DPP v QT [2026] VSC 83

1 On 6 November 2025, QT consented to a summary hearing in this Court and pleaded guilty to four charges of contravening a condition of a supervision order, three charges of committing an indictable offence while on bail, and two charges of contravening a family violence intervention order ("FVIO").

2 After hearing a prosecution summary of the offending, a plea in mitigation, and submissions from counsel, I sentenced QT to an aggregate sentence of two months' imprisonment on the supervision order and bail offences, and convicted and discharged him on the FVIO offences. As QT had spent 63 days in custody as pre‑sentence detention on those matters, his prison sentence was complete, and he was free to go.

3 While I gave ex tempore reasons for sentence, I indicated that I would publish more extensive written reasons at a later date. These are those reasons.

4 I turn first to a summary of the offending, commencing with the FVIO offences.

5 For about a year until August 2024, QT was in a relationship with GH. Shortly after the relationship ended, GH was granted an FVIO which listed herself and her children as the protected persons, and QT as the respondent. The FVIO had various conditions, one of which prohibited QT from "contacting or communicating with a protected person by any means".

6 On 12 March 2025, GH reported to police that QT's mobile phone had called hers at 2:17 p.m. that day.

7 Two days later, on 14 March 2025, GH's daughter, AB, reported that QT's mobile had called hers at 12:22 a.m. that day, and that a 20-second voicemail had been left. However, in AB's words, "You could not clearly hear anyone saying anything, but you could hear background noise."

8 On the day of AB's report, QT was arrested and interviewed by police. He denied any knowledge of the calls, and explained that they must have been pocket dials.

9 He was charged with two offences of contravening the FVIO,[1] and was released on bail later that day.

10 Next, before turning to a summary of the other offences, I shall set out some details of QT's supervision order.

11 His conviction and prison sentence for manslaughter in 2013 made him an "eligible offender" for such an order,[2] which was made in this Court by Tinney J on 26 August 2021. However, the order did not commence operation until 22 May 2022, when QT completed his parole obligations pursuant to a sentence in Queensland. Given that it is four years in duration, the order is due to expire in May 2026.

12 Relevantly, the supervision order includes conditions that QT:

• must be at his residence between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.;

• must not obtain, possess or use syringes, except for the purpose of administering medication as prescribed by a medical practitioner;[3]

• must submit to breath testing, urinalysis or other test procedures for the detection of drug use where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use; and

• must not commit an offence referred to in Schedule 3 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic) ("the SOA").

Use of methylamphetamine and possession of syringes

13 Turning to the supervision order offences, on 18 March 2025, QT underwent drug testing as a result of a suspicion formed by a relevant person on reasonable grounds that he had used a prohibited drug. On 25 March 2025, the test returned a positive result for methylamphetamine. Similarly, upon eight further occasions of drug testing between 3 April and 2 September 2025, each test returned a positive result for methylamphetamine. It is unnecessary to detail the circumstances that led to the relevant suspicion being formed on each of those occasions, except to say that QT variously disclosed drug use or displayed physical symptoms consistent with use of methylamphetamine. Further, on 11 September 2025, syringes, a glass pipe and a vial of tablets were found at QT's premises.

14 These events gave rise to several charges against QT for contravening a condition of his supervision order.[4] At the plea hearing, some of those charges were rolled up into fewer charges.[5] Two of the rolled-up charges alleged a breach of a condition of the order by using methylamphetamine. The first such charge pleaded the relevant events as occurring between 15 March and 14 April 2025, and the other pleaded them as occurring between 27 May and 17 July 2025. There was also a third rolled-up charge of that kind, this one being based on QT's use of methylamphetamine and his possession of syringes between 31 August and 11 September 2025.

15 On 30 August 2025, QT failed to return to his residence until 11:10 p.m., over an hour after his 10:00 p.m. curfew. This gave rise to a fourth charge of contravening a condition of his supervision order, this time by breaching his curfew.

17 QT had been arrested, charged and bailed at the time of the later supervision order offences. This led to his being charged with several corresponding offences of committing an indictable offence while on bail.[6] At the plea hearing, some of those charges were rolled up into two charges.[7] The first such charge pleaded the relevant events as occurring between 27 May and 17 July 2025, and the second was pleaded as between 31 August and 11 September 2025. There was also a third charge alleging the bail offence, this one being based on his supervision order offence of breaching his curfew on 30 August 2025.

Arrest, charge, remand in custody, and pre-sentence detention

18 After his arrest on 11 September 2025, QT was charged and remanded in custody, where he remained until the plea hearing on 6 November 2025.

19 He had also spent the period from 18 to 25 July 2025 in custody on some of the earlier charges before he was bailed.

20 Those two periods of incarceration meant that, at the time of the plea hearing, QT had spent 63 days in custody referable to these charges.[8]

21 Because the supervision order was made by this Court, charges alleging the supervision order offences must be heard and determined in this Court.[9] However, an order for summary jurisdiction may be made so that those alleged indictable offences may be dealt with summarily.[10] The bail offences were related summary offences that also had to be transferred to this Court.[11]

22 Mr Hooper, who appeared for QT, made an application for summary jurisdiction, which was not opposed by Ms Taylor, who appeared for the Director. I granted the application, and Mr Hooper indicated that QT pleaded guilty to the nine charges.

23 I turn to the gravity of the offending, commencing with the FVIO offences.

24 The summary offence of contravening an FVIO carries a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment.[12]

25 An FVIO may be breached in many ways, including, at the more serious end of the spectrum, by acts of actual violence. The offences here, however, were at the other end of the spectrum, and involved only a very low level of gravity. Neither call was even answered by the protected person, and the voicemail message left on the second call was indecipherable.

26 The indictable offence of contravening a supervision order carries a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment.[13] However, if heard summarily, as here, the maximum sentence that may be imposed for a single offence is two years' imprisonment.[14]

27 While using methylamphetamine is not usually regarded as serious offending in and of itself, when that conduct is the basis for the indictable offence of breaching a condition of a supervision order, it is often treated a good deal more seriously. Here, it is also relevant that the three charges put on that particular basis were rolled‑up charges covering nine instances of using that drug in breach of the supervision order.

28 On the other hand, I accept that QT used methylamphetamine on these particular occasions, as he has done in the past, to deal with the pain he suffers, which I shall say more about shortly.

29 The fourth supervision order offence was relatively minor in the scheme of things, as it involved breaching the curfew condition on one occasion by QT's being late home only an hour and ten minutes after the 10:00 p.m. deadline.

30 The summary offence of committing an indictable offence on bail carries a maximum penalty of three months' imprisonment.[15]

31 As I noted earlier, two of the bail offences were rolled-up matters corresponding to two of the rolled-up supervision order offences. All three offences were committed fairly soon after being released on bail.

32 I turn to QT's personal circumstances, mostly as set out in a report by psychologist Gina Cidoni that I received in evidence without objection.[16]

33 QT was born in Ararat in 1976, and is now aged 49. He was raised across three family‑owned farming properties in the surrounding rural district. Following the death of his maternal grandfather, his parents assumed management of both the maternal and paternal estates. His parents separated in 2005. His mother lives in rural Victoria, and his father is deceased. He reported minimal contact with his mother and no contact with his father prior to his death.

34 QT is the middle of three siblings. He alleged that both he and his younger sister were sexually abused by their older brother during childhood. When he disclosed the abuse at around 12 years of age, his parents did not believe him, and they blamed him for "breaking up the family". He described this as a formative betrayal that shaped his views on trust and shame. He did not report the abuse to the authorities. He had no further contact with his brother and felt no grief when he died in a car accident years later.

35 QT remains close to his younger sister, who resides in Victoria. She has experienced periods of psychiatric instability. He has supported her emotionally and financially during times of crisis.

36 QT completed Year 10 at a secondary school in Ararat.

37 He told Ms Cidoni that he left home at 15 to join a military apprenticeship programme in electronics. He said he was transferred to Townsville at 16 and deployed overseas at 17. He remained in accommodation supplied by the Australian Defence Force ("ADF") until his discharge in the mid-1990s.

38 While Ms Cidoni understood that junior entry schemes did exist within the ADF in the early-1990s, including military apprenticeship pathways, formal deployment of personnel under the age of 18 was uncommon and would have required parental consent or special exemption. Ms Cidoni was unable to verify, by independent means, the historical accuracy of QT's reported deployment timeline. However, she regarded his account of early operational exposure as consistent, emotionally detailed, and clinically significant. His account of trauma has remained consistent across multiple assessments and appears to reflect genuine psychological impact from this exposure.

39 QT completed three overseas deployments during his time in the Army, all of which he described as deeply traumatic. His first deployment was to Somalia at 17, where he served for nine months as part of Australia's involvement in the United Nations' peacekeeping operation. He reported exposure to active combat zones, scenes of extreme violence, and mutilated bodies. He said that he was present during the events surrounding the "Black Hawk Down" incident in Mogadishu and described it as "the worst of it". He identified this period as the onset of his post‑traumatic symptoms, including sleep disturbance, emotional numbness, and intrusive memories.

40 Following his return to Darwin, he was deployed to Bougainville Island in Papua New Guinea for about three months. He described this operation as involving perimeter security, response to tribal conflict, and patrols in areas destabilised by mining disputes. He recalled witnessing graphic and confronting scenes during these operations, including decapitated and speared human remains, which he said became psychologically blunting over time.

41 His final deployment was to Cambodia in 1994, where he participated in the recovery of mass grave sites associated with the Khmer Rouge regime. He described locating caves filled with skeletal remains and reported that one site contained over 4,600 skulls, many of which belonged to children and infants. He said, "You can't get that out of your head."

42 He returned to Australia shortly after this deployment and remained in service for a further two‑and‑a‑half years. He was involuntarily discharged following a disciplinary incident in which he assaulted a commanding officer. He was detained for 28 days in military custody and formally discharged from Simpson Barracks in Watsonia.

43 He then returned to Victoria and briefly resided on the family farm in Ararat. His relationship with his parents remained strained, particularly with his mother, and he described feeling emotionally unsupported.

44 In 1996, following a psychological breakdown and a suicide attempt, he was arrested and imprisoned for a short period. Upon release, he lived in Ararat, Ballarat, and Melbourne's western suburbs.

45 He worked in agriculture and livestock handling, followed by roles in cabinet making, freight logistics, and interstate haulage. He held a multi-combination licence and reported that interstate driving became his primary occupation during periods of relative stability. The autonomy and structure of the role suited him, but he acknowledged reliance on methylamphetamine to manage fatigue.

46 He was also involved in building a removals business in Queensland in the early-2000s, and later had a government contract. However, he reported that he was not remunerated for his contributions, which preceded a fraud-related offence.

47 His employment was disrupted by custodial periods and physical health deterioration. His longest period of unemployment followed his return to Victoria from custody in Queensland in 2022, which he attributed to his spinal injury and restrictions associated with his supervision order. He currently receives the Disability Support Pension.

48 As for his major relationships, in 1998, QT met BK, whom he later married. They established a home in suburban Melbourne and had four children together: twin daughters (born in 1998), a son (born in 2000, who was later diagnosed with severe autism), and another daughter (born in 2003). The family resided in the same place for about a decade, which QT described as a period of relative domestic stability, as he and BK shared goals of home ownership and family security. However, the relationship eventually deteriorated. QT remained in the home for some time after the breakdown of the relationship, but later moved to regional Victoria.

49 Following the separation, QT was estranged from his children, who remained in the care of BK. He spent a period living transiently, including time in vehicles, motels, and short-term accommodation, while trying to re‑establish contact.

50 He eventually discovered that BK and the children were living in a caravan park in regional Victoria. He went to the park in a state of emotional distress. The incident escalated when he cut the power to the caravan and entered the premises while armed. This resulted in criminal charges and a custodial sentence. He later described the aftermath as devastating, and that, thereafter, his "life was shit familywise". His relationship with his extended family never recovered.

51 In the early-2000s, QT relocated to Queensland in an effort to start afresh. He lived in Brisbane and other regional centres. During this time, he re-partnered, though he described the relationship as brief, unstable, and marked by significant conflict.

52 While in Queensland, he was unexpectedly contacted by one of his daughters, who was still a child at the time. He described the call as confronting, saying that it reminded him of everything he had lost.

53 He was later arrested in Queensland on fraud charges and other historical matters, and was then extradited back to Victoria. He subsequently served a custodial sentence and lost all contact with his then-partner.

54 After a period in custody, he was released but was again arrested in 2011 and charged with murder. He later pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was sentenced in 2013 to ten years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years and three months.

55 Upon release from that sentence, he was transferred to Queensland to complete parole obligations linked to earlier offences. He remained in Queensland for a period under supervision before being formally returned to Victoria in May 2022 to commence the supervision order imposed in this Court in August 2021. Since then, he has resided in accommodation organised by the Post Sentence Authority in suburban Melbourne.

56 In mid-2023, QT commenced a relationship with GH, who lived in suburban Melbourne and had three daughters.[17] He disclosed his criminal history early in their relationship. GH and her children intermittently stayed at his accommodation. The relationship ended in mid-2024, following QT's hospitalisation for spinal surgery and a period of emotional and physical deterioration.

57 QT has not had any further intimate relationships since then. He currently resides alone in his supervision order accommodation.

58 QT sustained a spinal injury in a road transport accident in 2006 and was placed on life support for two days at the Royal Adelaide Hospital. He underwent spinal surgeries in 2007 and in August 2024 at St Vincent's Hospital. He has been diagnosed with spinal stenosis and continues to experience bilateral leg pain, numbness, and neurogenic bladder and bowel dysfunction.

59 He receives care through the Barbara Walker Centre for Pain Management and uses a four-wheeled walker. He is prescribed methadone (for both chronic pain and opioid maintenance), pregabalin, clonidine, and Norflex.

60 He reported that the combination of chronic pain and mobility limitations has affected his daily functioning, independence, and mental health.

61 QT began exhibiting signs of emotional dysregulation and behavioural volatility in adolescence, following the unacknowledged childhood sexual abuse by his older brother. He described feeling betrayed, and blamed, by his parents after disclosing the abuse at 12. He reported that he became increasingly angry, withdrawn, and mistrustful. During this period, he began using substances and acting out, which he described as an attempt to numb his emotional pain and assert control.

62 These early vulnerabilities were compounded by cumulative trauma he suffered during military service, which intensified his symptoms. He reported experiencing nightmares, hyperarousal, emotional numbness, and intrusive memories, and said that psychological support was not offered within the Army. He said attempts to seek help were dismissed, noting, "PTSD wasn't a thing back then."

63 Following discharge from the Army, his symptoms escalated further and culminated in a psychiatric breakdown in 1996, during which he formulated a suicide plan, wrote farewell letters, and travelled to his grandmother's property with a high-powered rifle. He was arrested following a six-hour siege and later sentenced to a short stint in prison.

64 QT spoke about his involvement in the manslaughter as something that still sits with him, although he "tries not to think about [it]". He said, "You don't just walk away from something like that," and acknowledged that it changed how he saw himself and how others saw him. People cut him off afterwards. He said, "Even my own family didn't want to know me." He described keeping it bottled up and said he's never really talked to anyone properly about it. He said, "I just push it down - same as everything else." When asked about the emotional impact, he said, "It's just one more thing I carry."

65 He has since experienced recurrent depressive symptoms, affective instability, and suicidal ideation, including overdoses in 2024 and 2025. He has had multiple psychiatric admissions and has engaged with various services, including Open Arms, Uniting, and the Department of Families, Fairness and Housing ("DFFH"). He has been prescribed paroxetine, methadone, and other psychotropic medications, with variable adherence over time. His treatment history has been disrupted by periods of incarceration, institutional mistrust, and fragmented care pathways.

66 He is currently linked with Open Arms, a veterans' mental health service funded by the Department of Veterans' Affairs ("DVA"). He has accessed psychological support through this service during more stable periods.

67 While he has not engaged in ongoing trauma-focused therapy, he has attended sessions intermittently and expressed a willingness to participate more consistently.

68 QT acknowledged that veteran-specific mental health services are now more accessible but reflected that earlier institutional recognition may have mitigated some of the long-term deterioration in his mental health.

69 Ms Cidoni noted that clinical documentation confirms a diagnosis of PTSD and features of borderline personality disorder.[18] Clinicians have noted his persistent psychological vulnerability due to past trauma and current psychosocial stressors. His trauma history includes both military exposure and childhood sexual abuse, contributing to complex PTSD symptomatology.

70 During a review in March 2025, he described his most recent overdose as impulsive, and he expressed remorse. While he denied current suicidal ideation, other assessments identified ongoing risk related to his emotional dysregulation and suicidality, with protective factors including insight and a willingness to seek help.

71 QT began using alcohol and cannabis in mid-adolescence, prior to leaving home at age 15. He reported that use of these substances was intermittent during his military service but escalated in the years following his discharge in the mid-1990s.

72 His methamphetamine use became significant in the early-2000s, particularly during his time as an interstate truck driver and following the breakdown of his relationship with BK. He reported using methylamphetamine to manage extended driving shifts, psychological distress, and fatigue. His peak usage reached up to half an ounce per week between about 2003 and 2007.

73 His use of benzodiazepines and opioids - both prescribed and illicit - emerged during this same period and continued throughout his adult life in the context of chronic pain, sleep disturbance, and emotional dysregulation. He reported episodes of stimulant-induced paranoia, dissociation, and sleep deprivation lasting multiple days during times of acute instability, particularly between 2007 and 2011.

74 At the time of her assessment (on 25 June 2025), Ms Cidoni understood that QT was abstinent from drugs for a period of 19 months from mid-2022 after returning to Victoria to commence his supervision order. Further, QT told Ms Cidoni that he was not currently using substances but had relapsed intermittently in response to psychosocial stress. At that time, as far as Ms Cidoni was aware, his most recent documented use occurred in April 2025. However, as we have seen, by his pleas of guilty, QT has since admitted that testing in May and June 2025 before that assessment, and again after that assessment in June, July, August and September of 2025, showed he was using methylamphetamine at least monthly on those occasions. Further, while his prior convictions may not be inconsistent with a period of abstinence between May 2022 and December 2023, as we have seen, he did appear in this Court for a breach of his supervision order in October 2022, for which he was fined. The record does not reveal what type of behaviour constituted the breach dealt with on that occasion, or when that behaviour occurred. In any event, whatever the period of abstinence QT achieved, it coincided with his being subject to the strictures of the supervision order, including three supervised urine screens per week. This period also coincided with stable accommodation and increased engagement with community services. QT described his relapse as occurring in the context of unresolved grief, physical deterioration, and emotional disconnection.

75 He described a pattern of stimulant use to regulate distress, manage fatigue and pain, and sustain function during high-stress periods, rather than for euphoric effect.

76 QT has not undertaken residential rehabilitation, but he has engaged with community-based services, including Uniting, DFFH, and Corrections Victoria.

77 He acknowledged that his risk of drug-taking remains elevated without support.

78 After taking the foregoing history, conducting a mental state examination and administering psychological testing, Ms Cidoni formed the following opinions.

79 Applying the DSM-5-TR, in her view, QT warrants clinical diagnoses of PTSD, major depressive disorder (recurrent, moderate), somatic symptom disorder (with predominant pain), and substance use disorder (methamphetamine).[19]

80 PTSD: In Ms Cidoni's opinion, QT presents with a complex and longstanding psychological profile marked by trauma-related distress, depressive symptoms, chronic physical pain, and intermittent substance use. His presentation is consistent with PTSD. He described experiencing recurrent and intrusive recollections, nightmares, physiological reactivity, and emotional numbing linked to both early childhood trauma and multiple traumatic exposures during military service. His early psychological symptoms were dismissed both within his family and later during military service. This lack of acknowledgement at both the family and institutional level contributed to delayed diagnosis, internalised distress, and long-term psychological deterioration.

81 Major depressive disorder: In addition to trauma-related symptoms, in Ms Cidoni's opinion, QT meets the criteria for recurrent major depressive disorder. He reported chronic low mood, social withdrawal, anhedonia, persistent fatigue, low self‑worth, and recurrent suicidal ideation. These symptoms have worsened during periods of family estrangement, health deterioration, and post-release instability. Although depressive features have been noted in previous records, his current presentation reflects a more entrenched and enduring pattern. His affect during the evaluation was restricted but congruent, and his engagement was emotionally labile at times, particularly when discussing loss, identity, and institutional experiences. He reported limited response to pharmacological treatment, consistent with a long‑term, treatment‑resistant depressive profile.

82 Somatic symptom disorder: In Ms Cidoni's opinion, QT also meets the diagnostic criteria for somatic symptom disorder, with chronic pain as the predominant feature. He sustained a spinal injury in a road transport accident in 2006 and has since undergone two spinal surgeries. He continues to report ongoing pain, physical limitation, bilateral leg symptoms, and neurogenic bladder and bowel dysfunction. While these impairments are medically documented, his level of psychological preoccupation and functional disruption exceeds what might be expected from the underlying pathology alone. He focuses intensively on his physical condition, expresses anxiety about bodily failure, and links his self-worth to his physical decline. This pattern has been consistently reported in medical correspondence and hospital notes.

83 Substance abuse: In Ms Cidoni's opinion, QT's history of substance use further complicates his clinical presentation. As we have seen, he began using cannabis and alcohol in adolescence and later progressed to regular methamphetamine use in adulthood, particularly during periods of psychological collapse or high work demands. He reported using stimulants to manage fatigue and pain, trauma-related symptoms, and emotional exhaustion, and has also used benzodiazepines and opioids both as prescribed and illicitly. While he has achieved extended periods of abstinence, he has also relapsed during times of acute emotional stress and functional breakdown. In Ms Cidoni's view, his substance use appears to be a maladaptive coping strategy rather than a primary disorder. At the time of evaluation, while Ms Cidoni understood that he was not actively using substances but remained under close supervision due to recent lapses and ongoing risk, as we have seen, the former was not accurate, but the latter was. The truth of the matter was that QT was using methylamphetamine on occasions in the weeks before he saw her, and he continued to use the same drug on occasions in the three months that followed until his arrest.

84 In Ms Cidoni's opinion, QT presented with a longstanding combination of psychological vulnerability and complex physical impairment, both of which render him acutely susceptible to deterioration in custody. Based on the clinical evaluation and corroborating history, it was her opinion that imprisonment would likely aggravate his mental ill-health. In her view, the custodial environment is inherently destabilising for individuals with this combination of trauma, pain, and psychiatric history. For QT, similar settings have previously triggered suicidality, impulsive behaviour, and rapid clinical deterioration.

85 Ms Cidoni concluded her report in this way:[20]

His capacity to cope with imprisonment is significantly compromised due to the interplay of chronic physical disability, psychiatric vulnerability, and custodial limitations. He requires ongoing assistance with mobility, pain management, and continence care. In custody, he uses a four-wheeled walker for ambulation and wears continence pads due to neurogenic bladder and bowel dysfunction, stemming from spinal stenosis and related neurological impairment. He described experiencing ongoing urinary and faecal incontinence, which [creates] distress, embarrassment, and hygiene-related challenges in a prison environment. These care needs are not easily accommodated in standard custodial settings and have resulted in discomfort, reduced dignity, and inadequate clinical support. In earlier episodes of imprisonment and community supervision, he has demonstrated marked psychological destabilisation in response to relational loss, institutional rigidity, and the cumulative stress of confinement. While he has shown the capacity to maintain abstinence and emotional stability when supported in the community, his history indicates a pattern of rapid decompensation under custodial pressure, with increased risk of suicidality, emotional withdrawal, and deterioration in both physical and mental health functioning. These vulnerabilities are compounded by the limited flexibility of correctional systems to adequately address complex, intersecting impairments.

In my opinion, his psychiatric and physical health are likely to deteriorate in custody, and the cumulative burden of trauma, functional disability, and emotional vulnerability amounts to substantial and compelling circumstances. These conditions are both exceptional and rare in the context of the custodial population.

86 I should add that, notwithstanding Ms Cidoni's reservations about the accuracy of some aspects of QT's history of military service when aged 15 to 17, I accepted the thrust of her opinions, which (as I understood things) were not challenged.

87 QT has a prior criminal history for a range of matters in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, some of which I have touched on earlier. In summary, and in chronological order, that history is as follows:

88 In late-1996, QT was placed on a community-based order in Victoria for theft of a motor vehicle, burglary, and possessing a firearm without a licence.

89 In 1999, again in Victoria, he was placed on a 12-month suspended sentence for thefts, and on a community-based order for multiple instances of obtaining property or a financial advantage by deception.

90 In 2004, he was fined in New South Wales for driving offences.

91 In 2007, he was sentenced in Victoria to nine days' imprisonment for making a threat to kill and breaching an intervention order.

92 Later in 2007, he was sentenced in Victoria to 14 months' imprisonment with a non‑parole period of five months for aggravated burglary and false imprisonment.

93 Later still in 2007, he was imprisoned for 14 days in Queensland for failing to appear on bail.

94 In 2008, he was fined in New South Wales for negligent driving.

95 Later in 2008, he was sentenced in Queensland to four-and-a-half years' imprisonment for offences of fraud.

96 In 2011, he was fined in Queensland for unauthorised dealing with shop goods.

97 As we have seen, in 2013, in Victoria, he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of seven years and three months for manslaughter.

98 Also in 2013, he was sentenced in Victoria to three months' imprisonment for theft of a motor vehicle.

99 In October 2022, he was fined in this Court for contravening a condition of his supervision order.

100 In December 2023, in this Court, on two charges of contravening a condition of his supervision order, he was released on an undertaking for 12 months with a condition to make a donation of $200 to the Salvation Army.

101 In November 2024, in Victoria, he was convicted and discharged for using and possessing methylamphetamine.

102 In February 2025, in this Court, on five charges of contravening a condition of his supervision order and three charges of using a drug of dependence, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 62 days' imprisonment (which he had already served), and, on a charge of contravening an FVIO, he was fined.

103 On 20 May 2025, in this Court, on two charges of contravening a condition of his supervision order and one of committing an indictable offence while on bail, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of 33 days' imprisonment (which, again, was time served).

104 The next day, in the Magistrates' Court, on charges of theft and committing an indictable offence while on bail, he was sentenced to an aggregate term of one day's imprisonment (which, again, was time served).

105 Next, I turn to the mitigating factors urged by Mr Hooper, commencing with QT's pleas of guilty.

106 Significantly, these pleas of guilty were entered at an early stage, and have avoided contested hearings (or contests and a jury trial). Thus, they have substantial utilitarian value.

107 Second, Mr Hooper submitted that QT's drug use, and therefore the commission of his supervision order and bail offences, is informed by a complex presentation of childhood and military trauma, mental illness, and pain management needs.

108 In this connection, he referred to R v McKee & Brooks, where Buchanan JA (with whom Vincent JA and Eames JA agreed) said this:[21]

[13] The extent to which a decision to experiment with drugs is freely made, in my view, bears upon the moral culpability of the offender who commits a crime as a consequence of addiction to drugs. Age is relevant to the question, as Spigelman CJ acknowledged [in R v Henry[22]].[23] I would add that in the case of adults, despair and low self-regard may also play a significant part in the decision to use drugs and that condition may be the result of social or economic disadvantage, poor education or emotional or physical abuse. An addiction to heroin may also bear upon the question of rehabilitation, where the prospects of success will often depend upon the likelihood of the addiction being successfully treated.[24] In my view, a sentencing judge may have regard to the circumstances which led to an addiction that caused the commission of the offence and to whether the addiction has continued or is being treated in deciding upon a sentence appropriately tailored to the personal circumstances of the offender.

109 In the same matter, after specifically expressing his agreement with the views of Buchanan JA concerning the proper approach to be adopted in relation to drug addiction as a sentencing consideration, Vincent JA added these comments:[25]

[21] In the course of presenting their respective submissions, counsel for the appellants placed considerable reliance on the fact that both of their clients had developed an addiction to drugs. Each did so at a relatively early age and each almost certainly became so enmeshed in consequence of the deprivation, abuse or disadvantage to which she had been subjected as a young person. I accept that such experiences and drug addiction itself are capable of producing serious corrosive effects that may continue to influence the conduct of the person concerned well into adulthood and from which, in some circumstances, they may never completely escape. That possibility is one which, in my opinion, must be seriously taken into account for a variety of sentencing purposes. These would include the assessment of the moral culpability of an offender with respect to the commission of a specific offence and therefore could assume relevance when considering the significance to be attributed to the notion of retribution for wrongdoing as a sentencing consideration. Of course, it does not follow that individuals who come before the court with the type of history to which I have referred do not make choices or that they cannot be held fully accountable for conduct in which they voluntarily engage or which may be the ultimate product of deliberate lifestyle choices made by them. However, and obviously, in the determination of an appropriate sentence in an individual case, regard must be had to the particular circumstances of the offender concerned. As Buchanan JA has pointed out, the background against which an offence was committed could also possess relevance when a sentencing judge came to consider the offender's prospects of rehabilitation. It may indicate the presence of a need to endeavour, through the sentencing process, to protect the public and affect the weight given to specific deterrence in the determination of an appropriate sentence.

110 I accepted that QT's use of drugs, and more particularly his recent use of methylamphetamine, is linked to his childhood and military traumas, the pain he suffers as a result of his spinal injuries and other afflictions, and the poor mental health he has suffered as a result of all of those things. In those circumstances, I considered that his moral culpability for using methylamphetamine, and thereby for committing the supervision order and bail offences, was reduced somewhat, which in turn reduced the weight to be accorded to general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment as sentencing purposes.

111 Third, I accepted Mr Hooper's submission that the drug-taking that gave rise to the supervision order offences was not accompanied by aggravating features, such as violence or other further criminality. This is significant, because one of the principal reasons supervision orders are imposed on those like QT in the first place, and also why those orders often contain conditions prohibiting illicit drug use, is the concern that such drug use will lead to violent offending.

112 Fourth, I accepted Mr Hooper's submission that totality has a particular additional relevance in sentencing in this case. This was because some of the supervision order breaches pre-date the prison sentence imposed in May 2025 for offending of the same type. In other words, I accepted that, in sentencing on the current matters, I must allow for the fact that, had the two sets of matters been dealt with at the same time, a degree of concurrency between the two sets of resulting sentences may well have been effected.

113 Fifth, I accepted Mr Hooper's submission, which was supported by Ms Cidoni's opinion, that QT's physical difficulties - including his chronic pain, his incontinence (both urinary and faecal), and his need for a walker - and his poor mental health mean that imprisonment would weigh more heavily on him than it would on a person in normal health.[26]

Deterioration of mental and physical health in custody

114 Sixth, I accepted Mr Hooper's submission - which, again, was supported by Ms Cidoni's opinion - that QT's psychiatric and physical health are likely to deteriorate in custody, which is also a factor tending to mitigate punishment.[27]

115 Seventh, and finally, I accepted that QT had reasonable prospects of rehabilitation.

116 His criminal history generally, and especially his previous, repeated and relatively recent breaches of his supervision order, together with his history of illicit drug use, suggested poorer prospects. However, set against those matters were his early pleas of guilty, his expressed desire to engage in drug treatment, and the hope that, in middle-age, he might be able to follow through with this desire.

117 Thus, while I did not consider that QT had good, very good or excellent prospects of rehabilitation, I accepted that those prospects are reasonable, and not poor or hopeless.

118 I turn now to the purposes of sentencing. Section 5(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) provides that the only purposes for which sentences may be imposed are general deterrence, specific deterrence, denunciation, protection of the community, just punishment, and rehabilitation.

119 While general deterrence, denunciation and just punishment were relevant sentencing purposes in this matter, I considered that the weight to be accorded to those purposes had to be tempered by the circumstances in which QT had come to use drugs in breach of his supervision order and, in consequence, in breach of his bail.

120 Given QT's prior convictions generally, as well as those for the same type of offending in particular, and recently so, I considered that specific deterrence was a sentencing purpose of some weight, albeit I suspect that purpose may be hard to achieve in QT's case. That said, his pleas of guilty, his desire to engage in drug treatment, and my hope that middle-age might give him a better prospect of actually engaging in such treatment, gave me some cause to place less weight than I otherwise might on specific deterrence.

121 Rehabilitation remained an important purpose in sentencing QT for the supervision order and bail offences, for at least two reasons. First, because I was satisfied that his prospects of rehabilitation were reasonable, rehabilitation was a sentencing purpose that had to be afforded significant weight. Second, it was necessary to recognise the interplay between rehabilitation and protection of the community. If QT were to be imprisoned for even longer, apart from offending the principle of parsimony, which I shall come to shortly, there would be a significant risk that such prospects of rehabilitation he has would be reduced or even extinguished. It was therefore in the community's interests that such prospects of rehabilitation that he had be maximised, and that he was not crushed by a sentence that kept him in prison for any longer than was necessary, only to be released with lesser prospects in the longer run.

122 While it seems that the FVIO offences were alarming enough for GH and her daughter to report them, they were, objectively, such low level offences that the usual sentencing purposes conducing to a heavier sentence could have only very limited work to do.

123 Next, as I mentioned a moment ago, I note that the sentences I selected were intended to conform with the principle of parsimony, as they must. This principle, which is reflected in s 5(3) of the Sentencing Act in a modified form, provides that a court must not impose a sentence that is more severe than that which is necessary to achieve the purpose or purposes for which the sentence is imposed.

124 I also had regard, in a general way, to current sentencing practices for the FVIO, supervision order and bail offences, in so far as I could determine them. These practices are but one factor in sentencing, and certainly not a controlling one at that, but they are nevertheless important in the sentencing synthesis. For the purposes of determining these practices, I did not look for - nor was I shown - any sentencing statistics or case comparisons. Rather, I just relied on my familiarity (such as it was) with current sentencing practices for these offences. I considered it sufficient and appropriate to take that course in this case, particularly given the submissions of counsel, to which I turn now.

125 Ms Taylor submitted that imprisonment was necessary, but she also made it plain that the Crown did not seek any further term of imprisonment beyond the period QT had already spent in custody.

126 Mr Hooper submitted that, given the complex interplay between QT's mental and medical health issues, combined with his childhood trauma and early pleas of guilty, he should be sentenced to a relatively short term of imprisonment.

127 Balancing all matters as best I could, I determined to sentence as follows.

128 I considered that neither of the FVIO offences warranted imprisonment, a community correction order, a fine, an undertaking, or any like order. Instead, on each of the FVIO offences, I considered it appropriate to order, and I did so order, that QT be convicted and discharged.[28]

129 On the supervision order and bail offences, however, I considered that imprisonment was necessary. In particular, I considered it appropriate to sentence QT on those offences, and I did so sentence him, to an aggregate sentence of two months' imprisonment.[29]

130 Pursuant to s 18 of the Sentencing Act, I declared that 63 days be reckoned as served under that sentence. Thus, QT served a little more time in custody (perhaps a couple of days more) than the two months' imprisonment I imposed.

131 Finally, pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act, I declared that, but for his pleas of guilty to the supervision order and bail offences, I would have sentenced QT to an aggregate sentence of three months' imprisonment on those offences.

[1] Contrary to s 123(2) of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).

[2] See the definitions of "eligible offender" and "serious violence offence" in the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic), ss 3 and 8, and item 2 of Schedule 2.

[3] This particular prohibition resulted from a direction made by the Post Sentence Authority on 5 June 2024, as opposed to being an express condition of the original supervision order.

[4] Contrary to s 169 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic).

[6] Contrary to s 30B of the Bail Act 1977 (Vic).

[7] Again, leaving others to be withdrawn.

[8] See s 18 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic).

[9] See s 173(2) of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic).

[10] See s 174 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic).

[11] See s 175 of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic). On reflection, I am not sure that the FVIO offences were properly regarded as related summary offences, but they were dealt with as if they were.

[12] See s 123(2) of the Family Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic).

[13] See s 169(1) of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic).

[14] See s 174(4) of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic); and s 113(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). The maximum cumulative sentence for all offences when heard summarily is five years' imprisonment (see s 113B of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic); and s 174(4) of the Serious Offenders Act 2018 (Vic)).

[15] See s 30B of the Bail Act 1997 (Vic). I note also that, by operation of s 16(1A)(e) of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), the general rule as to concurrency in s 16(1) does not apply to a term of imprisonment imposed on any person for an offence committed while on bail in relation to another offence.

[16] The report of Ms Cidoni is dated 1 August 2025.

[17] GH and one of her daughters are the complainants in the FVIO offences the subject of these reasons. See above.

[18] Ms Cidoni noted that these diagnoses were supported by the Justice Health Records, a St Vincent's Hospital Emergency Department mental health review, and a letter from Dr Elizabeth Morris.

[19] As for the substance use disorder (methamphetamine), Ms Cidoni described that as in sustained partial remission, but that would seem to be qualified by the fact that, unknown to her, he was using in the days before, and continued to use on occasions for three months after, her assessment of him. See further below.

[20] Report of Ms Cidoni (1 August 2025), p 10.

[21] R v McKee & Brooks [2003] VSCA 16; (2003) 138 A Crim R 88 at 92-93[13].

[23] See also Douglas v R (1995) 56 FCR 465 at 470 (per von Boussa, Higgins and Nicholson JJ).

[24] See, for example, R v Ma [1999] NSWCCA 257; (1999) 107 A Crim R 252 at 255; R v Jarman [2001] NSWCCA 178; R v Horne [1999] NSWCCA 391 at [13] (per Greg James J).

[25] R v McKee & Brooks [2003] VSCA 16; (2003) 138 A Crim R 88 at 94[21].

[26] See R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269 at 276[32](5) (per Maxell P, Buchanan and Vincent JJ).

[27] See R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269 at 276[32](6).

[28] Pursuant to s 73 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic).

[29] Pursuant to s 9 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic).