[2025] VCC 1821
General information, not legal advice.
County Court of Victoria
2025-11-24
Mr J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Sentence: 3 years with 18 months of the sentence suspended.
3rd October 2025. The offences themselves occurred either on the 19th or
20th of December 2006. The first of the charges of which Ms Thomas was convicted was Charge 1 on the indictment, being an indecent assault contrary to s39(1) of the then Crimes Act. 3. The victim in the matter had been present at Ms Thomas' house. As a result of the consumption of alcohol, she had gone to bed and woke with Ms Thomas kissing her neck, face and stroking her stomach. The act relied upon in regard to this particular crime was in fact the stroking of the vagina, which occurred while the victim was either just waking up or coming out of a sleep state. The penalty prescribed for this offence is 10 years imprisonment. 4. I point out that the victim in this matter is now remotely connected to this hearing. 5. The second charge is one of rape contrary to s38(2) of the Crimes Act. This involved the digital penetration, on the same occasion that Charge 1 occurred, of the victim's vagina. This occurred subsequent to the first charge and while it was happening, the victim turned away, so that she could make it very clear to Ms Thomas that she was awake. She said she was distressed. As a result of that manoeuvre, if I call it that, Ms Thomas asked the victim was she feeling tired, to which the victim replied 'Yes'. Importantly, Ms Thomas voluntarily then withdrew her finger from the victim's vagina. The seriousness of the second charge of rape is demonstrated by Parliament having determined a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment for the offence and defined it at the time as a serious offence pursuant to s3 of the then Sentencing Act. That definition was for the purpose of considering the applicability of either a partial or fully suspended sentence. 6. To the time of that offending, Ms Thomas had no prior criminal offences and certainly has had none since. She has served, as a result of these crimes, no pre-sentence detention.
Ms Thomas, having considered that submission, I find that such does not amount to exceptional circumstances. In that regard, I refer to the consideration of the meaning of exceptional circumstances of Hedigan J in Kent v Wilson [2000] VSCA 98, [22] and [38]. 20. An examination of the factors advanced on behalf of Ms Thomas, in totality, meets the definition of normal human behaviour, not of exceptional circumstances. There was reference in Kent v Wilson, at [30] to Beech J. in Hanna Elrahi, unreported of 18 January 1996. Similar to what was found in that case, in regard to the submissions made on behalf of Ms Thomas, I have concluded on the facts that it was not an exceptional circumstance to have a person before the Court, of a previous good character, a character which up till the date of sentencing involves no criminal offending, but for the matters found and against her in this trial, with an excellent work record and the support of her family. I do not, on the basis of authority, find such amounts to an exceptional circumstance. By way of alternative, Ms Drago sought a partial suspended sentence and/or a combined sentence by way of imprisonment and a community corrections order under s44 of the Sentencing Act. 21. The three cases submitted by the prosecution for consideration have been important in the determination, by the Court, of objective criminality and seriousness. The first of those was Nous, a determination in 2008 by Judge Pullen of this Court. This was a case that also went to trial. The rape took place in September of 2005 and was committed upon a friend of a housemate of the accused. The victim, the housemate and the accused had all been drinking together. They had returned. The victim went off to bed and awoke to the accused orally penetrating her vagina. The accused, when the victim screamed, left the premises. The matter was obviously an opportunistic crime. In Nous, full suspension was sought, however, such was rejected and a sentence of four years with a minimum of two years passed. 22. The second case I was referred to is Coulson [2011] VCC 742, a retrial. The circumstances were similar to the circumstances that confront this Court. It involved a rape which occurred in 2006. The victim was described by the Judge as a young vulnerable girl who had been digitally penetrated while she slept. The victim impact statement was similar in that case to the one that I have referred to here, the impact being of lasting effect upon her, upon her sense of sexuality and her confidence. 23. In that case, Judge Tinney imposed the same penalty that had originally been imposed by the first trial judge, being imprisonment of three years and six months, with a minimum period to serve before parole of fifteen months. Similarly to Ms Thomas, the accused had no priors and had good prospects of rehabilitation. I should note that His Honour passed such sentence with some trepidation given his views as to the crime, however, he did maintain the original sentence. 24. The third case put to me was a determination of the Court of Appeal of this State in The Queen v Simon [2010] VSCA 66. It was an appeal from a determination in this Court following a trial when the accused was sentenced to four years imprisonment, with a minimum of two years. The period of four years being imposed for each of the two rape charges. 25. Again, all of the charges occurred in the one incident or occasion. The rapes were both digital and the third charge was one of indecent assault. The offences occurred in 2007, the victim was the girlfriend of the accused best friend. Again, they had all been drinking. The accused was 22 at the time, the victim was 18. The defence run in the trial was similar to the defence run by Ms Thomas, that is the accused said, he was not there at the time of the alleged offences and indeed had gone home from the premises. 26. Ms Thomas said that the victim was not at her home that night after the graduation celebrations and that another witness was also not there either, evidence obviously rejected by the jury. 27. In Simon, the Court determined, at [35], at the time, and I stress that this offending happened in 2007, the digital rape could be assessed by way of seriousness at the lower end. 28. Again, the circumstances were somewhat unusual, there was no response initially to the first penetration, a considerable amount of alcohol consumed and I have already noted the defence that was put. The Court, in particular
Ashley JA analysed the sentencing statistics at the time. The relevant statistic was number 83 of the Sentencing Snapshots, an analysis of rape sentences over a period of five years, from 2003 to 2008. 29. When one compares those with the latest statistics which is number 279, and involves 2017 to 2022, the medium sentence for rape has increased from five years to six years. The average sentence increased from five years to six to seven years. It is to be noted in the later figures that a standard sentence for rape has applied since 2018. What stands out however as noted by Ashley JA [57], is that the percentage of rape sentences passed of less than four years has reduced from the June 2009 figure of 23.8 per cent to the more recent figure of 4.4 per cent. 30. Such a change in sentencing, as evidenced from those two sentencing snapshots, confirms my view, based upon having been a Judge throughout those periods, and the view as accepted by the Prosecutor, that rape sentences at the time of the offending by Ms Thomas was certainly lower than they are now. To the degree that I can in this sentence, I take this into account. The determination in Simon by the Court of Appeal was to reduce the sentence in regard to both rapes from four years to three years, and it imposed a total effective sentence of three years, with a non-parole period of eighteen months, with a finding that the original sentence in each instance for rape of four years, was manifestly excessive [58]. 31. After close consideration of all factors, especially the determination of the Court of Appeal in The Queen v Simon, and in regard to the other cases which are all post in Sheriff, which I said was a determination which was unreported by the Court in 1999, I find the rape here must be classified at the lower end of seriousness. In regard to such finding, I refer to what the High Court said in Ibbs v The Queen [1987] HCA 46; [1987] 163 CLR 447, at [452]:
'When an offence is defined to include any of several categories of conduct, the heinousness of the conduct in a particular case depends not on the statute defining the offence, but on the facts of the case. In a case of sexual assault, a sentencing judge has to consider where the facts of the particular case lie, in a spectrum at one end of which lies the worst type of sexual assault perpetrated by any act which constitutes sexual penetration'.
'The lapse of time since the commission of these offences is not unusual. Nor is the otherwise blameless life of the offender. The crimes themselves and their consequences demanded a significant sentence. General deterrence and denunciation of the respondent's conduct are of the first importance'.
'The second comment that I wish to make addresses a different aspect. On occasions, when imposing sentence I have made mention of the notion of social rehabilitation. In DPP v DJK, for example, which is reported at 2003, VSCA 109 at paragraph 18, I remarked:
'This notion of social rehabilitation is one that I do not believe has been accorded anything approaching significant recognition as an identifiable underlying concern of the criminal justice system. It seems to me that the process of social and personal recovery which we attempt to achieve in order to ameliorate the consequences of a crime can be impeded or facilitated by the responses of the Courts. The imposition of a sentence often constitutes both a practical and ritual completion of a protracted painful period. It signifies the recognition by society of the nature and significance of the wrong that has been done to affected members, the assertion of its values and the public attribution of responsibility for that wrongdoing to the perpetrator. If the balancing of values and considerations represented by the sentence which, of course, must include those factors which militate in favour of mitigation of penalty, is capable of being perceived by a reasonably objective member of the community as just, the process of recovery is more likely to be assisted'.
'It is well to bear in mind that the rehabilitation of the victim of sexual abuse may often be more difficult to achieve than that of the perpetrator. Frequently the damage will be profound and a long time will pass before it can be addressed'.
'The vindication of the victim in cases of this kind, in particular, is profoundly important if the criminal justice system is to perform its role properly'.
was not going to be on the link, but they have since joined the link. 12. HIS HONOUR: I see, yes I didn't ‑ ‑ ‑ 13. MS PAGANIS: So I just wanted to note that ‑ ‑ ‑ 14. HIS HONOUR: I wasn't aware of that. 15. MS PAGANIS: No either was I, my instructor made me aware. See we can't see the various screen, so my instructor is able to see them, so they are on the link now, Your Honour, I just thought I'd make a note of that. 16. HIS HONOUR: All right, well hopefully those - Ms Leary was - well I've used victim mostly for the obvious reason. 17. MS PAGANIS: Yes. 18. HIS HONOUR: To make it clear that there's an obligation on the (indistinct) estate that the name of the victim is not published. 19. MS PAGANIS: Yes, Your Honour. 20. HIS HONOUR: Which no doubt they're well aware. 21. MS PAGANIS: Yes. 22. HIS HONOUR: If the victim hopefully was here for my words in regard to her, otherwise of course no doubt the prosecution will ensure that a copy of this sentence is provided to her. 23. MS PAGANIS: Yes I will do so, Your Honour, thank you. 24. MR ROSS: Your Honour, just one brief matter, I'm not sure if it was raised on the last occasion, the custody management issues. I think that they were raised, so ‑ ‑ ‑ 25. HIS HONOUR: That's the custody management matter that I referred to ‑ ‑ ‑ 26. MR ROSS: Yes. 27. HIS HONOUR: ‑ ‑ ‑ being the letter from the ‑ ‑ ‑ 28. MR ROSS: Well also the medications that ‑ ‑ ‑ 29. HIS HONOUR: Did we get a list of medications? 30. ASSOCIATE: (Indistinct words). 31. HIS HONOUR: I've only got - the only thing I had given to me was ‑ ‑ ‑ 32. MR ROSS: I can provide that to your associate, Your Honour. 33. HIS HONOUR: Well if you can provide that to my associate, I'll make sure that the letter received from school plus the medications goes with the material that we send to Corrections. 34. MR ROSS: I'm grateful, Your Honour. 35. HIS HONOUR: Thank you, Mr Ross. No doubt Mr Ross, you'll, if it's necessary, explain to your client what all that means that I had to go through. 36. MR ROSS: Yes Your Honour, I'll go down and see her shortly. 37. HIS HONOUR: Thank you. 38. MR ROSS: Thank you, Your Honour. 39. HIS HONOUR: Yes.
DPP
Thomas [2025] VCC 1821