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Reference Offence Maximum Penalty Number Series One – 1 June 2025 2 years imprisonment, Aggravated furious, reckless, dangerous driving (first 200 penalty units, or 1. offender) in contravention of s 7(1) by virtue of s 7A both. CAN 9727/2025 Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT) 12 months automatic licence disqualification. Driver did not wear seatbelt properly in contravention of s 264(1)(a) Road Transport (Road Rules)

2. CAN 5253/2026 20 penalty units. Regulation 2017 (ACT) Series Two – 9 April 2026 5 years imprisonment, Aggravated furious, reckless, dangerous driving 500 penalty units, or

3. (repeat offender) in contravention of s 7(1) by virtue both. CAN 5791/2026 of s 7A Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT) 24 months automatic licence disqualification. 12 months imprisonment, Drive while disqualified (repeat offender) in 100 penalty units, or 4. contravention of s 32(1)(a) Road Transport (Driver both. CAN 4289/2026 Licencing) Act 1999 (ACT) 12 months automatic licence disqualification. Number plate/rego not properly issued in contravention of s 22(1)(a) Road Transport (Vehicle 5. CAN 4292/2026 20 penalty units. Registration) Act 1999 (ACT) Use unregistered vehicle in contravention of s 18(1) Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) Act 1999 6. CAN 4294/2026 20 penalty units. (ACT) Use uninsured vehicle on road in contravention of s 7. CAN 4295/2026 50 penalty units. 289 Motor Accident Injuries Act 2019 (ACT) What are the issues?

2․ The issues that I have to resolve are the type and length of sentences to be imposed and whether the sentence is to be served by way of Drug and Alcohol treatment Order (DATO) supervised in the Drug and Alcohol Sentence List (DASL).

3․ The sentence type and length is to be determined by considering the objects and purposes of sentencing at ss 6 and 7 and the mandatory factors at s33 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (the CS Act). Whether or not a sentence may be served by DATO is governed by ss 12A, 80S and 80T of the CS Act. What were the nature and circumstances of the offending? (s 33(1)(a) CS Act)

4. There was no dispute about the facts. Statements of facts relating to each series of offending were tendered and the nature and circumstances of the offending are summarised as follows: Series One – 1 June 2025

5. At about 1.20 pm on Sunday 1 June 2025, the offender was driving a Toyota Hilux (the Toyota). He picked up two passengers from the suburb of Holder in the ACT. The offender was not wearing a seatbelt.

6. As the Toyota turned into a residential area on Hyndes Crescent the offender caused the vehicle to swerve heavily. This caused the passengers to fear for their safety.

7. Despite pleading by the passengers for the offender to stop, the offender again caused the Toyota to swerve a further three times. The Toyota collided heavily with the rear of a parked Kia Carnival with enough force to push the Kia into a third parked vehicle on the opposite side of the road. The Toyota then came to a stop embedded in a hedge on the boundary of the front yard of a suburban home.

8. Both passengers were able to get out of the Toyota. The offender remained in the drivers’ seat. A resident heard the collision and went to the Toyota. He saw that the offender was slumped across the passenger’s side seat. He called triple zero and was advised to commence CPR on the offender whilst ACT Fire and Rescue and the ACT Ambulance Service made their way to the scene.

9. A group of residents assisted in removing the offender from the Toyota. They commenced CPR until they were relieved by paramedics.

10. Blood samples showed that the offender had amphetamine and methylamphetamine in his blood. He also had monoacetylmorphine, morphine and codeine in his blood. These three drugs indicated that the defendant had also recently ingested heroin. Series Two – 9 April 2026

11. At about 5.07 am on Thursday 9 April 2026, the offender was driving a blue Mazda CX9 (‘the Mazda’) in the suburb of Phillip. The Mazda was seen by police leaving a service station on Botany Street. It completed a U-turn, turned left onto Melrose Drive, turned through a red light onto Eggleston Street in Chifley and then accelerated and travelled to a speed clearly in excess of the 60 km/h posted speed limit.

12. Police activated their emergency lights and sirens. The offender did not stop the Mazda. He accelerated away. Whilst travelling on Baldimira Street in Fisher, the Mazda left the roadway and commenced driving onto adjacent bushland and then onto a joint pedestrian and bicycle path.

13. The offender drove the Mazda along a bitumen pathway until he became level with the Tuggeranong Parkway. He then conducted a U-Turn in front of oncoming traffic and onto the parkway.

14. He drove north for about 300 metres before exiting the roadway again and driving on a nature strip on the left of the parkway. The Mazda was then driven into a stormwater drain and came to a halt in a drainage ditch.

15. The offender got out of the Mazda and attempted to run up the stormwater drain away from police. He ignored police directions to stop and lay on the ground. He stopped running, turned to face police and adopted a fighting stance. A taser was used to no effect. The offender continued to physically resist police. He refused to comply with lawful directions until he was handcuffed.

16. The offender’s licence was disqualified at the time of the offending. The Mazda had been unregistered since November 2024.

17. The number plate displayed on the Mazda was registered to another vehicle and so was incorrectly displayed on the Mazda.

18. This series of offending occurred while the offender was on bail for the Series One offending. There had been a specific bail condition that he was not to drive a motor vehicle. What is the objective seriousness of the charges?

19. The Court’s assessment of objective seriousness is to be determined wholly by reference to the nature of the offending: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 at [27]. Aggravated dangerous driving

20. The decisions in R v Whyte [2002] NSWCCA 343 and DPP v Clarke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 261 list the features of offending that may inform the objective seriousness of the offence of aggravated dangerous driving: (a) the extent to which the public and other road users were put at risk, the number of them and their vulnerability; (b) the nature of the location where the driving occurred and the time of day; (c) whether there were any passengers in the vehicle who were put at risk (especially children); (d) the variety and duration of aspects of the driving that were dangerous and the extent to which it was a multifaceted and/or a lengthy course of conduct (especially factors such as driving into oncoming traffic, onto footpaths, other places where pedestrians are, through stop signs, red lights or give way signs); (e) the distance driven and the period of the driving; (f) the speed of the vehicle and regard for the conditions; (g) erratic or aggressive driving; (h) whether there was competitive driving or street racing on a public road or showing off; (i) whether the vehicle was engaged in a pursuit from police or failed to stop when directed to do so by police; (j) the extent to which police were put at risk when trying to terminate the driving; (k) whether the offender was intoxicated by alcohol or drugs and the degree of intoxication; (l) any damage occasioned to other people, vehicles, houses or objects; and (m) the degree of sleep deprivation.

21. The charge in the first series is statutorily aggravated because of intoxication to such an extent that the defendant was incapable of having proper control of the vehicle. Although it was a short piece of dangerous driving in terms of distance and duration, it included erratic swerving on a suburban street on a Sunday afternoon, colliding with a parked vehicle and causing significant damage to that vehicle.

22. The two adult passengers were put at actual risk by the nature of the offender’s driving. The passengers were actively discouraging the nature of his driving during the journey.

23. The car came to rest over a footpath and partially into a hedge that formed the boundary of a suburban home.

24. The driving caused actual and potential risks to people and property. There were significant attributes that placed the driving beyond the median range of objective seriousness.

25. The charge in the second series is statutorily aggravated by the offender failing to stop for police, exceeding the speed limit by more than 30% and driving in a way that put at risk the safety of a vulnerable road user. It was amended by consent on 25 August 2026 to particularise the offending as being that of a repeat offender. This was a further circumstance of aggravation.

26. The driving occurred over many different streets and pedestrian areas in a dramatic and erratic manner. It involving speeding and occurred in circumstances of avoidance of police who had lights and sirens activated.

27. Driving into places with pedestrian access put members of the public at a significant potential risk because they would not expect a vehicle to be travelling on walkways and off-road areas at speed at any time of the day. However, there was no evidence of people being present for that risk.

28. The extreme disregard for the off-road conditions resulted in the vehicle coming to rest in a ditch. His behaviour after driving is not relevant.

29. The presence of these features indicates objective seriousness well above the median level. Driving whilst disqualified

30. In applying McWilliam J in DPP v Cameron [2026] ACTSC 166, I have considered the following features of the 9 April 2026 offending: (a) the number of prior offences of the same type; (b) whether the driving was wilfully disobedient of the court’s disqualification order; (c) what the purpose of the driving was, including whether it was associated with the commission of other offences (taking care to note that the court must not doubly sentence in those circumstances); (d) the duration and distance of the driving; (e) how recently the disqualification had been imposed; and (f) the manner of driving (taking care to not doubly sentence if the manner of driving was the subject of a separate charge).

31. The purpose, duration and manner of driving are all factors that will be dealt with in the accompanying aggravated dangerous driving charge and will not be twice considered.

32. As noted below, there are six prior convictions for driving disqualified on the offender’s history. The driving involved a wilful disobedience of a court-imposed disqualification.

33. The facts state that the drivers licence disqualification had been imposed on 11 November 2025 – about 5 months prior to the offending.

34. These features of the offending place it within the median range of objective seriousness. Was there any resultant injury, loss and damage and what was the effect of this upon the victims? (ss 33(1)(e) and 33(1)(f) CS Act)

35. The owner of the car damaged in series one provided a victim impact statement. That statement sets out very clearly that the damage that the victim and his family suffered was not confined to inconvenience or financial loss.

36. The victim went to the offender’s Toyota after hearing the collision. The offender was unconscious, bleeding, drooling and turning blue. He and other neighbours removed the offender from his damaged car. The victim then performed CPR on the offender until paramedics arrived and revived him. He has a harrowing memory of the offender laughing and smiling whilst being loaded into an ambulance.

37. Physical memories of the accident remain at the scene. Despite the victim’s persistent clean-up efforts, glass and car fragments are still found embedded in the verge. Crash scene paint markings remain marked on the street outside the family home. The curb remains accident damaged.

38. The victim and his family feel confident that if their car had not provided the physical barrier that it did, then the defendant’s vehicle would have crashed into their front yard and into their home.

39. The victim and his family now feel unsafe. They have lost sleep. They have also lost their sense of safety and the sense of freedom they once felt in their street. Was there any action taken by the offender to make reparation? (s 33(1)(h) CS Act)

40. The offender has not taken any action to make reparation for the damage incurred. What degree of responsibility has the offender taken for the commission of the offences and has he demonstrated remorse? (ss 33(1)(i) and 33 (1)w) CS Act)

41. The offender resolved the matters by entering pleas of guilty. In doing so he accepted full criminal responsibility for his offending.

42. The intensive corrections order assessment report (the ICOAR) and drug and alcohol treatment report (the DAATR) provided to the Court both indicate moral acceptance of responsibility for the offending. The offender did not quibble with the statements of facts during his interviews with the report writers.

43. The ICOAR (at page 6) notes that the offender “accepted he committed the offences and is deserving of punishment” and “attributed his impaired decision-making to his drug use and acknowledged responsibility for his actions”. Were there pleas of guilty and should there be a reduction in sentence applied for those pleas? (ss 33(1)(j) and 35 CS Act)

44. All of the charges were the subject of guilty pleas. The offender entered a plea of not guilty to the first series on the fifth occasion it was before the Magistrates Court. A plea of guilty was subsequently entered on the ninth occasion.

45. The charges in the second series were the subject of guilty pleas on the second occasion before the Magistrates Court.

46. The prosecution has submitted that the offender is entitled to the full discount of 25% for the entering of his guilty pleas. I see no reason to interfere with such an approach. What are the cultural background, character, criminal antecedents age and physical or mental condition of the offender? (s 33(1)(m) CS Act)

47. The offender is a 35-year-old Australian man who was raised in Jerrabomberra in New South Wales (NSW). He has two adult siblings and reports positive relationships with his parents and his sister. His relationship with his brother has been negatively affected by the offender’s incarceration and criminal offending.

48. The offender’s ex-partner looks after their two children. He has regular telephone and face-to-face contact with his children.

49. The offender has formed a personal relationship since mid-2025 with a lady who has no children. He described this relationship as positive and supportive to the report authors.

50. The offender has excellent employment prospects. He completed school to year 12 and then became a qualified plumber. He operated a successful plumbing business until 2020. He was forced to close the business after not being paid for significant work.

51. He has been employed since 2020 in the agricultural and construction industries.

52. The offender is physically fit and medically healthy. His mother reported that he had a prior history of eczema and dental health concerns.

53. The ICOAR and DAATR both indicate that the offender reported that he had been prescribed anti-depressants after experiencing depression and anxiety upon a previous induction into custody in 2023. He now reports stable mental health.

54. There is no history of the defendant seeking professional support in the community for any mental health issues.

55. The offender has an extensive history of driving offences in the ACT and NSW which disentitle him from the leniency afforded to a first offender. He has six prior convictions between both jurisdictions for either drink or drug driving.

56. His NSW history contains six prior convictions for driving whilst disqualified.

57. The offender was also on conditional liberty at the time of the offending by virtue of a suspended sentence order and a good behaviour order imposed by the Magistrates Court on 25 February 2025. The first series occurred only days after being released on a sentence of five months imprisonment that was suspended by a 12-month suspended sentence order. The second series occurred towards the very end of that same suspended sentence order.

58. I do not have to consider cancellation and imposition of the suspended term of imprisonment as that took place in July 2026 when the offender was sentenced for unrelated charges.

59. At the time of the second series the offender was on bail for the first series. One of those conditions was that he was not to drive. He was also subject to a NSW community corrections order. What are the financial circumstances of the offender? (s 33 (1)(n) CS Act)

60. The offender is presently remanded in custody and not experiencing a significant earning capacity. He reported fines and debts of between $88,000-$98,000 to the DAATR authors. What probable effect would any sentence have on the offender’s family or dependants? (s 33 (1)(o) CS Act)

61. No specific information was provided on this topic. The Court infers that a continued custodial sentence will have a negative effect on the offender’s familial and personal relationships. Was the offender affected by alcohol or a controlled drug at the time of the offending and what were the circumstances in which he became affected? (s 33(1)(p) CS Act and also s 12A(2) CS Act)

62. The ICOAR and DAATR combine to paint a picture of substance abuse that began at the age of 18. Between 18 and 20 the offender engaged in problematic alcohol use which subsided into social use and rare intoxication after the age of 20. There has been total abstinence from alcohol use since 2025.

63. At the age of 20 the offender experienced a relationship breakdown and financial difficulties. He commenced using cocaine and MDMA through to his mid-twenties. He then commenced infrequent methamphetamine use at about age 26.

64. After a further relationship breakdown in 2020, his methamphetamine use escalated significantly to daily use of between half of a gram and a gram. Between 2023 and being remanded in custody for these offences, he reported using about half a gram of methamphetamine and heroin each day.

65. It is clear that at the time of the offending the offender was dependant on methamphetamine and heroin. Those substances and his dependency upon them had an obvious and substantial contribution to the commission of both series of offences. There is no evidence to suggest that his substance dependence has decreased since being in custody.

66. There is clear evidence of poly-drug use at the time of the first series and reported poly-drug use by the offender for the second series. I have assumed that there was voluntary self-administration of those substances.

67. In the first series, the degree of intoxication (intoxication to such an extent that the defendant was incapable of having proper control of the vehicle) activated a statutory aggravating feature. By operation of statute, this aggravating feature increased the seriousness of the offending and the maximum penalty that applied to the offending.

68. In the second series, I find that the admission of intoxication is neutral. In certain circumstances if intoxication gives rise to foreseeability of offending it can make intoxication an aggravating feature: R v Robazzini [2010] VSCA 8 at [57]–[61]. There is no evidence of whether, at the time, the offender realised that there was any increased risk of him driving dangerously after consuming illicit substances.

69. The use of illicit substances explains the disinhibited behaviour of the offender, but I do not see how it might increase or decrease the moral culpability for his offending in the circumstances of this matter. Would the imposition of a conviction or a particular penalty be likely to cause particular hardship to the offender? (s 33(1)(r) CS Act)

70. The harshness of custodial sentences is a common outcome of serious criminal offending. There is no evidence that an immediate custodial sentence would cause particular hardship to this offender compared to any other offender. Was the offender in a position of trust or authority when he committed the offences (s 33(1)(u) CS Act)

71. In the first series, the offender drove with two passengers. They were unable to have any effect on his manner of driving and were placed at risk by it. As their driver he was in a position of trust. What is or are the reason or reasons why the offender committed the offences? (s 33(1)(v) CS Act)

72. The offender noted in the ICOAR and DAATR that drugs had impaired his decision making at the time of the offending. Is there a current sentencing practice for this type of offending? (s 33(1)(za) CS Act)

73. It is a statement of elementary principle that sentences of themselves do not give rise to binding precedents: Murray v IA [2020] ACTSC 288 at [29]-[30]. However, the legislation prescribes that regard must be had to any current sentencing practices that emerge from current sentencing cases.

74. I have not consulted sentencing statistics. Consideration of bare statistics and numerical charts does not assist a sentencing judge because it does not involve consideration of why those sentences were fixed as they were. Consistency in sentencing refers to the consistent application of sentencing principles and not to numerical consistency: Hili v The Queen, Jones v The Queen [2010] HCA 45 at [48]-[49].

75. The prosecution provided a helpful set of comparative cases related to aggravated dangerous driving and driving whilst disqualified including DPP v Pallier [2026] ACTSC 46; DPP v Cameron [2026] ACTSC 166; Mann v Tremethick (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 31; R v Guy [2022] ACTSC 373; R v Seymour [2021] ACTSC 152; R v Law [2021] ACTSC 351 and R v Collins [2019] ACTSC 302.

76. Each of those cases involved sentences of imprisonment for both offence types. I have closely considered those decisions and the sentencing principles applied therein. Pre-sentence custody

77. As of 1 September 2026, the offender will have spent 19 days in custody referable to this offending. Totality

78. The approach to principles of concurrence, accumulation and totality were set out in O’Brien v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 47: (a) When sentencing for multiple offences, the sentencing judge must fix an appropriate sentence for each offence and then consider questions of accumulation or concurrence, as well as totality: Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610 at 623-624.

(b) The principle of totality requires the sentencing judge to review the aggregate sentence, look at the totality of the criminal behaviour and consider whether the aggregate is “just and appropriate” for all the offences: Mill v The Queen [1988] HCA 70; (1988) 166 CLR 59 at [63].

(c) A countervailing factor is the need to ensure that there does not emerge a perception that there is no difference between a person who commits one or two offences and a person who commits six or seven offences: R v Wheeler [2000] NSWCCA 34 at [36]. The Court must avoid any suggestion that what is being offered is a discount for multiple offending: R v Knight [2005] NSWCCA 253; (2005) 155 A Crim R 252 at [112]; R v MAK (2006) 167 A Crim R 159 at [18].

(d) Where offences are discrete and independent, the sentence for one offence cannot comprehend and reflect the criminality of the other. In such circumstances, the sentences should be at least partly cumulative; otherwise there is a risk that the total sentence will not reflect the total criminality of the two offences. Where, however, the offences are not separate and distinct, but are part of a single episode of criminality with common features, it is more likely that the sentence for one of the offences will reflect the criminality of both, in which case the sentences should be concurrent, or at least partly concurrent: Cahyadi v The Queen [2007] NSWCCA 1; (2007) 168 A Crim R 41 at [27].

79. When those principles are applied to this case, there should be a careful consideration of the effect of totality when aggregating the sentences for both series.

80. In the second series there is a significant overlap between the aggravated dangerous driving charge and the drive disqualified charge that occurred at the same time in the same episode. There should be a considerable allowance for concurrency between the offences in the second series. Consideration

81. I have reminded myself of the objects and purposes of sentencing set out at ss 6 and 7 of the CS Act. They are key considerations in any sentence.

82. It was accepted that nothing other than a sentence of imprisonment was appropriate for the charges of aggravated dangerous driving and drive disqualified.

83. I have fashioned sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offending and impose significant penalties on the offender. The sentences satisfy all of the s 7 criteria other than rehabilitation.

84. Rehabilitation can be afforded significant weight by the imposition of a DATO rather than another mode of imprisonment. Disposition

85. Per s 12A(2) of the CS Act, on the evidence before the Court, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that: (a) the offender is dependent on a controlled drug; (b) the offender’s dependency substantially contributed to the commission of the offences; (c) the offender will live in the ACT for the duration of the sentence except as directed by the court; and (d) there are no concerns relating to the safety or welfare of any victim.

86. The reports provided to the court set out that the offender is both eligible and suitable for a treatment order: ss 80S and 80T of the CS Act.

87. I have decided that a DATO is appropriate after considering all of the sentencing considerations that apply to the offender, the absence of ongoing concerns about the safety and welfare of victims and the s 80O objects (all of which were relevant to the offender): (a) facilitating the rehabilitation of the offender by providing a judicially supervised, therapeutically oriented and integrated treatment regime; (b) reducing the offender’s dependency on alcohol or a controlled drug; (c) reducing the health risks associated with such dependency; (d) assisting the offender’s integration into the community; and (e) promoting community safety by reducing re-offending.

88. The DASL Suitability Assessment Report recommended a treatment and supervision part of the order to be for a period of 12 to 18 months (see page 6).

89. Rehabilitation will be the focus for the remainder of the sentence to be imposed. This will be achieved through a treatment order pursuant to s 12A(2)(b) of the CS Act. Orders

90. The orders of the Court are: (a) For CAN 9727/2025, aggravated dangerous driving (first offender), in contravention of s 7(1) by virtue of s 7A Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 15 months, reduced to 11 months and 7 days on account of his guilty plea. To take into account the 19 days that the offender has spent in custody, this will be backdated to commence on 13 August 2026 and conclude on 19 July 2027. He is disqualified from holding or applying for a drivers licence for 12 months. (b) For CAN 5791/2026, aggravated dangerous driving (repeat offender) in contravention of s 7(1) by virtue of s 7A Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 24 months reduced to 18 months on account of his guilty plea. This will commence on 13 May 2027 and conclude on 12 November 2028. He is disqualified from holding or applying for a drivers licence for 24 months. (c) For CAN 4289/2026, drive while disqualified (repeat offender) in contravention of s 32(1)(a) Road Transport (Driver Licencing) Act 1999 (ACT), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 4 months, reduced to 3 months on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 13 September 2028 and conclude on 12 December 2028. He is disqualified from holding or applying for a drivers licence for 12 months concurrent with the disqualification on CAN 5791/2026. (See DPP v Holder (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 167 at [94]-[95] for the power to allow for concurrency between offences in a single series - but not where there are two distinct series). (d) The total effective sentence of imprisonment is for a period of 2 years and 4 months commencing on 13 August 2026 and concluding on 12 December 2028. (e) I will not fix a non-parole period because the making of a Treatment Order means that the sentence becomes an “excluded sentence of imprisonment” under s 64 of the CS Act. (f) The total disqualification period is 36 months. (g) The remaining offences were fine only. I imposed the following fines on 25 August 2026:

I. CAN 5253/2026 driver did not wear seatbelt properly – a conviction and fine of $450 reduced from $600 for the plea of guilty with no time to pay;

II. CAN 4292/2026 number plate/rego not properly issued – a conviction and fine of $450 reduced from $600 for the plea of guilty with no time to pay;

III. CAN 4294/2026 use unregistered vehicle – a conviction and fine of $600 reduced from $800 for the plea of guilty with no time to pay; and

IV. CAN 4295/2026 use uninsured vehicle on road – a conviction and fine of $750 reduced from $1000 for the plea of guilty with no time to pay. Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order

91. Pursuant to s 12A(2) of the CS Act, a DATO is made for Joel Lonergan in respect of the following eligible offences: (a) CAN 9727/2025, aggravated dangerous driving (first offender); (b) CAN 5791/2026, aggravated dangerous driving (repeat offender); and (c) CAN 4289/2025, drive whilst disqualified (repeat offender).

92. Pursuant to s 80C of the CS Act, the convictions and sentences imposed for the eligible offences are hereby recorded and incorporated into the Custodial Part of the DATO.

93. The total period for which the Treatment Order is in force is 2 years and 4 months to commence on 13 August 2026 and conclude on 12 December 2028.

94. The Treatment and Supervision Part of the DATO is for 1 year and 6 months from today, 1 September 2026, to 29 February 2028.

95. Pursuant to s 12A(3) and 80W of the CS Act, the Custodial Part of the DATO for the eligible offences will be suspended from today, 1 September 2026, until the conclusion of the Treatment Order on 12 December 2028 on the condition that the offender agrees to complete a treatment program.

96. Under s 80ZA of the CS Act, Joel Lonergan is required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender’s Good Behaviour obligations from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the DATO, being 1 March 2028, until the end of the total sentence, 12 December 2028, with the following conditions: (a) The core conditions under s 85 of the CS Act; (b) A probation condition that he accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or his delegate for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person supervising him considers appropriate and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him, including as to alcohol and drug testing, counselling and treatment.

97. For the Treatment and Supervision Part of the DATO: (a) The core conditions of the Order set out in s 80Y of the CS Act are hereby imposed. (b) Mr Lonergan is to travel directly to Canberra Recovery Services on 1 September 2026 and admit himself to the residential drug rehabilitation program at that facility. (c) Mr Lonergan is directed to complete the said program or any other program of intervention, treatment or counselling he is directed to complete, including urinalysis or case management that may be required by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team. (d) Mr Lonergan is to obey all reasonable directions of any person in charge of the program and all the rules of the program and the facility, which may include directions about where he resides, with whom he associates and his attendance from time to time. (e) Following the completion of any residential program, Mr Lonergan is not to leave his approved place of residence between any curfew hours directed by the Treatment and Supervision team, other than for a medical emergency, and he is to present himself to the front door of the residence if required by an officer of ACT Policing. (f) Should Mr Lonergan leave or be discharged from the directed program before completing it, he is to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4:00pm on the next business day with a view to having his Treatment Order reviewed. (g) Mr Lonergan is not to consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs or prescription drugs not prescribed to him. (h) Mr Lonergan is to comply with any directions of the court from time to time about attendance at court in person or by electronic means.

98. The offender is directed to attend court for DASL review in person or via AVL on Tuesday, 8 September 2026 at 11:30am.

I certify that the preceding ninety-eight [98] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of his Honour Acting Justice Stewart Associate: Zeinab Elsheekhly Date: 1 September 2026