DPP v Langley

The offending took place between June 2014 to December 2016, when the child was aged between 12 and 15. All charges involved touching of the child's breast, either predominantly outside of clothing, but on one occasion inside.

b) The indictment also included two charges of incest involving his youngest stepdaughter, a crime pursuant to s44(1) of the then Crimes Act, for which the maximum penalty prescribed was one of 25 years imprisonment. Those charges are Charges 5 and 7 and occurred when she was 13 to 16, from 1 August 2015 to 31 December 2016. Both charges involved digital penetration of the vagina.

1. Finally on the indictment were two charges, Charges 8 and 9 of sexual assault, pursuant to s40(1) of the then Crimes Act, bringing with it a maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment. This sexual assault involved his older stepdaughter and the offending took place between January 2016 through to December 2016, when she was aged between 17 and 18.

1. Mr Langley was tried for these offences in December of 2021 and sentenced on 1 June 2022 by Judge Dyer. There were at the time additional offences in the indictment. An appeal was lodged, and on 29 August 2024 all convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered by the Court of Appeal, see Langley (a pseudonym) v R[2].

1. Coming to the offending the indecent act charges, which I have detailed, with a child under 16, occurred in the following circumstances:

a) Firstly, while driving the child to the doctor at The Gateway shopping centre, when the child was aged 12 to 13. > > b) Secondly, touching her on the return from that journey from the doctors when they got home. > > c) Thirdly, touching her at home when she was approximately 13 when she asked for money to be able to go to the movies. She was manipulated at that time, in order for such offence to be committed and the offence stopped when the mother was heard in the home. > > d) Fourthly, the circumstances in regard Charge 6, occurred at Beechworth. On that day, she was in the car with Mr Langley, when they were driving the child's grandfather to Wodonga. Rather than go to school, they then went off for a drive, having dropped the grandfather off, they stopped near a hill. The child was laid down on the grass and at that occasion, she being 13, her breasts were touched. This was a prelude to Charge 5, the incest charge. > > e) The final charge involving indecent act was Charge 6. That also occurred when she was 13 in Wodonga. It was a school day. Mr Langley was mowing the lawns. The child had come out to the shed to bring some oil. She was pushed against the wall of the shed by Mr Langley, who touched her breast. Having done that, he was asked by the child, 'Fuck, what type of parent are you?' She struggled against him and again, this charge was a prelude to the incest Charge 7.

I come then to the two incest charges in regard to the youngest stepdaughter.

f) As I indicated the Charge 5 occurred when she was 13 at Beechworth. She was on the ground and this charge occurred following Charge 4. Mr Langley placed his finger into her vagina, after having tried to pull her pants off, which she refused to allow. She was seeking to push him off and in the physical circumstances of that, she managed to disturb a recent operating scar on his body.

g) The last charge in in regard to his youngest stepdaughter is Charge 7. This is also an incest charge and occurred in the shed following Charge 6. Following those circumstances that I have detailed in Charge 6, he then placed his fingers in the child's vagina. She was trying to get his hand out of her pants and she could not. She became particularly upset, and was very concerned and worried at that stage that she had to put up with these type of assaults from her stepfather for the rest of her life.

h) Charges 8 and 9 concern the oldest stepdaughter. They both occurred during 2016. Charge 8 took place at the beginning of 2016, when Mr Langley was driving her to the gym and on this particular occasion, he touched her thigh, she said while he was trying to get to her vagina. She pushed or took his hand away and he said to her, 'Why did you do that? This is just normal. It's no great deal'

1. Finally the last charge on the indictment occurred in the parents' room, where there was a walk in closet and this was during 2016. He had placed her in the closet, touched her breast outside her clothing and used his body to block her escape, pushing against her. At the time, she considered or believed that he was masturbating behind her.

1. There are no victim impact statements filed in this matter. The presentence detention is agreed at 1025 days.
2. Mr Langley is subject to the serious sex offender legislation, which a sentence of imprisonment in regard to Charges 1 and 2, require the Court to have as its primary consideration the protection of the community. There was no submission by the prosecution of the need to pass a disproportionate sentence. All of the charges are defined as serious sex charges. The provisions as to cumulation in 6E apply, and 6F applies a notation in regard to Charges 3 to 9, will have to be made that in those charges, he was sentenced as a serious sexual offender.

1. The prosecution tendered the submissions on plea, Exhibit A and spoke to them. It was put that there was a need for general deterrence, condign punishment, especially in regard to the incest charges. It was further put that over a considerable prolonged period, a breach of trust had occurred between a stepfather and his two stepchildren. It should be pointed out that that period in regard to the youngest child was two years, whereas the oldest child was all within 2016.
2. It was further put that such offending involved limited physical coercion, but was connected with manipulation and opportunism, coercion and exploitation of the relationship.
3. There being no victim impact statements, Mr Barry relied upon the presumption of pain and the consequences to victims of such offences committed upon them as a child. These are in particular the first seven offences. As reported in Clarkson[3], I quote from [26] 'Protection from harm'.

In its statutory context, the absolute prohibition on sexual activity with a child can be seen as having twin purposes. The first is to protect children from the harms caused by premature sexual activity and - to that end - to protect them from their own immaturity. On behalf of the community, Parliament has decided that those under 16 cannot meaningfully consent to sexual activity, even if subjectively attracted to the idea ... [no suggestion, I should say, in this case, of that.] Secondly - and in order to advance the protective purpose - the prohibition is designed to deter those who contemplate sexual activity with a person under 16.

What emerges clearly from these authorities is the absolute prohibitions on underage sexual activity are founded on the presumption of harm. ... premature sexual activity is presumed to cause 'long term and serious harm, both physical and psychological' to the child.

5. The prosecution accepted the relevance of the principles of delay and the principles detailed in RH McL v R[4] by the High Court as to sentencing at a second trial. Taking into account the above matters, the prosecution submitted that the appropriate sentence was a term of imprisonment and parole.

1. The defence tendered nine exhibits. The submissions dated 20 November 2025 were Exhibit 1; two character references were Exhibit 2; the nursing report in 2018 when Mr Langley had had suicidal ideation is Exhibit 3; the reports of various doctors relevant to the first trial and the consequence of sentencing thereafter were detailed from [4]-[8], being Exhibit 4; Dr Dowling's report 25/02/19 Exhibit 5; Dr Walton's report 04/06/19 Exhibit 6; the Forensicare report dated 07/11/19 Exhibit 7; Dr Davis' report dated 21/03/22 Exhibit 8; the extracted evidence of Dr Davis; and finally Exhibit 9 was details of the programs completed by Mr Langley when he served his first gaol sentence.
2. As I have said, as to Exhibits 3-8, all were previously tendered in regard to the previous trial, the sentencing process or the preliminary applications before the Court in that matter as to fitness and admissibility of the record of interview.
3. As is clear from the clinical neurological psychological report of Dr Dowling (Exhibit 4) at p11 was detailed the testing of Mr Langley and the determination of his IQ at 55, described in the report as 'mildly disabled'. However, Dr Dowling opined that the correct figure was more like 65. This testing took place in March 19. Such opinion was confirmed with the later report of Dr Davis, forensic clinical psychologist, of 22 March 22 (Exhibit 7) where he agreed with Dr Dowling that Mr Langley was more capable than the diagnosis would suggest, albeit had difficulties with an interpreter, see [102].
4. Both of those specialists had noticed the slowness of processing speed, which they believed was linked to the education of Mr Langley, I should say the 'limited education'.
5. Dr Walton provided a report (Exhibit 5), consultant psychiatrist, in June of 2019, as I have recorded. Insofar as the IQ testing of Dr Dowling, Mr Walton considered Mr Langley's intelligence lay within the normal range.
6. Professor Ogloff, who was the author of the Forensicare report (Exhibit 6) in November 19, certainly thought him able to understand and cope with life, to be able to engage, to work, and carry out his normal activities without a problem.
7. Importantly as to the consideration of the defence submission as to Verdins set out at paragraph 1(a) of Exhibit 1, the Verdins principles reported in the case of Verdins[5], was what was said by Dr Davis in his report (Exhibit 7) at [109]:

It should be noted that there is nothing in the description of Mr Langley's offending behaviour to suggest that he did not appreciate its wrongfulness. His lower intellectual functioning and diagnosed mild intellectual disability would have undoubtedly affected his judgement to some degree, and may have potentially resulted in some impulsive decision-making, but the behavioural evidence indicates that he chose opportunities where he was alone with his victims and told one of his stepdaughters not to tell her mother.

8. I find that the persistent facts of this offending amply confirm that opinion of Dr Davis.
9. While I can accept Mr Cramer's reference to the principles set out in Muldrock v The Queen, put at [13] of his submission, on the basis of all of the evidence, and in particular the expert evidence, I do not find principle 1 of Verdins established. That is, there is no reduction in culpability caused by the intellectual deficit that he suffers. I of course am required to take such into account, in all matters involved in this sentencing, and I do so in regard to principles 2, 3 and 4 of Verdins.
10. Then coming to principles 4 and 5 themselves, based upon the reality of Mr Langley's prison exposure to date, his previous major depressive disorder[6], while it might be said that a determination of that is speculative at this stage, given the history, I conclude that there will be a high chance of recurrence in the foreseeable future, hence this sentence will weigh more heavily on Mr Langley than a normal person, and hence I take into account.
11. In addition to his low IQ, the circumstances show that demonstrably prison will place a burden upon him, an additional burden than would not be borne by the normal person entering prison.
12. I also accept the proposition in paragraph 1(e) of the submissions, that the imprisonment will impose an increased burden upon him, knowing that his now wife/partner and their family will suffer, I refer to Exhibit 1 at [49]-[52]. Such is a factor of course when a person serves gaol from a sentence, but of course in this case, he has already served a period of, prior to the plea, 1,610 days previous to the appeal.

1. I accept the submissions as to delay, which the prosecutor did also[7]. Since confronted in 2017, eight and a half years have passed. Mr Langley, had to endure the pandemic, a trial in 2021, subsequent to that an initial refusal by the Legal Aid authorities to back an appeal, then the decision in June of 2024 of the Legal Aid authorities to support the appeal, then the appeal in 2004. He was on bail pending his trial till October 2025.
2. In considering this submission on delay, in the circumstances of a retrial, I am not certain as to Mr Cramer's classification of this delay as being 'inordinate'. However, I accept that the delay is highly relevant to this sentence.
3. I accept certainly in gaol he suffered depression and anxiety as to his future, as he has done over the totality of the last eight and a half years, and associated stress. Given that he still denies the offending, such facts do not go to rehabilitation.
4. However, certainly he has no priors and there is no evidence, apart from these convictions, since his release on appeal bail, of any further offending. In that regard, Exhibit 2 from his employer in March 2022, speaks to his excellent employment record and character, and Exhibit 3 from his partner, speaks of him carrying out his responsibilities as a carer since he has been on appeal bail, or while she was working. And I also take into account Exhibit 9, the courses that he undertook while imprisoned.
5. I also accept the statements put to the Court in DPP v Merryfull and Bloomfield[8], about the entire period of delay from 2017 to 2005 as being relevant to both limbs of delay. And further, I accept the proposition that there can be no fault in the circumstances attributed to Mr Langley for this delay.
6. I also accept during such delay, certainly initially at the time that he was advised of these allegations in 2017, his anxiety to a degree that he attempted suicide and was placed on anti-depression tablets, see Exhibit 3, the report from North East Mental Health Service. From that time arose the issue of being unable to see his own son, and that has continued to be an issue for him. Clearly, I accept that delay is a considerable mitigatory factor in this sentence.

1. Mr Langley has a permanent resident visa. He is not however a citizen, and is therefore subject, upon these convictions, to deportation after he has served his sentence. I take both aspects of delay into account, as referred to in Guden v The Queen [2010] VSCA 196 at [25]. I note that his now partner and family are established in Australia and have been since the relationship began in 2017, and he has had a daughter with her, and is now a stepfather to her son.
2. I also take into account, as I said initially, the principles that apply to sentencing a person after they have faced a retrial. These were expanded in R H McL v R, and I accept there is no presumption relevant to Judge Dyer's sentence. I further accept the proposition put by Mr Cramer at [64], that there should be a reduction due to the increased delay, and my own assessments of the Verdins factors that I have made in these sentencing remarks. I make the point however, the reference in that submission to the fact of his wife being part of the charges in the last trial, and him being convicted of those matters, is totally irrelevant as far as I am concerned, to this sentence. I just simply do not take that into account.
3. Albeit putting all of the above matters, Mr Cramer conceded the only appropriate sentence, given the crimes, was one of a head sentence and parole.

1. I take into account the submission on gravity by the defence. There is no issue made by the defence as to the gravity of Charges 5 and 7. I accept the submission made that the gravity in regard to Charges 1 and 3 and 6, should be assessed as low, whereas 4, while still in the low category would be higher than that assessment.
2. In regard to the incest Charges at 5 and 7, I would assess them at low to moderate gravity. And in regard to the two indecent matters of sexual assault on the older stepdaughter, I would assess that as low order.
3. Mr Langley, I point out that the High Court in Dalgleish[9], which was an incest case, detailed that the administration of criminal justice in this country, involves individualised justice, the imposition of a just sentence on an offender in a particular case, is an exercise of judicial discretion, concerned in this particular case to do justice to you. Mr Langley, it is unfortunate that sentences of this type take so long, in order to take into account all of the factors put to me by your counsel and by the prosecution, and to take into account s5 of the Sentencing Act 1991 and part 2A of the Sentencing Act, it is necessary for me to have gone to those particular matters.
4. Given your position appearing remotely, you just need to stay exactly where you are while I pronounce your sentence.
5. On Charge 1, you will sentenced to imprisonment for18 months.
6. On Charge 2, to imprisonment for 18 months.
7. On Charge 3, to imprisonment for 18 months.
8. On Charge 4, to imprisonment for 20 months.
9. All those of course are charges of indecent act with a child under the age of 16.
10. In regard to the incest charge, Charge 5, you will be sentenced to imprisonment for four years.
11. On further indecent act charge with a child under the age of 16, Charge 6, to imprisonment for 18 months.
12. On Charge 7, the further incest charge, imprisonment for four years.
13. The two charges against the older stepdaughter, I will sentence you on both Charges 8 and 9 to imprisonment for nine months.
14. I then come of course to consider the question of cumulation. This requires me to take into account s6E of the Sentencing Act. I accept the principles detailed in the case I have quoted a number of times for other matters in this instance, but in this instance McL v R, with the same reference, but at pp 476-477, [75] and [76], which speak of the importance of this Court complying with the views of Parliament as to cumulation.
15. In this regard, I also refer to in Gordon v The Queen[10]. In that case, the then Redlich AJ spoke of the tension which can arise when one is considering the principle of totality and the provision s6E of the Sentencing Act. In the case of John Gordon (a pseudonym) v R[11] he said this at [74]:

A sentencing judge must evaluate the overall criminality involved in all of the offences for which the offender is to undergo sentence, ensuring that there is no disproportion between the totality of the criminality and the totality of the effective length of sentences imposed. The judge is also required to ensure that the totality principle is applied in a manner which will not undermine the legislative policy inherent in s6E of the Sentencing Act 1991. This tension between the policy underlying s6E and the principle of totality is difficult to reconcile. Authority has thus far provided no clear guidance as to the circumstances in which the statutory presumption of full cumulation under s6E should override the principle of totality. However, it may at least be said that as the objective gravity of the total offending increases, so will the degree of cumulation which is ordered, thereby producing a total effective sentence which will more closely correspond with both the legislative policy underlying s6E and the principle of totality.

16. I have determined on the basis of totality, and the cases that I have just referred to, the cumulation as follows. The base sentence in regard to this sentence will be Charge 5, for which I have imposed imprisonment for four years. I order that insofar as that base sentence, there be cumulated upon such sentence and with each other of the sentences I am about to read out, six months of the sentence on Charge 1, 10 months of the sentence on Charge 4, two years of the sentence on Charge 7, and three months of the sentence passed on Charge 9, making a total effective sentence of seven years and seven months.
17. The non-parole period that I impose in regard to that sentence will be a period of five years and six months.
18. The PSD of 1,025 days will be declared service of this sentence and it will also be noted in the records that Mr Langley was sentenced as a serious sexual offender in regard to Charges 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9.
19. There is obviously no need for the Court to be concerned with 6AAA.
20. As best, Mr Langley, as I can work it out, you will be required to serve a further two years on top of the period you have already served, plus a couple of months. I am not quite sure about that, but the 1,025 comes out to something like three years and a bit, doesn't it? Three years and three months or something?
21. MR CRAMER: I think just, I think it's just under, just under three years.
22. HIS HONOUR: Just under three years, right?
23. COUNSEL: Two years and six months.
24. HIS HONOUR: Yes. Is there any questions from counsel in regard to those matters or determinations?
25. MR ROSSI: Nothing, Your Honour.
26. MR CRAMER: No, Your Honour.
27. HIS HONOUR: Thank you, Mr Cramer, and also Mr Rossi, for your assistance, and Mr Cramer in particular for your plea.
28. HIS HONOUR: Well for those who are listening in the prison, can we arrange to leave Mr Langley in the current position until he's been able to talk to his solicitor and in order to facilitate that, I will get off the Bench. As I say for the last time.

[2] [2024] VSCA 187.

[3] [2011] VSCA 157.

[4] [2000] 203 CLR 452 at [23]

[5] [2007] VSCA 102 at [32].

[6] See Dr Davis' report [104] and [110], following his conviction in 2021.

[8] [2023] VSCA 244 at [60].

[9] [2017] ALJR 91, at [1063], [1072] and [49].

[10] [2013] VSCA 343