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[2026] ACTSC 83
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-03-30
Baker J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: DPP v Winters Citation: [2026] ACTSC 83 Hearing Dates: 11, 16 December 2025, 26 February, 26 March 2026 Decision Date: 30 March 2026 Before: Baker J Decision: See [54] Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – driving offences – offending breached good behaviour order and offender resentenced – extensive criminal history – profound disadvantage – rehabilitation the best community protection – unusual circumstances – demonstrated commitment to rehabilitation – offender working towards restoration of young son who is currently in care – full-time imprisonment would jeopardise this progress – suspended sentence Legislation Cited: Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT) s 7 Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) s 31, 32 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 308, 312, 318, 321 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 116 Cases Cited: DPP v Rohrlach (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 192 Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions Joshua Luke Winters (Offender) Representation: Counsel J Churchill (DPP) D Bloomfield (Offender) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions ACT Legal Aid (Offender) File Numbers: SCC 202 of 2025 SCC 203 of 2025 BAKER J: Introduction
The offender has pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court to one count of aggravated furious, reckless or dangerous driving contrary to s 7(1) of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT) (CAN 7799/2024) and one count of driving unlicensed having never held a license contrary to s 31(2) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) (CAN 12054/2024).
The offender is a first offender for the aggravated furious, reckless or dangerous driving charge. However, the offender is repeat offender for the driving unlicensed charge.
The maximum penalty for aggravated furious, reckless or dangerous driving (first offender) is 3 years’ imprisonment, 300 penalty units or both. The maximum penalty for drive unlicensed having never held a licence is 6 months’ imprisonment, 50 penalty units or both.
The offences were committed in breach of a suspended sentence and good behaviour order (GBO) imposed by Refshauge J. The offender is to be resentenced for the following offences: (a) One count of drive while disqualified contrary to s 32(1) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) (CAN 11444/2021); (b) Two counts of ride/drive motor vehicle without consent contrary to s 318 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CAN11445/2021 and CAN 2923/2022); (c) One count of aggravated burglary contrary to s 312 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CAN11716/2021); (d) One count of joint commission minor theft contrary to s 321 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CAN11717/2021); (e) One count of joint commission destroy/damage property contrary to s 116(3) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (CAN11718/2021); (f) One count of joint commission aggravated burglary contrary to s 312 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CAN11890/2021); (g) One count of joint commission theft contrary to s 308 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CAN716/2022); (h) Two counts of minor theft contrary to s 321 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CAN 1329/2022 and CAN 1330/2022); (i) One count of drive while unlicenced contrary to s 31(2) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) (CAN3069/2022).
The offender is now to be sentenced for each of these offences.
The offending
At 8:18am on 31 July 2024, Police were conducting a routine patrol along Hindmarsh Drive. At this time, Police observed a dark grey Mazda 3 turn off Hindmarsh Drive southbound onto Tuggeranong Parkway. Police then attempted to catch up with the Mazda 3, but could no longer see the vehicle. Police inferred that this meant the vehicle must have been travelling above the speed limit of Tuggeranong Parkway, which was 100 kilometres per hour. The Agreed Statement of Facts does not record how fast the police were travelling, nor for how long they pursued the vehicle. Accordingly, it is not possible to determine how much in excess of the speed limit the offender was travelling.
At 8:21am, Police located the Mazda 3. The Mazda 3 was stuck in traffic at the intersection of Tuggeranong Parkway and Sulwood Drive. Police pulled up alongside the vehicle, and had a clear view of the driver, who was later identified to be the offender. Police indicated to the offender to pull over. The offender shrugged. When the traffic lights turned green, the offender changed lanes and accelerated away from Police, who had activated their emergency lights and sirens. Based on their observations, Police estimated the offender to be driving above the speed limit of Drakeford Drive, being 80 kilometres per hour (CAN 7799/2024).
Due to the presence of heavy traffic, Police decided not to pursue the vehicle any further. However, at 8:37am, after having conducted inquiries to identify the offender, Police arrived at the offender’s home. The Mazda 3 was spotted by Police as being parked on the offender’s street, albeit now with its registration plates removed. It was warm to the touch.
At 8:43am, the Police gained entry to the offender’s home. Police located the offender within the home, hiding behind the door of the master bedroom. The offender was arrested. At this time, the offender told police that the registration plates for the car were located under the bed.
The offender has never held a driver’s licence of any class within the ACT (CAN12054/2024). The offender
Criminal History
The offender has an extensive criminal history, which includes convictions in the ACT for the following: (a) burglary (for offending in 2008, 2011 and 2016); (b) aggravated burglary (for offending in 2008, 2009 and 2011); (c) attempted aggravated burglary (2019); (d) theft (for offending in 2008, 2011 and 2016); (e) minor theft (for offending in 2008 and 2016); (f) culpable driving causing grievous bodily harm (2013); (g) failing to stop/render assistance (2013); (h) ride/drive motor vehicle without consent (for offending in 2010 and 2019); (i) drive while disqualified (for offending in 2016 and 2019); (j) drive unlicensed having never held a licence (for offending in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013); (k) drive unregistered/suspended vehicle (for offending in 2010, 2012 and 2016); (l) drive uninsured (for offending in 2012 and 2016); (m) take motor vehicle without consent (for offending in 2016) (n) drive with prescribed drug in oral fluid (2019); (o) drive with number plate not properly issued or issued for another vehicle (2016); (p) property damage (2016); (q) obtain property by deception (for offending in 2019); (r) unlawful possession of stolen property (for offending in 2016 and 2019); (s) possess prohibited substance (other drug or >25g cannabis) (2016); (t) fight in a public place (2011); and (u) breach GBO (for offending in 2011 and 2013). Breach
On 26 April 2022, Refshauge AJ sentenced the offender for one count of aggravated burglary, one count of aggravated burglary by joint commission, one count of property damage, one count of drive motor vehicle without consent, one count of theft by joint commission, two counts of minor theft, one count of minor theft by joint commission, one count of drive while disqualified (repeat offender) and one count of trespass: R v Winters [2022] ACTSC 371. These offences related to offending that occurred in November 2021.
The overall sentence imposed by Refshauge J for these offences was a sentence of four years’ imprisonment and a $500 fine for the trespass offence. His Honour ordered that the term of imprisonment be served by way of a two-year drug and alcohol treatment order (DATO), with the remainder of the sentence being suspended.
The offender’s compliance with the DATO was brief. On 15 June 2022, a search of the offender’s room by Canberra Recovery Services revealed that the offender had been concealing several rounds of live ammunition. The offender was remanded in custody on 16 June 2022. On 30 June 2022, Refshauge AJ cancelled the offender’s DATO. It appears that the unavailability of residential drug rehabilitation in circumstances where Canberra Recovery Services would not readmit the offender was central to this decision. Specifically, Refshauge AJ found (at [85]) that: … the continued commitment of Mr Winters to his rehabilitation, his positive participation for the period, though very short, in Canberra Recovery Services, his abstinence from the use of the drugs on which he was dependent and his return to Court, without absconding, all suggest that, had another residential drug rehabilitation facility been available, the Treatment Order may not have needed to have been cancelled. That is by no means certain. It is also relevant that he has not committed further offences since the Treatment Order was made.
On 15 August 2022, Refshauge AJ reimposed the four year term of imprisonment previously imposed, and sentenced the offender for further offending (namely, drive motor vehicle without consent and drive unlicensed having never held a licence) that had been committed prior to the imposition of the DATO: R v Winters (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 378. The total sentence of imprisonment imposed was four years and ten months.
His Honour backdated the sentence to take into account 212 days of pre-sentence custody, and suspended the remainder of the sentence on the offender’s entry into a GBO. The suspended sentences and GBO commenced on 15 August 2022 and were due to expire on 14 November 2026.
Breach proceedings were later brought by ACT Corrective Services and the offender was re-sentenced by Refshauge AJ in similar terms on 26 April 2023. His Honour’s reasons for this resentence are not available. The total sentence was 4 years and 2 months which was wholly suspended upon the commencement of a GBO. These suspended sentences and GBO were due to expire on 6 October 2026.
On 31 July 2024, the offender breached the GBOs by way of the present offending.
Evidence adduced in the sentence proceedings The sentence proceedings
The proceedings were first listed for hearing on 11 December 2025. On that occasion, the prosecution tendered two Intensive Correction Order Assessment Reports (ICOARs), each of which assessed the offender as unsuitable for an intensive correction order (ICO). The offender also gave evidence. The proceedings were adjourned to 16 December 2026 and at the conclusion of that hearing, I directed that a further ICOAR be prepared. As detailed below, the third ICOAR also assessed the offender as unsuitable for an ICO.
The proceedings were next listed for sentence on 26 February 2026. On that occasion, counsel for the offender provided further information which contextualised some of the statements that had been made by the offender to the ICOAR author. With the consent of the prosecution, the offender was granted a further adjournment to provide evidence supporting the matters raised. That evidence was a letter from a Family Worker employed by “Newpin” and a letter from a Child Safety Practitioner employed by Children Youth and Families ACT (CYF) which were each tendered at the hearing on 26 March 2026.
First ICOAR
Second ICOAR
The second ICOAR is dated 24 July 2025.
The offender engaged with Corrective Services in the preparation of this report.
The ICOAR author noted that the offender has positive and supportive relationships with his mother and five of his six siblings. The ICOAR recorded that the offender’s stepfather had been placed into care but the offender reported that he remained his stepfather’s primary carer. The report indicated that offender is the father of a two-year-old child, who is currently in care. CYF confirmed to the ICOAR author that work is being undertaken with the offender to build upon his parenting capacity with a view of potentially restoring his custody of the child. He reported being in an “on again, off again” relationship with his former partner since the age of 10, and continues to spend time with her and her children.
The offender has a history of drug use originating in childhood. However, he told the ICOAR author that he had been significantly abstinent for approximately four years, with the exception of cannabis, which the offender reported he has previously been medically prescribed. The offender told the ICOAR author, however, that he does not have a current prescription for cannabis. He also reported that he drinks alcohol infrequently, and has never had an alcohol addiction.
The ICOAR author reported that the offender is concerned that if he is returned to custody, he will not be granted custody of his son. He stated that this would be the “end of me”. The offender told the ICOAR author that he “shouldn’t go to jail for this”, although he had accepted that his offending was a mistake.
The ICOAR author assessed the offender as generally suitable for a medium level of supervision within the community, noting that the offender’s family support, caring responsibilities and motivation to gain custody of his son operate as protective factors. Nonetheless, the ICOAR author assessed the offender as unsuitable for an ICO. The basis of this assessment was the offender’s continued cannabis use in the absence of a current medical prescription. Such use would result in breach action and impact the ability of the offender to remain in the community.
The Offender’s Evidence on 11 December 2025
The offender gave evidence in the sentence proceedings on 11 December 2025. The offender told the Court that he first found out that he was father in April 2025, at which time his son was aged 18 months and had been placed into care. The offender explained that he is committed to gaining custody of his son. To achieve this, he had been attending a parenting course twice a week, and had fortnightly meetings with Care and Protection. The offender informed the Court that he has been told that he must have achieved custody of his son by April 2026 in order for his son not to be placed in permanent care. He understood that if a sentence of full-time custody were imposed, he will “lose [his] son”.
The offender also described his efforts to find suitable housing for himself and his son. He told the Court that, with the assistance of the Salvation Army, he had received housing through YWCA. The offender was due to sign the lease on the afternoon of the hearing.
The offender gave evidence that he has complex post-traumatic stress disorder. He also suffers from panic attacks and night terrors. The offender said that he has engaged in “a lot of counselling” and that he is “in a good place at the moment”.
The offender also gave evidence concerning the offending. He said that he could not “remember the exact scenario on why [he] was driving”, other than that it occurred after he had an argument with his partner and shortly after he had found out that his stepfather was sick. The offender said that he feels like an “absolute idiot” for engaging in the offending, particularly as his complex post-traumatic stress disorder arises in part from being involved in two serious car accidents in his youth. The offender said that he disposed of the car the day after the offences.
Third ICOAR
As noted above, in accordance with the Court’s direction, a third ICOAR was prepared at the request of the Court following the hearing dates in December. That ICOAR is dated 16 February 2026. That ICOAR again assessed the offender as unsuitable for an ICO.
The ICOAR author reported that the offender attended two scheduled appointments and failed to attend one appointment. The ICOAR recorded that the offender “advised he was unlikely to comply with the requirements of an [ICO], citing reluctance to attend this Service, responsibilities associated with seeking full-time care of his son, competing appointments, plans to relocate interstate, and his belief he was unsuitable for an ICO.” The offender also disclosed cannabis use. He was subject to an oral drug test on 30 January 2026 that indicated the presence of cannabis.
The offender reported a close relationship with his mother who lives in Melbourne and said that he contacts his four sisters who also reside in Melbourne often. He does not have contact with his brother who resides in Canberra. The offender told the ICOAR author that he expected to obtain custody of his son in early 2026. He said that he has worked in construction previously and indicated that he may consider returning to work once his son had commenced kindergarten.
The offender was assessed as suitable for a medium level of intervention by reference to his assessed risk of reoffending and again assessed as unsuitable for an ICO. This assessment was based on the offender’s “disregard for ICO conditions and continued cannabis use” which would impact his ability to remain in the community. The sentence proceedings on 26 February 2025
At the sentence proceedings on 26 February 2025, Mr Bloomfield, who appeared on behalf of the offender, explained that the offender’s comments as recorded in the third ICOAR were “partly correct”. He explained that the offender’s “entire focus” is on his son. He explained that the offender was concerned that with an ICO “he simply wouldn't be able to fulfill the very extensive and intense requirements of supervision of his son.” Mr Bloomfield also advised that the offender has struggled to get a prescription for medical cannabis for two reasons. The first is that cost has been prohibitive but that the offender had seen a doctor. The second is that the doctor advised that a medical cannabis prescription was not available to the offender, because the offender has had opiate treatment four and a half years ago, and medical cannabis is not available for persons who have had opiate treatment within the past five years. I accept these explanations.
Documentation provided by Children Youth and Family Services (CYF)
At the further hearing of the proceedings on 26 March 2026, a letter from a Family Worker employed by “Newpin” and a letter from a Child Safety Practitioner employed by CYF were each tendered on behalf of the offender.
The letter from “Newpin” indicates that the offender has “demonstrated consistent and meaningful engagement” with the program and a “willingness to remain engaged with ongoing supports”. The letter from CYF indicated that the offender is working towards full restoration of his son and is currently having unsupervised visits with him. Both letters expressed the view that a period of full-time imprisonment would have detrimental effects for offender’s progress as a parent, the relationship between the offender and his son and the offender’s son’s wellbeing.
Determination
The prosecutor accepted that it is open to sentence the offender to further suspended sentences for the present offending. It is understandable why this concession was made. Whilst the offence of dangerous driving is an extremely serious offence, the present offending is at the lower end of objective seriousness for that offence. The fact that the offence occurred during peak hour traffic is an aggravating circumstance, as it risked the safety of many peak hour drivers. However, the Agreed Facts contains no further particulars of the offending, other than that the offender drove well in excess of the speed limit, for two unspecified distances on 31 July 2024.
What renders the present offending of considerably more concern, however, is that the offender was subject to a suspended sentence and GBO at the time of this offending. Significantly, those suspended sentences were themselves imposed following a resentence for a breach of a previous suspended sentence, which was itself imposed following a breach of a DATO.
In DPP v Rohrlach (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 192 at [10]-[12], McWilliam J made the following observations about the discretion of the Court to resentence an offender where the offender has breached a condition of a GBO that was attached to that sentence: There is no presumption in favour of imposing the original sentence that had been suspended. However, there are many statements by courts across multiple jurisdictions of the principle that generally a breach of the conditions of a good behaviour order or the like following the suspension of a sentence will result in the offender serving the sentence that was suspended. The reason for this is to recognise that the offender avoided serving full-time imprisonment by entering into a GBO. In Cooke, Howie JA stated at [23]: ... There is nothing more likely to bring suspended sentences into disrepute than the failure of courts to act where there has been a clear breach of the conditions of the bond by which the offender avoided being sent to prison. ... [I]f offenders do not treat the obligations imposed upon them by the bond seriously and if courts are not rigorous in revoking the bond upon breach in the usual case, both offenders and the public in general will treat them as being nothing more than a legal fiction designed to allow an offender to escape the punishment that he or she rightly deserved. (Citations omitted.)
For those reasons, the Court must be very cautious before affording an offender a fully suspended sentence after that offender has already had the benefit of a further suspended sentence on a resentence.
However, as McWilliam J continued (at [14]): That is not to say that the sentence imposed should increase in every case where re-sentencing occurs as a result of a breach. A minor or technical breach of a GBO that occurs close to the end of the period of the suspended sentence and with a reasonable explanation for the breach is an example where it may not be appropriate to impose the original custodial sentence, nor to impose a more severe sentence. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate for the court to impose the same sentence that was imposed at first instance. The legislation expressly does not fetter the court’s discretion on a re-sentence in any particular way. (Citations omitted.)
The present case is unusual. The offender grew up in an environment of profound disadvantage. He struggled with drug addiction and mental illness. For many years, the offender engaged in a series of extremely serious criminal acts. He was imprisoned frequently. However, although his time subject to a DATO was brief, his life has taken a different shape in the time since it was imposed. For the first time in his life, the offender has successfully managed to remain significantly abstinent from all drugs, other than cannabis for a lengthy period. The effects of the offender’s abstinence can be seen in his criminal history. Significantly, the offender has also fully complied with the conditions of his bail for the year and 8 months since the present offences were committed.
Most importantly, the offender now has a further powerful incentive to build a prosocial life, in the discovery that he is the father of a young son. Since finding out about his son, the offender has done everything in his power to assure CYF that he can be trusted to care for his son. If he is sentenced to full-time custody, even for a short period, all of this will be jeopardised.
It is often said that the best protection of the community is “[r]ehabilitation, if it can be achieved”: Hogan v Hinch [2011] HCA 4; 243 CLR 506 at [32]. The emphasised words are of critical importance.
In the unusual circumstances of the present case, where the offender has demonstrated a commitment to his rehabilitation, and where the imposition of any period of full-time imprisonment would have a profound effect on both the offender and his young son, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to extend the offender a last opportunity to serve his sentence of imprisonment in the community. Accordingly, the sentences that I impose will be fully suspended.
For the offences presently before the Court, I will impose the following sentences: (a) aggravated furious, reckless or dangerous driving – 12 months’ imprisonment, discounted by 25% in recognition of the offender’s early plea of guilty to nine months’ imprisonment (b) driving unlicensed having never held a license – five months and 11 days imprisonment, discounted by approximately 25% in recognition of the offender’s early plea of guilty to four months’ imprisonment.
It will be necessary to cancel the offender’s existing suspended sentences and to resentence the offender for those offences. In resentencing the offender, I have taken into account the offender’s presentence custody for those offences and the lengthy period of supervision that the offender has had since the offences were committed, including both the brief period that he was subject to the DATO and the lengthy period that he has been supervised on bail.
In resentencing the offender with respect to previous breaches, Refshauge AJ has taken the approach of recalculating each sentence for each offence, and then carrying each sentence forward. As a result, the offender is currently subject to a number of suspended sentences for relatively minor offences (such as minor theft) which occurred a number of years ago. In my view, it is not in the community’s interest, or the offender’s interest, for this structure to continue. Rather, I consider that the appropriate course is for the offender to be subject to a limited number of suspended sentences, so that the consequences of any breach in the future will be clear to the offender, the Court and the community.
So as to achieve this result, for each of the breach offences other than the aggravated burglaries, I will impose the sentence imposed by Refshauge AJ, but will backdate those sentences to the date that the first suspended sentence was backdated to, namely 15 January 2022. This will leave as the operative sentences the two aggravated burglaries, which are the most serious of previously suspended sentences as well as the sentences for the two offences which are presently before the Court. Taking into account principles of totality, each of these sentences will be partially concurrent. There will be greater concurrency between the present sentences.
The overall sentence still to be served will be a period of imprisonment of two years and 8 months, which will be backdated by one day, to take account of the offender’s presentence custody for the present offences, and fully suspended.
I acknowledge that the approach I have taken to the suspended sentences is somewhat artificial. However, I consider that it is the most appropriate structure to promote the offender’s rehabilitation, recognise the criminality of the offending (both present and past), and to ensure clarity and certainty in the offender’s ongoing supervision.
Orders
I certify that the preceding fifty-four [54] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice Baker. Associate: Date: 20 April 2026
DPP
Winters