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[2026] ACTSC 174
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-05-29
Kelly AJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: DPP v Slattery (No 2) Citation: [2026] ACTSC 174 Hearing Date: 8 April 2026 Decision Date: 29 May 2026 Before: Kelly AJ Decision: See [26] Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – breach of a family violence order – use carriage service to harass – take vehicle without consent – reckless driving - offender previously successfully completed treatment and supervision part of drug and alcohol treatment order – drug and alcohol treatment order Legislation Cited: Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 80W, 80ZD, 80ZH, 80ZJ Criminal Code Act 1996 (Cth), s 474.17(1) Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), s 318(1) Family Violence Act 2016 (ACT), s 43(2) Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT), s 7(1) Cases Cited: R v Slattery [2021] ACTSC 154 R v Slattery (No 3); DPP v Slattery [2025] ACTSC 125 Parties: ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Joshua William Slattery (Offender) Representation: Counsel G Meikle (DPP) E Chen (Offender) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Legal Aid ACT (Offender) File Numbers: SCC 100 of 2023 SCC 101 of 2023 SCC 339 of 2023 SCC 340 of 2023 SCC 46 of 2026 KELLY AJ: Introduction
Joshua Slattery, on 31 March 2025 Christensen AJ sentenced you to three years and 11 months’ imprisonment backdated to commence on 7 November 2024, with the balance of three years, six months and seven days suspended pursuant to s 80W of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (‘Sentencing Act’) upon you entering into a drug and alcohol treatment order (DATO).
What happened thereafter has been accurately set out in the prosecutor’s submissions and I will now summarise the relevant aspects of the recent history.
The initial treatment plan proposed for you under the DATO was that you participate in a residential rehabilitation program. You were accepted into the Canberra Recovery Service (CRS) Residential Facility and admitted on 31 March 2025, but you absconded on 16 April 2025. On 17 April 2025, Christensen AJ issued an arrest warrant pursuant to s 80ZJ of the Sentencing Act.
The warrant was executed on 21 June 2025. You were refused bail in relation to the first series of offences which predated the imposition of your DATO. On 23 June 2025, the suspension of the term of imprisonment under the custodial part of the DATO made on 31 March 2025 was provisionally cancelled.
On 28 July 2025, after a hearing before McWilliam J, the suspension of the sentence of imprisonment under the custodial part of your DATO was reinstated and you were directed to return to the CRS Residential Facility. This time you did remain there until you graduated from the program on 17 October 2025.
Shortly after your graduation from CRS, you disengaged from the treatment team and the obligations of your DATO. Justice McWilliam issued a warrant pursuant to s 80ZJ of the Sentencing Act on 10 November 2025.
On 10 January 2026, while you were at large, you committed the following three offences: (a) Two counts of take motor vehicle without consent contrary to s 318(1) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CAN 832/2026, CAN 833/2026); and (b) One count of reckless driving as a repeat offender contrary to s 7(1) of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT).
You were arrested on 10 January 2026 in relation to these fresh charges and on the warrant previously issued by McWilliam J.
My task today is to sentence you for two offences which were committed in February and March 2025 while you were in custody, and the three offences which occurred on 10 January 2026 while there were warrants for your arrest on account of your breach of your DATO. The two offences committed in February 2025 are: (a) One count of contravening a family violence order (FVO) contrary to s 43(2) of the Family Violence Act 2016 (ACT) (CAN 6725/2025); and (b) One count of using a carriage service to harass contrary to s 474.17(1) of the Criminal Code Act 1996 (Cth) (CAN 6727/2025).
The facts relating to your contravention of the FVO are that you breached a condition of the FVO by contacting your partner by phone several times from the AMC in February 2025. The offence of using a carriage service to harass relates to the nature of your calling between February and March 2025 and I note that, over the course of a singular day, you called your partner no less than 26 times. Your partner terminated the phone calls on each occasion, yet you continued to call back. Both of you exchange profanities, however you initiated the calls.
The facts relating to the offences committed on 10 January 2026 are that you stole the keys to a vehicle out of a gym locker while the owner was at the gym. You then drove that vehicle to the Westfield Woden. Later that morning, you took a white Skoda, which had temporarily been parked outside the owner’s townhouse with the keys inside, and drove it on the wrong side of the road, causing a head-on collision with another vehicle.
The owner of the Skoda is a 78-year-old gentleman, and he was very shocked and felt violated by your brazen and opportunistic behaviour while he momentarily left his vehicle that morning. All in all, the owner of the Skoda has had a very stressful time dealing with the police and the insurance company on account of your behaviour. You say you wish to make amends to your victims. However, it is unclear whether your victims wish to engage in a restorative justice process. As a result, I will leave it to the discretion of the Judge presiding over the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List to determine whether a restorative justice order is appropriate in your case.
The three offences committed on 10 January 2026, while not especially serious, are not trivial. The public was clearly put at risk by reason of your reckless driving and collision. However, I do note that there was no police pursuit, no passengers in your vehicle and no evidence that your driving on that occasion was protracted.
The two offences of taking motor vehicles without consent appear to have been premeditated, impulsive and opportunistic instances of joyriding by you.
The offences which occurred in February and March 2025, namely the telephone calls to your partner, are serious because they involved a breach of an order designed to protect your partner from you. However, it is apparent that you and your partner exchanged similar profanities during those calls. Significantly, your behaviour did not involve any threats of physical violence or malice and for this reason I assess your offending on that occasion at the lower end of the scale of objective seriousness.
Background
I have had the benefit of reading two previous decisions concerning your criminal behaviour: R v Slattery [2021] ACTSC 154 and R v Slattery (No 3); DPP v Slattery [2025] ACTSC 125.
I do not consider it necessary to go into the details again today, except to say that, like the previous two judges, I have no difficulty in finding that the totality of your subjective circumstances diminishes your moral culpability.
However, given your previous offending history, there is no question that you must be sentenced to a term of full-time imprisonment for this offending. The only issue for me is how much time is enough, taking into account all of your circumstances.
In determining this issue, I have taken into account the time in custody which you have already served in relation to these offences, being 178 days.
I also take into account that you are entitled to a discount of 25% on account of your pleas of guilty to the offences you committed on 10 January 2026. I did not understand the prosecutor to cavil with that submission made by your counsel. As to the first two offences which were committed in February and March 2025 whilst you were in custody, your hearing on those charges had been listed to commence on 9 December 2025 but, because you were at large during that period of time, the hearing did not go ahead. As a result, any discount for your pleas on those charges must be minimal.
I also take into account that you did actually spend 99 days in residential rehabilitation in 2025 and graduated from that rehabilitation program.
I am also prepared to and do take into account that you spent time in custody from 7 November 2024 to 31 March 2025, amounting to 145 days for unrelated matters. Although that time is not able to be treated in a mathematical way, it does have relevance to the sentence I intend to impose when I am considering whether the sentence as a whole should be ameliorated taking into account the principle of totality.
During the course of these proceedings, you gave evidence and you wrote a long letter to the court attempting to explain why you have once again breached the DATO in such an egregious way.
For these reasons, I am prepared to make orders today which will have the effect that you will have wholly served the sentences I impose for the fresh offences.
That leaves the question of what orders to make under s 80ZD of the Sentencing Act. Although the court had the benefit of submissions on this issue, given the passage of time and the lack of clarity around whether the treatment and supervision component of the DATO is capable of being extended, I consider that this matter is most appropriately dealt with in the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List and will list the matter for immediate review accordingly. You are to be remanded in custody in the meantime.
Orders
I certify that the preceding twenty-six [26] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Acting Justice Kelly. Associate: Date: 29 May 2026
DPP
Slattery (No 2)