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1. Mr Puia is to be sentenced for the offences of: (a) Burglary, with intent to cause harm, contrary to s 311 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT); and (b) Sexual assault in the second degree, contrary to s 52 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT).

2. He asks me to take into account for sentencing purposes the additional offence of: (a) Act of indecency without consent, contrary to s 60 of the Crimes Act.

3. On 16 November 2025, the victim, who I shall refer to as Ms N, travelled to Canberra with a plan to stay overnight and collect one of her sons, returning home at the end of the university term. She had arranged accommodation at the Avenue Hotel, located on Northbourne Avenue. After checking in, she proceeded to drive down to the car park located on the lower level of the building and she used a swipe key provided to her at reception to gain access to the parking level. At the ramp leading to the lower level she observed Mr Puia, a person not known to her. He directed her down the car park ramp. Ms N proceeded to the lower car park level unaware Mr Puia had followed her. After parking her car, she opened the driver’s side door with a view to exiting the vehicle and observed Mr Puia standing before her. She was shocked by his presence and she sat back down in the vehicle. Thereafter a discussion ensued, the substance of which was Mr Puia asking Ms N for money or food. She declined his request and he initially moved away before returning and asking for a hug. When his further request was declined, Mr Puia proceeded to grasp Ms N around her lower waist with her back pressed against her vehicle. She attempted to free herself with some success, dropping items from her handbag in the process, and Mr Puia retreated for a period to the rear of the vehicle.

4. However, he returned shortly thereafter, at which point, the assault escalated. Ms N was pushed to the ground and Mr Puia positioned himself on top of her. She attempted to free herself, pushing Mr Puia and stabbing at his side with her car keys. Over her resistance he then attempted to remove her clothing, pulling at her jeans. In the face of her continued resistance, Mr Puia took hold of his victim’s head and pushed it into the ground on three occasions. Mr Puia climbed off her and continued his efforts to remove her jeans, exposing her buttocks in the process. She maintained her fight using her hands to resist Mr Puia’s efforts to remove her clothing. The force applied by Mr Puia in the attempts to remove her clothing was sufficient at one point to result in Ms N being dragged across the car park floor. Mr Puia then positioned himself on the chest of Ms N with his legs either side of her neck. Ms N continued to attempt to strike him with her keys as he attempted to remove his own pants. Then, without explanation, Mr P stood, adjusted his own clothing and left the scene. Ms N recovered sufficiently to stand and make her way to the reception area of the hotel, calling 000 on the way.

5. The CCTV footage of the incident is in evidence before me. One of its compelling features is the courageous attempts of Ms N to resist and fight off her attacker where opportunity presented to do so. Mr Puia has been in custody in relation to the subject offending since 16 November 2025. As at the date of sentence hand down, he has served 305 days in custody, inclusive, for this offending.

The nature and circumstances of the offence

6. The circumstances of the offence drawn from the agreed statement of facts and a viewing of the CCTV footage are set out in summary form above.

7. The objective seriousness of the offence is not disputed. Aspects of the offending which I consider particularly significant in assessing its objective seriousness are: (a) Ms N was subject to numerous assaults over a period of some minutes. (b) The assault comprised a real escalation of violence as Ms N resisted. (c) The force used was significant and included insult to vulnerable parts of the body including the head and face. (d) There was some premeditation or planning involved given the means of entry by Mr Puia to the car park area. (e) The vulnerability of Ms N was significant, positioned as she was in a deserted basement car park area in the early evening. (f) There can be absolutely no doubt as to Ms N’s lack of consent to the conduct. (g) As for the offence of burglary, I note the offending occurred in a commercial property rather than a residential one and there is no evidence of property damage. Having said that, the offending occurred at a time when it could reasonably be expected there were people present at the property.

8. I note that in cases of sexual offending, the objective seriousness is impacted by matters such as the degree of violence used, the circumstances of humiliation, the injury impact and the duration of the assault. In this case not only was the force used substantial but there was evident escalation undoubtedly engendering increased fear in the victim.

9. The offences in this instance occurred in the course of a single episode and they are properly to be viewed as part of a course of conduct with a consequent allowance for concurrency. I remain mindful of the need to structure the sentence so as to not provide a discount for multiple offending. Other offences to be taken into account

10. I have taken the additional offending into account and I adopt the statements of principle made by the Court of Appeal in R v Campbell [2010] ACTCA 20 at [46]–[50], noting in particular: (a) the offender is not to be sentenced on any additional offences; (b) although the additional offences, once taken into account, may have the effect of altering or increasing the sentence that would otherwise be imposed on the principal charges, whatever sentence is imposed cannot exceed the maximum penalty for that offence; (c) I am not obliged, nor is it necessary for me to indicate precisely what effect is given to taking into account additional offending on sentence; (d) any consideration occurs in the same way that one would take other matters into account for the sentencing exercise; (e) relevant sentencing principles apply and may constrain the consideration of additional offending – particularly as to totality; and (f) in taking the additional offending into account greater weight is given to the need for personal deterrence as well as the community’s entitlement to exact retribution in the circumstance where there is no punishment imposed for particular offences: R v Barton [2001] NSWCCA 63; 121 A Crim R 185.

The impact of the offending on the victim

11. I have the benefit of a victim impact statement from Ms N and from her husband. Ms N expresses in a very articulate way her experience of shock, fear and hopelessness as a consequence of this attack occurring in circumstances where she had no defender and felt increasingly unable to resist her attacker. She speaks of her fear the increasing violence represented a shift in the nature of the attack from one with an intention of rape to an intention of murder. At the time of the attack, Ms N had recently undergone shoulder surgery and remained in her recovery period. There is a body of medical evidence before me demonstrating a range of significant soft tissue injuries as a consequence of the attack. Importantly in terms of her shoulder condition, her treating orthopaedic surgeon opines the attack resulted in an extension of her recovery period in the order of three – four months. She also suffered injury to her right index finger with an anticipated recovery period of approximately 12 months. The psychological impact of an incident such as this is self-evident and it is reasonable to anticipate psychological sequelae of the kind described in Ms N’s victim impact statement will remain with her for the foreseeable future. Ms N speaks also of the ongoing impact on her wider family.

The circumstances of the offender

12. I have the benefit of a pre-sentence report (PSR) dated 1 September 2026 and the expert opinion of Ms Kocak, psychologist, dated 7 September 2026.

13. Mr Puia says he was born in Burma, but his father identifies his place of birth as India. He came to Australia from Burma with his family in 2008 and they entered the country as refugees. Mr Puia was then aged approximately 13 years. Mr Puia says there were no issues of significance in his childhood in Burma although the country became unsafe for his family when war commenced. In some contrast to that description, the records examined by Ms Kocak make repeated references to childhood and refugee related trauma. Mr Puia is one of seven siblings who live in Canberra and surrounding regions. He attests to regular contact with his family when in the community. He is single and without children.

14. Records of family interactions over the previous 10 years suggest an increasingly itinerant and homeless lifestyle and escalating difficulties for the family in managing Mr Puia’s symptomatic presentation.

15. Prior to being taken into custody, Mr Puia was living with his father in Queanbeyan and he has the option of returning there upon his eventual release. On the topic of social functioning Ms Kocak observes at [20]: Accordingly, his adult social trajectory has been characterised by a recurrent dependence upon family members for accommodation and practical support, interrupted by homelessness, itinerancy, incarceration and disengagement from services.

16. Available records confirm periods of homelessness including a period of sleeping rough in the months following his release from the AMC in August 2025 and prior to the current offending in November of that year.

17. In relation to schooling, he obtained his year 10 certificate and left school during the following year. There is a limited employment history and Mr Puia has been a recipient of the disability support pension for a period of approximately 10 years, presumably in the context of his mental health difficulties. There is no evidence of any debt or gambling issues.

18. Mr Puia has a small group of supportive friends with whom he has occasional contact.

19. Mr Puia gives the authors of the PSR a history of occasional alcohol use with no suggestion of that use being at a problematic level. The available records suggest otherwise. There is also a history of illicit drug use including methamphetamine. Problematic substance use with synthetic cannabis is also recorded.

20. Ms Kocak summarises his substance use history as follows at [28]: The records support a consistent relationship between substance misuse and psychiatric destabilisation, although they do not support reducing his psychotic disorder to substance-induced psychosis alone. Over time, psychotic symptoms have persisted during periods of abstinence and controlled incarceration, leading clinicians to diagnose a primary schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. Substance use is better understood as a major exacerbating and risk-amplifying factor superimposed upon that primary illness.

21. Mental health treatment has been ongoing for approximately 10 years. Ms Kocak records in great detail Mr Puia’s extensive interactions with mental health services commencing in or about 2015, including numerous examples of involuntary and high dependency admissions in the context of Mr Puia’s schizophrenia. In relation to the period after his last admission and prior to the subject offending, Ms Kocak records at [55]-[56]: [55] Mr Puia had been released from custody in August 2025. He intermittently stayed with his father in Queanbeyan but was otherwise reportedly homeless in Canberra. He had failed to successfully re-engage with community mental health services. His established medications were zuclopenthixol 600 mg fortnightly and olanzapine 20 mg nocte, but the treating team considered that he had been substantially non-adherent, with the last confirmed depot dose more than two months previously and Mr Puia reporting that he was not taking medication. His previous clozapine trial was also documented as having been discontinued because of non-adherence. [56] The October presentation was clinically assessed as a relapse of schizophrenia. His presentation included poor self-care, guardedness, inappropriate and incongruent laughter, thought blocking and thought disorder, apparent paranoia, auditory hallucinations, impaired insight and judgement and behavioural disinhibition. His auditory hallucinations were described as at times commanding him to harm himself or others. Of particular relevance to the later sexual offending, a female clinician was unable to continue part of the assessment because Mr Puia repeatedly attempted to touch her despite being directed to stop.

22. Delusional content was evident in the interview undertaken for the purposes of the pre-sentence report. Canberra Hospital records disclose diagnoses of schizophrenia, polysubstance use and borderline personality traits.

23. Ms Kocak concludes at [58]-[59]: [58] Across the records, Mr Puia's schizophrenia has followed a chronic and relapsing course, with episodes involving combinations of persecutory, religious and grandiose delusions; auditory and visual hallucinations; thought disorder; inappropriate or incongruent affect; impaired judgement and insight; behavioural disorganisation; aggression and, at times, sexual or interpersonal disinhibition. [59] A strikingly consistent feature of his history is poor insight and inconsistent treatment adherence. He has repeatedly ceased oral medication, become overdue for depot medication, declined injections, absconded from inpatient or rehabilitation settings and disengaged from community mental health services. This has resulted in repeated use of compulsory treatment mechanisms, including Emergency Detention provisions, ED3/ED11 processes, s 309 court-related assessments, ACT Psychiatric Treatment Orders and NSW Community Treatment Orders, together with involuntary treatment in Victoria.

24. Mr Puia sees his drug use as having contributed to the subject offending. However, he does not accept he requires treatment for substance use. The authors of the PSR note a pattern of increasing frequency of sexual offending and sporadic engagement with mental health services in the community. As a consequence, they consider him to pose a significant risk to the community if he does not address illicit substance use or submit to continuing mental health treatment.

25. In addressing the issue of causation of the subject offending Ms Kocak concludes at [116]: The most prominent formulation is that active or recently active psychosis, medication non-adherence and substance use interacted to produce poorer appraisal of interpersonal cues; reduced capacity for rational decision-making; increased behavioural disinhibition; reduced impulse control; diminished sensitivity to social and sexual boundaries; and impaired capacity to stop or redirect behaviour once activated. The causal link is strengthened by the fact that these same features were clinically documented only weeks before the offence, during an established psychotic relapse. Bugmy and Verdins principles

26. There is little doubt Mr Puia has suffered childhood trauma and disadvantage. Although there is little detail as to the substance of that trauma, the family’s refugee status is sufficient to demonstrate a significant degree of childhood deprivation impacting Mr Puia’s upbringing. As the High Court made clear in Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571, the ongoing effects of profound childhood deprivation must be given full weight in every sentencing decision. But that is not to say its impact will be the same upon every sentencing consideration and in every case. The need for individualised justice imposes upon the court an obligation to consider the ways in which childhood deprivation impinge upon the sentencing exercise in a particular case.

27. Here, the primary issue in assessing Mr Puia’s circumstances and culpability is his diagnosed schizophrenia and its interaction with his illicit drug use. That is not to ignore his childhood deprivation, but to recognise the connection between it and his offending conduct is less apparent than other factors.

28. Whilst conceding that Verdins principles are enlivened in this case in the context of Mr Puia’s mental health diagnosis, the prosecution submits this is a case where the considerations pull in both directions. The significant and related criminal antecedents of Mr Puia must be weighed against the inclination to reduce the impact of specific deterrence. The risk of the adverse impacts of a custodial sentence upon his mental health must be weighed against his poor compliance with treatment initiatives and his inclination to illicit substance use whilst in the community. Mr Puia submits his established mental illness warrants a reduction in his moral culpability and leads to him being a poor vehicle for general deterrence. He submits a custodial sentence will be more onerous for him.

29. It seems to me this is a case where the observations of Gleeson CJ in R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 at 68 are apposite: A moment's consideration will show that the interplay of the considerations relevant to sentencing may be complex and on occasion even intricate. In a given case, facts which point in one direction in relation to one of the considerations to be taken into account may point in a different direction in relation to some other consideration. For example, in the case of a particular offender, an aspect of the case which might mean that deterrence of others is of lesser importance, might, at the same time, mean that the protection of society is of greater importance. That was the particular problem being examined by the court in the case of Veen (No 2) [(1998) 164 CLR 465]. Again, in a particular case, a feature which lessens what might otherwise be the importance of general deterrence, might, at the same time increase the importance of deterrence of the offender. Criminal antecedents

30. Mr Puia has an extensive history of prior offending in the Territory, Victoria and New South Wales, including: (a) Acts of indecency without consent. (b) Sexual assault. (c) Taking a motor vehicle without consent. (d) Driving while licence is cancelled. (e) Assaults occasioning actual bodily harm. (f) Common assaults. (g) Possessing prohibited substances. (h) Unlawfully trespassing. (i) Breaching good behaviour orders. (j) Possessing offensive weapons.

31. It is a matter of some relevance Mr Puia was last released from custody prior to the subject offending on 29 August 2025, less than three months prior to committing these offences.

Significance of the plea of guilty

32. The application of a discount in some degree for the plea of guilty is not in contention. The parties differ as to the level of discount.

33. The Director argues her case should be viewed as overwhelmingly strong enlivening s 35(4) of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT). She therefore contends the reduction for the plea of guilty should not be significant.

34. Mr Puia disagrees with that characterisation of the prosecution case. There was no DNA evidence. Mr Puia was unknown to his victim and although the offending was captured on CCTV footage of reasonable clarity, the case was ultimately reliant upon identification evidence. Additionally, Mr Puia’s mental health issues warranted close examination as to the prospect of a mental impairment defence.

35. Section 35(4) is in the following terms: 35 Reduction of sentence—guilty plea … (4) However, in deciding any lesser penalty, the court must not make any significant reduction for the fact that the offender pleaded guilty if, based on established facts, the court considers that the prosecution’s case for the offence was overwhelmingly strong. …

36. Established facts are defined in sub-s 7 as facts established by: (a) evidence given at the trial; or (b) available documents; or (c) admissions by the offender; or (d) submissions made by the prosecution or defence.

37. The prosecution submits s 35(4) should be interpreted with reference to documents in the prosecution case without regard to documents that may be relied upon by the offender at trial. I do not accept the section is intended to operate in that way. The definition of established facts for the purposes of the section extends to those established by available documents or submissions made by one party or the other. Just how submissions, without more, could provide a basis for the establishment of facts is puzzling. It may be a reference to submissions in the nature of the concession by one party or the other about a factual matter that avoids the need for the court to make a determination on a particular point and thus establishes the relevant fact. The assessment of the strength of the prosecution case on the basis of established facts must be one that is referrable to those facts established at the time the plea was entered. An offender should not be penalised for an early guilty plea made at a time prior to the prosecution case entering the category of overwhelming strength. In this case the plea was entered at a time when the report of Ms Kocak was not available. But it was made at a time when Mr Puia knew he was previously assessed as unfit to plead by virtue of mental impairment in the context of proceedings in Victoria. I am therefore not satisfied the prosecution case should be assessed as overwhelmingly strong at that time.

38. I note the concession by the prosecution, where s 35(4) is not enlivened, a discount for the plea of guilty of 25% is appropriate. I propose to apply that discount. Whether imprisonment is likely to cause particular hardship to the offender

39. I accept as, Ms Kocak suggests, imprisonment is likely to have a mixed impact on Mr Puia’s mental health. There is a likely positive and stabilising effect from incarceration, at least in the short term. That is because the supervision Mr Puia will receive in custody should ensure stability in terms of administration of medication and avoids the challenges generated by homelessness. It also at least to some degree reduces his access to illicit substances. He ceases to have the freedom to disengage with treatment, although the treatment options available to him in custody are necessarily more limited. There are however difficulties that incarceration creates that are particular to his mental health state. The stability imposed by incarceration is not reflective of life in the community and although improvement may occur as a consequence of regular medication and denial of access to illicit substances, those changes do not necessarily reflect remission of the underlying illness or improved capacity to manage the illness in the outside world.

40. Relevantly Ms Kocak observes: [126]…The longer he remains institutionalised, the greater the importance of ensuring that treatment is not limited to symptom containment, but also addresses insight, relapse prevention, substance misuse, offence-related behaviour, independent living skills and transition planning. Current sentencing practice

41. The parties were unable to identify other decisions of this court they considered likely to be of assistance to me as comparators. The prosecution referred me to a single case of DPP v Rekni [2026] ACTSC 295, identified as having a somewhat similar factual matrix, resulting in a sentence of four years imprisonment. The critical differences between the circumstances in Rekni when compared with the present case are: Puia Rekni

One victim. Two victims across two episodes.

nd Victim was not intoxicated. 2 Victim was highly intoxicated.

nd Degree of pre-meditation in entering a Offender engineered taking the 2 victim private car park. to and entering her home.

nd Assault occurred within a car park. Offender assaulted the 2 victim in her own home.

42. Mr Puia’s case presents as one in which its unique circumstances are such that little assistance is likely to be gained from a comparison with other sentencing decisions.

Sentence

43. The central difficulty in sentencing Mr Puia is managing the tension between the evident need for specific deterrence and community protection on the one hand and the goal of positive management of Mr Puia’s mental health with a view to fostering a safe and durable return to the community on the other. Mr Puia will not be in custody forever for the subject offending. A sentence that ultimately delivers an effective transition to life in the community meets the need for community protection and the rehabilitative goal of an improved mental health outcome for Mr Puia. That is not to diminish the evident importance of specific deterrence in this case.

44. Whilst accepting the impact of Mr Puia’s mental health difficulties on his moral culpability for the offending, I do not accept they are such as to render him an entirely unsuitable vehicle for general deterrence. Those impairments have not prevented him from functioning in the community, living independently and at times holding down some employment, albeit less so when he is using illicit substances and there is non-compliance with his medication regime. I do not consider his mental health impairment renders him an entirely inappropriate vehicle for making an example to others, accepting they result in some moderation of the impact of general deterrence. In reaching that view I am mindful of the community’s express abhorrence for violent crime of a sexual nature. Mr Puia accepts as the prosecution submits no sentence other than the imposition of full-time custody is appropriate. For the offence of sexual assault in the second degree, carrying a maximum penalty of 14 years imprisonment, I begin with a sentence of six years. I apply a 25% discount for the plea of guilty resulting in a head sentence of four years and six months. For the offence of burglary, with intent to cause harm, carrying a maximum penalty of 14 years, I begin with a sentence of two years and four months, reduced to 1 year and nine months after applying a 25% discount for the plea of guilty. I have allowed a significant degree of concurrency noting the offending was in the context of a single course of conduct. The total head sentence will be for a term of five years.

45. Reflecting on the difficult balancing exercise I have identified above, I consider this to be an appropriate matter in which to provide for a lengthy period of supervision in the community. I believe that offers the most likely path for Mr Puia to reach a point where he no longer presents as a threat to women. In coming to that view, I am mindful of the words of his victim when she said, “My hope is that no other person experiences such a predator, and that the public are assured of safety and support within the community”.

Orders

46. Mr Puia, please stand: (1) Lai Ro Puia, I convict you in relation to sexual assault in the second degree, contrary to s 52 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (CC 12601/2025) and sentence you to a total effective term of imprisonment of four years and six months commencing on 15 November 2025 and ending on 14 May 2030. (2) Lai Ro Puia, I convict you in relation to the offence of burglary, with intent to cause harm, contrary to s 311 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (CC 3492/2026) and sentence you to a total effective term of imprisonment of one year and nine months commencing on 15 February 2029 and ending on 14 November 2030. (3) I have taken into account the offence of act of indecency without consent (CC 3493/2026), contrary to s 90 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). (4) The overall head sentence will be for a period of five years. (5) The non-parole period will be for two years and nine months ending on 14 August 2028. (6) The transfer charge (CC 12600/2025) of common assault contrary to s 26(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) is dismissed. I certify that the preceding forty-six [46] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Muller. Associate: Date: