DPP v Lock [2025] ACTSC 204

1. Kaine Lock is to be sentenced with respect to 10 offences as follows:

17 February 2024 offending (a) One offence of aggravated burglary contrary to s 312 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Criminal Code), carrying a maximum penalty of 20 years imprisonment, 2000 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/5627); (b) One offence of theft (by joint commission) contrary to s 308 of the Criminal Code, carrying a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment, 1000 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/5629); (c) Four offences of property damage contrary to s 116(3) of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Crimes Act), carrying a maximum penalty of 2 years imprisonment, 50 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/5626; CAN 2024/5630; CAN 2024/5631; CAN 2024/5632); (d) One offence of unauthorised entry of motor vehicle contrary to s 754(1) of the Criminal Code, carrying a maximum penalty of 10 penalty units (CAN 2024/5628); and (e) One offence of provide false name/address contrary to s 211(2)(e) of the Crimes Act, carrying a maximum penalty of a fine of $500.00 (CAN 2024/8406).

18 August 2024 offending (a) One offence of ride/drive stolen motor vehicle contrary to s 318(2) of the Criminal Code, carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, 500 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/8405); and (b) One offence of escaping arrest, contrary to s 160 of the Crimes Act, carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, 100 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/8407).

2. It is not in issue that, where the maximum penalty provides for this, the only appropriate penalty is imprisonment. Mr Lock seeks that this term be served by way of a drug and alcohol treatment order (treatment order): s 12A Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act). He has been assessed as suitable for a treatment order by ACT Corrective Services and Canberra Health Services. The prosecution does not oppose such an outcome, recognising the importance of promoting rehabilitation in the sentencing exercise. For the reasons that follow, I agree that Mr Lock is eligible for a treatment order, and that it is an appropriate and suitable order for Mr Lock.

17 February 2024 offending

3. On 17 February 2024 at approximately 2:30am, Mr Lock and a co-offender, Mr Mitchell Jacka, entered an apartment complex in Belconnen. They gained entry by forcing entry to a doorway, and they then entered the carpark via a stairwell.

4. The offenders went towards two Honda motorbikes. Both motorbikes were damaged to the ignition area. One motorbike had plastic broken from around the keyholes and two wires were cut. A piece of cutlery was jammed into the ignition. The damage caused to the other motorbike is not specified in the facts, beyond the particulars of the charge providing that the ignition was damaged.

5. The offenders then attempted to break into a white Toyota Landcruiser. I infer they were not initially successful, as the facts provide that they later returned to this vehicle and forced entry into it. This was by smashing the glass panel beside the driver’s side rear passenger window. The offenders searched this vehicle and took a pair of prescription sunglasses, coins, and a multi-tool. The front passenger door locks were damaged, causing the locks to be inoperable.

6. While in the carpark, the co-offender forced entry to the driver’s door of a Mitsubishi Lancer and searched the vehicle. Mr Lock then assisted the co-offender in searching the vehicle. In accordance with the particulars of the charges, the unlawful conduct in relation to this vehicle relates to causing damage to the steering alignment of the vehicle.

7. At about 3:55am, the offenders left the apartment complex, having been in the carpark for approximately one and a half hours. The entry to the apartment complex was reported by a resident who provided police with closed circuit television (CCTV) footage. Police recognised the co-offender, Mr Jacka.

8. During the entry to the complex, Mr Lock was wearing dark tracksuit type clothing with some distinct markings. There is no suggestion that the offenders made additional efforts to hide their identities, such as by wearing masks or gloves.

9. Police investigations ascertained that Mr Lock was wearing the same clothing outside of a retail shop the following day. On 8 April 2024, police searched a residence in Giralang where Mr Lock had been residing. They located clothing consistent with that depicted in the CCTV footage from the apartment complex. Mr Lock was also identified by a person who knew him as the person depicted in the footage.

10. On 27 April 2024, Mr Lock spoke to police in a record of interview during which he admitted knowing Mr Jacka, but he denied the offending.

Assessment of the offending

11. By his subsequent pleas of guilty, he now accepts his role in the offending. It appears there is little to distinguish his role from that of his co-offender: DPP v Jacka [2024] ACTSC 376 (DPP v Jacka). They were both charged with aggravated burglary by virtue of their commission of the offence in company, which accounts for the increased maximum penalty. However, Mr Jacka entered the complex carrying a knife, with this also informing the statutory aggravation in his charge. Such conduct is not attributable to Mr Lock. Further, with respect to the unauthorised entry to the vehicle, Mr Jacka was the one to force entry to the door of the vehicle. Another distinction is that Mr Jacka was not charged, and therefore not sentenced, in respect of the theft of the items from the Landcruiser.

12. These items were likely of not insignificant financial value to the victim, and they were of a nature that likely resulted in inconvenience in arranging replacement. The circumstances in which they were stolen involves a violation of the victim’s privacy and security, and the offence carries a significant maximum penalty.

13. Mr Jacka has been sentenced in relation to the other offences. As observed in those remarks (DPP v Jacka at [32]-[33]), a not insignificant period of time was spent in the carpark, indicative of a concerning level of confidence as to a willingness to engage in offending behaviour. However, it was not a sophisticated example of this offence. The time at which the entry occurred limited the prospect of residents of the complex being exposed to the offending, and fortunately no one directly was. All of the residents will though have experienced alarm and distress from the violation occasioned by the entry, and multiple victims experienced financial implications and inconvenience.

14. As to the offences of unauthorised entry of a motor vehicle and providing a false name/address, these are fine only offences. Reflective of the role of the totality principle in the sentencing exercise, and Mr Lock’s limited financial means, I consider it appropriate to convict Mr Lock of the offences, with no penalty imposed.

15. With respect to the offence of aggravated burglary, the prosecution assisted with authorities of potential comparative assistance: R v Donnelly [2021] ACTSC 336; R v Foster [2021] ACTSC 229; R v Muell [2019] ACTSC 77. However, as the prosecution appropriately acknowledged, in this matter a strong degree of parity between the co-offenders is indicated. Current sentencing practice for this offence was also considered in DPP v Jacka at [60]. In that context, it was observed that, in contrast to typical offenders of this type, Mr Jacka was not a recidivist offender for the offence of burglary. Nor is Mr Lock, such that, as with Mr Jacka, some leniency is available given deterrence is not as strongly indicated for this offence.

Parity

16. The starting points for Mr Jacka’s sentences were eight months imprisonment for the aggravated burglary, 40 days imprisonment with respect to each damage property, and he was convicted with no penalty imposed in respect to the unauthorised entry to the motor vehicle: DPP v Jacka at [79].

17. The terms were ordered to be served consecutively to reflect the harm caused to each individual victim: DPP v Jacka at [63]. A similar approach is warranted here, although the totality principle is such that a degree of concurrency is appropriate and a crushing sentence is to be avoided.

18. Mr Jacka was sentenced at the same time to separate offences of aggravated robbery and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The totality of his sentence is therefore not of relevance for parity purposes. I note though that Mr Jacka was sentenced to a drug and alcohol treatment order.

18 August 2024 offending

19. On 18 August 2024 at about 12:20am, Mr Lock entered the backyard of a residence in Gungahlin. He got into a Subaru WRX and drove it down the driveway, before leaving it on the road and running away. The occupants of the residence were alerted to his presence by their security system and they called police.

20. At about 12:35am, police located Mr Lock on another street in Gungahlin. Police approached him and asked his name. He replied with a fake name, and provided his address as a residence in Gungahlin. Police ascertained that the name provided was false. During a search conducted of Mr Lock, police located a card and tax invoice related to the owners of the Subaru WRX.

21. Mr Lock was informed that he was under arrest, and he fled from police.

22. At about 12:50am, a resident of a complex in Gungahlin called triple zero, reporting that someone had jumped into their backyard. Police were advised that the person had since jumped the fence into an adjoining residence, which was the location that Mr Lock had earlier given to police as his residential address.

23. Police attended at that residence and were informed by an occupant that no one had come into the home. Police then located Mr Lock in one of the bedrooms moments later. Assessment of the offending

24. The driving of the stolen motor vehicle is an unusual example of this type of offence. It was for only a very short duration and distance, and the vehicle was immediately recovered. There is no suggestion of damage to the vehicle, and it was a limited period of inconvenience for the victims. Nonetheless, the circumstances in which it was driven will have been alarming for the victims and any period of driving the vehicle of another person without consent warrants a deterrent sentence. I am satisfied that the only appropriate penalty is one of imprisonment.

25. As to the escaping arrest offence, this also warrants a deterrent sentence. While it seems that no officers were harmed in the escape, it was an escape for a short duration, and it was an unsophisticated example of this offence, conduct that frustrates law enforcement is to be deterred. It is also to be denounced, and I am satisfied that the only appropriate penalty is one of imprisonment.

26. Reflective of the totality principle in these offences, and the distinct nature of the offending, I consider that it is appropriate they are served cumulatively on the sentences for the earlier offences, and served as distinct cumulative terms.

Subjective circumstances

27. Mr Lock is now 29 years of age and was aged 27 and 28 at the time of the offending.

28. His background is one of profound disadvantage and deprivation. It was a childhood with disruption, transient housing, and parental substance abuse. The details of this are considered in previous sentencing decisions of this Court (see below at [34]) and are unnecessary to repeat.

29. It was not contended on Mr Lock’s behalf that the principles from Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 (Bugmy) apply, with it submitted “strictly, Bugmy doesn’t apply. He’s not of an Aboriginal background”. However, this is the opposite of what the High Court in Bugmy provides. That is, the High Court said (at [37]): An Aboriginal offender’s deprived background may mitigate the sentence that would otherwise be appropriate for the offence in the same way that the deprived background of a non-Aboriginal offender may mitigate that offender’s sentence.

30. The prosecution, appropriately, did not submit against a conclusion that the so called Bugmy principles are of application in respect to Mr Lock. I agree. That is, as the High Court also said in Bugmy (at [43], [44]): The experience of growing up in an environment surrounded by alcohol abuse and violence may leave its mark on a person throughout life. Among other things, a background of that kind may compromise the person’s capacity to mature and to learn from experience. It is a feature of the person’s make-up and remains relevant to the determination of the appropriate sentence, notwithstanding that the person has a long history of offending. Because the effects of profound childhood deprivation do not diminish with the passage of time and repeated offending, it is right to speak of giving “full weight” to an offender’s deprived background in every sentencing decision.

31. Mr Lock came to be living with his father in Canberra as an adolescent. He commenced use of substances in this period, beginning with cannabis at 13 or 14 years of age, amphetamine at 15 or 16 years, and methamphetamine when he was 17 years of age. He describes these substances as his “drugs of choice”, but has also used other substances, including benzodiazepine and heroin on occasion. Mr Lock has previously engaged in rehabilitation programs, but has not achieved sustained sobriety. He reported recognising that a residential program would be beneficial to him. He also expressed that the “rigidity” of a treatment order would assist him to “ensure he did not relapse”. He is currently using pharmacotherapy to good effect.

32. Mr Lock reports diagnoses of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, post traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression. He uses medication for some of the conditions to good effect. He has no symptoms indicative of any major mental illness. He has some physical health conditions, but not in the nature that would cause a treatment order to be unsuitable for him.

33. Mr Lock maintains contact with his grandmother and his parents, including his mother, who he is proud of for having achieved a drug free life. He has a son who is a motivating factor for him to rehabilitate. Mr Lock intends to engage with employment at an appropriate stage of his recovery and he has the prospect of obtaining a driver’s license. He has completed the equivalent of year 12 and has obtained certificates in automotives and in heavy machinery. His goals include to “get [his] life back on track”.

Criminal history and conditional liberty

34. Mr Lock has a criminal history reflective of his history of substance dependency. It is a history that spans three jurisdictions and includes offences of obtaining property by deception and driving offending. Mr Lock has also been convicted of offences of robbery and sentenced in the Supreme Court. He first came to be incarcerated after his 21st birthday.

35. On 7 December 2023, Mr Lock was released on parole following the most recent Supreme Court sentence and a sentence for driving offending. This parole order was to expire on 30 April 2024. Accordingly, Mr Lock was on parole at the time of the 17 February 2024 offending. In respect of the 18 August 2024 offending, he was on bail, having been granted bail for the earlier offending on 13 August 2024.

36. It follows that Mr Lock was on two forms of conditional liberty at the time of the offending. This is an aggravating factor on sentence and is of concern in terms of his ability to comply with a community based order. The strongly deterrent effect of a parole order did not deter offending, nor did a release on bail only some five days before the later offending.

Pleas of guilty

37. In respect to most of the charges, Mr Lock pleaded not guilty at the first appearance in the Magistrates Court. The bench sheets from that Court reflect that CCTV footage was to be disclosed. Shortly after, still at a mention stage, a plea of guilty was indicated to some charges, but not all charges. Some charges were allocated a hearing date in the Magistrates Court. In advance of the listed hearing date, pleas of guilty were entered in relation to all charges. This includes with respect to the 18 August 2024 charges which were never the subject of a not guilty plea. All charges were then committed for sentence to be heard in the Drug and Alcohol Sentencing List in the Supreme Court.

38. While there were initially pleas of not guilty to most of the charges, and some utilitarian value was not realised, I consider that, given the early indications of a plea of guilty, a full reduction in the order of 25 per cent is appropriate.

Time in custody

39. Mr Lock has been remanded in custody solely with respect to the charges the subject of this sentencing exercise from 3 June 2024 until 13 August 2024 (72 days) and from 18 August 2024 until today (275 days). However, he was recently sentenced by the Magistrates Court to a one month term of imprisonment, which also took into account a period on remand in respect to that charge. In accordance with the position of the parties, this reduces the applicable period in presentence custody by 28 days. A total of 319 days has been spent in presentence custody in relation to the charges the subject of sentence, and the sentence will be backdated to reflect this.

Consideration

40. The terms of imprisonment to be imposed are such that Mr Lock is eligible for a treatment order per s 12A(1) of the Sentencing Act. As to the appropriateness of such an order (s 12A(2)(b) Sentencing Act) and Mr Lock’s suitability for it (ss 80S, 80T Sentencing Act), the primary issue that concerns me is his capability and willingness to comply with a community based sentence of imprisonment.

41. The Corrective Services assessment report describes Mr Lock as having mixed compliance with previous community based orders, and raised that: Mr Lock’s answers to interview questions do not convey accountability for his actions, strong motivation to change, identified lessons from prior treatment or desire to comply with a [treatment order], although it is recognised that custodial environments can influence offenders’ well-being and responses to queries.

42. However, Corrective Services found that in their final interview with Mr Lock, he was “a little more receptive” to treatment options and to development of an individual strategy. It was also observed that Corrective Services records indicate that Mr Lock demonstrates higher compliance with community orders when he has been subject to greater monitoring. He was assessed by Corrective Services as suitable for a treatment order.

43. Canberra Health Services also find Mr Lock suitable for a treatment order, finding that he “engaged positively, appropriately and enthusiastically” during the assessment. He is described as presenting as “future focused” and as having “conveyed motivation towards engaging with treatment, finding employment, and … reconnect[ing] with his son”. This assessment reports that at the time of the offending Mr Lock expressed that he was “using a lot”. He attributes his substance use as the primary contributing factor to his criminal behaviour. Health Services find there to be a high likelihood of severe substance use disorder at the time of the offending.

44. A therapeutically recommended residential program is available for him. He has available to him thereafter housing through the Justice Housing Program. Health Services observe that Mr Lock acknowledged that the “intensive support provided as part of the [treatment order] would be pivotal in supporting his goal to create a lifestyle free from substance use”.

45. I conclude that promoting Mr Lock’s rehabilitation, by addressing his substance dependency, is the mechanism that will best avoid further offending by him. Doing so by way of the onerous requirements, and accountability measures, of a treatment order is the best mechanism available to achieve that. It will also fulfill other sentencing purposes. Mr Lock is plainly someone that the community will be protected from if he addresses his substance dependency. A treatment order is both an appropriate and suitable one.

Treatment and supervision period

46. Having said that, as will become apparent, in imposing a treatment order in respect to Mr Lock, and having regard to the period he has spent in presentence custody, the period of time remaining under the custodial part of the order that is suspended is a period of some seven months. This is less than the period of treatment and supervision recommended by Health Services, being a period of 12 to 18 months. It is also less than what is typically involved for a participant on a treatment order.

47. Typically, an offender subject to a treatment order is required to engage with treatment and supervision for a period no less than 12 months and no more than two years. This period reflects the ability for a participant to progress through three rehabilitation phases, the first phase being for a duration of three months, the second for four months, and the third for at least five months. However, these durations are not provided for in any of the practice notices or protocols that guide the operation of the drug and alcohol sentencing 1 list. Similarly, the recently updated All Rise ‘Adult Treatment Court Best Practice 2 Standards’ (April 1 2025), which informs the conduct of drug and alcohol sentencing courts, does not prescribed the period recommended for close rehabilitative supervision, beyond observing that: After completing a formal sequence of [therapeutic] interventions, an additional 3 months of monitoring and recovery management services are ordinarily required to encourage continued involvement in recovery support services after discharge from treatment court and to begin a process of addressing long-term adaptive needs such as remedial education, vocational training, home management skills, or assistance in sustaining stable gainful employment.

48. It appears to me that the issue is most appropriately considered with reference to the circumstances of each individual offender, and in accordance with the legislation that regulates treatment orders. In doing so, a useful starting point is to reflect on the objects of such an order, as provided by s 80O of the Sentencing Act, being: 80O Objects of drug and alcohol treatment orders The objects of making a treatment order in relation to an offender is to— (a) facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by providing a judicially supervised, therapeutically oriented and integrated treatment regime; and (b) reduce the offender’s dependency on alcohol or a controlled drug; and (c) reduce the health risks associated with the offender’s dependency on alcohol or controlled drugs; and (d) assist with the offender’s integration into the community; and (e) promote community safety by reducing the level of criminal activity caused by alcohol or controlled drug dependence in offenders.

49. I further observe that, while the legislation is only concerned with the court not imposing “a lesser sentence of imprisonment on the offender than the circumstances of the offence would ordinarily require only to allow the court to make a treatment order” (s 12A(5) Sentencing Act), there can be no doubt that imposing a greater sentence for the purposes of a treatment order would be contrary to law, and anathema to justice.

1 https://www.courts.act.gov.au/supreme/law-and-practice/criminal/drug-and-alcohol-sentencing-list. 2 https://allrise.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Adult-Treatment-Court-Best-Practice-Standards\_4.1.25.pdf.

50. The issue comes to be considered in a context of whether Mr Lock is, in the circumstances, eligible for a treatment order per s 80S(c) of the Sentencing Act. That is, having regard to whether “appropriate arrangements for the administration of a treatment order are practicable.”

51. There is no legislated period as to the duration of the treatment and supervision period, only that a treatment order is to include a custodial part and a treatment and supervision part: s 80V, 80X Sentencing Act. Indeed, s 80X(2), (3) provide: (2) The treatment and supervision part of a treatment order is in force for the period that – (a) starts when the treatment order is made; and (b) ends – (i) on a day stated by the court; or (ii) if the court earlier cancels the order, or the treatment and supervision part of the order – on the day of cancellation. (3) However, the treatment and supervision part of a treatment order must not end later than the day the custodial part of the order ends.

52. The rehabilitation program that has been recommended with respect to Mr Lock is scheduled to occur for a period of three months. There will be sufficient time for that program to be completed, and for Mr Lock to progress to at least the second phase of treatment and supervision under a treatment order. If he applies himself fully to his rehabilitation, there is a prospect he can graduate the treatment order within a condensed timeframe. If instead his rehabilitation journey is reflective of a non-linear nature, there remains a prospect of completing the treatment order as a non-graduate: DPP v Savage (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 121 [5]. Either way, Mr Lock, and the community, will have the benefit of there being close supervision upon the release from custody. I am satisfied that the purposes of sentencing remain fulfilled by the imposition of a treatment order, that the objects of such an order are capable of being met, and that appropriate arrangements for the administration of the order are practicable. A treatment order will be imposed.

Orders

53. For those reasons, the following orders are made: (1) On the charge of aggravated burglary (CAN 2024/5627) the offender is convicted and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment, reduced from 8 months imprisonment on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 4 July 2024 and end on 3 January 2025. (2) On the charge of theft (joint commission) (CAN 2024/5629) the offender is convicted and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, reduced from 4 months imprisonment on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 4 December 2024 and end on 3 March 2025. (3) On the charge of destroy/damage property (joint commission) (CAN 2024/5626) the offender is convicted and sentenced to 1 month imprisonment, reduced from 40 days imprisonment on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 4 March 2025 and end on 3 April 2025. (4) On the charge of destroy/damage property (joint commission) (CAN 2024/5630) the offender is convicted and sentenced to 1 month imprisonment, reduced from 40 days imprisonment on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 4 April 2025 and end on 3 May 2025. (5) On the charge of destroy/damage property (joint commission) (CAN 2024/5631) the offender is convicted and sentenced to 1 month imprisonment, reduced from 40 days imprisonment on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 4 May 2025 and end on 3 June 2025. (6) On the charge of destroy/damage property (joint commission) (CAN 2024/5632) the offender is convicted and sentenced to 1 month imprisonment, reduced from 40 days imprisonment on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 4 June 2025 and end on 3 July 2025. (7) On the charge of drive motor vehicle without consent (CAN 2024/8405) the offender is convicted and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, reduced from 4 months imprisonment on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 4 July 2025 and end on 3 October 2025. (8) On the charge of escape from arrest (CAN 2024/8407) the offender is convicted and sentenced to 3 months imprisonment, reduced from 4 months imprisonment on account of the plea of guilty, to commence on 4 October 2025 and end on 3 January 2026. (9) On the charge of unathorised entry of motor vehicle (CAN 2024/5628) the offender is convicted and no penalty is imposed. (10) On the charge of provide false name/address (CAN 2024/8406) the offender is convicted and no penalty is imposed. Drug and alcohol treatment order (11) A Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order pursuant to s 12A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) is made for Kaine Lock, in respect of the eligible offences set out in Orders 1 to 8, of which Kaine Lock has been convicted, and for which he has been sentenced to a total term of 1 year and 6 months imprisonment. (12) The drug and alcohol treatment order be for 7 months and 16 days, to commence on 19 May 2025 and end on 3 January 2026. (13) The Custodial Part of the drug and alcohol treatment order for the eligible offences be suspended under s 80W of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) from 19 May 2025 and to 3 January 2026. (14) The Treatment and Supervision Part of the drug and alcohol treatment order be for 7 months and 16 days, to commence on 19 May 2025 and end on 3 January 2026. (15) For the Treatment and Supervision Part of the drug and alcohol treatment order: (a) The core conditions of the order set out in s 80Y of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) be hereby imposed. (b) Kaine Lock undertake any program, treatment or counselling, alcohol and drug testing or case management, and comply with any direction as to where he resides, or any curfew that may be required, by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team and obey all reasonable directions of any member of that Team. (c) If Kaine Lock is discharged from or leaves any treatment program, he is to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4:00pm on the next business day. (d) Kaine Lock not return a positive test sample under alcohol and drug testing. (e) Kaine Lock not consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs and prescription drugs not prescribed to him. (f) Kaine Lock comply with any directions of the Court from time to time about attendance at Court in person or by electronic means. (16) Kaine Lock be directed to sign a sealed copy of this Order and an undertaking to comply with the Order and any obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) for the period that this Order is in force before he leave the Court precincts on 19 May 2025. (17) Kaine Lock return for DASL review in person or by AVL on Tuesday, 27 May 2025 at 12:30pm before Christensen AJ.

I certify that the preceding fifty-three [53] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Acting Justice Christensen Associate: Date: 19 May 2025