[2025] VCC 1726
General information, not legal advice.
County Court of Victoria
2025-11-21
Original judgment source is linked above.
Sentence: Indictment C2316156.2; sentenced to a Community Correction Order for a period of 2 years and 6 months. Indictment C2400183.2, sentenced to a Community Correction Order for a period of 2 years and 6 months.
Circumstances of offending CR-24-00113 - indictment C2316156.2
Circumstances of offending CR-24-01413 - indictment C2400183.2
'Based on my clinical assessment and review of Ms [Logan's] developmental history, it appears that the marked deterioration in her life trajectory following the index traumatic incident significantly contributed to her later involvement in criminal behaviour. Prior to the assault, Ms [Logan] was generally well-adjusted academically and exhibited no history of serious disruptive behaviour, however, following the incident her onset of PTSD, major depressive disorder and borderline personality features, compounded by escalating substance use, created a vulnerability that adversely affected her impulse control, emotional regulation and decision-making. > > These impairments have substantially increased her risk for engaging in maladaptive and, in some instances, criminal behaviours. > > While acknowledging that Ms [Logan] had pre-existing psychosocial stressors such as domestic instability and early exposure to violence, the evidence suggests that sexual assault acted as a critical catalyst that altered her developmental course. > > The findings from research from Shrivastava et al. (2017)1 support the understanding that childhood trauma, particularly sexual abuse, can lead to long-lasting neurobiological and psychological effects, increasing the risk of various psychiatric disorders in adulthood. This aligns with the evidence presented in the report which indicates that Ms [Logan's] experience of sexual trauma has led to significant emotional and cognitive impairments. The neurobiological changes associated with her experiences, such as alterations in brain structure and function, further exacerbate her psychiatric symptoms and contribute to her ongoing challenges in achieving stability and well-being. > > In addition to empirical evidence, I observed that her brother, raised in the same home environment as Ms [Logan[, lives in his own home, has a full-time job, a wife and young children, with no history of mental health disorders or substance use disorders. > > In my professional opinion, but for the traumatic incident and the profound psychobiological and social impact that ensued, is more likely than not that Ms [Logan] would have pursued a more adaptive trajectory with a reduced risk of criminal conduct. Consequently, although a precise quantification is inherently challenging, the index event appears to have been a pivotal factor in setting her on a path toward the criminal behaviours observed in adulthood.'
(a) The court must determine whether there are substantial and compelling circumstances**,** meaning circumstances that are weighty and powerful enough to justify not imposing a custodial sentence.
(b) If such circumstances exist, the next question is whether they are exceptional and rare**,** and this phrase should be treated as a single test, not two separate ones, because the meanings of 'exceptional' and 'rare' overlap. 'Exceptional' means unusual or out of the ordinary, which includes rarity. The requirement is therefore that the circumstances be wholly outside the usual factors typical of the offence.
(c) This is not just a description of common sentencing outcomes; it is a threshold that must be met before a non-custodial sentence can be imposed. Parliament has stated that imprisonment should ordinarily be imposed for Category 2 offences, which suggests that 'exceptional and rare' means something closer to 'out of the ordinary.'
(d) Earlier case law supports this interpretation, describing the test as requiring circumstances wholly outside 'run of the mill' factors. In short, 'exceptional and rare' refers to circumstances that are entirely beyond what is typical for the offence.
- (E) And finally, applying these two steps requires the sentencing judge to make an evaluative judgment based on the established facts. A combination of factors may satisfy the exception even if individual factors are relatively common.
(a) Your relative youth;
(b) Absence of prior convictions within the adult jurisdiction;
(c) Significant background of disadvantage;
(d) Significant exposure to trauma (within school, within familial relationships and intimate relationships);
(e) History of employment and training, notwithstanding considerable background of disadvantage;
(f) Evidence of concerted and impressive engagement within custodial environment within the Aboriginal Healing Unit;
(g) Excellent engagement in residential rehabilitation over a sustained and lengthy period from December 2024 until 21 November 2025, and that you hold a position of responsibility and opportunity for continued targeted support;
(h) Strong engagement in culturally specific supports;
(i) Significant mental health diagnoses;
(j) Increased utility of plea having regard to the position of the victim in the matter; and
(k) Significant remand periods served in relation to separate matters where submissions for Renzella time or totality arise.
'A community correction order may be suitable even in cases of relatively serious offences which might previously have attracted a medium term of imprisonment.'
'A CCO is likely to be a particularly important sentencing option in the case of a young offender where there may be a perceived conflict between the need to punish the offender and the importance, both to the community and to the offender, of rehabilitating the offender. > > Since the CCO can be used to rehabilitate and punish simultaneously, the conflict is likely to be reduced. Instead of needing to give less weight to denunciation or specific or general deterrence, in order to promote the young offender's rehabilitation, the court will be able to fashion a CCO which adequately achieves all of those purposes at once.'
[8] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(2H).
[9] Taleb v The Queen [2020] VSCA 329, [33].
[10] Akoka v The Queen [2017] VSCA 217.
[11] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s18.
[12] Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; Marrah v The Queen [2014] VSCA 119.
[13] R v Hermann [2021] VSCA 160 at [14].
[14] R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102.
[15] R v Shafik-Eid [2009] VSCA 217.
[17] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s5(1).
[18] DPP V Raux; DPP v Talanoa [2025] VSCA 258; DPP v Lombardo [2022] VSCA 204.
[19] Farmer v The Queen [2020] VSCA 140, DPP v Lombardo [2022] VSCA 204; DPP v Kenneison [2023] VSCA 321.
[20] Clarkson v R [2011] VSCA 157.
[21] Pasinis v R [2014] VSCA 91; DPP v Gregory Reynolds (a pseudonym) [2022] VSCA 263; DPP v Evans [2019] VSCA 239;
[22] Phillips v The Queen [2012] VSCA 140; (2012) 37 VR 594.
[23] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5.
[24] Boulton v The Queen [2014] VSCA 342; (2014) 46 VR 308.
[25] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 18.
[26] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 6AAA.
DPP
Logan
(2012) 37 VR 594
(2014) 46 VR 308