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1. On 23 October 2023, Thi Thuy Huong Nguyen (the deceased) was murdered by her former husband, Van Vu (the offender).

2. After initially entering a plea of not guilty, on 3 July 2024, the offender pleaded guilty to the murder of the deceased on 27 May 2025. He now stands to be sentenced for this offence, which carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

Background

The relationship between the deceased and the offender

3. The offender was born in Vietnam in 1952. He married the deceased in Vietnam around 1976, and the couple had a daughter the following year.

4. The marriage did not last, and the offender and the deceased divorced in the early 1980s. The deceased and [the daughter] moved to Australia, with the deceased becoming a naturalised Australian citizen in 1993.

5. After the deceased and [the daughter] moved to Australia, the offender remained in Vietnam, living alone in Ho Chi Minh City. He was in bad health, and suffered a stroke in 2013. After that stroke, [the daughter] arranged for the offender to move to Australia, where he could receive better health care.

6. In 2014, the offender remarried the deceased at a Roman Catholic Church in Australia. The offender has since reported that this marriage was “fake”, and that it occurred in order to enable him to obtain Australian Permanent Residency.

7. Following his arrival in Australia, the offender lived in a house with the deceased, their daughter, [their daughter’s] then husband, and their son and daughter (the grandchildren of the offender and the deceased). The offender never shared a bedroom with the deceased and never renewed intimacy with her after his emigration to Australia. They divorced again in 2021 but continued living in the same house.

8. The offender and the deceased would argue a lot. The deceased often got annoyed with the offender, particularly concerning his memory.

9. In 2016, the offender hit the deceased, causing bleeding and swelling to her right eye and right cheek during the course of an argument. On 29 July 2016, the offender was sentenced to a two-year good behaviour order with no conviction in respect of this offence.

10. In 2022 and 2023, the offender told a family friend that the deceased was abusive towards him, and that he was required to do housework like a slave. There is no objective evidence of the accused’s complaints, and the prosecution does not concede that there was any truth in his allegations. However, the prosecution accepts that the offender genuinely believed that he was being ill-treated by the deceased.

11. In early 2023, the offender removed himself and “travelled to Vietnam for three months”. When he returned, the relationship quickly deteriorated again. After his return, the offender told the family friend: A man should not cry, but my situation was in deep trouble. She [the deceased] provoked me many times… if I don’t control myself I’ll kill her.

12. The offender also told the family friend that “if she kept it up the way she did one day if I couldn’t contain myself, couldn’t control myself, then I’ll stab her”. The offender told the family friend that he had told the deceased: … don’t push me to the corner, like a dog. If you keep pushing it, it will jump at you and bite you. If you keep pushing me, one day … I’ll kill you and then kill myself because I don’t want to go to prison.

13. The family friend told the offender to go for a walk, to come to talk with her, or to see a psychologist when he felt that way. The offender said that he felt ashamed to talk to strangers about his family problems, but he continued to speak to the family friend when disagreements arose between him and the deceased.

14. At the beginning of 2023, [the granddaughter] moved away to university. In the same year, [the daughter] separated from her husband. Later in the year, [the daughter] moved out of the house and began living in an apartment with a new partner. The offender, the deceased, and [the grandson] continued living at the house.

15. In May 2023, the offender applied for social housing assistance. In his application, the offender said that he had heart disease and continued “[m]y ex-wife is also living under the same roof. She treats me very badly and we argue a lot. Therefore, my life is very stressful every day and that triggers the heart attacks”.

The murder

16. On 23 October 2023, the deceased dropped [the grandson] at school, which she did most days.

17. At around 9:15am, the offender and the deceased travelled by bus to the Westfield Shopping Centre at Belconnen. They sat separately on the bus, did most of their shopping separately, and returned home separately. The offender returned home on a bus that left Belconnen at around 10:07am. When the offender got home, he texted the family friend referred to above and asked how she was. Such texts were usually followed by the offender asking if he could come around and talk. However, the family friend was unwell, and was not able to reply to the offender until later that evening.

18. The deceased returned home on a bus that left Belconnen at around 10:53am.

19. Sometime between 11:05am and 5:15pm that day, the offender stabbed the deceased repeatedly in the head, neck and torso. The deceased collapsed to the floor of the living room/kitchen, where she died from her injuries.

20. After stabbing the deceased, the offender slashed his left wrist in the kitchen using a kitchen knife. He then went to his bedroom, which was down the hallway, leaving a trail of blood on the floor. He then swallowed a significant number of tablets of different kinds of drugs.

The aftermath of the murder

21. At around 4:50pm, [the grandson]’s school rang [the daughter] and told her that the deceased had not picked up [the grandson] as planned. [The daughter] tried to call the deceased’s phone several times. There was no answer. She also called the offender, who also did not answer.

22. [The daughter] then went and collected and [the grandson] from school. She noticed that the deceased’s car was still parked in the school car park. She then drove to the home of the offender, the deceased and [the grandson], stopping for takeaway food on the way.

23. [The daughter] and [the grandson] arrived at the house at around 5:32pm. On walking into the house using the internal garage door, [the daughter] saw the deceased lying on her back on the floor near the sliding glass doors. The deceased had blood on her abdomen and on her face and a large amount of blood was pooled around her head area. [The daughter] was in shock and immediately called 000. This call was made at 5:35pm.

24. At the direction of the 000 operator, [the daughter] told [the grandson] to stay in the garage. [The daughter] touched the deceased. [The daughter] knew that the deceased had already passed away because the deceased felt stiff and did not respond to her touch. [The daughter] attempted cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on the deceased, without success.

25. An ambulance arrived at 5:44pm. On arrival in the living room area, the paramedics began CPR. They ceased further treatment at around 5:50pm, because the deceased’s airway was completely obstructed by blood and the deceased had no signs of life.

26. When police arrived at the scene, they saw that the deceased had multiple stab wounds. They also saw two kitchen knives nearby on the kitchen bench. Both knives had blood on them and the tip of one knife was slightly bent. There were two plates of food; one was on the kitchen bench and the other was on the floor near the deceased.

27. Around 5:55pm, police asked [the daughter] to attempt to contact the offender again by mobile phone. Police heard the offender’s phone ringing from within the house. They followed the sound to a bedroom, where they saw the offender lying unconscious on the bed. A large amount of blood was on the carpet. Police saw that the offender had deep lacerations to his wrist and that he was gasping for breath. Paramedics then began to treat the offender. Paramedics also found boxes and blister packs of medication, which they suspected had been taken by the offender. These were later provided to police.

28. The offender was transferred to hospital by ambulance. On the way, he was heard to say “I want to die”.

29. Upon his arrival at North Canberra Hospital, medical staff intubated the offender and commenced treatment for a suspected drug overdose. Later that night, the offender went into cardiac arrest. With treatment, he recovered. He was subsequently discharged from the hospital on 12 December 2023.

The autopsy

30. An autopsy was performed on the deceased on 25 October 2023. The forensic pathologist, Professor Duflou, identified multiple sharp force injuries to the deceased’s body, including: (a) A 41 mm diagonally incised stab wound, which penetrated the deceased’s brain by her right eye socket; (b) An 11mm diagonally aligned stab wound, which passed through the left jugular vein of her neck, ending on contact with the lateral border of the cervical spine; (c) A 20mm stab wound to the deceased’s heart, and a 29mm stab wound to the lung, which also penetrated her heart; (d) Two further stab wounds in her lungs; and (e) A stab wound which caused superficial injury to the right kidney.

31. Professor Duflou also observed relatively minor blunt force injuries to the deceased’s body, including bruising to the back of the scalp, and a fracture of the tip of the right transverse process of the L33 lumbar vertebra.

32. Professor Duflou concluded that the cause of death was multiple stab wounds to the deceased’s head, neck and trunk. Professor Duflou reported that the stab wound which passed into the deceased’s cranial cavity would inevitably have been fatal, while the stab wounds in the jugular vein, heart, lungs and right kidney had the potential to cause death, either individually or in combination.

33. Professor Duflou further reported that blood inhalation into the lungs, together with a considerable quantity of blood loss seen both at the scene and internally into the left pleural cavity, indicates that the deceased had survived for an unspecified period of time after at least some of the major wounds have been sustained. Professor Duflou stated that it was not possible to determine the order in which the injuries were sustained.

34. Professor Duflou also observed multiple incised wounds to the deceased’s right-hand, which could be characterised as defensive-type wounds.

Different accounts given by the offender as to the circumstances of the murder

35. The offender was arrested on 27 October 2023 at North Canberra Hospital. On that day, the offender made a number of admissions to a consultant psychiatrist, including that the offender had a “burning” in his chest after an argument with the deceased concerning money.

36. The offender entered a plea of not guilty to the murder, and was subsequently examined by two forensic psychiatrists, Dr Carroll (who was requested to provide an opinion by the prosecution) and Dr Martin (who was asked to provide an opinion by the offender) in preparation for the trial.

37. In an interview with Dr Carroll on 18 July 2024, the offender reported that conflict had begun with his wife over breakfast. He said that the deceased accused him of being stupid. He said that the deceased later made an intensely derogatory remark about him and that she went to the kitchen bench and took out a cooking knife. He thought that this was dangerous and went to try to hold her hand. He said that as this occurred, the deceased “accidentally stabbed herself” in the abdomen. He said that he then stabbed the deceased a few times on the thigh because he was “so angry”. He said that he thought that the deceased would “already die” from the stab wound that she had inflicted upon herself. The offender denied stabbing the deceased in the heart, but conceded that his memory about what had occurred was “not 100%”. He said that he was scared that the deceased might use the knife to kill him.

38. The offender told Dr Carroll that he then used that knife to cut himself, and that he took an overdose of tablets. He said that he was scared about the criminal consequences of his behaviour and felt as if he didn’t know what was happening.

39. In his interview with Dr Martin on 19 March 2025, the offender denied killing the deceased. He said that the deceased had threatened him with the knife, and that they were “wrestling for a little bit”. On being challenged about the multiple stab wounds that were seen at autopsy, the offender explained that “as soon as she fell to the floor, I was so angry, I repeatedly stabbed her on the thigh”. The offender denied any recollection of stabbing the deceased around her heart and suggested that the knife may have “touched” the deceased’s eye when they were wrestling with the knife.

40. The offender told Dr Martin that the altercation was the result of conflict that had been building for a long time. He accused the deceased of abusing him, controlling his money and making him do all of the housework. He reported having told a family friend “I’m the male, I’m the victim”.

41. The accounts given by the offender to Dr Carroll and Dr Martin are entirely at odds with the objective forensic evidence concerning the number and location of the stab wounds that were seen at autopsy. Whilst neither Dr Carroll nor Dr Martin could exclude the possibility that the offender had consciously lied to them about what had occurred, both considered it more likely that the offender had unconsciously reconstructed his memory of the events, Dr Carroll explaining that this may have been done subconsciously by the offender in order to “shield” himself from the “full horror of his actions”. Dr Martin agreed, explaining that the offender is a “relatively unsophisticated and dementing man”. I accept the opinions of Dr Carroll and Dr Martin that the offender’s false accounts to them concerning the circumstances of the offending were not the product of a conscious intent to deceive.

Remorse

42. On 2 February 2026, the author of the pre-sentence report (PSR) recorded that the offender “mostly commented on the impact of the offending upon him and did not offer any insight into his offending behaviour”.

43. However, at the sentence proceedings, the offender provided a letter to the Court in which he expressed remorse for his offending and confirmed his acceptance of guilt. In that letter, the offender stated: In my earlier appearances before the Court I pleaded not guilty, which amounted to placing the blame upon my wife (the deceased). However, accusing someone who has passed away, someone who can no longer speak for herself in order to escape punishment, simply was a grave wrongdoing. I was profoundly mistaken. Whether judged by moral principles or by moral obligation I was completely in the wrong.

44. The offender continued: If the court imposes upon me an appropriate sentence, then my late wife, where she rests, may perhaps find some peace in knowing that I have been held accountable and have received the punishment I deserve. I am a Catholic and God has taught Catholics the Ten Commandments. The Fifth Commandment states very clearly: “Thou shalt not kill”. Therefore, I have committed a mortal sin, one that no Catholic is ever permitted to commit. God will never forgive me.

45. I have approached the offender’s letter with caution, particularly in circumstances where the expressions of remorse contained within it are inconsistent with the offender’s previous accounts to Dr Carroll and Dr Martin, and with his statements to the PSR author. However, as noted above, both psychiatrists considered that the offender’s earlier accounts were the result of the offender struggling to come to terms with the enormity of his actions, rather than from a conscious intent to deceive.

46. It is apparent from the offender’s letter to the Court that the offender now acknowledges the horrific consequences of what he has done. He has made an unreserved apology for his actions. He does not seek a lenient sentence, and instead asks that he receive the punishment that he deserves. I am satisfied that the offender is remorseful.

The Victim Impact Statement

47. [The daughter] has made a victim impact statement. As the prosecutor and counsel for the offender submitted, the statement is both gracious and thoughtful. I have taken the statement into account in determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed. [The daughter] has asked that the content of the statement remain confidential. In accordance with this request, a non-publication order has been made over the statement, and I will not recount its content in these reasons.

Reference

48. Father Xuan provided a character reference for the offender. In that statement, Father Xuan states that he first met the offender in 2003. He stated that during at that time, the offender provided a “good impression as a good and trustworthy person”. He said that he continues to provide support for the offender, and that the offender has used his time in custody to learn English, and to improve his medication, prayers and physical exercise.

49. As outlined further below, the offender has previously committed an assault against the deceased in a family violence context. I do not accept that the offender should receive any mitigation of his sentence arising from his prior character.

Determination

50. The circumstances of the murder are particularly grave. The offender used a kitchen knife to repeatedly stab the deceased in the head, neck and torso. The deceased was alive for a period after the first stab wounds were inflicted. She attempted to defend herself. Her final moments would have been of intense pain and terror.

51. The prosecutor submitted that I would find that stab wounds were inflicted whilst the deceased was lying on the floor. In support of this submission, the prosecutor relied upon a report of an expert, Ms Schenk, concerning blood spatters that were seen at the crime scene. In that report, Ms Schenk expresses the opinion that the location of droplets of blood suggests that force was applied to the deceased whilst she was “either on or low to the ground”. In response, counsel for the offender noted that Ms Schenk stated that these stains could either have been the result of an “impact event” or an “expiration of blood from the nose, mouth or wound” and stated that it was “not possible to definitively state by which mechanism the blood was deposited”. In this respect, counsel for the offender also referred to the evidence concerning blood being expelled during the CPR that was performed on the deceased. In view of Ms Schenk’s uncertainty, I cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was lying on the ground at the time that any of the stab wounds were inflicted.

52. But little turns on this. The number of stab wounds that were inflicted and the area of the deceased’s body upon which they were inflicted are more important than the deceased’s position at the time of their infliction. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the offender intended to kill the deceased.

53. The offence occurred in the deceased’s home, a place where she was entitled to feel safe. This is a matter which aggravates the objective seriousness of the offending.

54. The offender was the deceased’s former partner, who continued to share the deceased’s home with her. Counsel for the offender submitted that, whilst “technically and legally” the offending constituted family violence, an “unusual” feature was that the marriage was of convenience, and the two had not been in a partnership for some time. It was unclear whether this submission was intended to suggest that this feature rendered the offending less serious than other family violence offence. If this submission was made, I do not accept that this matter renders the offending less serious than other family violence offences. The need for denunciation and deterrence applies equally in the aftermath of a domestic relationship as it does during the course of the relationship.

55. The offending was not motivated by greed or revenge, but rather occurred in the context of an argument between the offender and the deceased. The offender perceived that the deceased was engaging in insulting or threatening behaviour towards him. As I have previously noted, there is no objective evidence that the deceased in fact insulted or threatened the offender, nor would such conduct have excused or justified the offender’s conduct.

56. Before commenting further on these subjective matters, it is necessary to address the evidence concerning the offender’s mental health. The offender has been diagnosed as having a mild neurocognitive disorder. At the time of the offending, he was also suffering from major depression. Both Dr Martin and Dr Carroll agreed that these two synergistic conditions contributed to the commission of the offence. Specifically, both agreed that these conditions would have impaired the offender’s ability to exercise appropriate judgment and as well as his ability to think clearly and rationally. They also agreed that these conditions would have had a disinhibiting effect upon the offender’s behaviour. In relation to the latter, Dr Carroll explained: We all have the capacity to enter into a state of rage. That’s a normal human phenomenon. For most of us most of the time the threshold is quite high and we’re not operating in a state of mind where we’re kind of close to losing our sense of self-control. It seems more likely than not, to me, that [the offender] was operating in a state of mind where all of the time he was closer to the edge, closer to the likelihood of losing his capacity for self-control.

57. Dr Carroll also explained that major depression is a “serious mental illness that affects one’s cognitive capacity to understand the world and affects one’s emotional capacity to react to the world”. In respect of the offender’s mild neurocognitive disorder, Dr Carroll stated: Look, that condition may or may not have had an impact on his perception of events but it is very likely that it had an impact on his capacity to self-control. The parts of the brain that are particularly been damaged, in [the offender’s] case, include the basal ganglia which is a part in the – fairly deep-seated part of the brain – that in tandem with the front part of the brain called the frontal cortex, is crucial for emotional self-regulation. And so the circuitry that actually manages emotions and controls emotions is essentially damaged by his vascular problems which have led to death of some of the relevant parts of the brain. So all of that means that especially when in a state of heightened arousal, when he’s triggered into – he’s more likely to be triggered into rage and that’s when the more primitive emotions take over and he became dysregulated.

58. The parties made conflicting submissions about the relevance of these conditions.

59. On behalf of the offender, it was submitted that the offender’s mental conditions are such as to reduce both the objective seriousness of the offending and the offender’s moral culpability. Counsel for the offender submitted that it followed that general and specific deterrence should play less of a role in the sentencing process. She also submitted that the offender’s physical and mental health was also relevant to an assessment of the impact of custody upon the offender.

60. The prosecutor submitted that, despite the offender’s mild neurocognitive disorder, the offender “appears to have been functioning okay”. He submitted that the offender’s mental illnesses did not reduce either the objective seriousness of the offending, and that any reduction of the offender’s moral culpability was slight. He submitted that the weight to be given to general deterrence should not be moderated, but should in fact be “increased because of the need to protect the community”. However, the prosecutor also acknowledged that there was no evidence that the offender presented any risk to any person other than the deceased.

61. In New South Wales, the fraught relationship between the objective seriousness of an offence and an offender’s moral culpability for that offence has been the subject of a number of decisions: see, for example, DS v R [2022] NSWCCA 156; 109 NSWLR 82 at [70]-[80]; Britton v R [2024] NSWCCA 138 at [114]. There is no need for the complexity in the NSW jurisprudence concerning those concepts to complicate the sentencing task in this jurisdiction. In contrast to NSW, in the ACT, there are no standard non-parole periods (cf Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) Pt 4 Div 1A), and no requirement to make a finding of objective seriousness upon an arbitrary range: R v Miller [2019] ACTCA 25; 279 A Crim R 232 at [18]-[25]. Rather, what is required is that the sentencing judge make the necessary findings of fact that are relevant to the “nature and circumstances” of the offence: s 33(1)(a) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). There is no legislative basis for excluding subjective matters such as an offender’s mental illness, cognitive impairment, or background when making these findings.

62. For this reason, when considering matters such as the offender’s intent, or the extent of planning (each of which may be relevant to a consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offending), it is necessary to consider all of the evidence, including any evidence of psychiatric illness or cognitive deficit suffered by an offender. I have taken this evidence into account in making my finding that the offender intended to kill the deceased (at [52] above), noting in particular that there was no evidence that the offender’s impairment was such that he could not appreciate the nature and quality of his conduct.

63. In respect of the issue of planning, the offender’s mental illnesses assume more importance. As indicated above, the offender had some months earlier foreshadowed that, if provoked, he may stab the deceased and that he would then attempt to kill himself. That is exactly what occurred. If an offender without the offender’s impairments had expressed those sentiments, an inference may well have been drawn that the offender had planned to kill the deceased, or at least, that the offending was not entirely spontaneous.

64. However, taking into account the expert evidence concerning the offender’s impairments, the earlier conversations take on a different complexion. As counsel for the offender submitted, “the fact that [the offender] had spoken to [the family friend] previously about these things does not indicate that this was a premeditated act. On the contrary, it demonstrates that [the offender] was attempting to deal with those frustrations by speaking with [her] about them”. In this respect, it will also be recalled that the offender tried, unsuccessfully, to contact the family friend on the morning of the offence.

65. Although the offender’s neurocognitive deficit was not “severe” (in that he remained able to feed and care for himself), the unequivocal evidence of the experts is that it had a real impact upon the offender’s executive function, that is, his capacity to rationally think and exercise appropriate judgment. In other words, as the offender’s counsel submitted, the offender’s psychiatric conditions impacted upon his ability to “rationalise, how [he] might go about removing [himself] from the situation”. Taking into account this evidence, I find that the offending was spontaneous.

66. Although spontaneous, the offending remains a serious instance of the offence of murder. As I have already stated, this was a furious attack, in a family violence context, of an unarmed woman in her own home. The offender has taken the life of the deceased. In doing so, he has deprived a daughter of her mother, and grandchildren of their grandmother.

67. I do accept that the offender’s moral culpability is reduced by reason of his mental health conditions. Both experts expressed the view that the offender’s conditions contributed to, and indeed were necessary preconditions for, the offending.

68. In McBride v DPP (Cth) [2025] ACTCA 16; 22 ACTLR 119, the Court of Appeal explained at [128]-[129] that: … a finding of reduced moral culpability does not necessarily require the weight to be given to general or specific deterrence to be reduced or eliminated. It is “erroneous in principle to approach the law of sentencing as though automatic consequences follow from the presence or absence of particular factual circumstances”. Each case will depend upon its own facts. As Nettle JA (as his Honour then was) observed in R v Howell, “[t]he theory and reality upon which the intuitive synthesis approach to sentencing is built is that each case is unique”. As explained by the Victorian Court of Appeal in Verdins, whether the weight to be given to general and/or specific deterrence should be moderated depends upon the nature and severity of the symptoms exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the mental capacity of the offender. Of particular relevance to this assessment will be whether the mental condition affected the offender’s capacity to understand the wrongfulness of their conduct. Where an offender’s mental illness is such that the offender is not an appropriate medium for making an example to others, the weight to be given to general deterrence may be reduced, potentially significantly so. (Citations omitted.)

69. In the present case, taking into account the nature and severity of the offender’s conditions, I have concluded that there should be some moderation of the weight to be given to denunciation and general deterrence. However, this moderation is not substantial: see similarly R v Al-Harazi (No 7) [2017] ACTSC 350 at [186]. Whilst the offender’s major depression and his mild neurocognitive disorder contributed to the offending, they were not the sole contributing factors. Particularly significant in this respect is the assault that the offender committed against the deceased in 2016. Although this previous offence occurred many years ago, it demonstrates an underlying preparedness to inflict harm upon the deceased in a family violence context, which also contributed to the offending. As s 34B of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act makes clear, his aspect of the offending must be deterred and denounced.

70. The offender is now 73 years old. He has a range of physical conditions, which include ischaemic heart disease, probable emphysema, diabetes and an “almost certain” diagnosis of prostate cancer. The offender has, to date, been unwilling to have treatment for his prostate cancer. If the offender’s prostate cancer remains untreated, he has a life expectancy of approximately four years. If the offender has treatment for the prostate cancer, it is unlikely that that condition would be terminal, however, in view of his other underlying health conditions, his life expectancy remains only some 5 to 6 years. When determining the sentence to be imposed, I must take these matters into account: R v RLP [2009] VSCA 271; 213 A Crim R 461 at [39].

71. As the prosecutor properly accepted, the offender’s mental and physical health conditions will mean that a sentence of custody will be more onerous for the offender in comparison to other offenders. I will also take this into account in setting the term of imprisonment to be imposed. By reason of the offender’s age and health conditions, there is little need for weight to be given to specific deterrence, protection of the community or the need for rehabilitation.

72. Chief Justice McCallum recently surveyed a number of comparative cases for offences of murder in her reasons for sentence in DPP v Wijesinghe [2025] ACTSC 543 at [73]- [78], including R v Al-Harazi (No 7) [2017] ACTSC 350 and R v Rappel [2017] ACTSC 38. The parties in the present case also drew my attention to Vojneski v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 57, R v Fredes [2020] NSWSC 1332, DPP v Morley [2024] ACTSC 124, R v Newby [2022] ACTCA 20, R v Fredes [2020] NSWSC 1332, R v Rappel [2017] ACTS 38 and R v Ratke [2023] NSWSC 1310.

73. Whilst acknowledging that none of the comparative cases were on all fours with the present case, the prosecutor placed particular reliance on the Chief Justice’s decision in Wijesinghe. In contrast, the offender submitted that a sentence closer to the sentence imposed in Morley would be appropriate. I do not consider either decision to be sufficiently analogous as to provide any guidance as to the appropriate sentence to be imposed. Wijesinghe concerned an offender who was a relatively young man, the murder involved a degree of planning, and the offender expressed limited insight into his offending. The offender in Morley was considerably older, and had a poorer prognosis than the offender, and the deceased was his wife, who was 92 years old, and was suffering from dementia. The offender in Morley acted from a belief that “death, including the involuntary killing of [his wife], was a way out [of the problems which he and his wife were facing]”: Morley at [59]. The criminality in the present case is qualitatively different from that in Morley.

74. Counsel for the offender urged me to consider imposing a sentence which would allow the offender “some hope” for release within his lifetime. Assuming a life expectancy of between 4 and 6 years, this cannot be achieved. A sentence which permitted release within that life expectancy could not adequately vindicate the harm caused by the violent taking of the deceased’s life by her former partner. As the Court of Appeal held in CX v R [2017] ACTCA 37 at [39]: An offender’s age and physical and mental condition are relevant to the sentence imposed, including the nonparole period. Imprisonment may be a greater burden because of ill health suffered by an older offender. However, a sentence (including the nonparole period) must appropriately reflect a variety of sentencing purposes, including those that relate to the objective culpability of the offender’s conduct. (Citations omitted.)

75. See similarly GS v R [2016] NSWCCA 266 at [100]: The necessity for the courts to impose penalties which reflect the community’s abhorrence of these crimes and which otherwise fulfil the purposes prescribed in [sentencing legislation] restricts the degree to which sentences can be mitigated on account of the age and/or frailty of the offender and R v RLP [2009] VSCA 271 at [39].

76. Taking into account each of the matters outlined above, I have concluded that the appropriate sentence to be imposed is 25 years’ imprisonment. This will be reduced by 20% to reflect the utilitarian value of the offender’s plea of guilty, resulting in an overall term of 20 years’ imprisonment. The non-parole period (which has also been reduced by 20% on account of the offender’s guilty plea) will be 14 years’ imprisonment.

Orders

77. The orders of the Court are: (1) For the offence of murder (CC2023/10625), the offender is convicted and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment, commencing on 27 October 2023 and expiring on 26 October 2043; (2) A non-parole period of 14 years’ imprisonment is imposed, expiring on 26 October 2037.

I certify that the preceding seventy-seven [77] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice Baker. Associate: Date: 23 February 2026