DPP v Nardo [2025] VCC 1857

1. An offence of intentionally damage property by fire caused by arson carries a maximum penalty of 15 years' imprisonment.
2. The maximum penalty reflects the risk of an uncontained fire to health and safety of people living and working in the vicinity of the fire as well as to those first responders who respond to the emergency.
3. The evidence from the expert at the trial confirmed the use of an accelerant, petrol.
4. Whilst it was submitted there was limited planning, the CCTV footage showed you carrying the box to the site with, what must have been accepted by the jury as accelerant, which connotes a level of premeditation and planning.
5. The value of the property destroyed is also a factor in the assessment of the seriousness of the case, and in this case the value of the settlement of the insurance claim was $147,753.65. Those matters outline the objective gravity of your offending.

1. You are 47 years old. You have no prior convictions.
2. You are married and have two children.
3. You have worked as a scaffolder for 22 years and have a consistent employment history.

1. You stood your trial, which was your right, but it means you do not receive a discount for pleading guilty.
2. There are no submissions or evidence tendered about your mental health.
3. It was submitted you have no prior convictions, however you had been dealt with subsequently to this offending for a low level offence and received a diversion.
4. Your counsel submitted your age, lack of prior criminal history, and family support indicate your risk of re-offending is low and your rehabilitative prospects are strong.
5. You have a stable work history. There is a link between your offending and employment. Your offending destroyed two partially built townhouses on a building site of 13 townhouses on the same day you were contracted by the owner of the site to provide scaffolding. Your employment gave you knowledge and access to the site.
6. You have provided 10 character references. The references tendered indicate you are a beloved family member by your wife, children, brother-in-law and parents in law. Your employer of two years, Lee Piper from LB Scaffolding, where you work as Operations Manager described you as an integral part of daily operations and contributing significantly to the development and success of the business. You are a reliable employee and colleague. Another industry colleague, who works for the sister company JC Scaffolding, Jason Charlton also describes you as approaching your responsibilities with diligence and care.
7. Alicia Keighran who has known you for 10 years described you as a kind-hearted, respectful and responsible friend, and described your conviction as completely out of character. One of your friends, Rick Didone a fire fighter with CFA Wollert & District Fire Brigade stated he has known you for two decades and also described your offending as completely out of character.
8. Your accountant of 10 years, Sebastian Caruso also described your offending as entirely out of character, noting you are a hardworking and community driven man.
9. Your long-standing friend of more than 40 years, Vincent De Luca, described you as a loyal, generous, genuine and caring friend.

1. Your counsel initially filed AI generated submissions.
2. Further submissions were filed dated 3 December 2025.
3. There was no explanation for the offending.
4. The submissions note there is no evidence of a personal vendetta, financial gain or insurance fraud involved in the offending. There is no motive, no one was injured, the fires were quickly contained and there was no prolonged or sophisticated planning. It was submitted this was not part of a wider criminal enterprise and was not the most serious category of arson. The sentencing survey referred to in the case of Salmi[1] indicate sentences vary widely and depend on factors such as, financial motive, injury or risk of injury to persons, the extent of damage and the offenders prior history and personal circumstances.
5. It was submitted you have a consistent work history, strong family support, and references noting your 'honesty, reliability and contribution to [your] community and workplace' which are significant mitigating factors. Counsel submitted your prospects for rehabilitation are 'very good'.
6. Whilst you are not entitled to the utilitarian discount for a plea of guilty this is a neutral factor.
7. The principle of totality applies to the two offences so that the total effective sentence should be proportionate to the offending.
8. The submissions note that you are the primary source of income and stability for your family. Your wife has psychological challenges and you are her principal emotional and practical support. Her mental health will be exacerbated by your incarceration and your children who are still living at home rely on you for support.
9. Counsel submitted that a community correction order alone could serve all sentencing objectives and your counsel described your presence as critical to the welfare of your household.
10. Alternatively, it was submitted a combination sentence with a short term of imprisonment was appropriate.
11. The prosecutor Mr Stefanovic submitted that the sentencing purposes applicable in this case are specific deterrence, punishment, denunciation and protection of the community. He submitted a term of imprisonment was warranted with a non‑parole period imposed. He submitted there was no discount for a plea of guilty applicable and there was a lack of remorse.
12. He challenged the defence submission that your offending is at the 'lower end', describing it as a 'substantial example' with a degree of pre planning where an accelerant has been used as confirmed by the expert evidence of Michelle Morrison at the trial.
13. He submitted a combination sentence was out of range though noted the two offences could be regarded as the one incident and substantial concurrency could apply.
14. Due to the presence of the accelerant he distinguished the facts here to those in Salmi where the Court of Appeal accepted the arson was unplanned and was an 'add on' to the home invasion charge. Counsel submitted that although no one was injured in this case, the risk was always there given the location of residences where people were living to the front and the back of the townhouses damaged by fire. The construction site comprised flammable materials, as well as damaging the two townhouses, the townhouse between the two fire damaged townhouses was water damaged. Counsel submitted there was a real risk to other persons safety, which fortunately did not eventuate.
15. He referred to the Sentencing Advisory Council noting the medium term for imprisonment for arson between 2018/19 to 2022/23 was between 1.5 to two years.
16. He submitted the defence submission that your rehabilitation prospects were 'good', he countered this saying they were 'guarded', given there was no explanation as to why the offending had occurred.
17. No written submissions were filed by prosecution.

1. I take into account the factors in s5(2) of the Sentencing Act 1991.
2. The seriousness of the offences is reflected by the maximum penalty for each offence being 15 years' imprisonment.
3. I am required to have regard to current sentencing practices, which is one factor in the sentencing synthesis but I note the High Court in Kilic v The Queen said the examination of comparable cases may provide a relevant yardstick by which Victorian courts can attempt to achieve consistency in sentencing and may assist the court in determining where the case at issue stands 'on the spectrum of seriousness'.[2]
4. I have been referred by defence counsel to the case of Salmi.[3]
5. In Salmi the sentence of five years for arson was found by the Court of Appeal to be manifestly excessive and was reduced to three years and six months. The Court noted that the arson charge was completely unplanned and was an 'add-on' to the home invasion. The court noted there was no fraud or intent to benefit financially, no one was in the premises and there was no risk or injury to any person.
6. Defence referenced the cases referred to in Salmi and I summarise them as follows:
7. In Beevers v The Queen[4] the offending involved the destruction of an historic homestead purchased for over $1m. The case involved significant prior planning, insurance fraud and deception of police investigators. The offender pleaded not guilty and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of imprisonment for arson and attempting to obtain property by deception for four years and four months, which was confirmed on appeal. The Court of Appeal stated: 'sentences of imprisonment of two, three or four years' imprisonment for arson perpetrated against houses (depending, of course, upon the individual circumstances of each case) seem to accord with current sentencing practices.'[5]
8. In Luciano v The Queen[6] arson destroyed a house owned by the offender's estranged wife's parents and occurred in the context of ongoing threats against her. The value of the damage was over $929,000. The offender had attended the house with the intent to commit arson equipped with petrol purchased for the purpose. A sentence of four years and two months' imprisonment was confirmed on appeal.
9. In Cotter v The Queen[7] a four year sentence was upheld. The offender pleaded not guilty and the case involved the destruction of a property owned by the Ministry of Housing and had occurred in the context of threats to the offender's partner.
10. In Davies v The Queen[8] the offender pleaded not guilty but was found guilty of five charges of arson. Charge 4 involved the destruction of a bakery business and adjacent properties and a financial loss exceeding $400,000. On appeal he was resentenced to six years' imprisonment. Charge 5 involved the destruction of a childcare centre and caused significant loss and damage. On appeal he was

re-sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. The offender had a prior conviction for arson, demonstrated no remorse, his moral culpability was found to be high and there was a very high likelihood of re-offending. 11. In McPadden v The Queen,[9] the applicant procured his co-offender to commit arson on a commercial premises for the purposes of insurance fraud for which the applicant was the primary beneficiary. The premises was within a two-story building among shops and residences and which put eight sleeping residents at risk. This constituted a separate offence of reckless conduct endangering serious injury. The applicant pleaded not guilty, had no remorse and had no prior convictions and the sentence of five years' imprisonment was upheld on appeal. 12. In Maddocks v The Queen[10] the offender burnt down a large shed and contents valued at about $80,000, on a property about 100 metres from a residential premises. The offender had a grievance about the way the owner had treated his sister five years prior in connection with a horse agistment arrangement. The offender used petrol and boasted about his actions to family and friends. The offender had an extremely deprived background and the principles in the case of Bugmy applied. He also had multiple prior convictions including two for arson when he was a teenager. The arson was premeditated, and community protection and specific deterrence were sentencing considerations. The sentence of six years' imprisonment described as an 'undoubtedly a high one', was upheld on appeal. The Court of Appeal noted the case lacked some aggravating features of other cases (burning down a house with people inside, property loss valued in the hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars) but had its own aggravating features and was a serious example of a serious offence. 13. In your case the value of damage is comparatively low, however it is significant. 14. In contrast to the cases of Beevers and Luciano the property damage was not to someone's home and nor did it involve the destruction of their possessions or the destruction of a business. 15. The prosecution has raised the risk to nearby residents, but your offending can be distinguished from McPadden where people were asleep in the same building. You knew there was no one in the premises at the time thus there was limited risk of injury or death to any person. 16. Your offending has similarities to the facts of Maddocks which involved the destruction of a shed and contents worth about $80,000 and the use of petrol as an accelerant, thereby involving planning and premeditation. The sentence of six years was described by the Court as at the higher end and the offender can be distinguished from yourself as he had both a significant prior history, motive, and bragged about his offending and severe deprivation in childhood such that the principles in Bugmy applied. 17. The nature and gravity of the offences have already been referred to but in your case there are two offences, and planning has been indicated by the use of an accelerant which was used on the two properties and taken to the site. There was risk exposure to nearby residents opposite and those in the residence behind the row of townhouses. Your actions were planned which means your moral culpability is high. 18. There are factors however which lessen the seriousness of this offending. 19. There is no apparent financial motive. There is no misguided vigilante context to your offending. There was no fraudulent insurance claim. There were no threats involved. 20. The offences were committed on two partially built townhouses which were not at lock up stage, on a site comprising other partially built townhouses. 21. Whilst there were adjacent properties, they were unoccupied, and no harm was caused to any person. 22. No individual lost their home or treasured lifelong possessions. 23. The offending was committed in the early hours of the morning when no one was about. 24. Whilst the fires attracted the attention of local residents who gathered around the site, the attending fire crew was able to extinguish the fire without injury or loss. 25. Although no one was injured or killed or harmed in any way there was some risk obviously to nearby residents and to the fire fighters who had to attend the blaze. 26. There is no victim impact statement. 27. The insurance cost of the fire damage of $148,000 is relatively low as compared with other cases. 28. You have no prior convictions and have a supportive family and a good work record. You presented 10 references from family and work colleagues and friends attesting to your good character. 29. I accept your prospects of rehabilitation are strong. 30. Counsel has referred me to the effect that a sentence of imprisonment would have on your family, specifically your wife and two children. 31. In Markovic the Court of Appeal explained:

..the consequences of a sentence upon other members of the family of a person in prison, such factors will need to be exceptional or extreme before the court will tailor its sentence to relieve the plight of those other family members...the graver the crime for which the prisoner is being sentenced the more difficult it will be to find exceptional circumstances, because the relief usually sought and generally necessary to alleviate the plight of the relevant family members affected will require absolution for incarceration.[11]

1. The test for exceptional family hardship is a high one. To satisfy the test of exceptional hardship an accused must produce 'cogent evidence' and establish the situation is so highly exceptional it 'would be, in effect, inhumane to refuse to do so'.[1]
2. I am not of the view that family hardship circumstances here are exceptional, however I take into account family hardship to your wife and children in the general sense and consider this as part of the general sentencing synthesis.
   1. I accept the sentencing purposes in this case are general and specific deterrence, punishment and protection of the community.
   2. The seriousness of the offending requires a term of imprisonment to reflect those factors.
   3. I have had you assessed for a community corrections order and the assessment is positive. The conditions recommended are unpaid community work, treatment and rehabilitation programs to reduce reoffending as well as supervision.
   4. I have regard to the current sentencing practices as outlined. These are useful cases but no case is completely on all fours with yours.
   5. The only cases I could find were a community correction order alone had been imposed in arson cases are quite different to your case.
   6. In DPP v Khodr,[12] the arson comprised lighting a mattress in shared accommodation. The value of the damage was $599,000 and the accused had no prior convictions. However, he had suffered a stroke and had an acquired brain injury and complex mental health conditions. The medical evidence in support was found to warrant a moderation in reduction to his moral culpability and the weight given to general and specific deterrence and it was noted that prison would be more burdensome for him.
   7. Other cases such as DPP v Bellis[13] and DPP v Baldock.[14] Raised the same issues, namely that the offender's moral culpability and the principles of general and specific deterrence were reduced.
   8. None of the mitigatory factors considered in those cases are applicable to your offending.
   9. Aggravating factors are that that the two offences were premediated and planned as indicated by your use of accelerant on both properties which you have procured and driven to from the site with the box containing the accelerant under the cover of darkness.
   10. Although there are the two offences of arson the prosecution has conceded they could be regarded as one incident and a substantial concurrency could apply.
   11. Where you are sentenced to a term of imprisonment for the first arson offence, you are then to be sentenced as a serious arson offender on Charge 2 and the court must regard protection of the community as the principal sentencing purpose in relation to Charge 2 pursuant to s6D of the Sentencing Act. In addition, s6E of the Sentencing Act provides that any term of imprisonment imposed by the Court on Charge 2 must, unless otherwise directed, be served cumulatively on the sentence of imprisonment imposed on Charge 1. The sentencing principle of totality also has a role to play given these two offences occurred almost within minutes of each other.
   12. I have regard to the factors which reduce the gravity of your offending, such as it was a construction site not a person's home, no one was harmed and the value of the damage was towards the lower end in comparison with other arson cases.
   13. I take into account your good character, family support and work record.
   14. The seriousness of the offending is such that sentence of imprisonment is required to effect the sentencing purposes of deterrence, punishment and denunciation. As I have indicated I have regard to the principle of totality in that both offences arise from the same factual scenario.
   15. You are to be sentenced as a serious arson offender on Charge 2 for which the protection of the community is the principal sentencing purpose and in respect of which there is a presumption of cumulation.
   16. I intend to impose a combination sentence on the power conferred by s44(1A) of the Sentencing Act. Imprisonment and a community corrections order will meet the sentencing purposes. On Charge 2 with respect to the principal sentencing purpose, protection of the community, I am satisfied the protection of the community will be adequately protected through a community corrections order and the conditions of unpaid community work, programs to reduce prospects for re-offending and supervision.
   17. I am of the view your prospects for rehabilitation are positive and the combined sentence I impose reflects this, together with the need for deterrence, punishment and protection of the community.

1. Mr Nardo, could you stand up please.
2. I sentence you to a combination sentence under s44 of the Sentencing Act as follows:
3. On Charge 1 you are convicted and sentenced to nine months' imprisonment.
4. On Charge 2 you are convicted and sentenced to a community corrections order for two years with the following terms and conditions:

(a), you are to report to the Community Corrections Centre at Reservoir within two clear days at the end of your release from imprisonment;

(b), you are to comply with the directions of the Secretary.

(a), you have to perform 200 hours of unpaid community work over a period of two years; 100 hours of treatment and rehabilitation satisfactorily undertaken are to be counted as hours of unpaid community work for the purposes of the unpaid community work condition

(b), you must be under the supervision of a Community Corrections officer for a period of two years;

(c), you must undergo programs or courses aimed at addressing factors relating to the offending as directed by the Regional Manager.

1. Do you consent to these conditions?
2. OFFENDER: I do.
3. HER HONOUR: The community corrections order commences within two working days of your release from custody. You will be required to sign the community correction order. You can take a seat. I might just take a short adjournment in order for those orders to be prepared, thank you.

1. HER HONOUR: Yes, thank you. I understand the CCO has been prepared. Yes, Mr Connors.
2. MR CONNORS: It has and can I indicate that I have gone through the terms of the CCO with Mr Nardo and he understands it and consents.
3. HER HONOUR: Thank you, all right thank you.
4. MR STEFANOVIC: Your Honour, can I just interpose.
5. HER HONOUR: Yes, Mr Stefanovic.
6. MR STEFANOVIC: Yes, I've not seen a copy of the CCO document. Could I have that email to myself and my instructor, Mr Taverna, just to cast a quick eye across it and check the terms of it.
7. HER HONOUR: Yes, certainly.
8. MR STEFANOVIC: Your Honour that email hasn't come through yet.
9. HER HONOUR: All right. It has been sent.
10. MR STEFANOVIC: Thank you. Your Honour I take no issue with the terms of the CCO.
11. HER HONOUR: Yes, perhaps if Mr Nardo could sign it please.
12. Thank you. Yes, I have signed that too. We will adjourn the court, thank you.

[1] Salmi v The Queen [2020] VSCA 250.

[2] Kilic v The Queen [2010] VSCA 182.

[3] Salmi v The Queen [2020] VSCA 250.

[4] [2016] VSCA 271.

[5] Beevers v The Queen [2016] VSCA 271, [41].

[6] [2015] VSCA 173.

[7] [2011] VSCA 240.

[8] [2019] VSCA 66.

[9] [2018] VSCA 57.

[10] [2020] VSCA 47.

[11] R v Markovic [2010] VSCA 105, [10].

[13] [2018] VCC 807.

[14] [2016] VCC 1469.