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Guilty plea

9. A plea of guilty was offered at the criminal case conference stage on the charge identified above. On the plea being entered the more serious charge of joint commission attempted aggravated robbery was withdrawn by the prosecution.

10. Ms Rowe submits, and the prosecution accepts, there was utilitarian value in the plea and a discount is appropriate noting the prosecution case was not overwhelmingly strong. A meaningful discount is therefore sought on two bases, first a contested trial in a multi-accused matter was avoided and secondly, the strength of the prosecution case was not such as to count against the application of a discount.

Nature and circumstances of the offence

11. The summary of events set out above is drawn from the agreed statement of facts.

12. In assessing the objective seriousness of the offending, I consider the following matters to carry particular significance: (a) As a starting point, in a joint commission offence Ms Rowe is liable for the actions of the other participants, including Mr Wilson. (b) Mr Wilson deliberately discharged a firearm at close range to the face of the victim. (c) Ms Rowe played a critical role in laying the trap for the victim. She was part of the planning exercise. Her complicity is reinforced by the telephone exchanges with Mr Wilson in the days following the offence. She made the phone call luring the victim to her home under a pretence. Her home provided the venue for the assault to occur. (d) Notwithstanding the absence of a victim impact statement the effect on the victim would have been significant both in terms of the immediate physical injury and the psychological trauma engendered by this kind of episode. I do not rely upon the absence of a victim impact statement to draw any inference as to the significance of the injuries and their impact.

13. I consider this to be a serious example of this type of offending.

Parity principle

14. In Saipani v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 5; 288 A Crim R 191 the Court of Appeal described the principal in this way at [56]: The “parity principle” is a manifestation of the fundamental principle of equality before the law. As Gibbs CJ said in Lowe v The Queen (1984) 154 CLR 606 at 609 (Lowe): “[I]t is obviously desirable that persons who have been parties to the commission of the same offence should, if other things are equal, receive the same sentence…”. As his Honour observed, however, other things are not always equal. There may, for example, be differences in degree of involvement of offenders in a joint offence, differences in their antecedents, and differences in the charges brought against them. The present case is primarily concerned with the application of the parity principle in circumstances where the appellant came to be sentenced on a more serious charge than those to which his co-offenders entered pleas of guilty.

15. Of the four co-offenders, it is only Mr Wilson and Ms Rowe who appear for sentence before me. Accepting the critical involvement of Ms Rowe in laying the trap for the victim, I consider she had a lesser involvement in the offending when compared with Mr Wilson who fired the weapon. She also, as a consequence, faced different charges. The prosecution submits she elected not to intervene to prevent the use of the weapon, but there is no evidence before me to indicate she was aware of Mr Wilson’s intent to use the handmade gun before it was produced. It is agreed the planning was with intent to harm the victim and not to use a weapon for that purpose. Any opportunity to intervene, even with words of discouragement, was therefore very limited.

16. Applying the parity principle in this instance necessarily leads to the conclusion Ms Rowe should be subject to a lesser sentence than that imposed upon Mr Wilson.

Circumstances of the offender

17. I have the benefit of a pre-sentence report.

18. Ms Rowe is aged 27 years. As part of my consideration of sentence, I take into account Ms Rowe’s relative youth at the time of the offending. She is an Aboriginal woman who only recently discovered her heritage and has no connection to culture. She is one of nine children, with six of those being half siblings. There is no indication of particular trauma or disadvantage until she was aged about 8 years. Prior to that time Ms Rowe describes her childhood as “good”. At the age of 8 she was sexually assaulted by a family member. She identifies that incident as diverting her onto a troubled path including alcohol and drug use and criminal offending, bringing her to the attention of the police. Ms Rowe says she commenced cannabis use at age 8 or 9. She progressed to using ice in her early adult years. As a young adult she would drink excessively; but less so in more recent years. Ms Rowe’s position is that her drug and alcohol use is not a problem for her; her drug use confined to social settings. I note it is sufficiently problematic for her to have resulted in a relatively recent breach of her bail conditions.

19. She attests to a supportive relationship with her mother for whom Ms Rowe currently shares caring duties with one of her siblings.

20. Formal education concluded for Ms Rowe at the commencement of year eight. She says she left school as a consequence of bullying and an unsupportive environment. She also concedes experiencing learning difficulties impacting on her schooling experience. After leaving school Ms Rowe undertook no further courses and she has never worked.

21. She lives in ACT Housing accommodation in Taylor. She has resided there since her release on bail. Ms Rowe has been in a relationship with Mr Wilson for approximately two years. She has two children from a previous relationship. They are aged six and eight years. It is a matter of significance that Ms Rowe is the sole carer for her young children and for the period of her incarceration following her arrest the children were placed in care.

22. Ms Rowe contends her friends and acquaintances are not involved in criminal activity. I understand her to be excluding Mr Wilson from the group of persons she describes. Her motivation for avoiding antisocial peers is said to be her responsibilities associated with the care of her children and her mother. As the pre-sentence report identifies, her ongoing illicit drug use is suggestive of Ms Rowe having some antisocial associates notwithstanding her assertions to the contrary.

23. There is no medical evidence before me. Any identified medical conditions are therefore based on Ms Rowe’s self-reporting. She was assessed by the custodial mental health service on induction on 24 June 2025. No recorded diagnosis of significant mental illness was made. Ms Rowe says she has received diagnoses of ADHD, depression and anxiety. She also describes what she believes are symptoms of schizophrenia, borderline personality disorder and bipolar disorder. I am unable to reach a view about whether a formal diagnosis of any of these recognised conditions has been made. I note no significant medical conditions were identified in the course of routine health care received during her period in custody.

24. Following her release on bail Ms Rowe participated in the Karralika Matrix day program. That is understood to be a 16-week group program aimed at addressing and supporting individuals in their alcohol and drug relapse prevention. It typically runs three days a week and involves counselling, self-help and mutual help groups. Ms Rowe did not complete the program as her children were returned to her care, making it difficult for her to attend on a three days per week basis. There is no material before me providing any further detail concerning her participation in Karralika.

25. There is some debate about the application of Bugmy principles. The prosecution accepts matters of deprivation in Ms Rowe’s background must be given full weight and there must be recognition those factors do not diminish with the passage of time. Accepting those factors reduce her moral culpability, the prosecution contends the same factors increase the need to protect the community from the offender, particularly with regard to her ongoing substance use. It is the second part of that submission with which Ms Rowe takes issue. She argues the position of the prosecution has the effect of converting a mitigating factor into an aggravating one. She points to the assessment in the pre-sentence report of her suitability for a low level of supervision and a community-based order. In Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 at [45] the court cited with approval a passage from the judgment of Gleeson CJ in R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 at 68: A moment's consideration will show that the interplay of the considerations relevant to sentencing may be complex and on occasion even intricate. In a given case, facts which point in one direction in relation to one of the considerations to be taken into account may point in a different direction in relation to some other consideration. For example, in the case of a particular offender, an aspect of the case which might mean that deterrence of others is of lesser importance, might, at the same time, mean that the protection of society is of greater importance. That was the particular problem being examined by the court in the case of Veen (No 2). Again, in a particular case, a feature which lessens what might otherwise be the importance of general deterrence, might, at the same time increase the importance of deterrence of the offender.

26. The, at times, complex interplay described by Gleeson CJ does not arise on the facts of this case. As the prosecution concedes Ms Rowe’s childhood deprivation, particularly in the form of childhood sexual abuse in the family context, coinciding with the inception of drug use is a relevant factor in sentencing and one that reduces her moral culpability. It is difficult to see how the corollary arises given Ms Rowe’s history. There is very limited evidence to support a conclusion that Ms Rowe’s continued drug use has led to offending suggesting the protection of society becomes a matter of greater importance in her sentencing. On the contrary there is a single offence of driving whilst under the influence of a prescribed drug in 2018. That matter on its own does not support the contention Ms Rowe’s deprived childhood and related ongoing substance use increases the need to protect the community from her.

27. In terms of her current circumstances Ms Rowe is in a steady relationship with Mr Wilson who is presently incarcerated. She is actively engaged in her parenting role for her two young children. She also shares caring responsibilities for her mother with whom she has a good supportive relationship. There is little doubt Ms Rowe has very good reason in the form of her caring responsibilities to engage with services and avoid future criminal conduct. The residual negative influence is her continuing exposure to illicit substances.

Ms Rowe’s prior criminal history

28. Ms Rowe has a relatively modest history of prior offending. As the prosecution concedes there is no history of like offending and the last offence recorded was in March 2020.

Sentencing options

29. The prosecution submits nothing other than a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate. In oral submissions that position was clarified with a concession that imprisonment need not be by way of a full-time custodial sentence.

30. Section 10(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) provides: (2) The court may, by order, sentence the offender to imprisonment, for all or part of the term of the sentence, if the court is satisfied, having considered possible alternatives, that no other penalty is appropriate.

31. Ms Rowe submits in the circumstances of her case other penalties are appropriate. She submits the purposes of sentencing identified in s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act are met by alternative penalties in the form of a conviction and some form of community-based order. In particular she points to the prospective benefits in terms of treatment and supervision available in that context.

Current sentencing practice

32. Each of the parties has provided some comparable cases for my assistance. No case is ever truly comparable in a sentencing exercise. The prosecution relies on DPP v XA [2024] ACTSC 292 and DPP v Shang (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 484.

33. Ms Rowe has referred me to no less than 38 separate decisions. The authorities to which I have been referred demonstrate for offending of this type a wide range of sentencing approaches has been applied.

34. Of the decisions to which I was referred I did find some assistance from the approach of Berman AJ in DPP v John [2023] ACTSC 311. That was a case where the offender’s involvement was essentially to facilitate entry into the premises where the offending occurred. The offender was unaware that a gun would be present and was not personally involved in the violence inflicted upon the victim. There was some criminal history and some progress towards rehabilitation before sentencing. For the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm a sentence of 14 months imprisonment was imposed and the balance to be served fully suspended upon entering into a good behaviour order for the remainder of the term of the sentence.

35. With reference to the matter of DPP v XA relied upon by the prosecution there are some notable differences when compared with the present case. XA was responsible for some of the acts of violence against the victims. There was no aggravating feature in the form of a weapon. The charges included aggravated burglary by joint commission carrying a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment. Although the offender had no criminal history there was also no suggestion of childhood deprivation impacting on the sentencing exercise. For the relevant offending a sentence of one year and 10 months was imposed, wholly suspended on a two-year good behaviour order and 100 hours community service

36. It is a matter of some relevance in the sentencing exercise that s 33(1)(o) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act requires me to take into account the probable effect any sentence under consideration will have on the dependants of the offender: DPP v Fallon (No 3) [2026] ACTSC 261 at [42]-[43]. The children of Ms Rowe are still very young. Her mother is of sufficiently ill health that she requires care and assistance. During the period of Ms Rowe’s incarceration her children were taken into care. Clearly a full-time custodial term will have a devastating impact on Ms Rowe’s children. That factor not only of itself weighs heavily against full-time imprisonment but I am satisfied it provides additional motivation for Ms Rowe to comply with the terms of any good behaviour order imposed where it is in the context of a sentence of imprisonment that is otherwise suspended

Sentences

37. For the offence of joint commission assault occasioning actual bodily harm carrying a maximum penalty of five years I consider a total sentence of 15 months to be appropriate. To that sentence I have applied a discount of 20% for the plea of guilty, resulting in a sentence of 12 months. I have backdated the commencement date to allow for 87 days served such that the sentence will commence on 25 May 2026 and conclude on 24 May 2027. That sentence is suspended immediately upon the offender entering into a good behaviour order today 20 August 2026 for a period of two years until 19 August 2028.

38. Under s 13(2) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act, Ms Rowe is required to sign an undertaking to comply with the good behaviour obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentencing Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) including the core conditions set out in s 86 of that act and that she accept such supervision for the period deemed necessary by ACT Corrective Services. Orders

39. Itiesha Maree Rowe please stand: (1) Itiesha Maree Rowe for the offence of joint commission assault occasioning actual bodily harm contrary to s 24 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), by virtue of s 45A of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), (CC 2025/8036), I convict and sentence you to 12 months imprisonment commencing on 25 May 2026 and ending on 24 May 2027. That sentence is suspended immediately upon you entering into a good behaviour order for a term of two years until 19 August 2028. You are subject, as a part of that good behaviour order, to the core conditions and you are to accept such supervision for a period deemed necessary by ACT Corrective Services.

I certify that the preceding thirty-nine [39] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Justice Muller. Associate: MG Malouf Date: 20 August 2026