DPP v Sturt (a pseudonym)

1. The offender is before the court for sentence having pleaded guilty to the following offences.

Charge number Offence Maximum penalty

CAN 8335/2024 Aggravated intentionally and unlawfully Imprisonment for choke, suffocate or strangle another seven years. person (family violence) contrary to s 28(2)(a) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).

CAN 8334/2024 Aggravated assault occasioning actual Imprisonment for bodily harm (family violence), contrary to s seven years. 24(1) of the Crimes Act.

CAN 8333/2024 Aggravated common assault (family Imprisonment for violence), contrary to s 26(1) of the Crimes three years. Act.

The task on sentence

2. He is to be sentenced having regard to his particular circumstances (applying the principle of individualised justice) and other mandatory statutory considerations, in a manner that makes him accountable, denounces and adequately punishes his conduct, deters the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences and recognises the harm done to the victims of the crimes and to the community, but also with a view to promoting the offender’s rehabilitation, so as to protect the community in the longer term: ss 7 and 33 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act).

Nature and circumstances of the offence (s 33(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act)

3. The facts setting out the circumstances of the offending are drawn from an agreed statement of facts that was before the court. The incident giving rise to the three offences occurred on 15 August 2024. The victim and the offender had known each other for four years. They had been in an intimate relationship for three months.

General approach to objective seriousness of offending

4. The court must evaluate where the below offending sits on the hypothetical spectrum of conduct, with regard to the maximum penalties set out below as a yardstick. While that spectrum takes into account the circumstances of both the offence and of the criminal, at this stage of the court’s consideration, the assessment is concerned only with the objective gravity of the conduct, with matters personal to the offender considered separately.

5. Each of the offences before the court are family violence offences which enlivens separate considerations under s 34B of the Sentencing Act, some of which are relevant to the objective assessment of the nature of the offence: Murphy v The King [2025] ACTCA 10 (Murphy) at [137]. Specifically, the offending occurred at the home of the victim and the offender.

6. While the family violence context is part of the nature and circumstances of the offending, which increases the gravity of the conduct (Murphy at [126]), that is already an element of the aggravated form of the offence (s 48C of the Crimes Act) and the elevated gravity is reflected by the higher maximum penalty. Accordingly, the fact of the family violence context is not given additional consideration, as that would result in double-counting of an aggravating circumstance.

Aggravated common assault (CAN 8333/2024)

7. The victim and the offender had a verbal argument in their bedroom at about midnight. the offender moved to where the victim was sitting and with his right hand grabbed the hair on the back of the victim’s head and forcibly pushed her in a downwards motion to the floor. The force exerted by the offender caused the victim to feel intense pain to the back of her head.

8. The range of conduct falling within the offence of common assault is wide and encompasses both actual violence and threatened violence that causes the complainant to fear immediate harm: R v Kirkwood [2022] ACTSC 148 at [65]. This type of conduct was at the lower end of the range of conduct falling within the offence and was the least serious of the conduct involved.

Aggravated assault occasioning actual bodily harm (CAN 8334/2024)

9. The victim told the offender that she was scared and that she wanted him to stop. The offender said to the victim words to the effect of “I don’t fucking care if you’re scared or not, this is all your fucking fault.” The offender proceeded to grab a set of measuring scales and stand over the victim who was seated on the ground with her back to the wardrobe facing up at the offender.

10. The offender lent down and punched the victim with a closed fist multiple times to the left side of her face while holding the scales in his right hand. The punches caused the victim to feel extreme pain to the left side of her face. The punches were consecutive and with sufficient force to cause the victim to fear for her life and almost fall into unconsciousness. The victim could not recall the length of time over which the offender struck her.

11. The victim attempted to defend herself by placing her arms around her head and slapping at the offender with her right arm. During this time, the victim was continually begging the offender to stop to no avail. He ceased being physical with the victim a short time later.

12. The victim suffered the following injuries: (a) The right side of her forehead appeared to be swollen, was red in colour and had two abrasions that were seeping blood; (b) Her nose appeared to have swelling, was red in colour and had what appeared to be dried blood on the bottom right nostril.

13. The legal principles and features of assault occasioning actual bodily harm were considered in R v Pearson [2020] ACTSC 375 at [24]-[29] and R v Redmond (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 295 at [12] (and the authority there-cited). Actual bodily harm means “any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort” of the victim. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent but must be “more than merely transient or trifling”: R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 at 509.

14. Relevant features here include: (a) the nature of the injury caused by the offender (severity of harm caused); (b) the degree of violence used or ferocity of the attack; and (c) the circumstances surrounding the offending.

15. There was a significant degree of ferocity used, with multiple strikes to the head, an inherently vulnerable part of the body, and a closed fist. The harm to the face was severe and as I have said, the location was in the victim’s bedroom. The conduct falls within the middle of the range of what was itself a serious offence.

Aggravated choke/suffocate/strangle (8335/2024).

16. The offender shouted at the victim words to the effect of “every time you talk I get more fucking angry”, leaving the room a short time later.

17. The victim took her phone and attempted to leave the residence. The offender was continually yelling at the victim and attempted to take her phone. At about 12:45am, the offender placed his right hand around the base of the victim’s throat and applied pressure for 45 seconds in a squeezing motion. The force was sufficient to restrict the victim from breathing and to cause her fear that she was going to die. The victim counted for 45 seconds before the offender released her and allowed her to breathe again. While this was happening, the offender said words to the effect of “I don’t care, you’re the reason that I’m doing this.”

18. At about 1:00am, the offender left the residence. The victim then called her friend to tell her what happened. The victim then called for an ambulance.

19. At about 2:23am, police attended at the location after a report from a neighbour of a loud ongoing argument. The victim disclosed the above incident to police.

20. It suffices to set out the observations in DPP v Padreny [2024] ACTCA 4 at [131]: 131․ To understand the spectrum of conduct by which a Court assesses the objective seriousness of an offence, it is helpful to explain some of the features of conduct that may be of relevance in assessing the objective seriousness of the offence. For this offence, without being exhaustive, the following have been referred to: (1) the length of time during which the “choking” persisted; (2) the amount of force used; (3) whether the victim’s breathing was restricted; (4) whether verbal threats were made at the time of the choking; (5) whether the victim sustained any injuries; (6) whether any aides like rope or cable were used; (7) the vulnerabilities of the victim; (8) whether the conduct was deliberate and sustained, designed to threaten and inflict harm; and (9) whether the conduct occurred in a family violence context: see for example, R v Bonfield [2021] ACTSC 362 (Bonfield) at [68]-[69]; DPP v Linsley [2023] ACTSC 255 at [12]; and DPP v Rohrlach [2023] ACTSC 166 (Rohrlach). …

21. Here, again, the family violence context is an element of the aggravated offence, although the location of the violence being in the victim’s home is relevant. Otherwise, the choking persisted for a significant amount of time (45 seconds) in the context of what was occurring, it was inflicted with sufficient force so as to cause the victim to fear she would die and the conduct was both deliberate and sustained, designed to control the victim (as reflected by the words spoken by the offender at the time). This was overall a serious example of an offence that was itself serious.

Victim impact statements (s 33(1)(f) of the Sentencing Act)

22. No victim impact statements were before the court. While the court does not speculate as to harm to a victim, that is to be distinguished from inferences that may be available from the facts themselves. As the prosecution submitted, due to the nature of the offending and the physical injuries sustained, there was physical injury to the victim (s 33(1)(e) of the Sentencing Act) and the victim’s belief that she was going to die is evidence of immediate emotional or psychological impact upon the victim, albeit that any ongoing psychological consequences remain unknown. Pleas of guilty (ss 33(1)(j) and 35 of the Sentencing Act)

23. The offender pleaded guilty at a pre-hearing mention in the Magistrates Court, following the provision of a brief of evidence and negotiations between the parties (although it is unclear whether the offender received any benefit from those negotiations). The pleas were entered before the matters were committed for trial and the matter had yet to be listed for hearing. I regard those circumstances as having significant utilitarian value by virtue of the early pleas. The timing combined with the objective seriousness of the offending and the unknown circumstances of the negotiations warrants a discretionary discount under s 35(3) of 25%.

Subjective circumstances of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

24. The offender is a 36-year-old indigenous male. His background was detailed in a number of pre-sentence reports. The offender’s difficult childhood and lack of family supports is accepted. Without going into the detail, I consider the general Bugmy considerations (derived from Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571) to apply as set out in the offender’s submissions and they operate to mitigate moral culpability somewhat. This subjective feature does not excuse the conduct, but it does inform it. When an offender has been let down in their formative years and it is clear the behaviour in their adult years is connected to that social disadvantage, including learned behavioural patterns, it mitigates the extent or weight of matters such as general deterrence and denunciation which justice would otherwise require be fully taken into account for this type of offending.

25. The considerations of social disadvantage also include the impact of early exposure to illicit substances and alcohol. He has suffered substance abuse issues for most of his life, having commenced illicit substance use at the age of 12 and methamphetamine use at 13 which progressed to daily intravenous use of methamphetamine by age 16 and heroin at age 21, which he currently manages through methadone treatment. The offender has attempted to rehabilitate from drug use through formal services, with mixed success.

26. The urinalysis testing conducted in December 2025 when the offender went into custody was positive for a range of substances. Since then, the offender maintains that he has achieved sobriety since being taken into custody. He does have positive behavioural reports and holds a trusted employment position in the custodial environment.

27. The offender’s physical health conditions include nerve damage in his left arm (currently untreated) following a dog attack, an incident that has had physical as well as psychological consequences for him, although these do not mitigate the offending in terms of moral culpability.

Criminal antecedents of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

28. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the offender has a significant criminal history, which disentitles him to leniency. That history includes several “serious family violence offences” as defined in s 34B of the Sentencing Act and because the offences for which the offender is currently facing sentence also fall within that definition, these must be taken into account in the overall sentence (and implicitly, given weight). In my view, this will be best reflected through the sentence giving prominence to specific deterrence.

Whether offender was affected by alcohol or controlled drug (s 33(1)(p) of the Sentencing Act)

29. I accept the offender’s submission that he is someone who has lived with substance abuse issues for most of his life, and the offender’s eligibility assessment report noted a “likelihood of severe substance abuse disorder at the time of the offending”. However, the offender subsequently reported that he had ceased using drugs in 2024 (recalling that the present offences occurred in August 2024). Whether the offender was affected by any substances at the time of the offending was at best, equivocal.

30. In addition, as discussed in the detailed report dated July 2026 from Canberra Health Services, the research suggests that while alcohol and other drug use are associated with an increased risk of domestic violence, substance use alone does not cause abusive behaviour. Rather, domestic violence is widely understood as a pattern of intentional, coercive, and controlling behaviour used to exert power and control over an intimate partner, with substance use often acting as a contributing or exacerbating factor rather than the primary cause of the violence.

31. I have set this out primarily because s 12A(2) of the Sentencing Act provides that a court may only impose a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order where it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that, amongst other things, the offender is dependent on alcohol or a controlled drug and that the offender’s dependency substantially contributed to the commission of the offence. Had this option been otherwise available, this would have been a barrier to such an order being made.

Reason for the offending / lack of remorse (ss 33(1)(v) and 33(1)(w) of the Sentencing Act)

32. The suitability assessment records that the offender demonstrated a notable lack of remorse for, and limited or inconsistent insight into, the offending behaviour. He initially disputed the charges, remarking that it “doesn’t matter, if a female says DV, don’t even need evidence as the system is stuffed. Wish them no ill but don’t agree with the charges”, while also placing blame on the victim for the imposition of the charges due to her intoxication at the time of the offending. Putting to one side whether that accords with the pleas of guilty accepting responsibility for the conduct, this type of honesty is actually useful to know on sentence. While demonstration of remorse may be a mitigating factor upon sentence, the lack of it also assists the court in crafting an appropriate sentence for this offender, which I consider should include a focus on underlying attitudes and education around respectful relationships and dealing with conflict as well as anger management more broadly.

Current sentencing practice (s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act)

33. Comparable cases helpfully provided by the prosecution included DPP v Clifford [2025] ACTSC 307; DPP v Gale [2023] ACTSC 297; DPP v Robin (a pseudonym) [2024] ACTSC 322; Robin (a pseudonym) v DPP [2025] ACTCA 40; and DPP v Williams [2024] ACTSC 303.

34. I have taken those cases into account, noting that to the extent that there was a discernible practice, it includes terms of imprisonment to be served by way of full-time custody for choking offences.

Pre-sentence custody

35. The offender has spent 381 days in pre-sentence custody referable to this offending. This time will be taken into account by way of backdating his sentence.

Totality

36. The offending all occurred as part of the one extended incident and is properly characterised as a course of conduct (s 33(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act). I also consider that the criminality of the aggravated assault occasioning actual bodily harm can comprehend that of the common assault offence. Taking the approach to concurrency set out in Dawson v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 9 at [37] (and the cases there-cited), it would be appropriate for a significant degree of concurrency between the sentences to be imposed for each of the three offences.

Disposition

37. The principles in the preamble to the Family Violence Act 2016 (ACT) include that “family violence is unacceptable in any form”, that “freedom from family violence is a human right”, that “the justice system should respect and protect all human rights” and that “family violence is best addressed through a coordinated legal and social response of assistance to victims” and preventing violence by “promoting the accountability of perpetrators of family violence and the appropriate intervention by the police and the courts”.

38. Those principles inform the sentence to be imposed, which must be proportionate to the objective seriousness of the offences. Plainly, the court must give effect to those statutory considerations and denounce the conduct in the strongest of terms. No sentence other than imprisonment is appropriate here. Accountability and intervention have emerged as priorities in the circumstances of this case. Specific deterrence may be promoted both through the length of time the offender has already spent in full-time custody, but also through targeted intervention.

39. The offender had hoped to serve the remainder of his sentence through a treatment order. However, he was not ultimately suitable due to the nature of the offending and as I have set out above, the statutory requirements were not fully met. That does not mean that he cannot pursue rehabilitation from drugs. On the contrary, that he does have a desire now is to be encouraged and supported. It is just that the court supervised method is not the right fit for him.

40. There are also other considerations for this offender in terms of his reintegration into the community, including ensuring that he has appropriate housing upon release, tying in the availability of the Bush Healing Farm which has accepted him as a suitable candidate for undertaking their rehabilitation program, and ensuring that he either completes or has been enrolled in educative programs designed to promote respectful relationships and manage conflict without anger. Rather than simply punish someone for doing the wrong thing, the focus for those in the offender’s position should also be heavily on equipping them with the skills and understanding to manage their behaviour in a way that does not see them constantly interacting with the justice system.

41. All of this suggests that careful management through parole conditions is appropriate for this offender. The lengthy time under supervision on parole takes into account the subjective circumstances and the challenges for this offender. It is designed to give flexibility to those managing his transition to the community, to give sufficient time for the offender to complete various programs in a staggered fashion (so as not to be overwhelming). I would encourage the offender to see that process as one of setting himself up to succeed and to fully engage with the support services available.

Orders 42. The orders of the Court are: (1) For CAN 8335/2024, aggravated choke/strangle/suffocate, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 2 years and 6 months, reduced to 1 year 10 months and 15 days on account of his guilty plea, backdated to commence on 6 October 2025 and conclude on 20 August 2027. (2) For CAN 8334/2024, aggravated assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 20 months, reduced to 1 year and 3 months on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 23 October 2026 and conclude on 22 January 2028. (3) For CAN 8333/2024, aggravated common assault, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 11 months, reduced to 8 months and 7 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 22 October 2027 and conclude on 28 June 2028. (4) The total term of imprisonment imposed is 2 years, 8 months and 23 days. (5) A non-parole period of 17 months is set, to commence on 6 October 2025 and expire on 5 March 2027.

I certify that the preceding forty-two [42] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Justice McWilliam.

Associate: Date: