereby indicating that Mr Jain would have to prove them); or
deny the allegations (thereby indicating that the applicant disputed them and intended to challenge them positively in its defence).
Because the applicant admitted these allegations, they were no longer in dispute and Mr Jain was not required to prove them. Also, the applicant was not, as a matter of natural justice, entitled to contradict its admissions unless NCAT had granted it leave to withdraw them or it was plain that the parties had decided to abandon the points of claim and defence entirely: see Dare v Pulham (1982) 148 CLR 658 at 664; [1982] HCA 70 (Murphy, Wilson, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). There is no basis for a suggestion that either of these possibilities occurred in the present case.
An admission on the pleadings, or quasi-pleadings such as the points of claim and points of defence in NCAT, is not the same as an agreed fact under s 191 of the Evidence Act. However, its effect is analogous. An “agreed fact” is defined as meaning a fact that the parties have agreed is not, for the purposes of the proceedings, to be disputed: s 191(1). Unless the Court gives leave, evidence is not required to prove an agreed fact and evidence cannot be adduced to qualify or contradict it: s 191(2). There are formal requirements for agreed facts: s 191(3).
An admission on pleadings is binding unless leave is granted to withdraw it. An agreed fact cannot be contradicted by other evidence. These types of formal agreement or admission are to be distinguished from an informal admission which comprises part of the evidence before the tribunal of fact and which must, therefore, be weighed together with all relevant evidence as a whole: see the discussion in The Nominal Defendant v Gabriel (2007) 71 NSWLR 150; [2007] NSWCA 52 at [103]-[113] (Campbell JA, Hodgson JA agreeing). A formal admission, such as one made in a pleading or by an agreed fact, cannot be resiled from, without leave, in part because of its potent effect on procedural fairness. The opposing party is entitled to rely on a formal admission and conduct its case accordingly: this is fundamental to the adversarial system and to procedural fairness.
It is apparent from the primary judge’s reasons that his Honour had regard to what evidence there was as to whether Mr Jain was an impacted lessee. To some extent, the primary judge was obliged to glean this from the reasons of NCAT and the Appeal Panel since the evidence was not before him. This task was unnecessary, having regard to the admission, on which his Honour principally relied. Nonetheless, it does not make his Honour’s conclusion – that Mr Jain’s status as an impacted lessee was established by the applicant’s admission – legally erroneous. The passage was plainly dicta.
For the reasons set out above, ground 2 has not been made out.