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1. Mr Kleantis Eric Stasinos, the offender, has pleaded guilty to the following offences: (1) Damaging property contrary to s 403 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Criminal Code) (CC 11772 of 2022), which carries a maximum penalty of 1,000 penalty units, imprisonment for 10 years or both; (2) Aggravated burglary contrary to s 312(b) of the Criminal Code (CC 11771 of 2022), which carries a maximum penalty of 2,000 penalty units, imprisonment for 20 years or both; (3) Assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 24(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Crimes Act) (CC 11774 of 2022), which carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for five years; and (4) Common assault contrary to s 26(1) of the Crimes Act (CC 11773 of 2022), which carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment for two years.

2. All four offences occurred on the same day, in the early hours of 30 November 2022.

Facts of the offending

3. The facts were agreed and have been summarised below as follows.

Damaging property

4. On 30 November 2022 at around 3:00am, the offender parked outside a property in Dickson. Two people were at home, with security cameras activated in front of the house. The cameras recorded the offender walk down the driveway of the property and approach the front door. He proceeded to pull at the security door to the house, resulting in the metal mesh of the security door being ripped from its frame. The offender caused damage to the latch of the security door and the latch of the front door of the house.

5. The offender was heard yelling words to the effect of: “Fucking dog, open your door bruv”, before he left and drove away from the property. Police attended and obtained the security footage.

Aggravated burglary and common assault

6. Before dealing with the facts of the aggravated burglary offence, it is helpful to explain that the offence under s 312 of the Criminal Code may be committed in a number of ways. Relevant to the facts here, a person commits aggravated burglary if they enter a building as a trespasser, with intent to commit an offence that involves causing harm or threatening to cause harm to anyone in the building and has an offensive weapon with them at the time (the presence of the weapon being the aggravating conduct).

7. The conduct here involved the offender attending a house in Giralang at around 3:37am on the same morning of the day he damaged the door in Dickson. Three people were home and asleep, including the two victims, Ms Abbey McLaughlin and her father Mr Richard Jack McLaughlin. The offender entered the residence and entered a bedroom where two of the residents were sleeping. He shouted words to the effect of: “Where’s Jack?” The offender was waving a machete. Ms McLaughlin woke up and, fearing for her safety, took the offender to the part of the property where her father was sleeping.

8. When the offender was outside where Mr McLaughlin was sleeping, he started shouting words to the effect of: “He knows why I’m fucking here, I’m Clancy I’m here for the fucking parts.” Mr McLaughlin woke up and opened the door, and the offender entered. The offender struck him in the face, causing him to fall to the ground and lose consciousness momentarily. The offender continued to yell at him and wave the machete.

9. The offender attempted to hit Mr McLaughlin again, and Ms McLaughlin moved to protect her father. This caused Ms McLaughlin to be struck on the left side of her face, causing pain and bleeding. The offender apologised to her after she had been struck. This strike constituted the charge of common assault.

Assault occasioning actual bodily harm

10. The offender then started hitting Mr McLaughlin again, causing him to again fall to the ground. He bled from the nose and mouth, and sustained swelling to his face and redness around his right eye.

11. Ms McLaughlin again tried to block the offender from hitting her father. She pushed the offender in the stomach to move him out of the bedroom, and he turned and walked back inside the house. The offender then doubled back and started yelling at Mr McLaughlin again. Shortly after, the offender exited the house and left the area.

12. Police attended shortly after, and noted the injuries sustained by Ms McLaughlin and Mr McLaughlin. They found a sheath for a machete on the floor of Mr McLaughlin’s bedroom, as well as blood splatters. They viewed CCTV footage at the house which showed the offender walking up the driveway and removing a machete from under his shirt.

13. The machete was later found at the residence of the offender’s sister, where the offender resided. The offender’s custodial status

14. The offender was arrested on the same day of the offending and has spent 112 days in custody solely referable to the above offences. That will be taken into account in the sentence to be imposed: s 63 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act). It is perhaps useful to state at the outset that it was accepted that the threshold set out in s 10 of the Sentencing Act, of imprisonment being a sentence of last resort, was crossed in relation to the offending.

The Court’s sentencing task

15. I referred to the Court’s sentencing task in detail in DPP v Rohrlach [2023] ACTSC 166 (Rohrlach), including the sentencing objectives in s 7 of the Sentencing Act. These include ensuring that the offender is “adequately punished” for the offence in a way that is “just and appropriate”.

16. Of equal importance among the objectives (s 7(2) of the Sentencing Act) are the objectives of general and specific deterrence, protection of the community, promotion of the offender’s rehabilitation, making the offender accountable for his action, denouncing the conduct of the offender and recognising the harm done to the victims of the crime and the community.

17. I repeat what I said in Rohrlach at [18]-[23], essentially that the focus of the Court’s task is to sentence according to the principle of individualised justice. What is “adequate punishment” by way of a sentence that is “just and appropriate” involves balancing the different sentencing objectives in all the circumstances for the particular offender, which includes giving consideration to his personal circumstances.

Plea of guilty (s 33(1)(j) of the Sentencing Act)

18. The offender pleaded guilty even before the briefs of evidence were prepared in the Magistrates Court. Applying s 35(3) of the Sentencing Act and having considered the matters referred to in s 35(2), he is to be afforded the maximum discount of 25 percent on sentence, representing the utilitarian benefit of those pleas.

Objective seriousness (s 33(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act)

19. The nature and circumstances of the offence call attention to the objective seriousness of the conduct in question. The approach is to consider where the facts of the particular offence and offender lie in the “spectrum” from the least serious instances of the offence to the most serious: R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; 259 CLR 256 at [19].

20. The evaluation is “objective”, in that the Court disregards matters personal to the offender and determines the seriousness wholly by reference to the nature of the offending: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 at [27].

21. The subjective features (being the aspects of the offending personal to the offender) and the after-effects of offending are considered separately, for example, as part of the context of factors listed in s 33 of the Sentencing Act: see McLeod v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 59 at [12].

22. The maximum penalty for an offence provides a yardstick against which to assess the objective seriousness of the offences before the Court: Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25; (2006) 228 CLR 357 at [31].

23. The offender accepted that the course of conduct comprising the four offences before the Court was serious, but I will deal specifically with the features relevant to the objective seriousness of the conduct for each offence.

Damage property

24. In relation to the offence of damaging property, the maximum penalty is 10 years’ imprisonment or $160,000 or both. Considerations relevant to the objective seriousness of the offence were discussed by Murrell CJ in R v Rosewarne [2021] ACTSC 217 (Rosewarne) at [120]. They include:

(a) The motive for the damage or theft; for example, whether damage was malicious or occurred to facilitate a burglary; and (b) The extent or value of the damage.

25. Here, the motive is unclear. It does not appear to have been motivated by greed or an intention to damage the property, but from the words spoken by the offender at the time, it may have been to facilitate a burglary. The value of the damage to the door and lock was not specified in the evidence. While it cannot be said that the replacement value of the door and the lock was insignificant, given the spectrum of conduct which falls within the offence, this was at the low end.

Aggravated burglary and common assault

26. In R v CN; R v SN; R v Rix [2019] ACTSC 293 (CN), when dealing with an offence of aggravated burglary, Murrell CJ referred to the fact that within the range of offences covered by s 312 of the Criminal Code, home invasions are generally objectively serious matters.

27. Murrell CJ also set out the factors informing the objective seriousness of the offences of aggravated burglary (and also relevant to burglary), in cases such as R v Elphick [2021] ACTSC 9 at [113], and Rosewarne at [119]. They include: (a) Whether the offence was committed at commercial or residential premises (where the occupants are likely to feel a greater sense of violation) and, if at residential premises, whether it was the main premises or an associated building (such as a garage) that was entered. (b) The time of the entry, and whether the premises were occupied or were likely to be occupied, or whether it was likely that members of the public would otherwise witness the conduct. (c) Whether the victim was vulnerable; for example, if the main residence was entered, whether the victim was at home alone and asleep. (d) The means of entry; for example, whether it was forced entry or entry via a partly open door. (e) The degree to which there was associated destruction or disarray. (f) Whether there was an interaction with an occupant and, if so, whether the occupant was directly threatened and the nature and duration of any force or threat (including whether it was gratuitous). (g) For offences of aggravated burglary, whether only one or both circumstances of aggravation were present (in company and in possession of an offensive weapon) and, if the offender was in company, the number of co-offenders with whom he was in company and the role played by the offender. (h) The degree of planning, which may be able to be deduced from whether the offender was disguised and/or had armed himself with an offensive weapon or implement for the purpose of gaining entry.

28. Here, the conduct occurred at night (early morning), at a residential house, where people were sleeping and vulnerable by that fact. The means of entry was not forced and there was no associated destruction of the contents of the premises, but there was an interaction with the two victims and the threats were both verbal and implied by the presence of the weapon. The offender was alone but there was a degree of planning to be inferred, again from the presence of the weapon. The circumstances in which the offence occurred made it likely that the victims would be traumatised.

29. The common assault was unintentional, but the victim was hurt in circumstances that were traumatic. The graver conduct was clearly the aggravated burglary, which I find was of significant objective seriousness.

Assault occasioning actual bodily harm

30. The assault of the male victim was intentional, forceful, and caused significant injury to the victim. Again, while the yardstick of five years’ imprisonment reflects that this offence is of relatively less seriousness than that of aggravated burglary, within the scale of conduct that constitutes the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm this was nevertheless a serious example.

Victim impact statement (ss 33(1)(f) of the Sentencing Act)

31. Each victim has prepared a victim impact statement. Ms McLaughlin speaks of being awoken from sleep when a man came storming into her house erratically waving around a machete and screaming that he wanted to know where her dad was. She spoke of being frozen with fear and of the offender screaming incoherently, of watching her father be punched in the head so hard that he fell to the floor and his eye became swollen shut immediately from the impact of the hit. She describes frantically ringing the police and of going to pieces after the offender left her house.

32. She was understandably so traumatised by the event that she had to move with her partner. She has required medical treatment to help with inability to sleep, stress and anxiety.

33. Her father, Mr McLaughlin, similarly refers to the impact of the assault on him, of presenting to the hospital emergency department for treatment, and of ongoing head pains following the assault. He also feels overwhelming guilt that he was unable to protect his daughter from the ordeal. He also has received medical treatment and has become hyper-vigilant about security of the home.

Subjective circumstances of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

34. A pre-sentence report was before the Court dated 29 June 2023. The offender is now 31. He has been “known to ACT Corrective Services” since 2012 and has struggled with drug addiction for many years. I will return to that matter below.

35. The offender reported a positive and supportive upbringing and I note that his mother has been the key source of stability for him. He was exposed to illicit substance use and family violence by his father, with his mother and father separating when he was two years of age and his father relocating to Greece when he was 10 years of age. The offender has had a strained relationship with his father.

36. The offender was diagnosed at age seven with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, which his mother believes had a severe impact on his learning capabilities. He completed Year 10 at high school. Since then, he has started university studies and a chef apprenticeship, but failed to finish both. From that it may be inferred that the desire to educate is there, but the offender lacks either personal resources or support or both to follow through and finish his goal. He presented to the Court as an articulate man with insight into both his offending and its consequences, and what appeared to be an appreciation that he is not living up to his potential.

Remorse (s 33(1)(w) of the Sentencing Act)

37. That leads to the offender’s remorse. In pleading guilty, the offender has spared the victims the time and stress of attending court to give evidence. Sparing the victims in this way is a separate matter relevant to remorse: see Cranfield v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 3 at [34] and [36] and the authorities there-cited. The offender has also written an email to the Court, asking for forgiveness against the people he has hurt and telling them that he is truthfully sorry. He wrote that in the seven months that he has been incarcerated, he has spent much time thinking about his offences and feels utterly ashamed.

Criminal history (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

38. The offender does have a criminal history and it was accepted that his history includes prior offences that are relevant to the present offending. I have taken the history into account in the manner described in Veen v The Queen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 477-8. The offender’s prior criminal history does not mean that a longer sentence is to be imposed, but it speaks against leniency when compared with someone who comes to be sentenced as a person of prior good character. Specific deterrence is a factor that will carry emphasis here, but what emerged from the criminal history that is of greater significance, in my view, is confirmation that there is an underlying drug and alcohol abuse problem. Unless that is addressed, there is a real concern that this history will be repeated.

The offender’s drug use, prospects of rehabilitation and present steps (s 33(1)(p) and s 33(1)(t) of the Sentencing Act)

39. The offender has struggled with drug addiction for many years. He started using MDMA and ecstasy at age 14, and alcohol and cannabis at age 16. At the time of the offending, he was using methamphetamine and alcohol regularly. In 2022, he attended various rehabilitation programs in NSW.

40. Unfortunately, he relapsed. The offender’s letter to the Court, which was confirmed orally at the hearing (although not under oath), explains that the offender was extremely intoxicated and unhappy with himself and the direction his life was heading at the time of the offences. He says now that he fell into a toxic relationship which led to him spiralling out of control and excessive substance abuse. His mother too, in her letter of support written to the Court, states that the offender suffers from impulsive behaviour, poor judgement and a lack of control when under the influence of alcohol and drugs. She went on to say that he only gets into “this sort of trouble” when suffering from the excesses of alcohol and drugs.

41. Since being incarcerated he has managed to stay clean and sober for seven months and he says all he wants now is to achieve long term sobriety. He has investigated rehabilitation programs and has identified a program in Cairns, run by the St Vincent de Paul Society. There was evidence before the Court from Ms Turner, who is a Community Care Worker for the Drug and Alcohol Residential Recovery Service in Queensland. She explained what is involved in the program. It commences as a 12-week residential placement. The offender would be accepted into the program upon his release from prison, subject to tying his entry in with the exit of another participant. There is a degree of flexibility but obviously the program is unable to hold beds open indefinitely, and it is very much dependant on the timing of exiting residents. Following the residential component, participants are provided with six months or more continuing care support including assisting the participant to locate safe and stable accommodation. That ongoing support assists the participant’s re-engagement in the community.

42. Initially I was firmly of the view that the offender should have been referred for a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order, but he refused to consent to being assessed for suitability, so that is not an option for the Court to consider. The reason the offender wants to go to Queensland to continue his rehabilitation is because he has an uncle who lives there and could provide ongoing support when he exits the program. The offender explained to the Court that this is not the first time he has tried to treat his disease of addiction. What makes it so hard for him not to relapse in Canberra is proximity to old associates and being pulled back into old habits. For this offender, I accept there is merit in him attempting a fresh start.

43. As discussed during the hearing, this shapes the manner in which any term of imprisonment would be served. Imposing an Intensive Corrections Order (ICO) or a partially suspended sentence on someone who is attempting to rehabilitate in a different state is not practical because of the supervision requirements that attach to those forms of sentence. It is even more difficult if the person breaches the conditions attached because the offender would not be within the jurisdiction.

44. However, I was informed that there is a process for transferring parole supervision interstate, and that it could be made a condition of the offender’s parole that he enter into the rehabilitation program that has been persuaded to take him. Given the notorious scarcity of places in these programs, that is no small feat, and he has done that through his own efforts and those representing him.

45. The offender also wished to draw the Court’s attention to the fact that he was granted bail to attend to his dying father in Greece, and that he returned. He says this demonstrates that when he is sober, he is a person who can be trusted. Comparable cases (s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act)

46. There are numerous cases dealing with offences of the kind committed by the offender here. In R v Bessant [2020] ACTSC 365 at [37]-[41], Refshauge AJ observed that the range of circumstances for offences that include aggravated burglary is “so wide that it is difficult to identify, with any reasonable utility, a singular sentencing practice.” His Honour referred to a range of generally between one year to two years and six months’ imprisonment for the offence of aggravated burglary, citing R v Lockwood [2018] ACTSC 288 at [49].

47. Albeit with some limitations (see generally R v Pham [2015] HCA 39; 256 CLR 550), sentencing statistics from the ACT Sentencing Database can also assist. For what it is worth, the current statistics obtained from the Sentencing Database show that in the case of aggravated burglary, 65.5 percent of offences received a sentence of imprisonment. Of these, 21 percent imposed a term of 13 to 18 months’ imprisonment, 16 percent were 19 to 24 months’ imprisonment and 12.4 percent were 25 to 30 months’ imprisonment. In total, nearly 70 percent of cases in which a term of imprisonment was imposed resulted in a sentence between 13 and 42 months’ imprisonment.

48. Consistent with the statistics, in R v Elphick [2021] ACTSC 9 at [154], Murrell CJ noted that “the offence of aggravated burglary usually results in a sentence of between 18 months and three years and six months imprisonment”. This echoes remarks made in R v Catanzariti [2020] ACTSC 326 (Catanzariti) at [60] and accords with the statistics set out above. These figures are, of course, not outer limits and they are all reflective of sentencing offenders whose circumstances do not include the particular rehabilitation path being considered for this offender. However, there is a sentencing practice which I have taken into account and I have endeavoured to ensure that the sentence to be imposed accords with that practice.

49. Similarly, for the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the Sentencing Database shows that nearly 59 percent of sentences imposed a term of imprisonment. 33 percent of these were for between seven and 12 months.

50. The offender referred to R v Crick [2021] ACTSC 106 (R v Crick), Catanzariti and CN as cases that may provide useful guidance in relation to sentencing practice for aggravated burglaries in the Territory. The Director did not provide any specific comparable cases but agreed that those three cases were sufficient guidance on the sentencing practices and patterns.

51. In R v Crick a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment (reduced from 15 months) was imposed for the offence of aggravated burglary. In that case, the offender (in company) forced his way into the house of a man known to them. He and the others pushed aside the victim’s sister and mother and assaulted the victim in his room. The offender punched him in the head several times. They took two mobile phones which they destroyed. The offender had ADHD and a learning disability. He had been using illegal drugs when the offending occurred. The offender had previously spent only four days in custody in relation to the above offences and the sentence of imprisonment was ordered to be served by way of ICO.

52. In Catanzariti, the offender (in company) forced his way into the house of people known to him. The victim was a young person and the only one home at the time. He was forced to sit and remain in a chair while the offender searched the house and stole a number of items. In terms of subjective circumstances, the offender had a history of anxiety, depression, adjustment disorder, and drug and alcohol use. For the offence of aggravated burglary by joint commission, a sentence of 21 months and 21 days’ imprisonment was imposed, to be served by way of drug and alcohol treatment order.

53. In CN, three co-offenders were sentenced for an offence of aggravated burglary. They had entered a house of occupants known to them. The intent of the enterprise was to cause harm or threaten to cause harm to the occupants. CN was in possession of a knife, threw a brick towards one of the occupants who exited the house, as well as attacked the screen door when that victim re-entered the house. She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. SN was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment which was wholly suspended, and Rix was sentenced to 31 months’ imprisonment for the principal offence and a breach of a good behaviour order.

54. I have also considered the more recent sentence of Director of Public Prosecutions v Fisher [2023] ACTSC 29. In that case the offender, in company, approached a home and smashed through a window to gain entry. One of them carried a knife. The occupants, who were known to the offender, awoke. The offender attempted to kick and punch one of them. On the way out, the group smashed car windows of the victim. The offender suffered from schizophrenia, epilepsy and substance use disorder. He had a history of childhood trauma and had an intellectual disability. He had a considerable criminal history. He was sentenced for the aggravated burglary charge to 18 months’ imprisonment. He was also sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for damaging property, and three months’ imprisonment for common assault, with an overall sentence of two years’ imprisonment.

55. Finally and without setting out the detail, I record for completeness that I have given consideration to R v Dawson [2022] ACTSC 64, (cited in Williams-Savage v The Queen [2022] ACTCA 58 at [37]-[38]) where a sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment was imposed for aggravated burglary, and four months’ imprisonment was imposed for the offence of damaging property (in each case, after a 20 percent discount was applied for pleas of guilty).

Totality considerations

56. The principles to be applied when sentencing an offender for multiple offences are summarised in O’Brien v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 47 at [26] as follows: The relevant principles in relation to the fixing of sentences for multiple offences and the consideration of totality are also well settled. They include the following: (a) When sentencing for multiple offences, the sentencing judge must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider questions of accumulation or concurrence, as well as totality: Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610 at 623–624. (b) The principle of totality requires the sentencing judge to review the aggregate sentence, look at the totality of the criminal behaviour and consider whether the aggregate is “just and appropriate” for all the offences: Mill at 63. (c) A countervailing factor is the need to ensure that there does not emerge a perception that there is no difference between a person who commits one or two offences and a person who commits six or seven offences: R v Wheeler [2000] NSWCCA 34 at [36]. The Court must avoid any suggestion that what is being offered is a discount for multiple offending: R v Knight (2005) 155 A Crim R 252 at [112]; R v MAK (2006) 167 A Crim R 159 at [18]. (d) Where offences are discrete and independent, the sentence for one offence cannot comprehend and reflect the criminality of the other. In such circumstances, the sentences should be at least partly cumulative; otherwise there is a risk that the total sentence will not reflect the total criminality of the two offences. Where, however, the offences are not separate and distinct, but are part of a single episode of criminality with common features, it is more likely that the sentence for one of the offences will reflect the criminality of both, in which case the sentences should be concurrent, or at least partly concurrent: Cahyadi v The Queen (2007) 168 A Crim R 41 at [27].

57. Although the offences here related to conduct that occurred on the one night, there were two separate locations and different victims and to that extent, the offence of damaging property may be said to be discrete. However, for totality reasons, an adjustment will be made to make the damage property offence largely concurrent with the second course of offending.

58. In respect of the two assaults (one occasioning actual bodily harm) and the aggravated burglary, although there were two victims, those offences are part of a single episode of criminality. Again, it is appropriate to make the sentences in respect of that offending almost wholly concurrent.

59. The most serious offence is that of aggravated burglary, and accordingly, that will be the primary sentence.

60. Totality considerations include the fixing of the non-parole period. In that regard, it is worth repeating the proper approach which was set out in Taylor v R [2014] ACTCA 9 (Taylor) at [19] as follows: 1. A non-parole period must be fixed having regard to all the sentencing purposes of s 7, the objective seriousness of the offence and the offender's subjective circumstances. It is the minimum period of imprisonment that justice requires to be served: Power v The Queen [1974] HCA 26; (1974) 131 CLR 623 at 627 – 628, Deakin v The Queen [1984] HCA 31; (1984) 11 A Crim R 88 at 89, Lowe v The Queen [1984] HCA 46; (1984) 154 CLR 606 (Lowe) at 615, Bugmy v The Queen [1990] HCA 18; (1990) 169 CLR 525 (Bugmy) at 536. 2. An offender’s prospects of rehabilitation are important to the fixing of the non-parole period. Generally, the perceived prospects of rehabilitation will make a significant difference to the non-parole period. Among other things, they will indicate what is required by way of protection of the community: Bugmy at 531 – 532. 3. The proportion of the sentence that is to be served by way of non-parole period is a matter for judicial discretion and cannot be reduced to a mathematical formula: Inge v The Queen [1999] HCA 55; (1999) 199 CLR 295 (Inge) per Kirby J at 316. In fixing the relationship between the term of imprisonment and the non-parole period, a sentencing judge has a wide discretion: Lowe at 610, 620 and 625. 4. Ordinarily, the non-parole period will constitute a substantial part of the total sentence: Inge per Kirby J at 316. In this Court, in circumstances where the offender committed a serious offence and had limited prospects of rehabilitation, the Court declined to disturb a non-parole period that was 70% of the total sentence: Drayton v The Queen [2013] ACTCA 44. However, Drayton and other cases decided in the ACT should not be used to fix an “available range” for non-parole periods. The concepts of “manifest excess” and “manifest inadequacy” do not mean that a sentence has fallen outside an “available range”. Very recently, in Barbaro v The Queen [2014] HCA 2 at [27], French CJ, Hayne, Kieffel and Bell JJ observed: ... the essentially negative proposition that a sentence is so wrong that there must have been some misapplication of principle in fixing it cannot safely be transformed into any positive statement of the upper and lower limits within which a sentence could properly have been imposed.

61. The Court in Taylor went on to note at [20] that in the ACT, non-parole periods generally fall within the range of 50-70 percent of the total term.

62. In this case, the offender is addressing his addiction issues through abstinence while he has been incarcerated, but the next step is a targeted rehabilitative intervention program. That should be completed by the offender while he is living in the community and having to deal with the ordinary stresses of daily life under the supervision of parole conditions.

63. The sentence will be backdated to take into account the period of time that the offender has spent in custody solely referable to the offence. However, it must be recognised that the offender has now been incarcerated for nearly eight months (albeit that such period is not solely referable to the current offending). The circuit-breaker that has been achieved by sobriety during this elapsed period of incarceration, and any objective of specific deterrence through a lengthy term of imprisonment, has already been achieved. A lengthy non-parole period may do more harm than good for this offender, if his current momentum and motivation for rehabilitation were to dissipate or opportunities for entry into rehabilitation programs were to close, or both. It need hardly be said that the participant being at peak willingness to participate in his own rehabilitation is a critical factor in the long-term success of any rehabilitation program.

64. Given that a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order is unavailable to this offender (by his choice and for reasons explained above), the sentence overall and the non-parole period to be imposed is what I consider to be the minimum period necessary in each case to: (a) properly denounce the conduct; (b) reflect the objective seriousness of the offence; and (c) recognise the impact on the victims that the home invasions and the assault have had, but; (d) accommodate this particular offender’s subjective circumstances and that the best way to ensure the community’s protection from the offender engaging in similar conduct in the future is to get him re-engaged in formal residential rehabilitation.

Orders

65. Accordingly, the following sentence is imposed: (1) For the offence of aggravated burglary contrary to s 312(b) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CC 11771 of 2022), the offender is sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, reduced from 2 years on account of the guilty plea, to commence on 24 March 2023 and conclude on 23 September 2024. (2) For the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 24(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (CC 11774 of 2022), the offender is sentenced to 1 year’s imprisonment, reduced from 1 year and 4 months on account of the guilty plea, to commence on 24 October 2023 and conclude on 23 October 2024. (3) For the offence of common assault contrary to s 26(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (CC 11773 of 2022), the offender is sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment, reduced from 4 months on account of the guilty plea, to commence on 24 July 2024 and conclude on 23 October 2024. (4) For the offence of damaging property contrary to s 403 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CC 11772 of 2022), the offender is sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment, reduced from 4 months on account of the guilty plea, to commence on 24 August 2024 and conclude on 23 November 2024. (5) Of a total sentence of 20 months’ imprisonment commencing on 24 March 2023 and concluding on 23 November 2024, a non-parole period of 10 months is fixed, to commence on 24 March 2023 and to conclude on 23 January 2024.

I certify that the preceding sixty-five [65] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice McWilliam

Associate: Date: 14 July 2023