[2025] VCC 1974
General information, not legal advice.
County Court of Victoria
2026-01-27
Ms J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Sentence: Community correction order for two years, with 200 hours of unpaid community work, supervision, drug treatment, alcohol treatment, mental health treatment, offending behaviour programs, supervision and judicial monitoring conditions
Following a plea given on your behalf, on 15 October 2025 I convicted you and sentenced you to a Community Correction Order (CCO) for a period of two years, with the following conditions:
Under Sentencing Act 1991 ('SA') s 48C, 200 hours of unpaid community work.
Under SA s 48CA, 100 hours of treatment and rehabilitation are to be counted as unpaid community work.
Under SA s 48D(3)(f), offending behaviour programs.
In accordance with s 6AAA of the SA, I declared that but for your plea of guilty, I would have sentenced you to six months' imprisonment.
(a) Dion Torpy, who resided on Nepean Highway Frankston.
(b) Peter Criggie and his girlfriend, Stephanie Beaton, who were both staying temporarily with Mr Torpy.
(c) Robert Oliver, who was also present at the address at the time of the offending.
(a) A broken television was found in the lounge room.
(b) A shoe impression was located on the outside of the bathroom door and on the broken television.
(a) the offender's intent at the point of entry;
(b) the mode of entry;
(c) whether the offender was carrying a weapon;
(d) whether the offender was alone or in company;
(e) the time of day at which the burglary took place;
(f) what the offender knew or believed about who would be inside; and
(g) whether the offender was someone of whom the victim was particularly frightened beforehand.
(a) Criggie and Beaton were attempting to flee and hid in the unit. You both forced yourselves through the front door in circumstances where Criggie, Oliver and Beaton attempted to shut it to stop you from entering.
(b) You and Poore intended to assault upon entry.
(c) You committed the offence in company and although the prosecutor conceded it is not known who entered first or whether you entered together, ultimately you both went inside the unit and confronted the victims.
(d) The offending took place in the early hours of the morning.
(e) There were a number of occupants present in the premises at the time.
(f) Both you and Poore played an active role in the aggravated burglary.
[a] distinction must always be carefully drawn between true regret for wrongdoing and regret engendered by concern for the position in which the offender finds [herself].[19]
[Genuine remorse] indicates realistic prospects of rehabilitation and a reduced need for specific deterrence. An offender who pleads guilty because he or she has an accurate appreciation of the wrongfulness of his or her offending, and of its impact upon its victim or victims, and who desires to do what reasonably can be done to repair the damage and to clear his or her conscience, is someone to whom mercy - in the form of a very substantial reduction in what would otherwise be an appropriate sentence - is very likely due.[25]
At the time of the offending Ms Sutherland was experiencing active symptoms of depression and anxiety, including pervasive dysphoria, physiological hyperarousal, and emotional numbing, as well as longstanding symptoms characterised by distractibility, impulsivity, and difficulties with inhibition. These conditions affected her capacity to remain calm and regulated during a high-stress situation. [These] symptoms impaired her ability to inhibit immediate behavioural responses and contributed to reduced capacity to make calm and considered choices in a rapidly evolving situation. Her mood and trauma-related symptoms compromised her ability to think clearly and rationally under pressure, increasing emotional reactivity and physiological arousal, and impairing her impulse control during the incident.
At the time of the offending Ms Sutherland was under significant situational stress. She was homeless or in highly unstable accommodation, had recently separated from her former partner amidst conflict regarding their daughter, and was managing serious health problems including cardiac and vascular conditions. Continued support from her medical team is essential to manage these conditions, as deterioration in her physical health has historically been liked to psychological destabilisation and functional decline, which was also evident during this period. These experiences occurred alongside inconsistent caregiving, with her father emotionally disengaging and her mother unable to manager her behaviour, resulting in repeated displacement from home.
Imprisonment would impose a disproportionately heavy burden on Ms Sutherland due to her complex mental health conditions, untreated ADHD, trauma-related symptoms, and significant cardiac and autoimmune illnesses. Her mental health profile, characterised by chronic anxiety, depressive symptoms, trauma-related hyperarousal, and impaired impulse control, increases her vulnerability to psychological deterioration in custodial settings where environmental stressors, lack of autonomy, and unpredictable routines are common. These vulnerabilities would make imprisonment more burdensome than for the general population, heightening distress, impairing emotional regulation, and increasing the risk of destabilisation.
... Custodial environments are not well equipped to provide the high level of medical oversight and responsiveness her condition requires... This physical vulnerability amplifies psychological stress, further increasing the risk of psychiatric decompensation in custody.
Her combination of medical and psychological impairments would also create significant barriers to rehabilitation within the prison system... Accessing and benefiting from rehabilitative opportunities would therefore be significantly more difficult for Ms Sutherland than for the general prisoner population.
It follows from what we have said that a CCO may be suitable even in cases of relatively serious offences which might previously have attracted a medium term of imprisonment (such as, for example, aggravated burglary, intentionally causing serious injury, some forms of sexual offences involving minors, some kinds of rape and some categories of homicide). The sentencing judge may find that, in view of the objective gravity of the conduct and the personal circumstances of the offender, a properly-conditioned CCO of lengthy duration is capable of satisfying the requirements of proportionality, parsimony and just punishment, while affording the best prospects for rehabilitation.[37]
[1] Contrary to s 77 of the Crimes Act 1958 ('CA').
[5] See R v Miller [1995] VicRp 60; [1995] 2 VR 348, 354 (Southwell, Ormiston and McDonald JJ); R v Lomax [1998] 1 VR 551, 559-560 (Ormiston JA, Winneke P and Hedigan AJA agreeing); R v Rankin [2001] VSCA 158 [10] (Winneke P, Vincent JA and O'Bryan AJA agreeing); MA v The Queen [2012] VSCA 214 [83] (Neave JA, Bongiorno JA and Whelan AJA agreeing).
[6] [2012] VSCA 302; (2012) 37 VR 658 ('Hogarth').
[7] Ibid 659 [1] (Maxwell P, Neave JA and Coghlan AJA).
[9] DPP v Brown [2004] VSCA 133; (2004) 10 VR 328, 336 [43] (Vincent JA) cited in Hogarth 667 [34].
[10] [2014] VSCA 314; (2014) 44 VR 486 ('Meyers').
[11] Ibid 498 [47]-[49] (Maxwell P, Redlich and Osborne JJA).
[18] [1998] VSCA 39; (1998) 103 A Crim R 51 ('Cooper').
[19] Cooper 55 (Tadgell JA agreeing). See also R v Raptis (1988) 36 A Crim R 362, 366 (Young CJ , O'Bryan & Tadgell JJ).
[20] Cooper 55; R v Gillick [2000] VSCA 127 [20] (Callaway JA, Chernov JA agreeing) .
[21] Barbaro v The Queen [2010] VSCA 288; (2012) 226 A Crim R 354, 365 [38] (Maxwell P, Harper JA and T Forrest AJA) ('Barbaro').
[22] Barbaro 365-66 [38], [40]; Bonacci v The Queen (2012) 224 A Crim R 194, 202 [44] (Neave, Mandie and Harper JJA).
[23] [2013] VSCA 95 [36].
[27] See R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; (2007) 16 VR 269, 276 [32] (Maxwell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJA) ('Verdins').
[28] Verdins 276 [32(6)] (emphasis added).
[29] [2016] HCA 48; (2016) 259 CLR 256, 266-268 [21]-[25] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ).
[30] [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428, 444-447 [47]-[58] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ), 452-455 [78]-[85] (Gageler and Gordon JJ).
[31] [2015] VSCA 96; (2015) 250 A Crim R 282, 292 [30]-[31] (Redlich, Priest and Beach JJA).
[32] [2016] VSCA 237; (2016) 53 VR 546, 606-609 [173]-[183] (Redlich, Santamaria and McLeish JJA). See also Williams (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2021] VSCA 35 [21]-[25] (Priest and Kyrou JJA); Russo v The Queen [2021] VSCA 244 [53]-[56] (Emerton JA, Priest JA agreeing).
[34] See DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a Pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428.
[35] See Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(4) ('SA').
[37] Ibid 338 [131] (Maxwell P, Nettle, Neave, Redlich and Osborn JJA).
DPP
Sutherland [2025] VCC 1974
(2012) 37 VR 658
(2014) 44 VR 486
(2012) 37 VR 594
(2007) 16 VR 269
(2014) 46 VR 308
(2004) 10 VR 328
(2016) 259 CLR 256
(2017) 262 CLR 428
(2016) 53 VR 546