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1. Julius Vance (a pseudonym), who I will refer to as the young person, is to be sentenced for an offence of incest, contrary to s 62(2) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Crimes Act). The charge is a course of conduct charge pursuant to s 66B of the Crimes Act. A maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment applies.

2. The offending occurred from September 2020 until the end of December 2022. The young person was aged 14 years through to 16 years and 4 months during that time. The victim of the offending is his younger biological sister, who was aged from 11 to 14 years at the time.

3. This sentence proceeding is one involving a vulnerable young person, and a vulnerable victim. In addition to this being serious offending having significant consequences within the family unit, the criminal justice proceedings themselves have brought their own form of trauma to the young person, the victim, and their family. That observation is not made by way of criticism of any person, agency, or institution. The proceedings were a necessity given the seriousness of what occurred, and reflective that sexual offending, irrespective of the circumstances, is a form of offence that impacts not only the individual victim, but also the broader community.

4. The observation is made because this circumstance of trauma is such that the approach in sentencing in this matter needs to be appropriately adapted in the interests, to the extent possible, of limiting any additional trauma that these proceedings may be capable of causing. Accordingly, the extent to which certain matters will be set out in these sentencing reasons will be limited.

The offending behaviour

5. The offending behaviour is set out in agreed facts which I have carefully considered. These facts include that the offending behaviour became known after the victim made disclosures to a counsellor, which led to a police investigation. The police investigation included that the young person agreed to participate in a record of interview in which he made full disclosures.

6. It is sufficient to observe the nature and circumstances of the offending with reference to what has informed my assessment of the objective seriousness, inclusive of matters considered in accordance with s 34B of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act).

7. The particulars of the course of conduct include there having been about ten occasions of sexual intercourse, involving penile-vaginal, digital-vaginal, penile-oral penetration, and an occasion involving cunnilingus, in a two year and four month period. There was an escalation of seriousness in that period. The acts occurred at the family home, and otherwise on an occasion interstate in a relative’s home. These were locations where the victim was entitled to feel safe and secure.

8. The behaviour began with acts of touching in a context of playing, with the young person initiating and guiding the behaviour, which progressed in the seriousness of the conduct. The victim verbally resisted intercourse on the first occasion, saying to the young person that “No this isn’t normal”. He responded, “Other people do it and it’s normal, no one will find out, it’s fine”. There was not intercourse on this occasion.

9. Subsequently, when the victim was aged 12 or 13 years, there was an act of penile-vaginal intercourse in the young person’s bedroom, after the young person called the victim in there and had her lay on the bed. On this occasion, the young person used a rudimentary form of protection from pregnancy and sexually transmitted disease, the circumstances of which are indicative of a level of pre-meditation to the act. This act occurred when their mother was out of the house.

10. On other occasions, their parents were inside, and acts occurred in the backyard shed, or their parents were not home. On one occasion, the young person stopped the act when he observed on a family application that their mother was returning home.

11. At least one occasion of intercourse involved the young person ejaculating. After telling the victim to wash, which she did, the young person said to her that if she was to ever become pregnant, she was to say that she had used one of his towels and that is how she became pregnant.

12. In his record of interview, the young person said that he started touching the victim prior th th to his 14 birthday. He described that after his 14 birthday, the conduct progressed to intercourse. The young person is described as corroborating some of the incidents as described by the victim. He said to the police that he did not use force on the victim, and he believed she was a willing participant. He said that he only recently became aware that his actions were not only “messed up” but a criminal offence. The young person said that the behaviour ceased after the victim became concerned that she may be pregnant.

13. The agreed facts do not address if this being the reason the offending stopped is accepted by the victim. In a letter to the court prepared by the young person, which I will come to, the young person also ascribes the cessation of the behaviour as being to his own growth in maturity and responsibility following school teachers encouraging him to make better choices in his school behaviour at the time. The young person states that from this point, it never happened again, and he “truly under[stood] how vile [his] actions were”.

14. What can be concluded is that the young person desisted from the conduct of his own volition, albeit the reason for that are not entirely clear. There was plainly at least a growth in understanding by the young person as to the seriousness, and wrongfulness, of the conduct and the consequences that could occur.

15. There is nothing in the offending behaviour as described in the agreed facts indicative of the victim initiating or encouraging the behaviour. Rather, the facts describe the young person as initiating the acts and directing the victim as to the positions she is to get into and the conduct she is to do.

16. The behaviour began when the victim was at a young age, in a circumstance of a power imbalance given the young person was the victim’s older brother. However, the age gap itself between the young person and the victim was towards the lesser range of what this form of offending can involve.

17. There has been a significant breach of the trust that a younger sister is entitled to have in an older brother, who should protect her from harm, rather than cause it. There are no features of physical or verbal aggression or harm, but the acts did occur in circumstances that involve more than mere acquiescence by the victim, with a level of apparent coercion and persistence. This is not to say that the objective seriousness has been assessed with reference to a lack of consent, such an element not being an essential element of the subject offence. Rather, there are features particular to the offending behaviour that, irrespective of the absence of consent as an element for this 1 form of offence, remain informative in assessing its seriousness. These features are such that this was not a low level form of seriousness of this offence.

Effect on the victim

18. In what is a powerful reflection of her inner strength and resilience, the victim has provided an impact statement. In an attempt to give the victim a voice, one that she expresses has been lost by the criminal justice response, it is appropriate to set out her victim impact statement in full, with necessary redactions to protect her identity:

1 See generally R v P [1997] QCA 453. While concerned with the offence of incest in a different jurisdiction, the Queensland Court of Appeal provides a useful overview of the history of the offence of incest, including in part in the ACT, and it is informative as to the assessment of this form of sexual offending. I wanted to write this Victim Impact Statement as I would like my voice to be heard. I feel like what I wanted has not matter[ed] during this process. I was talked in to making my statement to the police at my most vulnerable time by the school counsellor. I never wanted [the young person] charged or for this to be in court. I wanted help for me and my brother, but not like this. I was convinced by the school counsellor who I trusted, that I was just making a statement to be held on file by the police as a way to start the healing process and that it wouldn’t go any further unless I wanted it to later on when I was older. I was told that I could withdraw my statement at anytime, but when I tried, I was told it was out of my hands and I could not. I was told that [the young person] would be questioned by the police, but he would lie so the matter wouldn’t go any further. I made my statement in the moment without actually thinking about what I was doing. I was not told the truth about what was going to happen afterwards. I acted on the advice of someone I thought I could trust who made me feel like I had no choice. Impact, yes, I have a lot to work through which I am with counselling. But I am not the same person I was this time last year. My life has continued, and I have achieved many goals [redacted]. All I want now is for this to be over so we can move forward. I just want my family back. I know [Child and Youth Protective Services] have found a specialised counsellor for [the young person] who believes she can also help our whole family heal, this is all I want. I want to be a family again and not be torn apart and separated. I am not afraid of [the young person] and I know this will never happen again. What happened stopped a long time before I made my statement. I want [the young person] to get help and have a good life just like I plan to do.

19. Any form of sexual offending inevitably causes prolonged impacts on a victim, and the offending here has had such an impact not only on the direct victim, but on the young person’s entire family. Those impacts will likely be life-long, but there is reason to have confidence in the ability for the victim, and the family, to heal and be restored.

Subjective circumstances

20. The young person is now 18 years of age. His subjective circumstances are set out in detail in a Child and Youth Protection Services (CYPS) pre-sentence report dated 20 May 2024. In the interests of ensuring the young person and the victim are not able to be identified, I will not set out those subjective circumstances in any detail.

21. It suffices to observe that the young person has a favourable family environment, although there have been some health issues experienced by a close family member which has involved challenges for all of the family. The young person otherwise engages positively in education, community and family activities, and employment, and he has positive goals for the future, including education and employment intentions.

22. The young person has no criminal history, and he positively complied with his bail conditions, including supervision by CYPS.

23. Importantly, the young person, and the victim, benefit from dedicated and supportive parents who have assisted both the young person and the victim to receive counselling and psychological support. They have ensured the living environment for their children is a safe one, and I have every confidence that will continue in the future.

24. The young person’s parents provided a letter to the Court in which they express that this been the hardest time they have experienced, with the turmoil in their family and their hearts broken for both of their children. The young person’s parents speak of the positive attributes of their son, and his growth despite the court proceeding. While they clearly do not condone their son’s actions in any way, and recognise the harm caused to their daughter, they, like the victim, have experienced frustration from the criminal justice response. They speak of their concern of the consequences of a conviction on their son, and the risk that this could lead to the identification of their daughter in the years to come as their son needs to disclose the offending in various settings. The young person’s parents speak of their genuine sadness for their children, and their family. They express, “All we can hope for now, is that we are given the chance to heal and create a new family dynamic through Counselling, understanding, time and privacy”.

25. The counselling that has been facilitated for the young person has involved the young person engaging with a therapist and a psychologist with expertise in the subject area. The psychological support that the young person has received has been comprehensive and appropriately targeted to this form of offending behaviour. I have carefully considered reports from those supports, but again, will not set out the information contained in them in detail.

26. Relevantly though, one assessment, set out in a report dated 26 May 2024, finds that the young person is at low risk of engaging in future harmful sexual behaviours, and that the young person has a high level of protective factors. The psychologist opines that he “cannot envisage [that the young person] presents a significant risk to those outside his family”.

27. The therapist, who has engaged with the young person in eight sessions and produced reports dated 11 April 2024 and 20 September 2024, finds that there is no evidence that the young person has a sexual interest in children, nor that his behaviours are associated with a broader pattern of persistent conduct disturbance or antisociality. The therapist describes the young person as having “responded positively to intervention” and as having exhibited a willingness to engage in further therapy to ascertain why the conduct happened. Beyond an incident of a sexual nature that occurred in the young person’s childhood that caused him discomfort, there is little understanding at this time as to what lead to the offending behaviour. Areas for ongoing therapeutic intervention have been identified, as well as the need for interventions with the individuals involved, their parents, and the family unit.

Plea of guilty

28. The young person pleaded guilty in the Childrens Court. This was after a brief of evidence was provided, but this occurred in a circumstance of a court direction for that to occur. The matter was committed for sentence to the Supreme Court.

29. As will become apparent, it is unnecessary to quantify the appropriate discount. Suffice to say, that I do not find the circumstances of the plea of guilty to reflect any lack of genuine remorse.

Remorse and insight

30. The young person’s apparent genuine remorse is borne about by his approach in participating in a record of interview immediately after becoming aware of the victim’s disclosures. Further, he is described by the therapist and psychologist as having consistently acknowledged that he engaged in the conduct. The young person has expressed his apology and regret to the victim.

31. The young person has provided a letter to the court in which he sets out in detail his remorse and appreciation for the harm he has caused his younger sister and his parents. The young person expressed: A big brother is supposed to be someone their younger siblings can rely on to always protect and look after them. Someone who will always be there for them. Someone whose parents can have faith in and trust them. I have failed as an older brother and my words will never be able to express how sorry I am for everything. I am sorry for all the pain I have put you all through and how much damage I have caused to this family. I was informed at the sentence hearing that the young person prepared this letter without guidance, it being something that he took the initiative to prepare, representing his own thoughts and words.

32. The young person also demonstrates an understanding of the broader consequences of his offending, such as the implications from a conviction, and an acceptance of this. Overall, the young person demonstrates a level of acknowledgment of the harm caused, and a maturity in this regard, that is seldom seen in adults who engage in offending behaviour of this type.

33. Nonetheless, as to the extent of his insight into the offending, this cannot be regarded as sharing the same depth as his remorse. The therapist and psychologist report the young person as describing the offending as involving, at least initially, a level of mutual curiosity, and that the young person’s drivers, or motivators, for engaging in the behaviour are not yet fully understood. However, there has been a limitation to engage in full therapy while the criminal proceedings have been underway. It is envisaged that therapeutic intervention to ensure the young person takes full responsibility for his actions, and gains insight as to the motivation for it, will be able to occur once the young person is sentenced.

Current sentencing practice

Comparative authorities

34. The prosecution helpfully assisted the court with a number of authorities, acknowledging the limitations these provide, and noting what was said by Mossop J in R v AQ [2021] ACTSC 74 at [32] (R v AQ) that the authorities “do not provide any clear sentencing pattern for offences like this”.

35. I have considered the authorities provided – R v AQ; Director of Public Prosecutions v Pagani (a pseudonym) [2022] VCC 2013 (DPP v Pagani); and R v WS [2021] NSWDC 135 (R v WS). I find only R v AQ and DPP v Pagani to be of assistance given they are the only authorities that involve the sentencing of a young person which, regardless of jurisdiction, involves the application of particular sentencing legislation and jurisprudence. Pagani though is still significantly distinguishable given the lesser maximum penalty that applied, and the historical nature of the offending such that the role of rehabilitation was significantly different.

36. In R v AQ, Mossop J was sentencing a young person for offending by an older brother against his younger sister, the victim then aged from 8 to 11 years. The nature of the offending behaviour had similar characteristics to the offending that occurred here, albeit with some more serious aspects, and some less serious aspects. The victim was younger, and the sexual acts were much more frequent, but the sexual behaviour did not involve penile-vaginal intercourse. The young person there was aged between 12 to 15 years at the time of the offending and was engaged in psychological treatment. The young person was sentenced to a suspended period of imprisonment, with the appropriateness of such a sentence conceded on behalf of the young person.

37. In considering current sentencing practice in the sentencing of young persons for serious sexual offending, I further observe that it is not without precedent that sentences other than ones involving imprisonment have been imposed by the Supreme Court: see for example, R v CC [2016] ACTSC 324 and OH v Driessen (No 2) [2015] ACTSC 354. Sentencing principles for child sex offending

38. The prosecution otherwise referred the court to a number of authorities as to the principles that inform sentencing for sexual offences against children, including those involving incest: R v BI (No 4) [2017] ACTSC 71; Clarkson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 157; 32 VR 361; R v CC [2016] ACTSC 43.

39. I have considered these authorities, and the principles contained therein, but am of the view that the typical sentencing principles and considerations that apply when sentencing for sexual offending involving a child victim are not necessarily applicable when sentencing a young person for such offending. While those principles are not irrelevant in considering the harm that such offending causes a victim, and factors that can inform the objective seriousness, there is a significant difference in the moral culpability involved. That is, a young person engaging in such offending behaviour likely lacks the same inherent form of evil as an adult that engages in such a way with a child.

40. That is certainly the case here, even without any identified explanation as to why the offending behaviour occurred (see above at [27, 33]). There is nothing to suggest the young person appreciated, at the time of the offending, beyond having the requisite legal capacity, the depth of wrongfulness that his conduct involved and the extent of harm that it would cause.

41. This is not to say that the young person ought not be held to account, his conduct not denounced, nor that the behaviour having been engaged in by a young person lessens the harm to the victim, and the community, from the offending. It is to say that, as in any sentencing exercise involving a young person, it is necessary, as both legislated and in order to reflect contemporary understanding of the capacity and culpability of young persons, that the court be cautious to attribute a moral culpability, or moral blameworthiness, that would be attributed to an adult engaging in the same form of offending behaviour.

42. Further, the likely explanation for such offending by an adult, that is, one of self-interested sexual gratification, is not necessarily the explanation for this form of offending by a young person. It is certainly not clear that this is the explanation for the offending that occurred here.

Consideration

43. This is, as was submitted on behalf of the young person, a “complex, difficult, and traumatic case”. It was submitted on behalf of the young person that, having regard, particularly, to the degree of acknowledgment of the offending and the prospects of rehabilitation, that a good behaviour order is appropriate.

44. The prosecution submitted that the only appropriate sentence was one of imprisonment, albeit that such a term could properly be suspended. The prosecution submitted that the sentencing purpose of rehabilitation is “paramount” and that it does apply, but submitted that the sentencing purposes set out in s 7(1)(b) (deterrence), s 7(1)(e) (accountability), s 7(1)(f) (denunciation) and s (7)(1)(g) (recognition of harm) have application: s 133C Sentencing Act, MT v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 26; 17 ACTLR 26; R v MJR [2010] NSWSC 653.

45. I would not characterise rehabilitation as being a legislatively mandated “paramount” consideration, with reference to what is said by the legislature in Chapter 8A of the 2 Sentencing Act, and the authorities relied upon by the prosecution. The promotion of rehabilitation is a purpose of sentencing that the court must consider and may give more weight to than it gives any other the other purposes in s 7 of the Sentencing Act: s 133C(1) Sentencing Act.

46. Additionally, pursuant to s 133C(2) of the Sentencing Act, the court must have particular regard to the common law principle of individualised justice when sentencing a young person, and the court must, in addition to the matters in s 33 of the Sentencing Act, consider (per s 133D(1)(a) - (c)): (a) the young offender’s culpability for the offence having regard to his or her maturity; (b) the young offender’s state of development; and (c) the past and present family circumstances of the young offender.

47. Where the court is sentencing a young offender to imprisonment under s 10 of the Sentencing Act, the sentence of imprisonment “must be a last resort and for the shortest appropriate term”: s 133G Sentencing Act.

48. I accept that the imposition of a penalty involving imprisonment is seemingly warranted given the seriousness of the conduct, and concerning aspects as to the lack of insight, at this stage, as to why the conduct occurred. I accept, as the prosecution submitted, that it is of concern that at this time, it is apparent that the young person attributes a level

2 I also observe, without criticism, but for clarity, that the use of the term “paramount” in the context of sentencing of young persons is apt to risk confusion that it is sought to apply the paramount consideration of the best interests of children and young people that applies to the criminal matters chapters of the Child and Young People Act 2008 (ACT) (CYP Act) (s 8, Chapter 4 CYP Act) and, by extension, the youth justice principles in the CYP Act. The youth justice principles are currently confined in application to Chapter 4 CYP Act, which is concerned with detention conditions of young persons; the administration of sentences per s 320B Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentence Administration Act); and to the consideration of granting bail to persons under 18 years old: ss 22, 23, 26 Bail Act 1992 (ACT). Whether those principles ought to be applied more broadly, and their role in the sentencing exercise of young persons, was not the subject of submissions in this matter. of blame on the victim for his offending behaviour. A term of imprisonment would appropriately denounce such serious conduct, and appropriately reflect accountability and deterrence.

49. I am not satisfied though, having considered possible alternatives, that no other penalty is appropriate: s 10 Sentencing Act. It is appropriate that the promotion of rehabilitation is given more weight than other sentencing purposes in this matter, and that individualised justice dictates a need for a sentence order that fully supports that rehabilitation. A good behaviour order, one in which it was appropriately sought to be made pursuant to of the s 13 Sentencing Act, is capable of fulfilling the purposes of sentencing.

50. Other sentencing purposes of specific deterrence have been met with the young person having spent one night in custody from when he was arrested, until the following day when he released on bail. Further, the young person has also experienced the deterrent effect from the necessity for him to move from the family home, the disruption to the family unit, the impact that the court proceedings have had on his engagement with education, and the anxiety he has experienced from the prospect of imprisonment.

51. It follows that specific deterrence has been, as submitted on behalf of the young person, “achieved and exhausted”. As to general deterrence – to the extent that sentencing decisions involving young people can ever be of deterrent effect to other young persons given the level of decision-making process they engage in when involving in offending behaviour – I do not conclude that this is a factor of significance here, where promotion of rehabilitation and individualised justice has primacy in the sentencing exercise.

52. The same conclusion arises as to the other sentencing purposes in s 7 of the Sentencing Act. It is unnecessary, in the circumstances of this matter, that there be a term of imprisonment to denounce the conduct, hold the young person to account, or to recognise the harm to the victim, even given the depth of that harm. There can be confidence that community protection does not weigh heavily in the sentencing exercise given the prospects of rehabilitation, that the offending behaviour ceased in advance of police involvement, and the supportive and protective approach of the parents. A good behaviour order, involving a conviction, is one that will adequately punish the young person in a way that is just and appropriate.

53. I otherwise observe that in reaching this decision that, while sympathetic to the concerns of the parents and the victim, I do not consider their concern as to the risk of identification of the victim as being significantly informative, and certainly not determinative, as a matter of law in the decision as to the appropriate penalty. Nonetheless, I have not ignored their concerns and have carefully considered their views, particularly those of the victim. But I am not satisfied that this concern is elevated to being a probable effect such that it weighs heavily in the sentencing exercise: s 33(o) Sentencing Act. If it is of any comfort, to the extent any such issues could arise, I consider the proposed orders are the least likely of the appropriately available sentencing options to mitigate against this risk.

Supervision

54. The determination becomes the appropriate period of the good behaviour order, and whether supervision is an appropriate condition. In the context of a supervision condition for a young offender, this is a condition included in the order that, per s 133U of the Sentencing Act: (a) requires the young offender to comply with all reasonable directions given by the director-general; and (b) allows the director-general to require information from entities directly supervising the young offender.

55. The pre-sentence report includes that supervision is not recommended given the proactive action taken by the young person’s parents to secure psychological assistance, along with the young person otherwise being a pro-social and responsible adolescent. CYPS consider that supervision is not necessary as there are no general criminogenic risks and the young person is assisted by appropriate experts in this area. The therapist observes that the young person, despite having confidence that such sexual harm will never happen again and that he understands what he did was wrong, this is not a restraint to the young person being motivated and willing to reflect and understand his behaviour further. All of these factors are to be accepted, but I conclude that a supervision condition remains necessary.

56. I conclude this with reference to the report of the psychologist dated 26 May 2024. This includes: [The young person] … needs to find genuine, internally-based motivation to engage fully in treatment, such that he develops awareness and understanding of the dynamic which supported his [harmful sexual behaviours] over such a long period of time. … [W]hilst the risk [of re-offending] is low, strong supervision and management by the parents, and continued adherence to principles of safety should remain in-place whilst both youths undertake treatment. … Although it is likely [the young person] and his family would attend [therapeutic engagement] voluntarily, there may be some value in a treatment order to reflect the severity of the behaviours and the importance of therapy taking place in a meaningful and appropriate way.

57. A supervision condition, which I did not understand to be an impediment to continuation of engagement with the appropriately qualified therapist with whom the young person has built a rapport, will provide the necessary incentive, oversight, and facilitation of continued therapy to ensure rehabilitation.

58. As to the period of good behaviour, and the period that there will be a need to comply with the applicable conditions under such an order, I am of the view that a period of 24 months is appropriate. This is an appropriate period, having taken into account that the young person will be exposed to the supervision as it applies to adults given his age. Such a period will encompass, and extend beyond, the period during which it can be expected that the young person will continue to engage with and make progress as to insight into the offending, per the therapeutic recommendations of the psychologist (being a period of 12 to 15 months). During this period, the Director-General can provide supervision for the period that they assess is warranted as the young person moves into early adulthood.

Register

59. Application is made pursuant to s 9(3) Crimes (Child Sex Offenders) Act 2005 (ACT) (Child Sex Offenders Act) that the young person be excluded as a registrable offender on child sex offenders register, it being submitted that to do so would be inappropriate in the circumstances of the case. Incest is a class 1 offence under the Act (Sch 1, Pt 1.1, item 15), that is, a ‘registrable offence’.

60. I have had regard to the mandatory considerations in s 9(4) of the Child Sex Offenders Act. While the severity of the offence, the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding its commission, and the level of harm to the victim and the community might in themselves weigh towards declining the application, the age of the offender, his progress towards, and prospects of, rehabilitation, and the absence of community protection concerns, weigh in favour of the application.

61. The psychologist recommended that if there is scope to not place the young person on a register, that this should occur. This recommendation was made in circumstances where it was opined that community safety would not be enhanced by placing the young person on the register. The psychologist describes him as a “low-risk, solely intrafamilial offender with excellent prospects of leading a future ‘good, productive life’”.

62. I otherwise have considered, being a relevant circumstance pursuant to s 9(4)(f) of the Child Sex Offenders Act, that the victim and her parents have a strong preference towards an outcome that limits the prospect of the victim being identified, or further exposed to processes beyond therapeutic support. While it is unclear whether there is a prospect of the victim being identified or contacted if the young person was on the register, in circumstances where there is a strong preference against this occurring, and community protection does not compel an outcome involving the young person being a registrable offender, I, to the extent I can, give voice to the victim in this regard.

63. Accordingly, I am satisfied that it is inappropriate in the circumstances of the case to include the young person on the register.

Orders

64. For those reasons, the following orders are made: (1) Julius Vance (a pseudonym) be convicted of incest (CC CAN 1119/2023) and sentenced to a good behaviour order pursuant to s 13 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) for 2 years, to commence on 10 October 2024 and end on 9 October 2026. (2) The conditions of the young person’s good behaviour order are to be the core conditions contained in s 86 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), and an additional condition to accept the supervision of the Director- General of ACT Corrective Services and comply with all reasonable directions of the Director-General of ACT Corrective Services for the period of the good behaviour order or such lesser period as deemed appropriate by the Director- General. (3) Pursuant to s 9(3) of the Crimes (Child Sex Offenders) Act 2005 (ACT) the young person is not a registrable offender.

I certify that the preceding sixty-four [64] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Acting Justice Christensen Associate: Date: