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1. Derek Williams is to be sentenced for numerous acts of physical and sexual violence committed against his former partner. The offending is reflected in 10 charges dealt with in four separate proceedings.

2. Mr Williams was first put to trial at a trial over which I presided. That trial came to an end when the jury was discharged because the complainant became extremely distressed during the cross-examination and was unable to complete her evidence.

3. He was put to trial again on 20 November 2023 at a trial presided over by Taylor J. On 4 December 2023, the jury found him guilty of one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 24(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). At the relevant time, the maximum penalty for that offence was imprisonment for five years. The jury found Mr Williams not guilty of another count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, but was unable to agree on verdicts on the remaining six counts. Although it was Taylor J who presided over that trial, it is appropriate that I sentence Mr Williams for that offence as I am dealing with him for all other offences and have heard the same evidence as Taylor J.

4. A third trial commenced before me in 2024. At the outset of that trial, the prosecution presented a fresh indictment dated 20 September 2024. The jury found Mr Williams guilty of all six counts on that indictment, as follows: (a) An act of indecency in the third degree contrary to s 59 of the Crimes Act. That offence carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 10 years. (b) An act of indecency contrary to s 60(1) of the Crimes Act. At the relevant time, that offence carried a maximum penalty of imprisonment for five years. (c) Four counts of sexual intercourse without consent contrary to s 54(1) of the Crimes Act. That offence carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for 12 years.

5. At the time Mr Williams was committed for trial for those matters, two related offences of common assault contrary to s 26 of the Crimes Act were transferred to this Court, as contemplated by s 88B(2)(b) of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT). The offence of common assault carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for two years. Those charges arise from the same circumstances as the offences on the indictment tried before me and are alleged to have been committed against the same complainant. In those circumstances, it is clearly in the interests of justice for me to deal with them and accordingly I am required under s 68D(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) to do so. For reasons I will explain, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Williams is guilty of those two related offences.

6. Finally, on 31 March 2025, Mr Williams pleaded guilty to a rolled-up charge of common assault in full satisfaction of three further charges of common assault that had also been transferred from the Magistrates Court. Those charges arose from three separate incidents unrelated to the offences tried by the three juries (except that they involve the same victim).

7. On 20 March 2026, Mr Williams discontinued an appeal against his convictions arising from the two jury trials.

Purposes of Sentencing

8. The sentencing task is governed by the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). Section 7 of that Act specifies the purposes of sentencing. They include ensuring that the offender is adequately punished in a way that is just and appropriate; preventing crime by deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences; protecting the community from the offender; promoting their rehabilitation; making them accountable for their actions; denouncing their conduct and recognising the harm done to the victim and the community. The appropriate weight to be given to each purpose in any particular sentencing exercise is an assessment that must be made according to the circumstances of the individual case.

9. That assessment is particularly difficult in the present case. On the one hand, the offender is to be sentenced for numerous offences, some of which are extremely serious. The purposes of punishment, prevention, protection and denunciation must accordingly be given considerable weight. On the other hand, Mr Williams has spent much of his adult life in gaol and is at severe risk of becoming institutionalised, which does not serve the purpose of rehabilitation or indeed the protection of the community.

Nature and circumstances of offences

10. The offences involve physical and sexual violence within the context of an intimate relationship. It is recognised that such offences attract particular considerations. The Director of Public Prosecutions relied in that context on the remarks of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Dunn [2004] NSWCCA 41; 144 A Crim R 180 at [47] where the Court (Adams J, with whom Ipp JA and Sully J agreed) said: Crimes involving domestic violence have two important characteristics which differentiate them from many other crimes of violence: firstly, the offender usually believes that, in a real sense, what they do is justified, even that they are the true victim; and, secondly, the continued estrangement requires continued threat. These elements also usually mean that the victim never feels truly safe. Unlike the casual robbery, where the victim is often simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, the victim of a domestic violence offence is personally targeted.

11. The Court considered, and I respectfully agree, that those characteristics of offences of this kind emphasise the need for general and personal deterrence and denunciation, as well as recognition of the harm done to the victim. The same has been said of sexual offences: Wyper v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 59 at [114]-[115] (Murrell CJ, Bromwich J and Robinson AJ).

Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (CAN 183/2022)

12. The circumstances of the offences may be summarised as follows. The offender and the victim were in a domestic relationship between 2006 and 2012. They have three children together.

13. The offences of which the offender was convicted by the two juries were committed during a three-day ordeal which the victim describes as the “one that terrorised” her. It began when the victim was asleep on a mattress in the loungeroom of their home in Kambah with her infant son asleep in her arms. She said she “woke up to getting [her] head jumped on”. The offender was yelling at her, screaming at her and accusing her of “sleeping with somebody”. She pushed her child away to get him out of danger. She said the offender stomped on her head three or four times. She described the force used as about “seven” out of ten, where ten would be the hardest force the offender could use. The offender was wearing shoes at the time. After the victim got up, the offender kept “slinging” her around the house and bashing her. That is the incident relied upon to establish the first count on the first indictment.

14. The prosecutor noted the following features of this offence. First, the assault was ferocious and involved a significant degree of violence. Any offence involving a hit to the head (let alone stomping on it three or four times) is serious. The head is a particularly vulnerable part of the body. The victim gave evidence that, as a result of the assault, there was blood in her hair and that she was “lumps and bumps” from “head to toe”. While I do not take that statement literally, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt based on the victim’s description of the assault that she suffered a cut to the head and significant bruising and swelling over her body. I accept, as submitted by the prosecution, that this was a serious example of this type of offence. Considered alone, it warrants a stern sentence. The total sentence for all of the present offences will necessarily be tempered by the application of the principle of totality. It will of course also be necessary to ensure that the total sentence imposed for the combination of offences is not crushing.

15. From that point, the offender subjected the victim to various assaults over a period of three days. The prosecution does not contend that she was physically detained over that time because, in theory at least, she could have left. I do not mean to suggest that was a realistic possibility in practice. A common feature of cases involving intimate partner violence is that the victim feels unable to leave. As the community’s understanding of such violence has improved, the reasons for that have become better understood. I accept that the victim in the present case felt unable to leave her dysfunctional relationship with the offender, and unable to escape him on this occasion. Her evidence was that she tried to escape but was stopped. However, the prosecution did not rely on unlawful detention as a factor in the proceedings on sentence and accordingly I am required, as a matter of law, to put it out of my mind.

Act of Indecency in the Third Degree (SCC 96/2023)

16. The second offence occurred later the same day but at a different house. After the first offence, the offender put the victim and her infant child in his car and drove to the house of his ex-partner, where he handed over the child. In her evidence in the trial, the victim said every time the offender “was bashing” her, he would take the children to his ex-partner’s home first if they had the children with them. The victim stated that “if [she] didn’t have [her] son there, that was [her] protection kind of gone … then [she knew] that it was going to be on after that.” The victim and the offender then went to a house in Narrabundah which belonged to a relative of the offender. While the evidence on this issue was mixed, it appears to have been a house they attended frequently including, at times, when the relative was not home. Once inside the house, the offender turned on the shower, stripped the victim “down naked” and forced her to shower and “scrub [herself]”. She said the water was hot and was burning her. The offender was spitting on her, swearing and calling her a “filthy slut”.

17. The offender then “dragged” the victim out of the shower and “threw” her on the lounge. He drew a Stanley knife and used it to “cut at” the victim’s groin and vagina but did not actually cut her. That is the incident relied upon to establish the first count on the indictment dated 20 September 2024 which was presented before the third trial, being an act of indecency in the third degree.

18. The offence consists in the offender unlawfully assaulting or threatening to inflict grievous or actual bodily harm on the victim with intent to commit an act of indecency on her. It involved menacing her with a weapon, the Stanley knife, which aggravates the seriousness of the offence. Slashing towards such a sensitive part of the body with a weapon of that kind cannot be construed as anything less than a threat to inflict grievous bodily harm. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that this aspect of the incident must have been particularly terrifying and traumatising for the victim.

19. The victim’s evidence established that the offender was in the grip of an ice addiction at that time. She said he was “high as a kite”, that he had not slept for days and that he did not sleep for the next three days. That goes some way to explaining (without excusing) the bizarre and violent nature of this offence. In light of the use of the knife and the terrifying nature of the slashing or cutting action described by the victim, I would classify this as a serious example of this type of offence.

20. The offender’s motivation for the offence was his belief that the victim had been unfaithful to him. That is also a common feature of cases involving intimate partner violence, particularly where mutual drug use is a regular part of the relationship, as it was here. Cases frequently come before the courts in which perpetrators of violence, fuelled by jealousy, insecurity and drug-induced paranoia, wrongly accuse their partners of infidelity and inflict violence (amongst other forms of punishment) for the perceived insult.

21. In the present case, as submitted by the DPP, the complainant lost all autonomy over her body during the days that followed. The offender kept her naked (apart from when they were travelling) and forced her to go outside to urinate, as the victim put it, like a dog. She said that every time the offender felt like it, he was just raping her or bashing her and that “it was pretty much just treating [her] like a piece of meat for the next three days”.

Act of Indecency (CAN 97/2023)

22. The third offence is based on the offender’s act of, for want of a better word, inspecting the victim’s vagina after he threw her on the lounge. She said he was “tearing” at the “insides of [her] vagina” and saying that “he knew, he could tell just by looking at it” that she had been “sleeping around with another man”. Regrettably that, too, is a common feature of intimate partner violence. A woman’s vagina does not belong to her partner. It is not a possession that may be inspected at whim. The victim’s humiliation was compounded by the unscientific assertion that the offender could tell, just from looking at her vagina, that she had been having sexual intercourse with another man. That would be an extremely useful forensic skill if it were true, but it is not. It is just another form of abuse; a fabricated piece of corroboration to support a false accusation. Even so, I must accept that this offence is less serious than the previous two but it is still an offence of some seriousness. Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (CAN 5048/2022)

23. The next offence is based on the victim’s evidence that the offender then started “raping” her by having penile/vaginal intercourse with her. The victim was lying on her back on the lounge with her legs hanging over the arm rest. During the intercourse, the offender repeatedly spat on the victim and told her she was “filthy”. The offender eventually stopped. He did not ejaculate inside her. He told her that was because she “disgusted him so much” and that she was a “putrid slut”. The victim retrieved her clothing from the bathroom and got dressed.

24. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender knew the victim had not consented to have sexual intercourse with him at that time. There is otherwise scant detail about this offence beyond the circumstances in which it was committed, which I have already described. It is a serious offence.

Common Assault (CAN 5047/2022)

25. As already explained, I am required to deal with the two charges of common assault transferred by the Magistrates Court (CAN 5047/2022 and CAN 5051/2022). Both charges arise out of the same events as the counts on the two indictments. The first alleged common assault (CAN 5047/2022) is based on the victim’s evidence that the offender spat on her while he was sexually assaulting her at the relative’s house in Narrabundah.

26. There was no application for leave to call additional evidence in relation to the related charges. Accordingly, I must deal with those charges by reference to the evidence given in the trial over which I presided: s 68E(1)(b)(i) of the Supreme Court Act. In performing that task, I am in effect to stand in the shoes of the Magistrates Court and to proceed in a manner that is consistent with the jury’s assessment of the evidence: MZ v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 41 at [57], [74]. As the offender was convicted of the sexual assault during which the alleged spitting occurred, the jury must have accepted the victim’s evidence about those events.

27. My own assessment is the same as the jury’s. I believed the complainant. It may be accepted that she recalled some events with greater clarity than others. That is not unusual in cases of this kind. Even so, her evidence was compelling. She described events in language that reflected actual recollection rather than a narrative she was making up. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Williams is guilty of the first common assault. That offence formed an integral part of the sexual assault during which it was committed but it was, separately, a disgusting and humiliating act. Common Assault (CAN 5051/2022)

28. The victim and the offender then drove from the house in Narrabundah back to their house in Kambah. The offender went into the kitchen where he used methamphetamine. He then forced the victim to strip naked again and to remain in the same part of the house.

29. The second offence of common assault transferred by the Magistrates Court is based on the offender’s acts when the victim needed to go to the toilet. For the reasons already explained, I accept her evidence about this assault. The telling of it was humiliating and difficult for the victim. I have no doubt that it is not something she made up.

30. The victim said that, throughout the ordeal at the Kambah house, the offender would not let her move around the house or use the bathroom. Instead, he forced her to go to the toilet in their backyard. While she was squatting down urinating, the offender was kicking and “booting” her. She said that a number of the kicks struck her in the stomach, causing her to fall over from her squatting position. As a result, she was covered in both dirt and her own urine. The victim described the force of the kicks as about “eight” out of ten, adding that they “winded” her. The offender was wearing shoes at the time.

31. This is a serious offence of its kind. It is separate from the sexual assaults that occurred later.

Second Count of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (CAN 98/2023)

32. The victim told the offender they should go back inside before any neighbours heard them and called the police. At some point back inside the house the offender forced the victim to engage in penile-vaginal sexual intercourse with him again. That is the basis for the second of the four counts of sexual intercourse without consent. As with the first, there is scant detail about this offence beyond the fact that it was committed as part of an ongoing ordeal that caused the victim to feel terrorised and humiliated. It is a serious offence.

Third and Fourth Counts of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent (CAN 186/2022 and CAN 187/2022)

33. They went back to the lounge room, where the offender again engaged in non-consensual penile-vaginal intercourse with the victim. Some time later, he did the same. During the second of these assaults, the victim urinated. During both assaults, the offender spat on the victim. That is the basis for the third and fourth counts of sexual intercourse without consent.

34. The offender then returned to the kitchen and took more methamphetamine. He refused to allow the victim to consume any food or water. He continued to force her to go to the toilet in the backyard.

35. As with the first and second counts of sexual intercourse without consent, little more can be said other than that, having regard to the circumstances in which they were committed and the inherent seriousness of sexual assault of this kind, where the offender clearly knew the victim was not consenting, they were serious offences.

The rolled-up charge of common assault (CAN 2794/2023)

36. The offender pleaded guilty to a rolled-up count of common assault, arising out of three occasions occurring in 2009, 2011 and 2012.

37. On one occasion in 2009, the offender took the victim to a remote location in the Tuggeranong area. The offender picked the victim up by her hair and cut her hair using scissors. The offender then began “flogging” the victim and dragging her around. When asked by the victim why he was doing this, the offender responded that the victim had been going around thinking she was attractive and good looking in front of other men. They later went to a petrol station. The victim took the opportunity to ask the attendant to call police. When police attended, they identified that the victim had an outstanding warrant for her arrest. Accordingly, she was arrested. The offender was not. CCTV footage taken at the police station following the victim’s arrest captured her repeatedly touching her hair at different points on her head and commenting that there was “not much left” of her hair.

38. In late January or early February 2011, the victim left the offender. She and her children went to stay with a friend. However, as she did not have access to food or baby formula at the friend’s house, the victim decided to return to the offender. On 12 February 2011, she called the offender and he came to pick them up. The family then went to a café in Wanniassa. The victim passed a note to an employee at the café and told them a man in the car was abusing and threatening her. She asked for the police to be called. The café employee noted that the victim looked upset and “had bruises all over her arms”.

39. Police attended the offender’s home later that day and spoke to the victim. The offender was present when they attended. Unsurprisingly in that circumstance, the victim was too scared to make a report at that time. She advised the officers she was fine and that nothing had happened to her. This is also very common for victims of domestic violence. About a week later, the offender “flogged” the victim for leaving with the children.

40. On a day in 2012, the offender struck the victim on her arms with a hammer. The victim was holding her baby at the time. This assault was in response to the offender overhearing another man referring to having met the victim at another male’s house on a previous occasion, during a time when the victim had left the offender.

41. As a rolled-up offence reflecting three separate incidents, each serious enough standing alone, this offence must be regarded as one of considerable seriousness.

Impact on Victim

42. The victim did not provide a victim impact statement. It does not follow that she did not suffer significant harm. I am prohibited from drawing any such inference from the mere fact that she did not provide a victim impact statement: s 53(1)(b) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. But, in any event, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the victim has been extremely traumatised by the physical and sexual violence inflicted on her by the offender. So much was apparent from her evidence in the trials, particularly the aborted trial. The victim was in gaol at that time. As already noted, she became so distraught during the cross-examination that she refused to complete her evidence. I am mindful of the fact that the offender is not to be punished for pleading not guilty and that cross-examination is a necessary incident of a trial. The relevance of her response at that time is that it was a demonstration of how deeply traumatised she is. That is hardly surprising having regard to the nature and duration of the offences committed against her by the offender.

Circumstances of the offender

43. I am required to have regard to the personal circumstances of the offender.

44. The prosecution tendered a pre-sentence report dated 14 August 2025, the contents of which may be summarised as follows. Mr Williams is an Aboriginal man from Ngunnawal Country. He is 44 years of age. He has been in custody since November 2016 in relation to previous offences and the offences for which he is to be sentenced today.

45. Mr Williams grew up in Queanbeyan, New South Wales and was one of 12 children. Both his parents are now deceased and five of his siblings have also passed away. He has minimal contact with his surviving siblings. He has a long-term partner who visits him weekly and has six children from two different relationships.

46. Mr Williams reported that both his parents struggled with alcohol misuse while he was growing up. He reported first using methamphetamine, cannabis and alcohol when he was 14 years old. His use of methamphetamine increased after the death of his father in 2010. He reported that he had not used cannabis since 2016 and had not consumed alcohol since 2009. He also reported that he had abstained from using methamphetamine since becoming incarcerated, although that is contradicted by positive drug test results for methamphetamine and amphetamines in 2024.

47. Mr Williams left school after completing Year 7 due to behavioural issues. He has since completed a Certificate II in both Horticulture and Construction. He has completed a range of programs while in custody, including programs relating to alcohol and drug use, conflict resolution and anger management.

48. Mr Williams reports experiencing chronic anxiety and depression, as well as daily suicidal ideation. He has reported feeling overwhelmed by the length of his incarceration and told the author of the pre-sentence report that he had been assaulted in custody. I have no difficulty accepting that Mr Williams experiences his ongoing custody as extremely traumatising.

49. Mr Williams has an extensive criminal history spanning multiple decades. He has been convicted of offences in both the Territory and New South Wales, including property damage, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, common assault, aggravated burglary and a variety of driving offences. He also has a recent conviction for an offence committed in custody.

50. At the sentence hearing, Mr Williams’ legal representative expressed the concern that, because Mr Williams did not give evidence, the Court would not be able to apply Bugmy principles: see Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571. I did not consider the absence of direct evidence from the offender to be necessarily fatal to a Bugmy argument, for several reasons. The Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) did not apply to the sentence proceedings because no such direction was sought or made under s 4(2) of the Evidence Act. Even where the Evidence Act does apply, it is open to the Court to draw inferences from the established facts. There will be cases in which the fact that an offender has not given evidence will leave the Court simply unable to draw an inference about Bugmy considerations but that will not always be the case. It is appropriate for sentencing judges to bear in mind that the very factors that may invoke Bugmy principles may overlap with the reasons for making a forensic decision not to call an offender to give evidence. Traumatised people do not always act in their own best interests and may not make the best witnesses. Based on the several outbursts and interruptions made by Mr Williams during his trial, I can understand that any experienced lawyer would have been reluctant to call him at the proceedings on sentence, for any number of good reasons. I do not think that forensic decision takes Bugmy principles off the table for him.

51. For those reasons, I granted leave to the offender to file further evidence after the conclusion of the sentence hearing. A statement from Ms DO was duly filed. The prosecutor did not require her for cross-examination. Ms DO reported that she started living with Mr Williams and his family when Mr Williams was 14 years old. She stated that Mr Williams’ mother was “always drunk” and that Mr Williams’ father was a drug dealer who was incarcerated at different times during the period that Ms DO lived with them. Ms DO witnessed arguments between Mr Williams’ family members, including occasions where Mr Williams’ father was violent towards Mr Williams’ mother. Mr Williams’ mother would throw objects at the children during arguments. According to Ms DO, “drugs, alcohol, and violence were a constant in the household.”

52. Mr Williams told the author of the pre-sentence report that his upbringing was “generally positive”. It is promising that he perceived his upbringing in that way. Perhaps it reflects loyalty, which is also promising. I am nonetheless satisfied, having regard to Ms DO’s statement and other evidence before me, that Mr Williams was exposed to many childhood experiences that would have undermined his resilience and impaired his capacity to resist falling into the same patterns of drug abuse and domestic violence as were evidently modelled by his parents. That reduces his moral culpability to some extent. It means that Mr Williams does not bear the same degree of responsibility for his drug-fuelled offending as a person who makes an informed choice as an adult to take up the use of prohibited drugs; he was exposed to drug and alcohol abuse, and domestic violence, as a child.

53. The impact of such experiences is explained in several chapters of the Bugmy Bar Book.

54. The chapter titled ‘Childhood, Infant and Perinatal Exposure to, and Experience of, Domestic and Family Violence’ in the Bugmy Bar Book notes the findings of the 2016 Victorian Royal Commission into Family Violence that: There is some evidence that exposure to family violence as a child can lead to intergenerational transmission of violence: children exposed to family violence are more likely to hold attitudes that justify their own use of violence.

55. The Bugmy Bar Book also records submissions made to the Australian Human Rights Commission by the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists explaining that children who witness domestic and family violence may be at risk of developing similar behaviours in adulthood: … children whose formative years are affected by heightened and sustained stress and fear are vulnerable to developing long term mental health issues, which is in itself a risk factor for both experiencing and perpetrating family violence. … These children can be at risk of developing psychologically controlling, physically violent or sexually abusive behaviours in adulthood and potentially, as a father and partner, repeat the family violence they witnessed as a child.

56. The impact of substance abuse is also addressed in the Bugmy Bar Book. The chapter on ‘Early Exposure to Harmful Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse’ records the following finding reported in Myra F Taylor et al’s article ‘Substance Misuse-Related Parental Child Maltreatment: Intergenerational Implications for Grandparents, Parents, and Grandchildren Relationships’ (2017) 47(2) Journal of Drug Issues,: Being raised by a [harmful] substance-using parent increases a child’s risk of exposure to unsanitary living conditions, witnessing domestic violence, requiring hospitalization, and experiencing poverty/homelessness. In older children, the long-term traumatizing effect of untreated childhood experiences of parental maltreatment often manifests as age inappropriate behavioral [sic] problems, learning difficulties, and mental health problems (e.g., depression, anxiety, paranoia), which in adolescents can become a catalyst for venting, antisocial, hostile, violent, and criminal behaviors [sic].

57. That material and the evidence provided lead me to conclude that Mr Williams was denied the kind of support in his childhood that might have left him better equipped to avoid the kind of criminal activities he has fallen into. That said, the present offences are very serious and have caused extreme trauma to the victim which is likely to remain with her. Bugmy considerations must not be permitted to overwhelm that important consideration.

The probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on any of the offender’s family or dependants

58. I am also required to have regard to the likely impact of the sentence on Mr Williams’ dependants. There was material on that topic in the evidence before me. It confirms what the Court knows in any event, that the impact of incarceration on family outside is also extremely traumatic. It is well understood that the incarceration of a parent can and does have negative consequences for their children: see ‘Incarceration of a Parent or Caregiver’, The Bugmy Bar Book.

59. I do not propose to recite the detail of the evidence on that issue as it is the kind of information that should remain private. It is enough to say that impact on Mr Williams’ family has some significance in the present sentencing exercise. That is one of the factors that has prompted me to allow the degree of concurrency I propose between the individual sentences.

Remorse and Rehabilitation

60. Mr Williams has expressed no remorse for his offences. My assessment of his prospects of rehabilitation is accordingly guarded. That is a factor that militates in favour of a longer sentence. Conversely, he is at considerable risk of becoming institutionalised, which is inimical to rehabilitation. That is a factor that points in favour of a longer period under supervision on parole.

Current sentencing practice

61. Section 33(1)(za) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act requires me to consider “current sentencing practice”. That must be taken to mean current sentencing practice in and for the Territory: s 122(1)(b) of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT). The proper approach where “current sentencing practice” is designated by statute as a mandatory consideration was explained by the High Court in Director of Public Prosecutions v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41 in relation to a provision in the same terms in the Victorian sentencing statute. As explained in the joint judgment of Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ in that case, such a provision is not to be understood to constrain a sentencing court to conform to a sentencing practice that has evolved to be inadequate (or excessive) for offences of a particular kind; nor does it require the principles of sentencing to suffer any derogation from individualised justice, which calls for “an exercise of judicial discretion concerned to do justice in [a particular] case”: at [49].

62. To assist the Court in determining current sentencing practice, the prosecutor provided the cases of R v Smith [2021] ACTSC 114, R v Alex Pinto Pedreirei (27 May 2010, Gray J), DPP v Deighan (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 295 and R v UM (No 2) [2021] ACTSC 115. I have considered those decisions. They cannot be said to establish any helpful range. They do indicate that sexual intercourse without consent attended by violence or degrading acts committed in the context of family violence of the kind seen in the present case will ordinarily attract a sentence of three to four years.

Appropriate structure of the sentences

63. The task of determining the appropriate structure for the sentences to be imposed on Mr Williams is complicated by his custodial history and the need to have regard to the principle of totality. Mr Williams has a lengthy criminal history and has previously served terms of imprisonment. Before his arrest for the present matters, his most recent arrest was on 8 November 2016 when he was charged with numerous offences committed over several days, the most serious of which was using an offensive weapon to hinder his own detention. That offence was based on Mr Williams’ act of driving directly at a police officer to escape arrest for other charges. The police officer was sitting on a motorbike. Mr Williams pleaded guilty to all offences. On 23 February 2017, he was sentenced by Mossop J for those offences and also re-sentenced for some breach matters: R v Williams [2017] ACTSC 298. The total of the sentences imposed by Mossop J produced a head sentence of nine years, 11 months and 20 days commencing on 8 November 2016, giving a total sentence that would expire on 27 October 2026. His Honour fixed a non-parole period of five years and nine months, giving a potential date for release to parole of 7 August 2022.

64. That sentence was reduced on appeal, giving an amended sentence that would expire on 27 August 2026 and an amended non-parole period until 7 June 2022: Williams v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 4.

65. In April 2023, the Sentence Administration Board directed that Mr Williams be released to parole on 3 May 2023 until 27 August 2026. However, upon his release that day, he was immediately re-arrested for the present offences.

66. On 30 May 2024, following a hearing, the Sentence Administration Board cancelled Mr Williams’ parole order and ordered that Mr Williams be imprisoned for the remaining portion of the sentence until 27 August 2026.

67. Meanwhile, on 5 February 2024, Mr Williams committed a further offence while in custody. On 3 December 2024, he was sentenced for that offence to a term of imprisonment for 3 months commencing on 20 July 2026 and concluding on 19 October 2026. According to a letter from ACT Corrective Services obtained at my request after the sentence hearing, the Court reset a non-parole period of five years and nine months commencing on 8 November 2016 and expiring on 7 August 2022. I note that the effect of this order was to reinstate the non-parole period order fixed by Mossop J before the determination of the appeal in February 2018.

68. It follows that Mr Williams has been in custody for almost ten years, since 8 November 2016. But for these matters, he would have been on parole from 3 May 2023. On that basis, but for one further complication, it could be said that he has been in custody for 3 years and just over 3 months referable to these matters alone. The complication is that he committed a further offence whilst in custody about 9 months after being granted parole.

69. It may accordingly be seen that this sentencing exercise poses an exquisite illustration of the capacity for different sentencing considerations to pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, the offences for which Mr Williams stands to be sentenced today are extremely serious and warrant stern punishment. His criminal history and his lengthy use of methamphetamine indicate that he poses a risk to the community in a number of different ways. The present offences and the driving offences for which he was sentenced by Mossop J are particularly concerning in that context. On the other hand, Mr Williams has been in gaol for so long that the risk of crushing his spirit irreparably is real.

70. The proper approach in such cases was considered by the Court of Appeal in R v Carberry; R v Deng; Carberry v The King [2023] ACTCA 32, cited with approval in DPP v Padreny [2024] ACTCA 4 at [145]. In Carberry, the Court said at [92] that there is “no single correct approach to the structuring of multiple sentences” and that the task for the sentencing judge was “to look at the totality of the criminal behaviour and consider whether the aggregate is ‘just and appropriate’ for all the offences”. The Court further noted, citing the well-known decision of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v MAK; R v MSK [2006] NSWCCA 381; 167 A Crim R 159 at [16]- [17], that a sentence “should not be ‘crushing’ in that it induces a sense of hopelessness and destroys prospects of rehabilitation, or too severe as a result or accumulation (noting the severity of a sentence may increase at a greater rate than the increase in its length)”. That is a real consideration here.

71. The offences of which Mr Williams has been found guilty by a jury were committed over a three-day period in 2011. The sentences should be able to be served partly at the same time but there should be some additional time served to mark the protracted nature of the victim’s ordeal. Conversely and perhaps unusually, the rolled-up common assault charge concerns offending over three separate calendar years, being 2009, 2011 and 2012. As already noted, Mr Williams pleaded guilty to those offences. Although the plea was entered on the day of the trial, there was some value in the plea in that it brought matters to an end for the victim, who is an extremely vulnerable woman. I propose to reduce the penalty for that offence by 10%.

72. In attempting to balance the competing considerations to which I have referred, I have determined to structure the sentence as follows. There must be lengthy sentences imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offences. As will be obvious, substantial weight must be given to ensuring that the offender is adequately punished for his offences and that the trauma he has inflicted on the victim is recognised. The need to protect the community from the offender is also a significant consideration in the present case. However, protection can be achieved in different ways. Deterrence and prevention are considered to offer protection of the community but so is rehabilitation. In the circumstances I have described, significant weight must be given to the importance of structuring a sentence that will support Mr Williams in his return to the community outside gaol. The structure of the sentences to be imposed, in order to be just and appropriate, must afford Mr Williams that support.

73. All of those considerations point to the imposition of a lengthy head sentence combined with a re-set non-parole period that is not so distant in the future as to leave Mr Williams with no hope. The protection of the community will be served by the threat of the lengthy head sentence he will likely have to serve if he breaches his parole by committing further offences of any kind that threatens the safety of the community.

74. To give effect to those considerations and the principle of totality, I propose to deal with the offences in four categories: the initial assault at the house in Kambah; the offences committed in the house at Narrabundah; the further offences committed when they returned to Kambah and the rolled up common assault. I propose to make the sentences for the offences committed in the house at Narrabundah entirely concurrent. In other words, the sentences for the four offences committed at the Narrabundah house will all be served at the same time as each other. I acknowledge that there is a measure of leniency taking that approach but it is necessary to avoid a crushing sentence. I propose to do the same for the offences committed after they returned to the house at Kambah, for the same reason. Those sentences will also be served at the same time as each other. However, there must be some accumulation between the four categories of offences. In other words, the sentences for the Narrabundah offences will add some time to the initial Kambah assault, and the sentences for the later Kambah offences will add some further time on top of the sentences for the Narrabundah offences.

75. The sentence for the rolled-up offence of common assault will also add some time to the total sentence. Those were separate offences that involved additional violence and humiliation for the victim. The assault in which Mr Williams cut off the victim’s beautiful long hair is particularly troubling, indicating a sense of ownership and control. For the unthinkable transgression of being too pretty, she was to be punished and made less so. No woman deserves to be treated that way, like a possession or a badly-treated domestic animal.

76. I am required to set a non-parole period, being the period during which the offender is not eligible to be released on parole: s 65(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. As Mr Williams is serving an existing sentence (the sentence imposed by Mossop J), I am required to set a non-parole period as if I had sentenced Mr Williams for those matters as well as the current matters: s 66(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. That requirement skews the current sentencing exercise considerably. The structure I propose for the current sentences will give a head sentence of eight years and six months commencing on 3 May 2023, the date of Mr Williams’ arrest for the present matters, and expiring on 2 November 2031. Standing alone, the appropriate non-parole period for such sentences would require Mr Williams to remain in custody for at least another two years. However, it is necessary to set a non-parole period that reflects the lengthy time he has already spent in custody serving the earlier sentences. As a proportion of his overall total head sentence (now approaching 15 years), I consider 10 years to be an appropriate non-parole period. For that reason, I will structure the sentences so that Mr Williams will be eligible for parole from 7 November 2026, which is 10 years from the date he commenced serving the sentences imposed by Mossop J.

Orders

77. Derek Williams, please stand. (1) For the offence in count 1 on the first indictment of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (SCCAN2022/183), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for two years and six months commencing on 3 May 2023 and ending on 2 November 2025. (2) For the offence in count 1 on the second indictment of committing an act of indecency in the third degree (SCCAN2023/96), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for three years commencing on 3 November 2024 and ending on 2 November 2027. (3) For the offence in count 2 on the second indictment of committing an act of indecency (SCCAN2023/97) contrary to s 60(1) of the Crimes Act, you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for two years commencing on 3 November 2024 and ending on 2 November 2026. (4) For the offence in count 3 on the second indictment of sexual intercourse without consent (CC2022/5048), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for three years commencing on 3 November 2024 and ending on 2 November 2027. (5) For the related offence of common assault (CC2022/5047), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for two months commencing on 3 November 2024 and ending on 2 January 2025. (6) For the offence in count 4 on the second indictment of sexual intercourse without consent (SCCAN2023/98), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for three years and six months commencing on 3 November 2026 and ending on 2 May 2030. (7) For the related offence of common assault (CC5051/2022), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for 12 months commencing on 3 November 2026 and ending on 2 November 2027. (8) For the offence in count 6 on the second indictment of sexual intercourse without consent (SCCAN2022/186), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for four years commencing on 3 November 2026 and ending on 2 November 2030. (9) For the offence in count 5 on the second indictment of sexual intercourse without consent (SCCAN2022/187), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for four years commencing on 3 November 2026 and ending on 2 November 2030. (10) For the rolled-up charge of common assault (CAN 2794/2023), you are convicted. I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for 16 months, reduced from 18 months on account of the plea. That sentence will commence on 3 May 2030 and end on 2 September 2031. (11) I reset your non-parole to a period of 10 years commencing on 8 November 2016 and ending on 7 November 2026. (12) I dismiss the transferred charges numbered 2795/23 and 2796/23.

I certify that the preceding seventy-seven [77] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Chief Justice McCallum. Associate: Date: