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Section 316 provides relevantly: 316 Special hearing (1) Subject to this section, the Supreme Court shall conduct a special hearing as nearly as possible as if it were an ordinary criminal proceeding. (2) A special hearing shall be a trial by jury— (a) unless— (i) the Supreme Court is satisfied that the accused is capable of making an election to have a special hearing to be a trial by a single judge without a jury before the court first fixes a date for the hearing; and (ii) the accused makes the election before that date; or (b) unless— (i) the Supreme Court is satisfied that the accused is incapable of making the election mentioned in paragraph (a) (i); and (ii) before the court first fixes a date for the hearing, any guardian of the accused notifies the court that, in his or her opinion, it is in the best interests of the accused for the special hearing to be a trial by a single judge without a jury. (3) The Supreme Court must direct the ACAT to appoint a guardian with power to notify the court under subsection (2) (b) (ii) if the court is satisfied that— (a) there is no guardian who has power to do so; and (b) the accused is incapable of making the election mentioned in subsection (2) (a) (i). (4) If— (a) the accused makes an election under subsection (2) (a) (ii); or (b) a guardian notifies the Supreme Court under subsection (2) (b) (ii); the special hearing shall be by single judge without a jury. (5) Despite subsection (2) (b), if before the date fixed by the Supreme Court for the hearing— (a) the court is satisfied that the accused is capable of making the election mentioned in subsection (2) (a) (i); and (b) the accused notifies the court that he or she objects to the special hearing being a trial by a single judge without a jury; the special hearing shall be a trial by jury. (6) Unless the Supreme Court otherwise orders, the accused shall have legal representation at a special hearing. (7) A decision that the accused is unfit to plead to the charge is not to be taken to be an impediment to his or her being represented at a special hearing. (8) At a special hearing, the accused is to be taken to have pleaded not guilty in respect of the offence charged.

Background

7. Manfred Uhle was born on 1 April 1938.

8. Wanda Uhle was born on 18 February 1946. Mr Uhle and other members of Ms Uhle’s family regularly referred to Ms Uhle as “nan”.

9. As at 2 June 2024, Mr Uhle and Ms Uhle had been in a relationship for approximately 60 years.

10. As at 2 June 2024, Mr Uhle and Ms Uhle lived at an address in, Gordon, ACT. They had resided at that premises for approximately five years.

11. Mr Uhle and Ms Uhle shared two children: Darin Uhle and Carol Thompson.

12. Ms Thompson has two children: Jessie Leffers and Grace Kearon.

Mr Uhle’s behaviour prior to the offence

13. Since approximately 2021, family members of Mr Uhle had noticed changes in his confidence, independence and anxiety levels, describing him as becoming highly anxious and fearful, which they described as out of character for him. In the 12 to 18 months prior to the offending, Ms Kearon reported Mr Uhle experienced episodes of confusion and memory loss which continued to deteriorate. Ms Kearon observed that Mr Uhle was unable to complete simple mathematics despite his proficiency in computational arithmetic. During this time, family members had suggested Mr Uhle and Ms Uhle engage with aged care services or assisted living arrangements, but neither Mr Uhle or Ms Uhle accepted this assistance.

14. In the period preceding the offence, Mr Uhle spent time with Ms Kearon and Ms Thompson. Both observed that he was forgetful, disoriented and confused. Moreover, there had been increased episodes of paranoid and persecutory ideation.

15. Mr Uhle was admitted to hospital with pneumonia some two to three weeks prior to the offence occurring. Whilst in hospital, Ms Kearon observed that Mr Uhle believed nurses were attempting to poison and kill him. Ms Kearon recalled he was highly distressed and asked to be discharged from hospital as he refused to eat or receive medication. Ms Kearon contacted her nan (Ms Uhle) and asked her to attend hospital, to reassure Mr Uhle. To this point, he refused medication and expressed persistent paranoid beliefs about the medical staff. Ms Kearon recalled speaking with Mr Uhle three days after he was discharged where he could not recall these incidents.

2 June 2024 – the offence

16. At approximately 5:45am on 2 June 2024, Mr Uhle retrieved an "M-7S Survival Knife” (the knife). The knife was an overall length of approximately 32cm with a double-edged blade of approximately 17cm. One edge of the blade was serrated and the other was not.

17. Having retrieved the knife, Mr Uhle entered the bedroom where Ms Uhle was sleeping and got into bed with her. Ms Uhle asked Mr Uhle what he was doing and Mr Uhle replied, “I’m going to kill you”.

18. Mr Uhle stabbed Ms Uhle. Ms Uhle attempted to defend herself and to flee from the room. She managed to make her way out of the bedroom and move to the front door. While doing so, Ms Uhle was screaming, “Fred Stop, Fred stop, think of your karma”. She also yelled out “Bob, Bob” (one of their neighbours was Robert Wood who was known as Bob). Two neighbours (including Robert Wood) heard the commotion but thought that Mr and Ms Uhle were simply arguing.

19. Mr Uhle continued to stab Ms Uhle with the knife. The autopsy report of Ms Uhle noted that there were multiple sharp force injuries on her, including a combination of 10 stab wounds to the upper trunk, including wounds which caused lethal injury to the heart, aorta, lungs and liver, and 23 incised wounds to the extremities consistent with defensive wounds.

20. Ms Uhle died in the open doorway of the premises. Except for a scarf tied twice around her neck and a t-shirt on her left arm, Ms Uhle was naked.

21. Mr Uhle used a floral-patterned doona to cover Ms Uhle.

22. Thereafter, Mr Uhle left the residence in his white Toyota Rav-4.

2 June 2024 – post offence

23. Mr Uhle drove to Ms Leffers’ residence in Fadden, ACT, arriving at approximately 7:00am.

24. When Ms Leffers answered the door, she observed Mr Uhle was struggling to breathe, had blood on his feet, and was dressed in his pyjamas. It was subsequently observed that Mr Uhle had blood on his face, hands and feet.

25. Ms Leffers queried Mr Uhle as to whether he was injured and Mr Uhle responded, “No, no. Just let me sit down for a minute and then I’ll tell you what happened”.

26. Ms Leffers queried Mr Uhle concerning where Ms Uhle was and Mr Uhle replied with words to the effect of “I don’t know. I’ll tell you what happened once I calm down and can breathe”.

27. Shortly thereafter, Mr Uhle told Ms Leffers and her husband (Rowan Leffers) that he had had a fight with Ms Uhle, that Ms Uhle hated him, and that she wanted a divorce. Mr Uhle further stated that Ms Uhle had cheated on him with their neighbour (there is no evidence of any infidelity between Mr Wood and Ms Uhle). Mr Uhle also said that Ms Uhle had cut him but when pressed was unable to say why. Ms Leffers observed that Mr Uhle had a cut above his left wrist.

28. Ms Leffers pressed Mr Uhle as to where Ms Uhle was and Mr Uhle responded, “Well, nan’s okay. She is just sleeping”. Mr Uhle also said that “Nan is at peace”.

29. Ms Leffers phoned Ms Kearon and expressed concern that Mr Uhle had done something to Ms Uhle. Ms Kearon phoned police who subsequently attended the Gordon residence where they located Ms Uhle, dead, in the open front doorway of the premises.

30. Subsequent examination of the Gordon residence revealed extensive blood staining throughout the premises. Testing of these stains confirmed that the large majority were Ms Uhle’s blood. This included on the bed where Ms Uhle had been sleeping, the wardrobe door, the bedroom door, the laundry floor, the floor of the living area (which is between the bedroom and the front door), and the front door.

31. At approximately 7:40am on 2 June 0224, police attended Ms Leffers’ residence where a short time later, they arrested Mr Uhle for murder. Mr Uhle has remained in custody since this time.

25 September 2024 – admissions

32. On 25 September 2024, Ms Thompson visited Mr Uhle at the Alexander Maconochie Centre. Ms Thompson observed that Mr Uhle looked “spacey”, and like he was looking right through her. During this visit, Mr Uhle recounted what had occurred at the Gordon residence on the morning of 2 June 2024, including: (a) “I went to my bedroom, I grabbed the knife”; (b) “I walked back into where nan was sleeping. I jumped into bed with her and that’s when she stated to wake up. Then she said “what are you doing Fred?” I said “I’m going to kill you”.”; (c) Mr Uhle indicated a stabbing motion by raising both hands clasped together above him and moving them downwards in front of him; (d) “She put up a good fight, she was strong, she fought like a tiger”; (e) “She got away from me and got to the screen door”; (f) Mr Uhle said that Ms Uhle had said “Fred stop, Fred stop, think of your karma” and had yelled out “Bob! Bob!” before going silent; (g) Mr Uhle indicated that he “didn’t feel like the knife was going in”, that he “couldn’t stand” and that “that’s when I got the doona and covered her up”; and (h) Mr Uhle said that he had limited recall of travelling to Ms Leffers’ house.

33. At the end of the visit, Mr Uhle said to Ms Leffers, “Tell nan to come visit me if she is alive.”

General directions for the conduct of a criminal trial

34. I adopt the summary of directions identified by Nield AJ in R v Mulcahy [2010] ACTSC 98 at [13]-[24], excluding those with no relevance in this case: [13] A criminal trial is governed by rules. The fundamental rules are designed to ensure that an accused person receives a fair trial according to law. The fundamental rules which govern a criminal trial are these. [14] The Crown bears the onus, burden or obligation, to use three interchangeable words, to prove the guilt of the accused. The Crown has asserted that the accused has committed a criminal offence, therefore the Crown must prove that the accused committed that offence. The accused does not have to prove that he did not commit that offence. [15] The level or standard of proof required in a criminal trial is proof beyond reasonable doubt. The accused cannot be found to be guilty of the offence unless the evidence, which I accept, satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. [16] The accused is presumed by law to be innocent of the offence with which he stands charged unless and until the evidence which I accept satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. If the evidence which I accept satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt, then he loses the presumption of innocence and the appropriate verdict is guilty. If, however, the evidence which I accept fails to satisfy me beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt, then he remains presumed to be innocent and the appropriate verdict is not guilty. [17] In addition to the fundamental rules which govern a criminal trial, the following rules have been developed. [18] As I am the judge of the facts, as well as the judge of the law, I must bring an open and unbiased mind to the evidentiary material. I must view that material coldly, clinically and dispassionately, and I must not let emotion enter into the decision-making process, because both the Crown and the accused are entitled to my verdict free of partiality or prejudice, favour or ill will. … [20] I must determine the relevant facts according to the evidentiary material, considered logically and rationally, without acting capriciously or irrationally. … [24] In a criminal trial the Crown must prove the essential elements of the charge beyond reasonable doubt. The Crown does not have to prove everything about which evidence has been given beyond reasonable doubt…

35. In addition, I have taken into account the following matters: (a) Mr Uhle did not give evidence in the proceedings. He was under no obligation to do so and the evidence before me reflects the likely limited utility of the receipt of any evidence from him. I draw no adverse inference from his failure to give evidence. In a special hearing he has the same entitlement an accused person has in a normal criminal trial to decline to give evidence. I do not take into account his decision not to give evidence in any way. Nor do I use the absence of evidence to fill gaps in the prosecution case or to strengthen that case. I do not speculate as to the likely content of any evidence he may have given. (b) Where I am called upon to draw inferences they must rest upon something more than mere conjecture or speculation. Conjecture will arise where there are no positive proved facts from which the inference can be drawn. The defendant is not obliged either to establish that some inference other than guilt should be drawn from the evidence or to prove the particular facts tending to support an inference to that effect. The evidence is not to be considered in a piecemeal approach and rather must be considered as a whole with the accumulated weight of the circumstances put together: TI v R [2015] ACTCA 62. Guilt can only be inferred from circumstantial evidence where that is the only reasonable or rational inference available from the evidence. (c) Where the evidence of an admission is lead as the only evidence upon which to convict an accused, the reliability of the admission must be proved beyond reasonable doubt: R v Eastman [2018] ACTSC 321. In this instance the evidence of Mr Uhle’s guilt is not solely reliant upon his alleged admissions and as such the admissions do not need to be proved to the criminal standard. It is also an agreed fact per s 191 of the Evidence Act, that certain admissions were made. It is clear that in considering the reliability of admissions, a jury, and in this case a judge-alone, should have regard to the circumstances in which those admissions were said to be made, as they might bear upon their reliability. In DPP v Williams [2024] ACTSC 160, Taylor J, in considering the reliability of an admission by that accused, informed herself of the signs and symptoms of mental health and emotional instability exhibited by the accused impacting the admissions made. I note the need for caution in the weight to be given to such evidence, with due regard to Mr Uhle’s evident cognitive decline.

36. It must be remembered that this is a case resting in part on agreed facts. Pursuant to s 191 of the Evidence Act where the facts have been signed and agreed by the parties, they are not to be disputed for the purposes of the proceedings. However, where the agreed facts are based on admissions, the circumstances of the admissions and background are still to be considered in the attribution of weight.

37. As Refshauge J articulated in R v McLaughlan [2008] ACTSC 49; 185 A Crim R 97 at [58]: The question for the court does not include a consideration of the actual truth or reliability of the admission: Esposito at 460; R v Ul-Haque [2007] NSWSC 1251 at [102]. The focus of the inquiry to be undertaken by the court is upon the impact of the circumstances in which the admission was made on the actual reliability of the admission: Esposito at 460.

38. His Honour continued at [64]-[65] (albeit in the context of considering an admission under s 85 of the Evidence Act): It is clear that a psychiatric illness is not itself sufficient to prove the unlikelihood of the reliability of an admission: R v Starecki [1960] VR 141 at 151-2. Similarly, the fact that a person being questioned is depressed is not, by itself, sufficient to show that the reliability of admission made are adversely affected: Truong (1996) 86 A Crim R 188 at 193. For a somewhat different view, see Donnelly (1997) 96 A Crim R 432 at 435. In Parker (1990) 19 NSWLR 177 at 183-4. Gleeson J observed: Persons who are intellectually handicapped or who suffer from disease or disorder of the mind are by no means necessarily incapable of telling, or admitting, the truth. Nevertheless, if the psychiatric and psychological vulnerabilities and circumstances of a person questioned are clearly potentially relevant to the issue of reliability and it would appear from the decision of the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal in R v GA (NSWCCA, Gleeson CJ, James and Sperling JJ, 17 July 1997, unreported) that if relevant they are to be considered in the context of s 85(2). Matters requiring proof at a special hearing

39. Section 317(3) of the Crimes Act provides relevantly: 317 Verdicts available at special hearing (3) If, at a special hearing by a single judge without a jury, the judge is not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused engaged in the conduct required for the offence charged (or an alternative offence, if not satisfied in relation to the offence charged)— (a) the judge shall find the accused not guilty of the offence charged; and (b) the accused shall be dealt with as if the accused had been found not guilty at an ordinary trial.

40. In this case, the elements of the charge of murder which I must be satisfied are proved beyond reasonable doubt are: (a) Mr Uhle voluntarily engaged in the conduct; and (b) his conduct resulted in his wife’s death.

41. The second element is readily satisfied on the evidence before me. The autopsy report confirms multiple sharp force injuries including stab wounds causing lethal injury to the heart, aorta, lungs and liver. It is agreed the stab wounds were caused by Mr Uhle.

42. As for the first element the prosecution relies on Mr Uhle’s action in retrieving the knife and entering his wife’s bedroom, his statement of intent to kill, and the repeated administration of stab wounds notwithstanding Ms Uhle’s attempts to escape her husband and to defend herself. Accepting each of those actions is agreed, and with due regard to the caution to be applied in assessing the reliability of facts agreed on the basis of Mr Uhle’s account, it is beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Uhle stabbed his wife repeatedly with a knife, resulting in her death. The residual question is whether his actions are properly viewed as voluntary actions. “Engage in conduct” is defined in s 13 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) to mean: (a) do an act; or (b) omit to do an act.

43. In the Criminal Code, “voluntariness” is defined in s 15: 15 Voluntariness (1) Conduct can only be a physical element if it is voluntary. (2) Conduct is voluntary only if it is a product of the will of the person whose conduct it is. Examples of conduct that is not voluntary 1 a spasm, convulsion or other unwilled bodily movement 2 an act done during sleep or unconsciousness 3 an act done during impaired consciousness depriving the person of the will to act (3) An omission to do an act is voluntary only if the act omitted is an act that the person can do. (4) If the conduct required for an offence consists only of a state of affairs, the state of affairs is voluntary only if it is a state of affairs over which the person is capable of exercising control. (5) Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in deciding whether conduct is voluntary. (note omitted by this court)

44. The examples identified appear to limit the concept of involuntariness to movements performed without intent or control, without consciousness, or during consciousness so impaired that the person is deprived of the will to act. Those descriptors do not apply to the conduct of Mr Uhle. His was voluntary in the sense that his movements were controlled and administered repeatedly, he was conscious and, to the extent his consciousness was impaired, it was not impaired so as to deprive him of the will to act. That is something quite different to a positive intention to perform the act. However, the mental element of intention is not something the prosecution is required to prove in the circumstances of this case

45. As Barwick CJ observed in Ryan v The Queen [1967] HCA 2; 121 CLR 205 at 213 “[i]t is the act which must be willed though its consequences may not be intended”: see also R v Musa (No 2) [2023] NSWSC 247; 111 NSWLR 228 at [7].

46. For the reasons given above I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Uhle engaged in the conduct required for the offence charged on the indictment in accordance with s 317(4) of the Crimes Act.

47. The parties each accept the offence is a serious offence as that term is defined in s 300 of the Crimes Act.

Non-acquittal for a serious offence – consequential orders

48. As I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Uhle engaged in the conduct required for the offence, and the offence is a serious offence s 319(2) of the Crimes Act applies: 319 Non-acquittal at special hearing—serious offence (1) This section applies if— (a) an accused is charged with a serious offence; and (b) at a special hearing that is a trial— (i) by a single judge without a jury—the judge is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused engaged in the conduct required for the offence charged (or an alternative offence, if not satisfied in relation to the offence charged); or (ii) by jury—the jury advises the court under section 317 (1). (2) The Supreme Court must— (a) order that the accused be detained in custody for immediate review by the ACAT under the Mental Health Act 2015, section 180; or (b) if, taking into account the criteria for detention in section 308, it is more appropriate—order that the accused submit to the jurisdiction of the ACAT to allow the ACAT to make a mental health order or a forensic mental health order under the Mental Health Act 2015.

49. The prosecution submits the only suitable order in the present circumstances is an order remanding Mr Uhle in custody for immediate review by the ACAT under the Mental Health Act 2015 (ACT). In making that submission the prosecution accepts detention in a correctional facility should be a last resort; but no other option presents itself at the present time. I indicated to the parties I would provide an opportunity for further submissions on that topic with a view to exploring whether there is a suitable alternative in Mr Uhle’s case that would see him released from custody to facilitate an ACAT assessment for the purpose of making a mental health order.

50. The parties should also be afforded an opportunity to be heard in relation to the criteria for detention pursuant to s 308 of the Crimes Act and, where applicable, as to an appropriate sentence in accordance with s 301 of the Crimes Act. I will hear the parties further in relation to the matters I have identified.

Orders

51. I make the following orders: (1) I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the conduct of Mr Uhle satisfied each of the elements of the offence of murder, contrary to s 12 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), pursuant to s 317(4) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). (2) I find the offence with which Mr Uhle was charged is a serious offence within the meaning of s 300(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). (3) I will hear the parties further on the operation of s 308 and s 319 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), any orders that should follow, as well as any orders that would follow as a consequence under s 301 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).

I certify that the preceding fifty-one [51] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Muller. Associate: MG Malouf Date: 18 September 2026