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1. Jude Wijesinghe stands to be sentenced after pleading guilty to the murder of Tshewang Choden. The offence of murder carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for life: s 12 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).

2. The offender and Ms Choden worked together as chefs at the Jamala Wildlife Lodge at the National Zoo and Aquarium. He became infatuated with her, but his feelings were unrequited. In late 2023, over a period of days and in a spiralling mental state, he developed a plan to kill her and then to kill himself. On 18 December 2023, at the end of her shift and the beginning of his, he trapped her in a storeroom by locking it from the inside and stabbed her numerous times with a boning knife. Workers outside the storeroom could hear her screaming frantically but could not get to her because the door was locked. She undoubtedly spent the last moments of her life in pain and abject terror. After killing Ms Choden, the offender opened the storeroom door. He made an apparent attempt to kill himself but failed. He was saved by police and paramedics.

Circumstances of Offending

3. An essential aspect of the sentencing task is to consider the circumstances of the offence and make an assessment of its objective seriousness. The circumstances may be summarised as follows.

4. The offender and Ms Choden were often rostered on together for the dinner shift. During those shifts, they were not seen to engage in conversation about much other than the work involved. Ms Choden was Bhutanese, as were a number of other members of staff at the Lodge. They would converse in the Bhutanese language. The offender was not Bhutanese and did not speak or understand their language.

5. The offender developed a romantic interest in Ms Choden from early 2023. He told the psychiatrist who gave evidence at the proceedings on sentence that he fell in love with her but felt constrained because he was her supervisor. His feelings evidently got the better of him. In June 2023, he told Ms Choden in a text message that she had the “prettiest name in the world”. He asked her out to dinner, but she declined.

6. The offender often spoke about his feelings towards Ms Choden with others, including a friend name Donna. On 4 July 2023, he wrote to Donna “Yeah. I was right. She never did wish me”. On 10 July, he told Donna he needed to tell her something that happened. He wrote, “they almost kissed and I saw. On 23 July 2023, he wrote to Donna that he was having “a very hard time”. She asked whether it was “Choden related”. He replied, “every inch of distress, heart pain and agony I have is always only related to Choden.”

7. At some point, Ms Choden changed to the breakfast shift while the offender remained on the dinner shift. At around the same time, Ms Choden entered into a romantic relationship with somebody else. She commented to others that the offender seemed “moody” towards her. She said that, on days when she talked to other men, the offender would become angry and would stop talking to her. Colleagues of the offender and Ms Choden at the Lodge made the same observation, describing the offender as being jealous of other men who interacted with her.

8. The offender’s text exchanges with Donna at this time reveal two important considerations: first, his growing fixation on Ms Choden and, secondly, his resistance to taking any constructive steps to address his deteriorating mental state. On 5 September 2023, the offender wrote to Donna “I’m so attached to Choden. And she knows it. She knows exactly what she is doing. And she knows exactly what I’m going through.” Donna replied, “This is going to sound harsh but unfortunately others are not responsible for our happiness”. Two weeks later, Donna again implored the offender to move on. She noted that she had seen in the offender the previous day a “look of complete despair” and that he seemed to have “given up on life”. She said it was time for him to “make a choice”: You either let the fuckers at work continue to make your life miserable or you pick yourself up and start living life and show the fuckers that you are Jude, you are worthy. Life is too short to let others ruin your happiness. I say all this with love and care my friend.

9. By early December, the offender was taking steps to get rid of his possessions. He told Donna he would “most probably moved back to Sri Lanka end of this month”, explaining that there was no progress on his visa. However, other evidence suggests that, at around that time, it occurred to the offender to kill Ms Choden and possibly also himself. On 10 December 2023, he contacted a friend in Denmark, telling him that he had given his resignation and would be sending him a letter. The following day, he told a colleague that it would be the last time she would work with him. She asked, “chef, are you going somewhere?”, to which the offender laughed and said, “maybe”. Later that day, he drafted a note on his phone addressed to a man named Ugyen. The draft note read: Ugyen, I told you to be honest with me and give me the truth. I clearly told you that the state of doubt was fucking with my head. What did you do? You went ahead and took me as a hoke [sic]. Now see what happened. Two people are gone never to come back. I hope you live with this regret for the rest of your life. I would never forgive you.

10. The inescapable inference is that the two people who were “gone never to come back” were Ms Choden and the offender. Over the next few days, he made arrangements to sell his possessions. He searched for flights from Canberra to Melbourne. On 16 December, he told another friend that he was leaving and wished her good luck in the future. On the evening of 17 December, he cooked dinner for the staff at the Lodge and told another colleague that he wanted to take a holiday, possibly in New Zealand.

11. On 18 December, the day she was murdered, Ms Choden commenced her shift at the Lodge at 6 am. She was rostered to work until 1 pm that day. The offender was due to start his shift at midday but texted a colleague shortly before then to say he would be late. At 12:14 pm, he searched how to delete “all the chats on messenger”. At 12:16 pm, he deleted messages from his phone, including messages for sexual services, messages with colleagues and messages with Ms Choden.

12. The offender arrived at the Lodge shortly after 12:20 pm that day. Ms Choden and a male colleague were in the kitchen when the offender arrived, but they left shortly afterwards to deliver food to guests. At 12:40 pm, the offender texted a number of friends to say goodbye. The male colleague finished his shift and left the kitchen without seeing Ms Choden.

13. At 12:45 pm, a worker on a construction site at the back of the Lodge kitchen heard a woman screaming frantically. He and two co-workers ran towards the screaming, which they traced to a dry storeroom located just outside the kitchen. They could hear screaming and banging from inside the storeroom. The construction worker tried to open the door, but it was locked. He and his colleagues ran inside the Lodge for help. They found a waiter, who followed them back to the storeroom. The worker called 000.

14. By the time the construction workers and the waiter returned to the storeroom, the screaming had stopped. The wooden door of the storeroom was open, but the screen mesh door was closed. They could see the offender inside the storeroom holding a knife with blood on it. They became fearful and distanced themselves from him. The offender then walked out of the storeroom, still holding the knife. His hands and the knife were covered in blood.

15. A transcript of the 000 call was in evidence. It recorded that, at 12:47 pm, the worker told the police emergency line, “we just saw someone get murdered” and said, “I saw what I think was a chef, it looked like he had a knife and blood all over his hands and I’m pretty sure I saw him cutting his throat”.

16. Other staff rushed to the scene. By the time they arrived, the offender was lying on the ground outside the storeroom, having slit his own throat. He was still holding the knife. A staff member told the offender to drop the knife, which he refused to do. That person then stood on the offender’s wrist, causing him to release the knife, and kicked the knife away. The knife was later identified as a Japanese boning knife that the offender had bought earlier that year which he carried to and from work in a leather case for use at work.

17. The offender had fresh lacerations on his neck and wrists. He had also apparently swallowed some Ratsak and vomited it back up. Staff members tried to assist him, but he resisted. He was later attended by police and paramedics who took him to the Canberra Hospital, where he was treated and then charged with Ms Choden’s murder.

18. The staff member who had forced the offender to drop the knife was also the person who discovered Ms Choden’s body in the storeroom. He attempted to find a pulse but could not. Paramedics confirmed that she was deceased. She was 29 years old.

19. An autopsy was conducted by a forensic pathologist, Professor Duflou. He identified 14 stab wounds and slashing wounds to Ms Choden’s body, including four to her head and neck, three to her trunk, six to her upper extremities and one to her upper thigh. The most serious wounds were a stab wound to the left front chest, which had passed through the heart and ended in the left lung, and a stab wound on the right side of the neck, which caused fatal injury to the jugular vein and trachea. The neck wound was over 80 mm deep. The chest wound was 40 mm deep. The injuries to the arms were characteristic of defensive injuries.

20. Police executed a search warrant at the offender’s home later that day. They found a bag of “Double Strength Ratsak” and several suicide notes addressed to various people. To members of his family, the offender expressed his love and apologised for what he was putting them through. To others, he expressed anger, blame and vitriol and threatened revenge. To Ugyen, he wrote: Remember I told you to be honest with me, that this is fucking my head. And you said I was being psycho. It’s all done now. I was not joking when I told you that this will never end well. I hope things happened differently, but it didn’t. This could have been stopped, you know it.

21. In another note, addressed to “whomever finds this”, the offender wrote: Why did she have to lead me on and then fuck with my head. I can’t find my peace to forgive and move on knowing that I will be scared [sic] and broken for the rest of my life, while they laugh about it. I will not let you people have the last laugh. You people ruined me and I won’t let this go. I might be gone now, but I will be back for each one of you who destroyed my happiness and everything I loved.

22. There is no evidence that the offender had any basis for expecting anything more from Ms Choden than for her to discharge her duties as a chef, along with every other chef employed at the Lodge. Impact on Victims

23. A number of victim impact statements were read at the sentencing hearing. The first statement, on behalf of the deceased’s family, detailed the grief and pain that they have endured since her death. They asked the Court to recognise “not just the life taken, but the lasting pain carried by those left behind”.

24. Two further statements from co-workers at the Lodge were read to the Court. They detailed the sense of purpose, joy and belonging they felt working at the zoo prior to the offending, and the sense of anxiety and unease that now pervades their lives. One victim stated that she has been diagnosed with PTSD. Both statements described the overwhelming sense of dread they now experience. They spoke of the shattered trust and safety that they struggle to regain.

25. The victims’ statements serve as an important reminder to the Court of the dreadful and lasting impact on many people of this shocking offence.

Objective Seriousness

26. I am required to make an assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence. I am mindful of the fact that it may sound callous to compare the seriousness of this murder with other hypothetical murders. The reason it is necessary to do so is that, as explained by the High Court in Markarian v The Queen (2005) 228 CLR 357 at 372 [31], a sentencing judge must compare the case at hand with the notional most serious case so as to give proper effect to the maximum penalty prescribed by the legislature. I hope it will be understood that the articulation of a comparative description of the offence is a necessary part of the sentencing task for that reason.

27. This assessment is complicated by the need to consider the offender’s mental state. I will return to that issue. Leaving it aside at this point, in my assessment, the murder of Ms Choden was an offence of the utmost gravity. I accept the submission of the prosecutor that, objectively, the offence is so grave as to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty. However, the prosecutor also acknowledged, and I accept, that because of the guilty plea and the need to take into account the offender’s mental health at the time of the offence, a sentence of life imprisonment should not be imposed.

28. In reaching the conclusion that the offence is of the utmost gravity, I have had regard to the following factors.

29. First, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offence was premeditated. The offender was contemplating killing Ms Choden for at least a week before he did so. So much is clear from the draft message to Ugyen composed a week earlier, when read in the context of the notes later found at his home, including the note to Ugyen essentially blaming him for not stopping the offender from killing a woman for “fucking with his head”. The offender would later report to a psychiatrist, Dr Carroll, that he was having thoughts of killing Ms Choden a week or two before the offence. The length of time he had the offence in contemplation is a significant aggravating factor.

30. The conclusion that the offence was premeditated is reinforced by the notes and the packet of Ratsak found at the offender’s home after the murder, which indicate that his ruminations had hardened into a firm plan at some point before he left home on the day of the offence. The offence was not a spontaneous act of jealousy or sudden loss of control. The plan conceived by the offender reflected calculation, self-focussed rumination and a slow-burning rage.

31. I accept that the offender may also have been planning to kill himself. That is clear from his notes and his acts including acquiring Ratsak, deleting his phone messages and texting friends to say goodbye. After killing Ms Choden, he drank Ratsak and inflicted stab wounds on himself. That says something about his mental health at the time, and I will return to that issue. However, leaving aside the issue of the offender’s mental health, it cannot be said that a plan to commit suicide lessens the objective seriousness of a planned murder.

32. It was contended on behalf of the offender that the notes found at his home do not expressly refer to any intention to harm or kill the deceased. I do not accept that submission. The only reasonable inference from the notes is that the offender was planning to kill Ms Choden before killing himself.

33. The offender’s acts were extremely serious. He trapped Ms Choden and attacked her in a locked room, where she could not hope to protect herself. As already noted, she must have been in a state of abject terror when he attacked her. She must have known that she was about to die. Her screams heard by others and her defensive wounds indicate that she was not killed instantly; she put up a fight, but was effectively defenceless against the weapon he chose, a boning knife. He stabbed her multiple times to the areas of the body that were most likely to result in her death – her neck and her heart. He locked the room from the inside so that no one could come to her assistance. The attack was one of sustained brutality.

34. As to the offender’s state of mind, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender intended to kill Ms Choden. The plea of guilty was entered on that basis. The offender claims to have no memory of the offending itself but, even assuming that is true, the presence of an intention to kill is the only reasonable inference available.

35. I have also had regard to the impact of the offence on others. The law pays regard to consequences. The offence was committed at the place of work of both the offender and the deceased. In addition to the impact on family and colleagues at the zoo to which I have referred, I wish to make particular reference to the construction worker who heard Ms Choden’s screams and tried to save her. It was submitted that the experience of the worker was “a disturbing incident” but did not qualify as immense trauma. I reject that submission. The experience of hearing a woman scream, being unable to reach her, finding that she had been murdered and seeing her murderer step outside with bloodied hands wielding a knife before slitting his throat can only be described as one that must have been extremely traumatic.

36. Finally, the motivation for the offence as revealed by the notes found in the offender’s home was that a woman “led” him on and “fucked with [his] head”. There is no evidence that Ms Choden ever did any such thing. She never dated the offender. When he murdered her, she was dating someone else and had told him so. The only reasonable inference is that he was motivated to kill a woman because he could not have her for himself. It was an offence of murderous violence against a vulnerable woman at the hands of a jealous, possessive man. Such violence against women is a scourge; it warrants the sternest punishment.

Mental Health

37. It remains necessary to consider the extent, if any, to which the seriousness of the offence is reduced by reason of the offender’s mental state at the time he committed the offence. This aspect of the present sentencing task provides a stark illustration of the point made by the High Court in DPP v Dalgliesh [2017] HCA 41; 262 CLR 428 at [4] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ) that the factors a sentencing judge must take into account in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence are “incommensurable” and, “in many respects, inconsistent”. Resolution of inconsistent factors is perhaps nowhere more complex than in a case where, as here, a person suffering from mental illness commits an offence of extreme violence.

38. There is ample evidence to establish that the offender was mentally unwell at the time of the offence. The offender contends that was causative of the offence and relies on that as a matter that reduces its objective seriousness as well as reducing his moral culpability. The prosecution accepts that, consistently with the approach recently adopted by the Court of Appeal in McBride v The King [2025] ACTCA 16 at [127], the offender’s moral culpability is reduced on account of his mental illness. That concession reflects an acceptance, with which I respectfully agree, that the offender’s mental illness “explains or sheds light on the offending conduct in some material way”: Crane v The King [2024] NSWCCA 87 at [70], applied in McBride at [127]. However, the prosecution submitted that the offender’s mental impairment does not reduce the objective seriousness of the offence in the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, it is necessary to make a determination on that issue.

39. The relationship between moral culpability and objective seriousness was considered by the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in DS v R; DM v R (2022) 109 NSWLR 82; [2022] NSWCCA 156 (Beech-Jones CJ at CL, N Adams and Cavanagh JJ). In that case, the Court explained at [77] that assessment of the seriousness of the offending and the moral culpability of the offender are “separate but related steps.” The quote is lengthy but warrants recitation in full, as it provides important guidance in the present case. Their Honours said at [96]: However, while a mental impairment ‘may’ affect an assessment of the objective seriousness of an offence it will not necessarily do so, even if it is said that there is ‘a’ causal connection between the impairment and the offence. The critical factors are the nature of the impairment, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and the degree of connection between the former and the latter. The most obvious such circumstance is where the mental impairment is effectively a constituent element of the crime, such as manslaughter involving a substantial impairment within the meaning of s 23A of the Crimes Act. Another example may be where an offender damaged property during a period of psychosis or while suffering delusions but in circumstance that fall short of that which might establish a mental illness defence. In such a case, it could be said that the objective seriousness of the offending was reduced perhaps substantially. Such an offence would not be premediated [sic] or planned, and the offender would not have sought or derived any advantage from their offending or possessed any malice in doing do. On the other hand, where an offender suffered from depression that impaired their decision making, it is very difficult to accept that the objective seriousness of a sexual assault they committed is somehow reduced even though it might be said that their depression materially contributed to their inability to overcome their own impulse to commit the offence. Such circumstances might warrant a reduction in their moral culpability which would in turn warrant further consideration be given to the weight attached to various sentencing factors, although it would not necessarily result in a reduction in their sentence.

40. I respectfully agree with that analysis and have adopted it in determining the objective seriousness of the present offence. Based on my consideration of the evidence in the present case as to the nature of the offender’s impairment, the nature and circumstances of the offence and the degree of connection between the two, I have concluded that the offender’s mental illness does not reduce the objective seriousness of the offence in the present case. My reasoning in support of that conclusion is as follows.

41. The prosecution tendered a report from Dr Adam Martin, a forensic psychiatrist. He expressed the opinion that the offender was experiencing a major depressive disorder in the period leading up to the offence. He noted that the offender has given a consistent history to various clinicians of sustained and deteriorating mood (in the period leading up to the offence) with associated symptoms such as sleep disturbance, fatigue, lack of motivation and poor self-care. I note that the evidence before me, particularly including the text exchanges with Donna, support the history given by the offender.

42. Dr Martin also expressed the opinion that the evidence: points to a fixated infatuation with the victim, that was apparently unrequited, and which, in my view, was associated with extreme distress and despair in the accused, probably with jealousy, frustration and an extreme sense of grievance.

43. Dr Martin noted an account given by the offender suggesting some disordered thinking. The offender told Dr Martin, “I kind of see numbers which get me to do things”. He explained that certain numbers meant “go ahead with what you’re doing” and others would be to stop. However, Dr Martin did not consider there was enough evidence to demonstrate that the offender was delusional in the sense of experiencing fixed, false beliefs held despite evidence to the contrary. He said it was plausible that the offender had “some psychotic phenomena” but considered it to be more likely that the offender’s beliefs were of an obsessional quality, noting that the distinction is “a relatively minor and academic point”.

44. Dr Martin concluded: my impression is that [the offender] acted in a narcissistic rage mediated by extreme distress, associated with feelings of hopelessness and nihilism, and a likely sense of futility in relation to the likelihood of the victim reciprocating his intense feelings. This led to overwhelming, extreme anger.

45. Dr Martin accepted that the offender had “a sustained, distorted and disordered mental state that would have affected his judgement and problem-solving capacity, that led to a situation where he felt hopeless et cetera and which manifested as rage directed to the alleged victim and himself”. Separately, however, Dr Martin noted that there was a significant period of time that involved consideration and planning of the violence which he noted detracts from the proposition that the offender’s responsibility for the offence was substantially impaired.

46. The offender relied on two written reports and oral evidence from Associate Professor Andrew Carroll, a forensic psychiatrist with extensive experience. Professor Carroll examined the offender for about 3 hours face-to-face and a further half hour by videoconference.

47. Prior to the offending, the offender had never had any mental health treatment. Professor Carroll considered that the offender had a significant deterioration in mood from around April 2023. It was his opinion that the offender was suffering the onset of a Major Depressive Episode at that time that escalated in severity. As already noted, Dr Martin reached the same diagnosis.

48. Professor Carroll further stated that the offender became “pathologically infatuated” with Ms Choden. He was unable to say whether the infatuation caused the decline in mood or whether the decline in mood caused the infatuation, but considered it likely that the infatuation and depressive symptoms were mutually aggravating.

49. Professor Carroll explained that the offender also developed pathologically suspicious ideas regarding co-workers around this time, including feelings of exclusion and humiliation. This contributed to his belief that Ms Choden “led him on” romantically. Professor Carroll stated that the offender’s judgement was clearly profoundly impaired and included a level of delusional thinking (psychosis).

50. Professor Carroll reported that the offender had developed a suicidal state of mind by December 2023 and was making plans for a murder/suicide, with the intention that he and Ms Choden could “be in this place together”. Professor Caroll stated that these plans were methodical and that the killing was motivated by indignant anger and a “grossly misplaced urge to exact ‘justice’ on the object of his desire”.

51. Professor Carroll concluded that it is more likely than not that, at the time of offending, the offender’s state of mind was profoundly disturbed and his judgement severely impaired by his depressed mood, persecutory beliefs of delusional intensity and pathological infatuation with the victim. He concluded that the offender’s state of mind would qualify as an “abnormality of the mind”. However, he did not consider that the offender’s purported experiences of referential beliefs or odd perceptions have any connection to the offending. He noted that there is a lack of reliable self-reporting.

52. Professor Carroll noted that “pathological infatuation” does not feature in the DSM-5. He noted that the offender was unable to state why he took the poison to work instead of killing himself at home, if that was his intention. Additionally, Professor Carrol described the offender’s Major Depressive Episode as a single episode whereas his pathological infatuation with the victim continues despite undergoing treatment for depression.

53. Professor Carroll expressed the opinion that that there was a causal relationship between the offender’s mental illness and his commission of the offence. As already noted, the offender submitted that this reduces both his moral culpability and the objective seriousness of the offence.

54. The offender noted in his written submissions that “[Professor] Carroll also diagnosed a Mild Personality Disorder equating to Personality Disorder – Trait Specified with pathological degrees of detachment and psychoticism and a ‘moderate’ level of impairment of personality functioning.”

55. It was submitted on behalf of the offender that his pathological infatuation “interplays with the psychotic aspects of the depressive disorder, and was relevant to the deluded thinking or the psychotic thinking that was part of [the offender’s] mental state at the time of the offence”. Counsel for the offender noted that the offender’s perception that Ms Choden was deliberately taunting him was not based in reality; it was a feature of the psychotic symptoms associated with his depression. It was argued that this impaired the offender’s ability to think clearly and to make rational choices about how he responded to his delusional thinking in that it impaired his ability to control the impulses that flowed from the disordered thinking, and it impaired his ability to reason about the wrongfulness of that conduct.

56. I accept that there was a measure of disordered thinking associated with the offender’s major depressive disorder that impaired the offender’s ability to think clearly. However, I am not persuaded that reduces the objective seriousness of the offence. The offender’s mental state spiralled over a significant period during which he had every opportunity to seek support. He did in fact seek support from his friend Donna, who counselled him that he was responsible for his own happiness and that he had to make a choice. There is ample evidence that the offender was capable of rational deliberation during the weeks and days leading up to the offence. He contemplated returning to Sri Lanka. He talked about resigning. He searched airfares from Canberra to Melbourne. Instead of doing any of those things, he developed a plan to murder Ms Choden.

57. Although I am not satisfied that the offender’s mental illness reduces the objective seriousness of the offence, as already indicated, I accept that it reduces his moral culpability and may otherwise be taken into account in the ways explained by the Victorian Court of Appeal in R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269. That decision has frequently been applied by this Court. The principles are as follows.

58. First, the condition “may reduce the moral culpability of the offending conduct, as distinct from the offender’s legal responsibility”: at [32(1)]. The Court explained that where an offender’s moral culpability is reduced, “the condition affects the punishment that is just in all the circumstances; and denunciation is less likely to be a relevant sentencing objective”.

59. The second Verdins principle is not relevant here.

60. Thirdly, the condition may be relevant to an assessment of the weight to be given to general deterrence. The Court emphasised that “[w]hether general deterrence should be moderated or eliminated as a sentencing consideration depends upon the nature and severity of the symptoms exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the mental capacity of the offender, whether at the time of the offending or at the date of sentence or both”: at [32(3)].

61. Fourthly, the condition may be relevant to an assessment of the weight to be given to specific deterrence, again depending on “the nature and severity of the symptoms of the condition as exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the mental capacity of the offender”: at [32(4)].

62. Fifthly, “the existence of the condition at the date of sentencing (or its foreseeable recurrence) may mean that a given sentence will weigh more heavily on the offender than it would on a person in normal health”: at [32(5)]. As explained in McBride at [123](iv), this may indicate that the weight to be given to the sentencing objects of punishment, denunciation and deterrence should be moderated.

63. The offender submitted that his mental illness enlivens the first, third and fourth of those principles. As to moral culpability, the offender submitted that his mental condition was significant and provided “almost a complete explanation” for his offending (principle 1). While I accept that the offender’s condition provides some explanation for the offence, I do not think that warrants any reduction in the overall sentence having regard to the very serious objective features of the offence. I have reflected that consideration primarily in the fixing of the non-parole period.

64. As to the objects of sentencing, the offender submitted that his mental illness reduces the need for both general and specific deterrence (principles 3 and 4). However, as the Court of Appeal noted in McBride at [128], “a finding of reduced moral culpability does not necessarily require the weight to be given to general or specific deterrence to be reduced or eliminated”. As I will explain, I consider that both general and specific deterrence must be given some weight in the present case.

Circumstances of the offender

65. I must have regard to the offender’s cultural background, character, antecedents, age and physical or mental condition: Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), s 33(1)(m).

66. The offender was born in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and migrated to Australia in 2016 for work. He initially resided in Adelaide for 18 months, moved to Melbourne for 4 years and then moved to Canberra in April 2021. Throughout his time in Australia, he worked and studied in hospitality. He has a good study and work history. He was 29 at the time of the offence.

67. The offender has no prior convictions. He tendered numerous character references which speak of him in glowing terms. One aspect of the character references that troubled me was the repeated reference to the offender’s act of murder as “an unfortunate incident”. It was more than that. I accept nonetheless that the references speak with one voice in describing the offender as a respectful, disciplined and caring person. The offender also tendered numerous qualifications and certificates he has obtained over many years.

Remorse and Rehabilitation

68. I am required to consider whether the offender has demonstrated any remorse: Crimes (Sentencing) Act s 33(1)(w). The offender has expressed remorse for the offence. This is recorded in the reports of Dr Carroll and in a letter to the court.

69. The accused was assessed by ACT Corrective Services to be at a low to medium risk of reoffending. Professor Carroll also suggested that the offender’s risk of reoffending was directly linked to his mental health treatment and that the combination of poor mental health with fixation tendencies was the key to the offending. Professor Carroll was not concerned about the risk of reoffending. In his oral evidence, he said: I don’t think the infatuation in and of itself is a sufficient causal factor. I think it’s a – it’s a relevant part of the mix, but it was really that issue mixed in with the major depressive episode that is the key here. If he were to become infatuated with somebody else but not suffer a major depressive episode, I think the chance of reoffending is low. His depression has now been diagnosed. It’s now been treated. I would - he is certainly keen to remain on treatment for the rest of his life, and I would assume that that will be facilitated wherever and whenever. I mean, risk of reoffending in cases like this which are so unusual is always a difficult one to estimate, but the fact that he remains infatuated with the victim doesn’t cause me too much concern in terms of reoffending because I really do think it’s the very distorted thinking secondary to the depression which was the key here.

70. I respectfully do not share Professor Carroll’s optimism. For my part, I am troubled by the letter provided by the offender to the Court. In that letter, the offender apologised to the parents and siblings of the deceased as well as his former colleagues. He apologised to “everyone at Jamala” and to his parents. He promised to work for “awareness in mental health, because it would save lives”. However, the letter concluded with a display of ongoing fixation with the woman he murdered, suggesting a troubling degree of self-absorption. The offender wrote: Dear Tshewang, you are loved. I am sorry for what happened. I really am. I pray for you every day.

71. In my opinion, the offender’s ongoing lack of insight indicates that significant weight must be given to specific deterrence. Comparative Cases

72. I am required to have regard to current sentencing practice in the Territory: s 33(1)(za). The purpose of that requirement is to promote systemic fairness in the criminal justice system through consistency in the application of the relevant legal principles; it is not to be undertaken at the expense of individualised justice: Dalgliesh.

73. The prosecution identified two comparative decisions. The first was the decision of Refshauge J in R v Al-Harazi (No 7) [2017] ACTSC 350. That case involved the violent murder of the offender’s wife, who was the mother of their three children. Following a fight about whether to return to Yemen or remain in Australia, the offender stabbed the victim numerous times as she sat on the bed with their youngest child at her breast. He then placed false blame on the victim’s father and brother. The offender’s mental health was a factor; he had suffered depression, bouts of psychosis and a potential personality disorder. Refshauge J accepted that the offender’s mental impairment “would have reduced his capacity to act rationally, though he could still do so to a significant extent” and that this affected the offender’s culpability for the offence “to a small, not substantial, degree”: at [186]. Unlike the present case, there was no evidence of premeditation. Conversely, the offender did not plead guilty prior to trial. The offender was sentenced to imprisonment for thirty years with a non-parole period of twenty-one years. The prosecution submitted that the present case is more serious. That is a difficult comparison to make, as in each case there are different factors pointing in different directions.

74. The other case identified by the prosecution was the decision of Burns J in R v Rappel [2017] ACTSC 38. The offender in that case murdered his ex-partner, who had taken out a family violence order that had been served on the offender that day. The offender purchased an axe, drove to the victim’s house and smashed in her front door. He proceeded to strike her twice with the axe whilst she was holding a baby, the second blow severing her spine and cutting her vertebral artery. He then attacked others present at the house. Burns J noted that there was a degree of premeditation and planning; the murder was conducted in front of others, including children; the use of an axe was designed to inflict severe and horrific injury; and the violence was a punishment for the family violence order. His Honour accepted that a degree of remorse was shown and that there was a plea of guilty, although the Crown case was overwhelming. Ultimately, the offender was sentenced to 30 years for murder, with an aggregate sentence of 32 years and 2 months for all offences, and a non-parole period of 26 years.

75. The prosecution also referred to a decision of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal. In my respectful opinion, on the issue of current sentencing practices, it is appropriate to confine attention to decisions from the Territory.

76. The offender also identified several comparable decisions. The first was the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Newby [2022] ACTCA 20, which concerned a murder in a family violence context. The offender had entered the house of his former partner and mother of his child one night to find her in bed with a new partner. The offender used a large kitchen knife to stab the man 37 times across his body. The Court of Appeal, in re-sentencing the offender, noted that the murder had been committed in the context of a history of violence towards his former partner, and that the offender had displayed no remorse for his actions. The Court also noted at [82] that the offender’s co-operation with law enforcement and his plea of guilty could not warrant “more than a year off the appropriate and agreed starting point”. The final sentence imposed was imprisonment for a period of 24 years, with a non-parole period of 15 years. It should be noted that, as that was a Crown appeal, the principle of leniency was taken into account.

77. In R v Vosikata (No 2) [2016] ACTSC 391, an offender was sentenced for murdering a woman with whom he had had a brief relationship. He was unable to accept the end of the relationship and began to obsess about her. On one occasion, he entered the woman’s house early one morning and attempted to perform an act of indecency. Later, the offender wrote a suicide note to the deceased, broke into her apartment and strangled her to death, after which he proceeded to perform sexual acts on her body. He pleaded guilty to the offence. He was sentenced to 22 years 10 months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years and 4 months (a figure that accounted for additional offences). Burns J assessed the offending as being towards the top of the range, but noted that the lack of premeditation placed it just outside the worst category of case. His Honour also noted that the offender had no prior criminal history and that there was no evidence to suggest the offender suffered a mental impairment.

78. Finally, the offender referred to R v Tuifua [2023] ACTCA 38. That case involved an offender in his mid-twenties who carried a knife into a nightclub and stabbed the deceased once in the neck. The murder occurred in the context of a general melee involving the deceased and others who were part of an outlaw motorcycle gang. The offending was assessed to be at the mid-range, noting that the offender was intoxicated at the time, the deceased was unarmed and the murder occurred in a public area. In dismissing a Crown appeal, the Court of Appeal in that case noted that the sentence imposed would “never” be the maximum penalty given that there was a guilty plea well before any trial; the lack of premeditation or malignant motive; and the fact that the offender had remorse, some prospects of rehabilitation and other subjective features such as relative youth. The sentence imposed and upheld on appeal was 18 years following a plea discount, and an effective non-parole period of 11 years.

79. In my assessment, the authorities relied upon by the prosecution are more relevant and provide better guidance as to the consistent application of principle in the present case.

Guilty Plea

80. The offender pleaded guilty on 28 July 2025, about four weeks before the date scheduled for the commencement of his trial by jury. A sentence may be reduced in recognition of the utilitarian value of a guilty plea: Crimes (Sentencing) Act s 35(3). However, a significant reduction must not be made where the prosecution case was particularly overwhelming: s 35(4).

81. The offender noted that, during the period before the plea was entered, the parties were investigating the issue of fitness to plead. I accept that he was entitled to seek and consider expert evidence on that issue and that that warrants some consideration: R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTSC 9 at [47]. The offender submitted that, as he entered his plea as soon that issue was resolved, a discount of 20% remains appropriate. I do not accept that submission. That would be a wholly excessive reduction in a matter of this kind. The offender further submitted that the entry of the plea, while later than a plea entered in the Magistrates Court or following criminal case conference, obviated the need for witnesses to give evidence and so still had some utilitarian value. I accept that to be the case, but it remains the fact that the prosecution case was overwhelming. I have allowed a moderate reduction in the non-parole period to reflect the plea of guilty.

82. The offender further submitted that he had engaged with the relevant psychological experts and had been forthcoming and cooperative, warranting a further discount under s 35A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. That section confers a discretion to reduce a sentence for assistance provided in the administration of justice: s 35A(3). I do not consider that the offender’s cooperation with mental health practitioners amounts to assistance of the kind that warrants a reduction in penalty. The evidence of those practitioners was ultimately for the benefit of the offender. In any case, any reduction must not be unreasonably disproportionate to the nature and circumstances of the offence: s 35A(4).

83. The most significant factor in the present sentencing exercise is the very serious objective seriousness of the offence. The sentencing purposes of punishment, general deterrence, protection of the community, denunciation of the offence and recognition of the harm done to the community must all be given significant weight. I accept that the purpose of rehabilitation must also be given some weight and propose to reflect that primarily in the non-parole period to be fixed.

Orders

84. Jude Wijesinghe, please stand: (1) I convict you for the murder of Tshewang Choden on 18 December 2023 (CC2023/12494). (2) I sentence you to a term of imprisonment for thirty years commencing on 18 December 2023 and expiring on 17 December 2053. (3) I fix a non-parole period of twenty years commencing on 18 December 2023 and expiring on 17 December 2043.

I certify that the preceding eighty-four [84] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Chief Justice McCallum. Associate: Date: