DPP v Saunders

1. On 22 April 2025, Tristan Saunders was sentenced by Christensen AJ for a series of burglaries over a total of 19 offences arising from burglaries on nine homes, eight of those burglaries being committed whilst Mr Saunders was on bail for the first: see DPP v Saunders [2025] ACTSC 160. The period over which those burglaries occurred was January to April 2024.

2. Her Honour noted the harm that had been caused by those offences. She considered Mr Saunders' subjective factors. She found that there were clearly Bugmy factors (taking their name from Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571) present. Her Honour also found that the offences were motivated by a desperate need for Mr Saunders to fuel his substance dependency, in circumstances where he was spending $300 a day on methamphetamine.

3. Her Honour sentenced him in an unusual way. She imposed a sentence of 10 months which had already been served with no treatment order connected to that sentence and a separate sentence which commenced on 1 February 2025. The custodial part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (Treatment Order) was suspended under section 80W of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) from the date the sentence was imposed, 22 April 2025, and it would continue until 30 November 2028 which was the date the total sentence expired.

4. Regrettably, Mr Saunders failed to take advantage of the significantly lenient opportunity that that sentence provided him with. Only a week later he was issued a warning for the use of substances and non-engagement with the treatment team. A couple of weeks after that, another warning was issued.

5. Two more weeks after that, there were five sanction points imposed in relation to three additional uses of drugs, non-attendance at urinalysis and non-attendance at court. Eventually, on 30 May 2025, the Treatment Order was provisionally cancelled pursuant to section 80ZB(1)(e) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act. 10 days later, it was reinstated. A week after that, he again failed to attend court. He reported use of substances, non-attendance at urinalysis and non-attendance at the Canberra Recovery Hub since he was released.

6. The following day he did present to court but two days later he didn't, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On 24 July 2025, he committed further offences. They involved driving while he should not have been, and being involved in some very dangerous driving as he attempted to evade arrest. He was sentenced in the Magistrates Court on 11 March to a total sentence of imprisonment for eight months.

7. Because he has been convicted of fresh matters in the Magistrates Court, section 80ZD(3) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act applies. Accordingly, I must make an order cancelling the Treatment Order. There are two consequences of that from which I must choose. Section 80ZD(4) says I must either impose the sentence of imprisonment that was suspended under the custodial part of the Treatment Order, or if I consider it appropriate in the circumstances, re-sentence the offender. It is the common submission of both parties appearing today that I should take the former alternative, and given the lamentable history of Mr Saunders' non-compliance with his Treatment Order, I entirely agree. This is a not a case where Mr Saunders has made substantial efforts at rehabilitation to achieve progress: see DPP v Tonna (No 2) [2020] ACTSC 362 at [78]- [79].

8. Instead, this is a case where Mr Saunders has failed to adequately demonstrate compliance with the conditions of the opportunity that was offered to him. His non-compliance arose early in the Treatment Order. There has been no demonstrated rehabilitation and no significant sacrifice to Mr Saunders in complying with the Treatment Order for the period prior to cancellation: see Figura v DPP [2025] ACTCA 48 at [49]. What I must do therefore is to impose the sentence of imprisonment that was suspended under the custodial part of the Treatment Order.

9. Two issues then arise: firstly, what date that should start from, and secondly, what non-parole period I should set. The prosecutor tells me, and Mr Small who appears for Mr Saunders agrees, that I should allow 10 days for the period that the Treatment Order was provisionally suspended and the lawyers appearing today both also agree that I should make the sentence partially concurrent with the sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court. I have therefore decided that the imposed sentence will be backdated to commence on 24 November 2025 to reflect those circumstances.

10. In relation to the non-parole period, Mr Small seeks something close to 50% and the prosecution does not speak in opposition to that. The non-parole period I have selected is more than 50% but it is, I believe, the shortest period which appropriately reflects the gravity of the many offences committed by Mr Saunders and the impact of those offences on both the individual victims of his crimes and the community generally. I therefore make the following orders. Orders

11. The orders of the Court are: (1) A review of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order made on 22 April 2025 is conducted pursuant to section 80ZH(4) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). (2) Pursuant to section 80ZD(3) of that Act, the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order made on 22 April 2025 is cancelled. (3) I impose the sentence of imprisonment that was suspended under the custodial part of the Treatment Order being a total term of imprisonment of three years seven months and nine days. This is backdated to start on 24 November 2025 to take into account the 10 days the offender's Treatment Order was provisionally suspended and to make the sentence partially concurrent with the sentence imposed by the magistrate. (4) I set a non-parole period of 2 years to commence on 24 November 2025 and expire on 23 November 2027.

I certify that the preceding eleven [11] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Justice Berman. Associate: Date: