[1999] VSC 298
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Victoria
1999-08-05
Cummins J.
Original judgment source is linked above.
DPP v Stephen Andrew McLeod, David Kenneth Bumpstead and Paula Jean Bumpstead
CRIMINAL LAW - sentencing - multiple accused - manslaughter - accessory after the fact to manslaughter - extensive delay due to actions of accused - considerations applicable.
I express my regret to persons who are affected by this case and to the accused for my delay in pronouncing sentence. As you may know, I had an accident which required hospitalisation and surgery, and I am sorry this has taken that time.
Before proceeding to sentence, I will very briefly refer to some formal matters.
The presentment has been amended by the deletion of count 4 of the original presentment and by the sequential re-numbering of counts 5 to 8 now to read counts 4 to 7, as will be apparent from the transcript of this sentence.
Mr Fraser, in relation to the forensic procedure, the matter under s.464ZF, is there anything further that needs to be said ?
MR FRASER: No, Your Honour. I think I have already previously indicated.
HIS HONOUR: I am satisfied under the Crimes Act 1958 s.464ZF(2) that a forensic procedure ought to be undertaken in relation to the first accused Mr McLeod, and I so order. Next, under s.78(1) of the Confiscation Act 1997 I am satisfied that the disposal order there sought ought be made, and I sign that order; and finally counsel might like to confirm, at a convenient time, my calculation that the first accused, Mr McLeod, has now served 488 days of pre-sentence detention and I propose in due course to order that those 488 days be declared as already served under the sentence I shall impose upon him.
Before turning to the formal sentences and the reasons therefor, I will address now the second and the third accused before I proceed to the major matters.
In relation to the second accused, Mr David Bumpstead, he has already served 234 days in pre-sentence detention, which is about seven and a half months. I propose in the case of the second accused to direct that he have a suspended gaol sentence to operate from now, so that, at the conclusion of these proceedings, he will be able not to remain further in custody. I propose to order that he has a sentence of imprisonment of two years, 18 months of which are suspended, which means he would have to serve six months. He has already served more than that, and I declare, pursuant to s.18(4) of the Sentencing Act 1991 that 234 days have been served in custody by Mr Bumpstead and, accordingly, he has served that six months now, which means he will be free to leave the court at the conclusion of today's proceedings.
Mr David Bumpstead, will you kindly stand up first? The purpose of the suspended sentence is that it is indeed a sentence of imprisonment. But you have already served six months, and you are not required to remain in custody for the balance of the sentence of imprisonment; do you understand that?
HIS HONOUR: And if during the period of the sentence still to run you commit another offence punishable by imprisonment, you will be brought back here, and then I will sentence you for this particular crime, and you may ordered to serve the balance of the time; do you understand that?
PRISONER DAVID BUMPSTEAD: Yes, thank you, Your Honour.
HIS HONOUR: Are you prepared to undertake all of that?
HIS HONOUR: Thank you very much, Mr Bumpstead; you may be seated.
In relation to Ms Paula Bumpstead, one of the provisions of the Sentencing Act 1991 which applies to suspended sentences is section 27(3), which says that a suspended sentence is not to be imposed unless I consider that a sentence of imprisonment in the first place otherwise would be appropriate. I am not satisfied in her case, because of the very minor part she played in these terrible events, that she should have any sentence of imprisonment at all. Nor do I consider a community-based order under Part 3, Division 3 is appropriate, because I do not consider she needs the therapy contemplated by that Division. I consider in her case the appropriate sentence is that I convict her of the crime with which she is charged and adjourn for two years the proceedings on an undertaking, if she is prepared to give it, that she comply with the law during that period. There are no special conditions which are appropriate to be imposed. She is not required to attend this court in two years' time unless she commits any offence in the meantime. I will adjourn the proceedings to August 2001, and assuming she has committed no further offences, the matter will then be finalised.
Ms Bumpstead, will you be good enough to stand up? That means you do not have a suspended sentence of imprisonment but rather, what in the old days we used to call a bond. It is now called something different, but it is basically the same thing.
Are you participated to sign an undertaking that you will comply with the law for that two-year period?
HIS HONOUR: Very well. You may sit down as well. I will give my reasons in a moment, and then I will come back formally and pronounce those sentences in relation to the second and the third accused.
Dr Kenneth Byrne of 17 May 1999 was tendered. I am affirmatively satisfied that when she had learned early that week that the deceased had been killed and buried, that she suffered genuine grief, not for herself but for the deceased, that she was appalled and traumatised by what had happened, that she had genuine concern for the deceased and the terrible situation that his body was left. She inherited a situation which was not of her own making. She did not wish to implicate her brothers who had wrongfully acted. As I have said, the misleading statement she made to the police a short time later played no significant part and did not deflect the police investigation which otherwise was unsuccessful for such a long time.
DPP
McLeod, Bumpstead & Bumpstead [1999] VSC 298