DPP v Tigani [2025] VCC 1624

(a) Charge 1 - Sexual assault of a child under 16 - by kissing complainant, Erica DIXON.[2]

(b) Charge 2 - Sexual assault of a child under 16 - by touching the breasts of Erica DIXON.

(c) Charge 3 - Sexual penetration of a child under 16 - by introducing your finger into the vagina of Erica DIXON.

(d) Charge 4 - Sexual penetration of a child under 16 - by introducing your tongue into the vagina of Erica DIXON.

1. The trial commenced on 22 May 2025. A jury was empanelled, opening addresses were made by both counsel. The complainant's pre-recorded testimony, including her being cross-examined on 20 May, was played to the jury.
2. On the 27 May 2025, that jury was discharged without verdict because you absconded in breach of your bail. A warrant was issued for your arrest. That warrant was executed on 31 May 2025. You were arrested taken into custody where you have spent the last nearly five months.
3. You have now pleaded guilty to a fresh Indictment[3] which covers the same criminality alleged in the trial indictment, but is in the form of two rolled up charges:

(a) Charge 1 - Sexual Assault of a child under the age of 16 years (rolled up to include one instance of kissing Erica DIXON & one instance of touching Erica DIXON's breasts). Maximum penalty Level 5 (10 years);

(b) Charge 2 - Sexual Penetration of a child under 16 years (rolled up to include one instance of introducing your finger into the vagina of Erica DIXON and one instance of introducing your tongue into the vagina of Erica DIXON). Maximum penalty Level 4 (15 years).

1. Both charges are subject to the standard (not mandatory) sentence regime:

(a) In the case of charge 1 - Sexual Assault of a child under the age of 16 the standard sentence is 4 years;

(b) In the case of charge 2 - Sexual Penetration of a child under 16 years, the standard sentence is 6 years.

1. You are a young man who has endured a lot of adversity in your short life and had not offended before or after this episode. You are thus a young, first-time prisoner. You can call in aid a number of powerful matters in mitigation of sentence. You have also belatedly accepted responsibility for your wrongdoing.
2. There is no question that this offending warrants a term of imprisonment, with a non-parole period. So much was sensibly conceded by your counsel.
3. This brings about a total effective term of 2 years 8 months. I set a non-parole period of 1 year 6 months. The time you have spent thus far in custody will be deducted from your sentence. How I arrived at that sentence is explained in the reasons that follow to all of those who have an interest in the outcome of this case.

1. You were born in March 2003. You were 20 years old at the time of this offending. In the early months of 2023, you had no permanent place to live and were living out of a hired work van, being a white 2022 Toyota HiAce Van.
2. Erica DIXON was 13 years old and a Year 7 student at the relevant time.
3. Erica resides at her family's home address with her mother, Rachel BROOKS,[4] and two older brothers, Brendan DIXON,[5] and Kevn DIXON.[6]
4. You and the complainant's eldest brother, Brendan, were close personal friends and work colleagues. You and Brendan describe your friendship as being more like brothers and the two of you were practically inseparable.
5. You were well aware of the victims age, having purchased her a present for her birthday.

1. Approximately two months prior to the incident, being in early September 2023, the victim's mother, learnt that you were living out of your hired van. She invited you to live with her family at her home while you and Brendan sorted long-term living arrangements.
2. You were respectful and well-mannered whilst living at the home. You came to be considered part of the family. You and the victim shared an older brother/younger sister relationship.
3. On the evening of Tuesday 24 October 2023, you and Erica found yourselves to be the only two persons home.
4. You were in the loungeroom watching television and having dinner. You were drinking and had consumed approximately half of a 1 Litre bottle of Jack Daniels whiskey.
5. You poured yourself a glass of straight whiskey and instantly sculled it without taking a breath. You returned to the couch and sat beside Erica.
6. Approximately 15 minutes after having the drink you turned to her and without warning picked her up from the family couch. You carried her to her bedroom. You laid her on her back on the corner of her bed.

Charge 1: Sexual assault of a child under the age of 16 (Crimes Act 1958 - S49D.1) (Two rolled-up incidents of sexual touching)

1. You placed your body over the top of Erica and began kissing her.
2. You pulled one side of her bra downwards exposing her breast. You started grabbing her on her exposed breast.

Charge 2: Sexual Penetration of a Child under 16 Years (Crimes Act 1958 - S49B.1) (Two rolled up incidents of penetration)

1. You removed Erica's shorts and underwear exposing her vagina.
2. You used your finger to penetrate her vagina. You continued to move your finger in and out of her vagina.
3. You positioned yourself so that your head was between her legs, and begun using your tongue to lick her clitoris. She told you to stop. You ignored her and continued to lick her vagina.

1. At 9.15 pm the victim's mother returned home from work, finding the family home to be quiet. She made her way through the home to her daughter's bedroom. She found the bedroom door to be wide open.
2. She entered the room and observed her daughter to be on the bed, naked from the waist down. Her daughter's pants and underwear were around her ankles and your head was between her daughter's legs and moving in an 'up and down' motion.
3. She made her presence in the room known by stating - 'Are you guys serious?'. You immediately apologised, telling her, 'I'm sorry it was an accident, it was an accident.'
4. Rachel BROOKS was very upset, crying, and hysterical at what she had seen and went to her own bedroom and closed the door behind her.

Rachel contacts her son Brendan by telephone and texts

1. Whilst in her own bedroom, Rachel immediately contacted Brendan by telephone and disclosed to him what she had seen. She said, 'You would not believe what I just saw, Lucas was licking your sister off, in between her legs, in her room.'
2. Brendan's girlfriend, Natalie WILLAIMS,[7] was nearby and overheard parts of the conversation, including the words, 'Luca' '[victim's name]' and 'Pussy.'
3. Rachel then had a texting conversation with Brendan further telling him what she saw and instructed Brendan to get you out of her home.

Texting conversation between with Brendan (Direct admission to Charge 1 - Kissing)

1. Moments after this, you sent text messages to Brendan, as part of a broader conversation conducted over texts, admitting you had kissed Brendan's sister, which is in part an admission to Charge 1. Specifically,

(a) The accused stated - 'Ay [victim's brother's name] I was drunk and I kinda fucked up bro.'

(b) Brendan replied - 'What happened.'

(c) You replied - 'I accidentally kissed your sister by accident bro I didn't mean to.'

(d) The accused then further replied - 'And your mom walked in.'

(e) Brendan replied - 'Kissed her?'

(f) The accused replied - 'Yea.'

Complaint/Previous Representations to Natalie WILLIAMS (Relevant to Charge 1 - Kissing)

1. On the night of the incident, Natalie WILLIAMS contacted Erica DIXON over the Snapchat messaging service. In that conversation Erica DIXON disclosed that you had first kissed her on the couch and picked her up and carried her to the bedroom.' She did not disclose any further offending at that time.

Texting and Telephone conversations with Natalie WILLIAMS (Direct Admissions to Natalie WILLIAMS) (Relevant to Charge 2)

1. After the incident there were a number of text message exchanges between you and Natalie WILLIAMS including her trying to contact you on the night of the incident (24 October) and the next day (25 October) and finally reaching you on the 26 October 2023 and commencing a texting conversation.
2. During that texting conversation Natalie called you and you had a telephone conversation. She explained to you what she (Natalie) heard that Rachel BROOKS had said. That is, 'Luca was in between her legs with [victim's name]'s pants off eating her out.' You responded, '[mother's name] did see what she saw.' which is an admission to Charge 2, or at least part thereof.

1. On 25 October 2023 there was a celebration at the family home. Erica's father was also there. Later that evening Rachel BROOKS told George DIXON[8] of her observations of the incident. George DIXON then made the first report by the family to police.
2. For completeness I note that the complainant confided in her father a few weeks after the incident. Erica said:

(a) He (meaning you) was very, very, very drunk;

(b) He picked her up and carried her to her room;

(c) He started kissing her;

(d) She was trying to push him off which would have been when her mother walked in;

(e) She had her pants on at the time;

(f) He was just kissing her.

1. On the 31 October 2023 you self-presented at the Mernda Police Station where he was arrested and interviewed by Detective Senior Constable DIENJES.
2. During the recorded interview you corroborated basic events as described by the victim, including;

(a) That you were living in Erica DIXON's home.

(b) That you and Erica were alone on the night of the incident.

(c) That you were in Erica's bedroom with her.

1. However, you denied all allegations, stating (improbably I might add)

(a) That Erica approached and kissed you

(b) That you then attempted to leave the bedroom but you (at that point in time a 20-year-old young man who had a history of performing physically demanding work for years) was forcibly restrained from doing so by a 13-year-old schoolgirl;

(c) That you were actively attempting to escape from Erica and leave the room as Erica's mother entered.

1. Despite the admissions you had made very soon after the offending that I have referenced above, you still conducted a trial in which the above denials were put to the complainant and (where relevant) her mother as representing the true state of affairs between you and the victim on that night.

1. Two Victim Impact Statements (VIS's) have been prepared:

(a) Erica DIXON - Declared on 6 October 2025.

(b) Rachel BROOKS - Declared on 2 October 2025.

1. Erica did not want her VIS read out in open Court, but that does not absolve me from noting here the effect your crimes have had on her. The emotional impact for your crimes are obvious. This remains a horrible period in her life, exacerbated by the delays in the case. She has had trouble concentrating at school. She feels hurt and angry. She understands the toll it has taken on her mother too. She hopes she can move on once the case is completed with support. She has difficulty being around anyone besides family members. She is restrained (by fear) from engaging in extra-curricular activities such as the gym, going out with friends et cetera. She is trying to work to alleviate some of the financial pressures on her family by looking for work.
2. Rachel read her VIS into open Court. She feels, quite rightly, that she was generous in taking you in and not allowing you to become homeless. It was very distressing to walk in on the actual acts that make up part of the offending. She is upset and angry at the situation.
3. She finds it difficult to remain stoic in front of her children when she herself is upset at the situation, working full time as a single mother exacerbates this (further exacerbated by financial difficulties). This has been an ongoing and difficult emotional burden for her. She has had to take time off work to attend the many and various hearings involved.
4. Your offending has had a serious impact on the victim and her mother. I consider this serious offending.

Special Hearing - complainant examined and cross examined

Arraigned - pleads guilty to the charges on filed over indictment Q10618396.1

1. The matter has slowly moved through the criminal justice system in the following

1. You are now 22 years old. You were only 20 at the time of the offence.

1. You were born in Melbourne. You are the youngest of two brothers.
2. Your parents separated when you were an infant. Your mother 'dumped' you with your father when you were about one year old. You were thereafter raised by your father in Melbourne.

1. What I have just said hints at a difficult beginning to life. You grew up in a highly dysfunctional household marked by substance abuse, domestic violence, and mental illness.
2. Your mother was a heroin user and sex worker. You were exposed to drug and alcohol abuse, instability, and neglect throughout childhood.
3. Your father suffered from psychotic depression and paranoid delusions.
4. Your parents separated when you were an infant ('when I was 1 or 2'), when your mother 'dumped' you with your father shortly thereafter. You were deprived of maternal care and attachment from the outset.
5. Your father suffered from psychotic depression and paranoid delusions, keeping you locked inside the home for extended periods due to fear of others. Your father was later hospitalised for psychiatric illness.
6. At risk of labouring the point, you were raised in circumstances punctuated by chronic substance abuse, domestic violence, and mental illness, with no consistent caregiving or supervision. You have few, if any, good memories of your formative years.
7. Between the ages of four and 10, you were repeatedly sexually abused by multiple adult men and women, facilitated through your mother. This abuse was prolonged, involved multiple perpetrators, and has never been addressed in treatment.
8. You have experienced significant and multiple losses within your family, including the death of your father from a brain aneurysm when you were 18 and the deaths of close relatives during adolescence.
9. You were prevented from going to school for years due to your father's paranoia and fear of outsiders. You did not attend regular schooling until Year 8 and ultimately left after Year 10 to work and support the household.
10. This is a life of profound emotional neglect, absence of affection, and continuous exposure to instability and trauma. It is far from a sound foundation upon which to build a life.

1. You had, as I said, limited and disrupted schooling, leaving formal education initially in Year 5 because of your father's mental illness and fear of letting you outside. You later returned to school around Year 8-10 and left finally after Year 10 to help your father pay bills.
2. After leaving school, you worked consistently in trades, including bricklaying and plumbing.
3. You completed TAFE courses at Heidelberg and VUT Sunshine and held employment before your arrest.
4. To your credit, you have never been on government benefits and prefer working to 'getting handout things'. I suspect it gives you a source of pride and purpose. You are capable, in my view, of both industry and contribution to the community.

1. Unsurprisingly, given the way substance abuse was normalised at home, you began drinking at 15; and were a heavy drinker by the age of 18. You have enough insight to describe your alcohol as a form of self-medication - 'I don't enjoy it, I need it', you told Dr Gee. Is see this as rather than this simply being a mindless pleasure-seeking indulgence of yours.
2. You regularly consumed up to 1-2 litres at a time and would frequently black-out.
3. You had obviously consumed on any view of it, a substantial amount of alcohol at the time, prior to committing the offence.

1. Dr Gee,[10] in his very detailed report, describes you as a young man from an extraordinarily deprived and traumatic upbringing, marked by severe early sexual abuse, parental mental illness, and emotional neglect. You left school early but maintained a work ethic in manual trades.
2. Alcohol use emerged as your main maladaptive coping mechanism and was consumed prior to the offending.
3. Dr Gee diagnoses you with the following; persistent depression, complex PTSD, and emerging personality disturbance - which are chronic, thus far untreated, and appear causally linked to your impaired judgment and emotional control.
4. Dr Gee opines that custody has already aggravated these conditions, with a high risk of further deterioration without trauma-informed treatment.

1. Despite that troubling history I have been at pains to articulate, I stress you have never offended before or since. Accordingly, I find that you do have the capacity to be reclaimed.
2. I will say something here about your absconding during the trial and the matters surrounding it.
3. Having embarked on a trial before the jury, shortly after your then counsel had cross examined all of the civilian witnesses, you did not turn up to court. You were living at your brother Lornezo's.
4. You put your then counsel in an invidious position by telling him untruths. You created the impression through him that you were on your way to court and about to arrive literally at any time. None of this was true. You had in fact absconded and made your way to Bendigo seeking out family members.
5. Your mother gave evidence in support of your application for bail. She had convinced you to turn yourself in. Your relationship with her is fractured, but she wanted desperately to help you despite her own serious difficulties. She wanted you to live with you for the first time since you were three - on her couch in her Prahran apartment if necessary.

1. I have had regard to the following matters of sentencing principles

1. Offences committed against children, particularly involving sexual acts, can only be regarded as particularly serious within the criminal legislative framework.
2. The fact that sexual penetration of a child under 16 attracts a maximum of 15 years with a standard sentence of six years applicable to it, is reflective of the community's abhorrence of such criminal acts and the seriousness with which those offending against children will be treated.
3. The sexual assault charges alone carry a maximum penalty of 10 years with them a standard sentence of four years for similar reasons.
4. In assessing the general gravity of the offending, the court must have regard for the fact that sexual offending against children is now well understood to have the capacity to cause enormous harm to those subjected to it. The legislative scheme means that a child under 16 cannot consent to sexual penetration. This prohibition has the dual purposes of protecting the child from harm that can come from premature sexual activity, sexually speaking, and deterring adults who would contemplate having sex with someone under the age of 16. This prohibition is founded on a presumption that premature sexual activity will cause long-term physical and psychological harm and is unaffected by the presence of apparent consent. [11] That presumption of harm of course is borne out in this case of course.
5. General deterrence is an important sentencing consideration. Other members of the community must understand that sexual offences against children will not be tolerated. The principles of denunciation and just punishment are properly engaged in matters of this seriousness. All are relevant and carry substantial weight in the sentencing of persons who offend sexually against children.

Specific and general deterrence assume great significance as sentencing considerations and, putting it bluntly, those who exploit and abuse young children, must anticipate that the response of our society, which our courts represent, will be severe.[13]

1. The weight to be given to these principles must be tempered by the mitigating features I am dealing with in this part of my remarks. You has (belatedly) acknowledged his offending conduct and, have exhibited remorse in doing so. In these circumstances, the punitive and denunciatory aspects of sentencing can be moderated without undermining the court's obligation to mark the gravity of the offence.

1. Mr Blake accepted that any offending against a child is serious. It is submitted the following matters are relevant to the court's consideration in assessing the objective seriousness of the offending, with regards to sexual penetration of a child to which Mr Stefanovic agreed:[14]

(a) The offending occurs over a single incident, on one evening, involving one victim;

(b) The victim was 13 at the time. You were 20. There was a seven year age gap. She was vulnerable (and was harmed) for that reason alone;

(c) You were not in a position of trust or authority with respect to the victim, but had been brought in by the family and welcomed due to your homelessness. You betrayed the familial trust having been brought in to the home to live temporarily;[15]

(d) The conduct occurred over a short episode but involved two penetrative acts;

(e) The victim resisted and told you to stop;

(f) There is no suggestion of physical violence (or weapons), though I sentence you on the basis I have just identified - that you were told to stop and did not;

(g) The incident occurred in circumstances where you had consumed a significant amount of whiskey - while not mitigating the offence, in the context of the offence, the volume you had consumed would place you in a state of significant disinhibition - as distinct from premeditated predation;

(h) There is no suggestion of grooming;

(i) The abuse was not degrading and humiliating, either physically or verbally, such as by treating the child as an object for your sexual gratification';

(j) The offending appears spontaneous and opportunistic;

(k) You pleaded not guilty before a jury. You commenced to run a trial. Your counsel cross-examined the victim at trial. You entered a late plea and expressed some remorse to Dr Gee.

1. Mr Blake submits that the offending certainly falls well below the gravest examples of offences for this type of charge (no violence, limited duration, single episode, no grooming). With respect I agree.
2. A table of cases bearing some comparable features to the offending conduct has been included in Appendix A to assist the Court.
3. I stress the absence of one or more of these factors is not necessarily mitigating. Rather, it may simply be characterised as the absence of an aggravating factor.

1. While each case must, of course, be assessed on its own facts and circumstances, other sentencing cases may be of assistance in guiding the court where such cases bear similar features or where such cases deal with relevant sentencing provisions.[16]
2. I have familiarised myself with current sentencing practices for sexual penetration of a child under 16 and sexual assault of a child under 16.
3. These are offences of course that can be committed in a myriad of different ways and occur in a wide range of circumstances, by a wide range of offenders. It is hard to truly discern a clear range of sentences for this type of offending.
4. I have looked to the case collection available through the Judicial College of Victoria (JCV) for the offences of sexual penetration of a child under 16[17], sexual (or indecent) assault [18] as well as the Sentencing Advisory Council sentencing snapshots for the same offence [19] for assistance.
5. I was referred to, as part of Appendix A of the plea submissions to:

(a) Fisher v The King [20]

(b) Adkins v The King [21]

(c) Bouris v The Queen [22]

(d) Cooke v The Queen [23]

(e) Roberts v The King [24]

1. Broadly speaking those cases usually involved pleas of guilty, and often involved young offenders, with deprived backgrounds. There was a wide range of offending dealt with in those cases (some involving unprotected penile-vaginal penetration increasing the risk of pregnancy and transmission of disease to the victim), with the individual sentences imposed clustered between two to four years, with one significant outlier where the accused received a combination sentence (a penalty that is not contended for here).
2. While sentences of other courts are not binding precedents, but are merely historical statements of what has happened in the past, [25] and current sentencing practices represent just one of the sentencing factors to be considered. Previous sentencing decisions have made clear the importance of general deterrence and protection of the community in relation to sexual offences.

1. The standard sentencing provisions under the Sentencing Act 1991 apply in relation to both charges, being the charges of sexual assault of a child under 16, and sexual penetration of a child under 16. The standard (not mandatory) sentence that applies to these charges are four years and six years respectively.
2. Standard sentencing provisions are but one of the factors to be considered and utilized as a legislative guidepost, having the same function as the maximum penalty. It does not require or permit two-stage reasoning process and does not affect the established instinctive synthesis approach.
3. The provisions do not require me to assess the seriousness of the subject offence on the objective factors, particularly in circumstances where such an offence covers a broad gamut of sexual misconduct (and I add - involve rolled up versions of the offence here), making any assessment of the hypothetical 'mid-range' offence very difficult to identify.[26]
4. Ultimately, the assessment of the offence seriousness is to be done as it has always been done, without reference to the structures imposed by s5A(3).[27]
5. I have indicated just a moment ago my view of the seriousness of the offending already, and how it relates to the standard sentence regime.

1. It is submitted that the plea of guilty, despite occurring at a very late stage in the proceeding, nonetheless remains evident on an acceptance of responsibility, and is relevant to your prospects of rehabilitation.
2. I agree that it is meaningful that you finally accept responsibility for what you did. The plea still has some utilitarian value as it saves precious court resources from being spent conducting a retrial. It means I hope that the victim and her family can begin to put this matter behind them, rather than have the trial process grind on and leave them in a state of uncertainty and distress.
3. You, through your counsel, had put the complainant's credibility and reliability squarely in issue in your trial. She was cross-examined in a way that suggested that she was the instigating party of this activity. [28] You had her mother's reliability challenged too. This was all done to avoid the consequences of your own criminality. You were well entitled to contest the matter, but it diminishes the value of your plea and the notion that you are truly remorseful as I will come to now.
4. The remorse now relied on is a vexed issue. You told Dr Gee that no one was hurt[29] and could only grasp the harm done to the victim when it was compared to your own experience of abuse. At best, your insight and accompanying remorse is emerging.
5. The Crown have asked me to view this (and your absconding) through the lens of s5(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act 1991, which states In sentencing an offender a court may have regard to the conduct of the offender on or in connection with the trial or hearing as an indication of remorse or lack of remorse on his or her part, and I have done so.

1. Your youth is a powerful factor in the sentencing synthesis.[30] The Crown sensibly concur.
2. Whilst the offending before the court is serious, it remains that the youth of the offender is not displaced in the sentencing synthesis.
3. Young offenders, such as you are immature, and may not fully appreciate the nature, seriousness and consequences of criminal conduct and the courts recognise the increased potential for young offenders to be rehabilitate, which is in the public interest.
4. It remains that incarceration can impair rather than enhance a young offenders prospects of rehabilitation.[31]
5. It is submitted the community has a sizeable interest in the rehabilitation of any offender, but more so a youthful offender. Young people are more prone to make mistakes or to act without thinking through the consequences of their actions. The law generally treats youth as involving some reduction in culpability and as leading generally to some moderation of the purposes of sentencing, including the need to deter and to punish.
6. The Court of Appeal, particularly Redlich JA, in the case of R v Azzopardi[32] reviewed common law sentencing principles concerning young offenders. His Honour referred to the matter of R v Mills [33] and highlighted how courts recognise the potential for youth to be rehabilitated:

No doubt because of this potential, it has been stated that the rehabilitation of young offenders 'is one of the great objectives of the criminal law'. The added emphasis for the purposes of sentencing on realisation of a young offender's potential to be rehabilitated is further justified because of the communities interest in such rehabilitation, not only at a theoretical level, but because the effective rehabilitation of a young offender protects the community from further offending.

1. As a corollary, His Honour raised the effect of incarceration in adult prison on a young offender. He found that an adult custodial environment would 'more likely impair, rather than improve, the offender's prospects of successful rehabilitation.' He continued:

While in prison a youthful offender is likely to be exposed to corrupting influences which may entrench in that young person criminal behaviour, thereby defeating the very purpose for which punishment is imposed. Imprisonment for any substantial period carries with it the recognised risk that anti-social tendencies may be exacerbated.

1. Your upbringing is properly characterised as one of profound deprivation, marked by neglect, instability, exposure to substance abuse, and the absence of proper and consistent parental care. The Crown do not disagree with those being true and accurate descriptors.
2. In Bugmy v The Queen[34], the High Court confirmed that the effects of such profound childhood disadvantage do not diminish with time. The court recognised that experiences of violence, substance abuse, sexual abuse and childhood neglect may permanently affect an individual's capacity to mature, to learn from experience, and to exercise judgment, and that these effects must be given 'full weight' in sentencing.

The experience of growing up in an environment surrounded by alcohol abuse and violence may leave its mark on a person throughout life. Among other things, a background of that kind may compromise the person's capacity to mature and to learn from experience. It is a feature of the person's make-up and remains relevant to the determination of the appropriate sentence, notwithstanding that the person has a long history of offending.

Because the effects of profound childhood deprivation do not diminish with the passage of time and repeated offending, it is right to speak of giving 'full weight' to an offender's deprived background in every sentencing decision. However, this is not to suggest, as the appellant's submissions were apt to do, that an offender's deprived background has the same (mitigatory) relevance for all of the purposes of punishment. Giving weight to the conflicting purposes of punishment is what makes the exercise of the discretion so difficult. An offender's childhood exposure to extreme violence and alcohol abuse may explain the offender's recourse to violence when frustrated such that the offender's moral culpability for the inability to control that impulse may be substantially reduced. However, the inability to control the violent response to frustration may increase the importance of protecting the community from the offender.[35]

1. Consistent with the principle in Bugmy, it is submitted that your moral culpability for the present offending must be assessed through the lens of your significantly deprived background. Your culpability is reduced for that reason.
2. Your exposure to neglect, substance abuse, sexual abuse and chronic instability helps to explain your vulnerability, your maladaptive coping mechanisms and limited appreciation of the consequences of your actions.
3. While deterrence remains an important consideration in cases of this kind, the court must balance it against the enduring effects of your disadvantaged upbringing and demonstrated potential for rehabilitation.
4. There is an intersection here between your background and your poor mental health that is dealt with in Dr Dion Gee's comprehensive report of 30 September 2025[36] and his rather extensive viva voce evidence on 24 October 2025.
5. What is relied on under the cover of R v Verdins[37] is of course a different head of mitigation than Bugmy.[38]

1. It is submitted that you were suffering a 'mental disorder or abnormality' or 'impaired mental functioning' at the time these offences were committed, which falls within the scope of 'the wide variety of impaired mental functioning or conditions' as contemplated by the leading judgment in Verdins.
2. In Verdins, the Court of Appeal said impaired mental functioning, whether temporary or permanent ('the condition or impairment'), is relevant to sentencing, and outlined the six ways in which it could be used. Mr Blake relies on all six limbs having application.
3. He relies on Dr Gee's evidence to establish that you have such a condition (or conditions or impairment).
4. Dr Gee says:

(a) At the time of the assessment, you appeared to be suffering from symptoms that meet the clinical criteria following major diagnosable psychological disorders of Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Depressive Disorder;

(b) It is his opinion that you now experience worsened depression, hopelessness and suicidal ideation; exacerbation of trauma symptoms, intrusive memories and flashbacks; periodic hallucinatory experiences and dissociation; and, heightened anxiety, sleep disturbance, and emotional volatility.

1. Your mental health at the time was characterised by severe depressive pathology, trauma-related emotional numbing, and cognitive disorganisation. These states undermined your social-moral reasoning, consequential thinking, and judgment.
2. Dr Gee opines the following at paragraph [19]:

The combined disinhibiting effects of this impaired functioning would have certainly placed Mr. Tigani in a position where he was more vulnerable than the average person to act in a manner without having given due consideration to the consequences of his actions. Indeed, these very difficulties are what underpin - and in part gives rise to - Mr. Tigani's clinical diagnoses.

1. Dr Gee qualifies his findings by providing an opinion that it cannot be said that your impaired mental functioning directly caused you to commit the sexually aberrant behaviour constituting the index sexual offence.
2. You had consumed a significant amount of alcohol prior to committing the offence, but this fact is accommodated in the below analysis of your mental functioning.
3. Dr Gee explained this further in his evidence - this stepped connection or nexus between your impaired mental functioning and the instant offending.
4. At risk of overly simplifying complex ideas of formulation of personality, and serious mental illness, the connection is this:

(a) You have endured a truly terrible childhood and background experiences many would struggle to imagine, let alone endure;

(b) You have developed PTSD and major depression as part of that childhood and adolescence which is not that far or long ago;

(c) Alcohol consumption is a primary means of escaping the realities and symptoms of (b); and

(d) All of the foregoing combined made you disinhibited, creating an environment and mind set where the offending occurred.

1. I note that the law has traditionally been cautious in embracing the principles in Verdins in mitigation where there is a degree of self-induced intoxication, [39] but in this case it is apparent to me that alcohol plays only a part in the offending. You have been drinking for years and never offended before. You did not drink to excess with the knowledge that it caused you to be so disinhibited that you would offend like this.[40] Moreover, the alcohol consumption is so bound up in your compromised mental health it would be simply artificial to separate and quarantine it from my consideration.
2. The Crown had understandable reservations about the limits of the application of Verdins limbs 1-4, but fairly conceded limbs 5 and 6 had work to do here.

If the accused has a mental condition, how is it to be taken into account

1. Turning now to the application of the principles of Verdins.

Limb 1: the condition may reduce the moral culpability of the offending conduct, as distinct from the offender's legal responsibility. Where that is so, the condition affects the punishment that is just in all the circumstances; and denunciation is less likely to be a relevant sentencing objective.

1. Mr Blake submitted that the principle in Verdins limb 1, relating to a reduction in moral culpability, is enlivened and has application in the present case, noting the qualification by Dr Gee that your mental health did not directly cause you to commit the acts, nonetheless your mental health impacted on his ability reason properly, that being the combined disinhibiting effects of your condition on mental functioning. I find this is so. Your culpability is reduced to some extent.

Limb 2: The condition may have a bearing on the kind of sentence that is imposed and the conditions in which it should be served.

1. This limb is also enlivened, though its application does not mean that a different kind or type of sentence ought to be imposed (like a combination sentence), it does help shape the sentence I impose.

Limb 3: Whether general deterrence should be moderated or eliminated as a sentencing consideration depends upon the nature and severity of the symptoms exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the mental capacity of the offender, whether at the time of the offending or at the date of sentence or both.

1. I am prepared to moderate to a modest degree the need for general deterrence because of your poor mental health. You are not an especially suitable vehicle through which to deter others. Your background and condition mean that you are not an especially suitable vehicle through which to deter others. Likewise, the same can be said for specific deterrence.

Limb 4: Whether specific deterrence should be moderated or eliminated as a sentencing consideration likewise depends upon the nature and severity of the symptoms of the condition as exhibited by the offender, and the effect of the condition on the mental capacity of the offender, whether at the time of the offending or at the date of the sentence or both.

1. Specific deterrence still has obvious application, but will be moderated to a suitable degree.

Limb 5: The existence of the condition at the date of sentencing (or its foreseeable recurrence) may mean that a given sentence will weigh more heavily on the offender than it would on a person in normal health.

1. You have had no prior mental-health treatment before remand (Dr Gee saw you as somewhat avoidant of openly airing your many serious issues to others) and are now only beginning to consider therapy and antidepressant medication. Since being in custody, you have commenced treatment with a psychologist - something that is consistent with your description by Dr Gee.
2. Dr Gee opines that incarceration will likely cause 'further deterioration in mental health', noting an exacerbation of depression or depressive pathology, trauma, suicidal ideation/intent, and hallucinatory experiences. Custody will therefore 'weigh much more heavily on you than on a person in normal mental health'.
3. You have a complex presentation, Mr Tigani, and it is not clear to me that you have insight and coping mechanisms to ask for assistance properly (bearing in mind at times you can either shield the worst of your symptoms and at other time overly magnify them), let alone be treated appropriately within the inherently distressing environment of an adult prison. So much is inarguable.

Limb 6: Where there is a serious risk of imprisonment having a significant adverse effect on the offender's mental health, this will be a factor tending to mitigate punishment

1. This proposition has application, following on from the above.

1. General and specific deterrence are relevant considerations in the context of this offending. Moderation should be given to the application of general deterrence in the context of your age, mental health and deprived upbringing (modified of course in the way I have just outlined in the context of Verdins)
2. The Crown says both forms of deterrence have work to do, and I have factored that in because I do agree.

1. It is submitted the following are relevant to your prospects of rehabilitation:

(a) Youth;

(b) No prior criminal history;

(c) Previous good character;

(d) Employment history;

(e) Genuine remorse, with a caveat in the way that I have indicated earlier because of your expressions to Dr Gee;[41]

(f) Plea of guilty;

1. I agree your prospects for reform are optimistic, if you are given the necessary supports and assistance. Ultimately the community is best protected by your enduring rehabilitation, if achievable, and I find it is achievable.[42]

1. Section 5(3) of the Sentencing Act 1991 provides that a court must not impose a sentence that is more severe than that which is necessary to achieve the purpose or purposes for which it is imposed.

1. I am mindful of the significance in this case of the application of that principle which requires me when sentencing you for multiple offences to ensure that the aggregate term I impose is a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved. This applies when I consider the inter-relationship of the charges on the indictment.
   1. The offences occurred within the same incident. Where two or more offences are committed in the course of a single 'transaction', the notion that the sentences in respect of these offences should be concurrent rather than consecutive, applies strongly where offences took place against the same victim within moments of the other, there ought to be a substantial (but not total) degree of concurrency ordered. [43] I have made very modest orders for cumulation on the of the charges upon the to conform with the rule relating to single transaction offending in mind, whilst still recognise those separate criminal acts causing harm.
   2. There must of course be consideration to concurrency in circumstances where any significant degree of cumulation as well will result in a crushing sentence, especially in light of your age, mental health and significantly deprived upbringing.[44]
   3. No issue is taken by the Crown to the application of this principle save to say that they are discrete charges and some acknowledgement of this fact should be reflected in the sentence. This has been done.

1. It is submitted on your behalf that the competing sentencing considerations are best balanced by a head sentence, moderated by the matters in mitigation, with a longer than usual non-parole period.
2. The length of the new single non-parole period should reflect the particular considerations for fixing a non-parole period for standard sentence offences.
3. Section 11A(4)(c) of the Sentencing Act 1991 relevantly provides as follows (emphasis added);

'(4) Unless the court considers that it is in the interests of justice not to do so, the court must fix a non-parole period of at least -

...

(c) 60 percent of the relevant term if that term is a term of less than 20 years.'

1. It is in the interests of justice in this case to fix a non-parole period of more than 60 percent of the head sentence. [45] Your age, lack of prior criminal history, your poor mental health and deprived background all militate towards that outcome.
2. The period I have set pays due regard to your prospects for reform whilst maintaining appropriate weight to be given to necessary and important countervailing factors when sentencing. I have allowed for a measure of mitigation of punishment in favour of your reform through conditional freedom.[46]

1. I come now to the part of my reasons, Mr Tigani, where I pass sentence on you formally. Having considered the many and various sentencing considerations required of me in this exercise, I sentence you as follows.
2. Charge 1 - Sexual Assault of a child under the age of 16 years - 12 months;
3. Charge 2 - Sexual Penetration of a child under 16 years - 2 years 6 months;
4. I declare two months of the sentence imposed on Charge 1 to be served on the two year, six month sentence imposed on Charge 2, which is the base.
5. This brings about a total effective sentence of 2 years 8 months (32 months) as a head sentence. I set a non-parole period of 1 year and 6 months (18 months) as the period you must serve before you are eligible for parole. The non-parole period represents 55 percent of the head sentence.

1. Pursuant to s18 of the Sentencing Act, I declare that you have served 160 days, up to but not including today, as reckoned as having been served under this sentence.

S.6AAA

1. Pursuant to s6AAA the Sentencing Act, but for your belated plea of guilty, I would have sentenced you to 3 years 6 months (42 months), with a non-parole period of 2 years 2 months (26 months).

(a) Sexual Assault of a child under 16 years is a 'Class 2' offence.[47]

(b) Sexual Penetration of a child under 16 years is a 'Class 1' offence.[48]

1. Accordingly, pursuant to s34(1)(c)(ia)(ii) of the Act, you are subject to registration for 15 years. I note that is not a matter that I can take into account for the purposes of sentencing.

[2] Is the subject of a pseudonym to prevent her from being identified. Other members of her family (or friends) have also been pseudonymised where necessary.

[9] Taken from the submission filed on your behalf (Exhibit 1), the evidence of Dr Dion Gee (his report being Exhibit 2) and the heartfelt supportive reference from your brother Loreno (Exhibit 3).

1. [10] Exhibit 2: Report Dr Dion Gee, dated 30 September 2025.

[11] See Clarkson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 157 for general principles in sentencing for this offending and the presumption of harm to Victims.

[12] [2007] VSCA 219; (2007) 176 A Crim R 382.

[14] In relation to discussions regarding factors typically taken into consideration in relation to sexual penetration against a child see: Clarkson [2011] VSCA 157; (2011) 32 VR 361, 364 at [42]; Woods v The Queen [2019] VSCA 259 [133]-[135]; DPP v Smith [2022] VSCA 4 [55]-[56].

[15] Acknowledging that the relationship between you might not fall within the strict definition of a position of trust. See Watkins v The King [2022] VSCA 203 at [39].

[16] Cutri Fruit Pty Ltd v The King [2025] VSCA 173.

[17] JCV Victorian Sentencing Manual at 3.4.2.

[18] JCV Victorian Sentencing Manual at 3.2.1 Court of Appeal sentence overview.

[19] Snapshot 282, September 2023 and snapshot 280, September 2023.

[20] Fisher v The King [2025] VSCA 131.

[21] Adkins v The King [2023] VSCA 23.

[22] Bouris v The Queen [2021] VSCA 245.

[23] Cooke v The Queen [2021] VSCA 70.

[24] Roberts v The King [2023] VSCA 92.

[25] Director of Public Prosecutions v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41 at paragraph [83].

[26] McPherson v The Queen [2021] VSCA 53 at [31].

[27] Brown v The Queen [2019] VSCA 286 [4] - [9]; [36] - [38]; [55].

[28] Special hearing transcript 20 May 2025 Dp59

1. [30] R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235, [35].

[31] Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372; (2011) 35 VR 43, [34].

[32] [2011] VSCA 372, Redlich JA (with whom Coghlan J and Macaulay AJJA agreed).

[33] [1998] 4 VR 235.

[35] Ibid. See also DPP v Snow [2020] VSCA 67.

[37] R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102.

[38] Ellis v The Queen [2021] VSCA 229, [63].

[39] See Ellis v The Queen [2021] VSCA 229.

1. [40] In distinction from DPP v Kao [2009] VSCA 273 'there is a real question as to whether, as a matter of policy, a person experienced in the use of drugs, and who therefore must know their effect upon him, should be entitled to call in aid the moderating effect of Verdins in relation to reduced moral culpability. In that sense, the problem is not dissimilar to that which presents itself in relation to self-induced intoxication.'

[41] I have expressed my views on this already.

[42] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) ss 51(1)(c) and 51(1)(e). See DPP v Milson [2019] VSCA 55, [71].

1. [43] Flynn (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2020] VSCA 173.
2. [44] Underwood (a Pseudonym) v The Queen (No 2) [2018] VSCA 87 [27]; Flynn (a Pseudonym) v The Queen [2020] VSCA 173 [108]- [130]; Stamper (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 323 [40]

[45] See Pan [2022] VSCA 98 for instance.

[46] Power v The Queen (1974) 131 CLR 623; [1974] HCA 26.

[47] See Schedule 1 (Clause 1) of the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic).

[48] See Schedule 2 (Clause 5A) of the Sex Offenders Registration Act 2004 (Vic).