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[2025] ACTSC 325
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of the ACT
2025-06-23
Christensen AJ
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Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: DPP v Kazmar-Hall Citation: [2025] ACTSC 325 Hearing Date: 23 June 2025 Decision Date: 23 June 2025 Before: Christensen AJ Decision: (1) The verdict of the Court is that the accused is guilty of Count 1 (CAN 2024/5133, arson, s 404 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT)) on the indictment dated 27 May 2025.
Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judge alone trial – arson – where accused set fire to own unit – conduct in extenuating circumstances – relentless music emanating from neighbouring unit – previous attempts to resolve issue unsuccessful – whether act of self-defence – imminence or immediacy of threat – reasonableness of response – agreed facts – impacts on accused’s health – verdict cannot be based on sympathy – guilty Legislation Cited: Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) r 2470 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 18, 28, 41, 42, 404 Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) s 191 Supreme Court Act 1933 (ACT) ss 66B, 68C Cases Cited: Liberato v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507 R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 R v Zdravkovic [2020] ACTSC 251 Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions Steven Kazmar-Hall (Accused) Representation: Counsel E Priestly (DPP) E Chen (Accused) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) Legal Aid ACT (Accused) File Number: SCC 237 of 2024 CHRISTENSEN AJ:
Introduction
Background
On 23 June 2025, Steven Kazmar-Hall (the accused) was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to charge CAN 2024/5133. The charge contends: That on 9 April 2024 at Canberra in the Australian Capital Territory STEVEN KAZMAR-HALL caused damage to a building, namely 16/2 Emerald Way Amaroo by fire, and intended to cause or was reckless about causing damage to that building.
It is not in issue that Mr Kazmar-Hall caused damage by fire to the particular unit as alleged. In issue is the reason that the accused did this, that is, whether this was an act done in self-defence. Accordingly, the judge alone trial proceeded with agreed facts, with the only witness called to give evidence being the accused.
The submissions by counsel at the trial made plain that the issue was confined to whether the conduct was carried out in self-defence as provided by s 42 of the Criminal Code. This section provides: 42 Self-defence (1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the person carries out the conduct required for the offence in self-defence. (2) A person carries out conduct in self-defence only if— (a) the person believes the conduct is necessary— (i) to defend himself or herself or someone else; or (ii) to prevent or end the unlawful imprisonment of himself or herself or someone else; or (iii) to protect property from unlawful appropriation, destruction, damage or interference; or (iv) to prevent criminal trespass to land or premises; or (v) to remove from land or premises a person committing criminal trespass; and (b) the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives them. (3) However, the person does not carry out conduct in self-defence if— (a) the person uses force that involves the intentional infliction of death or serious harm— (i) to protect property; or (ii) to prevent criminal trespass; or (iii) to remove a person committing criminal trespass; or (b) the person is responding to lawful conduct that the person knows is lawful. (4) Conduct is not lawful for subsection (3) (b) only because the person carrying it out is not criminally responsible for it.
On behalf of the accused, mental impairment (s 28 of the Criminal Code) and sudden or extraordinary emergency (s 41 of the Criminal Code) were specifically disavowed as defences sought to be relied upon.
Directions
The submissions of the parties also made plain that other than as to self-defence, and the important directions as to the onus and standard of proof that apply in the trial, no other directions are warranted: s 68C(3) Supreme Court Act.
Accordingly, I direct myself that the starting point is that the accused does not have to prove that he did not commit the offence charged, or, in the circumstances of this matter, that the conduct was done in self-defence. The accused is presumed to be innocent. The prosecution bears the onus of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused cannot be found to be guilty of the offence unless the evidence which I accept satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. This standard of proof applies to each element of the offence, and, in the circumstances of the defence raised, the onus is on the prosecution to exclude beyond reasonable doubt that the conduct was done in self-defence.
The burden never shifts to the accused, including when, as here, the accused gave evidence in the trial. A direction in accordance with Liberato v The Queen (1985) 159 CLR 507 was not specifically sought, in circumstances where there was not a conflicting case. I direct myself that the fact the accused gave evidence does not alter the burden of proof. The accused does not have to prove his version is true. It is not for the accused to prove his innocence, but for the prosecution to prove his guilt.
If the evidence which I accept satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt in relation to the offence charged, then the accused loses the presumption of innocence, and the appropriate verdict is guilty. If, however, the evidence which I accept fails to satisfy me beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt, then he remains presumed to be innocent and the appropriate verdict is not guilty.
Agreed facts
Pursuant to s 191 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), facts relating to core elements of the offence were agreed. The agreed facts were comprehensive and amounted to the entirety of the prosecution case. These facts can be summarised as follows.
On 11 December 2019, the accused became the sole tenant of a two bedroom unit at [redacted]. The unit was part of an apartment complex known as ‘[redacted]’ and was leased to the accused by the Commissioner for Social Housing (the Commissioner). Mr DL, who has since died in circumstances unrelated to this matter, was the sole tenant of adjoining unit number 17.
In the years and months preceding the alleged arson, the accused made a series of complaints about noise coming from Mr DL’s unit. The agreed facts provide that the history as to complaints was: (a) Sometime in 2020, the accused raised a complaint with the Commissioner in a face-to-face meeting between the accused, a support worker for the accused, and a representative of the Commissioner. (b) On 9 December 2020, the Commissioner emailed the accused stating that it could “not breach the tenant without the EPS [Environmental Property Authority] readings” and they had contacted Mr DL “in a bid to get the music turned down”. The accused corresponded with the Commissioner on numerous further occasions complaining about the noise emanating from Mr DL’s apartment. (c) On 15 June 2021, the accused emailed the ACT Disability, Aged and Carer Advocacy Service, seeking their supporting to make a formal complaint to the ACT Civil and Administration Tribunal (ACAT) as to the manner in which ‘Housing ACT’ was handling his complaint. The accused said that [sic] “the noise is currently still occurring and has impact on my health. I have kept sound recordings the EPA has attended”. (d) On 25 October 2021, the accused emailed the Commissioner stating, “I am thinking of killing myself so you will have a solution to this problem soon”. This was referred to the Police, Ambulance & Clinical Early Response (PACER) team, who attended the accused’s unit. (e) On 9 February 2022, Ms Elizabeth Lee MLA, as a result of being contacted by a resident, wrote a letter to Ms Yvette Barry MLA, the Minister for Housing at the time, seeking for Ms Berry MLA to investigate the noise levels at the complex. (f) On 23 May 2022, the accused emailed, amongst other people, Ms Rebecca Vassarotti MLA and Ms Lee MLA, stating that he has had his wall “sound proofed [but] the bass still travels through this extra layer”. On 24 May 2022, an advisor to Ms Vassarotti MLA provided a response to the accused, stating, amongst other things, that [sic] “in previous correspondence you have indicated that you would be prepared to explore the option of a transfer. I have asked Housing ACT to send you’re a transfer kit via email and Housing ACT have advised me that this will be posted out to you today”. (g) Between December 2022 and May 2023, the accused did not make any further complaints about the noise emanating from Mr DL’s apartment. (h) In May 2023, the accused began submitting complaints again to the Commissioner regarding the noise emanating from Mr DL’s apartment.
On 26 May 2022, the Commissioner issued a Notice to Remedy to Mr DL regarding the noise emanating from his apartment.
On 27 May 2022, the accused filed an application with the ACAT against the Commissioner, seeking to resolve the residential tenancy dispute relating to the noise complaints. This application was dismissed on 12 December 2022.
On 1 June 2022, the accused submitted an application to the Commissioner to be transferred to another premises. The application was deemed to be incomplete and was not accepted by the Commissioner. The Commissioner requested the accused provide further information, including about his income. The accused did not provide any further information.
In October 2022, the accused filed an application in the ACAT regarding a residential tenancy dispute against Mr DL. On 12 December 2022, the ACAT made an order against Mr DL, requiring him “not to operate his music system so as to materially interfere with [the accused]’s peace and comfort”.
In the course of the complaints made, investigations were carried out. The agreed facts provide that these were: (a) On 11 May 2022, an officer from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) emailed the Commissioner advising that he had inspected the accused’s property two days earlier. The officer’s finding was that the noise level was 33.1dB(A), indicating the noise level complied with the relevant applicable levels before 10:00pm. The email continued that [sic]: The LCEeq-LAeq that can also be seen in the attached gave 20.4dB(A) this is a separate reading of the bass/low frequency noise from the music being played, this level is extremely high for a residential area and it is understandable why [the accused] is so affected by the noise, to give you an idea of how loud this bass is we licence outdoor concerts in the ACT with a condition allowing them to reach an LCeq-LAeq of 20dB(A). I believe this matter should be addressed in the hope of reducing the bass from your tenant … as the health issues accosted with long term exposure to this kind of low frequency noise is very serious and there are many study’s been undertaken in the past that can back this up also supporting behaviours been undertaken by [the accused] since he has been affected by this noise. (b) On 11 July 2022, the same officer from the EPA emailed the Commissioner, stating, amongst other things: Environment Protection officer [redacted] and myself attended at 19.50hrs on 10 July 2022 and could clearly hear the low frequency bass noise penetrating through [the accused]’s walls. It is understood noise insultation has been installed but based on last nights observations it appears to have had little or no effect. The noise was clearly audible to a point it would affect Mr Kazmar’s amenity. (c) On 12 August 2022, an Assistant Director from the EPA emailed the accused with the results of a noise reading conducted on 9 August 2022. He said that the noise from amplified music was compliant at the time of the recording, however, the “[bass component] is noteworthy” and the results of the recording would be forwarded to Housing for their consideration. The LCeq-LAeq was measured to be 23.6 dB.
In the course of the complaints made, the accused made numerous threats to burn down number [redacted], as well as engaging in other behaviours. The agreed facts provide that these were: (a) Throughout 2023, the Australian Federal Police (AFP) attended six incidents involving the accused’s threats to burn down the premises. (b) On 9 October 2023, an employee of the Commissioner contacted the accused regarding the noise complaints. Amongst other things, the accused said that Mr DL had started playing music again and that he was going to “deal with this bullshit again and would burn the building down … he would go to the petrol station to get fuel and burn the unit”. (c) On 17 October 2023, the AFP contacted the Commissioner advising the Commissioner that the accused had made threats to “burn the apartment down as he cannot handle the noise” and he had walked to a service station to purchase a jerry can of fuel. The AFP requested the Commissioner assist the accused by transferring him into alternative accommodation. (d) On 17 October 2023, an employee of the Commissioner noted an email from the accused had included [sic]: fuck you, it 3am. You wake me up. fuck you shit head. Love the smell of petrol in the morning. I need help. There continue to be breaches of orders. I am concerned for the safety of people in this building. Police removed petrol from my unit. When contacted, the accused advised that the 10 litre jerry can of fuel he had purchased had been confiscated after he had called the police. He apologised for the abusive emails but suggested they were “the only way I could cope with the noise”. An employee of the Commissioner advised him not to purchase fuel again, and they would do what they could to assist him with a potential transfer. (e) On 18 October 2023, the accused informed the Commissioner that he had broken a window in his premises after throwing a frying pan in frustration with the noise. (f) On 25 October 2023, the Commissioner sent a letter to the accused titled ‘warning notice’, referring to the consistent threats by the accused to set fire to the premises. The letter informed the accused that there was an intention to submit an application to the ACT seeking termination of the occupancy agreement. (g) On 6 November 2023, the accused sent the Commissioner an email stating that he had been woken up by Mr DL just before 3am, that he was “really angry” and that the [sic] “petrol station opens at 5am so I cope until then”. An employee of the Commissioner had tried several times to convince the accused to fill out a transfer application, to which he refused. (h) On 6 and 7 November, the accused called the Commissioner and threatened twice to burn down the premises. (i) On 7 November 2023, the accused emailed the Commissioner stating [sic] “I have no problem setting my unit on fire today”. (j) On 9 November 2023, the accused emailed the Commissioner stating he had broken a window again.
On 10 November 2023, the Commissioner provided the accused with a letter titled ‘second warning notice’ and informed the accused that the Commissioner would commence action in the ACAT seeking immediate termination of the tenancy.
On 20 November 2023, the accused filed proceedings in the ACT Magistrates Court seeking enforcement of the order made by the ACAT on 12 December 2022. On 23 November 2023, the accused applied for, and was granted, an Interim Personal Protection order against Mr DL.
On 8 December 2023, the Commissioner filed an application in the ACAT seeking termination of the tenancy agreement.
On 5 January 2024, the accused submitted a second application for a transfer of accommodation. On 11 January 2024, the accused was informed that his application had been approved and that he had been placed on the High Needs Allocation register.
Also on 11 January 2024, the ACAT made orders terminating the tenancy. This was appealed by the accused on 12 January 2024, which stayed his eviction. This decision was successfully appealed by the accused and on 29 October 2024, the Appeal Tribunal of the ACAT set aside the Commissioner’s application for termination due to the required notice not being provided to the accused.
On 18 January 2024, the accused attended the Central Access Point of Housing ACT. He had a discussion with two directors of Housing ACT, and a manager at One Link. The accused discussed the termination of his tenancy agreement and his desire to remain at the property or be transferred to an alternate property. After this, he was contacted by OneLink Services to discuss his housing options.
On 4 March 2024, the accused emailed the Commissioner stating [sic] “your tenant woke me up, I knocked on the shared wall 3 times, I called the police for urgent support. See you at the supreme court soon”.
On 9 March 2024, the accused emailed the Commissioner stating, “I have decided to call 000 and ask for support because of the amplified bass impact”. Also on this date, the accused emailed Ms Vassarotti MLA seeking a meeting for the purposes of obtaining assistance. He expressed, amongst other things, that “I am overwhelmed by the process of seeking assistance …”.
On 12 March 2024, the ACT Magistrates Court made an order pursuant to r 2470 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) that enforcement officers were “authorised to attend at [redacted], ACT to seize any sub-woofer speakers located at that premises”.
A download of the accused’s mobile phone established the following messages were sent between the accused and another person on 26 March 2024 as to the outcome of, I infer, a tribunal or court proceeding. The accused explained that “today was adjourned for a month” and that he was happy, but that “they had a barrister today. This government has too much money”. The other person asked about the accused’s lawyer and whether they were confident, and the accused replied “yep, I just have to help them get up to date with information”. From around this time, the accused was represented by lawyers at the ACAT proceedings.
On 2 April 2024, by consent and without admissions, the proceedings for a Personal Protection Order against Mr DL were discontinued after Mr DL gave an undertaking to not contact the accused or engage in behaviour that constituted violence towards the accused for 12 months.
On 8 April 2024, the accused sent an email to a representative of the Commissioner, stating “I was of the understanding that the speakers had been removed, they are stressing me out again”. Further, on this date, the accused sent an email to the ACT Magistrates Court stating “[h]i, [c]an I ask when the speakers will be removed, they are stressing me out”.
On 9 April 2024, sometime prior to 1:38am, the accused intentionally set fire to a bedroom of the unit. At no time did the Commissioner give the accused permission to damage the premises.
Subsequently, the premises were deemed uninhabitable due to damage caused by the fire and required extensive repairs. The investigation as to the fire, with the damage caused and the scene shown in photographs tendered in the trial, included: (a) An area of localised damage was observed in the north-west corner of the second bedroom, with truncated-cone fire patterns on the northern wall, western wall, and ceiling. The curtains and blinds against the window on the western wall were consumed by the fire. The three glass panels in the window were all broken, with some of the glass having fallen out and part of it remaining in the window frame. (b) Charred debris was identified on the floor in the north-west corner of the room, including cardboard boxes, books and remnants of curtains or blinds. No potential ignition sources were located and AFP forensics did not detect odours of ignitable liquids. (c) Impact damage was observed on the plasterboard within the second bedroom, some of which had features consistent with having been caused by a claw hammer. A hammer was observed on items that were on the chairs against the southern wall of the room.
On 9 April at about 1:33am, the accused sent an email to a Housing Manager at ACT Housing, stating “I don’t think I will be worn up again”.
At approximately 1:38am, the accused had a conversation with another tenant via Facebook Messenger, being [sic]: Accused: Shit happens when you lose it Tenant: Open the door now [the tenant then called the accused, but the call was unanswered] Accused: I am down the road Tenant: Why the hell did U do that? Accused: Couldn’t cope with the bass anymore Tenant: No excuse for what U did. U endangered everyone who lives there Accused: I have rights! Fuck off!
Also at approximately 1:38am, the accused posted an update on his Facebook page stating [sic] “I have rights! I lost I couldn’t cope anymore”.
At approximately 1:40am, ACT Fire and Rescue and Police attended at the complex. The fire was subsequently extinguished. At approximately 1:50am, the accused was located by police on [redacted]. He was arrested and cautioned. During the course of his arrest he said [sic]: It’s always my fault, everything. Why can’t the Court just take away his speakers? They said they would … they said they’d take away his speakers and he didn’t – they didn’t, and I lost it.
As the accused was being escorted to a police vehicle, the following conversation occurred between the accused and a police officer [sic]: Police: Seriously, hey? Accused: I lost it. Police: You know better than this, hey? Accused: Well, I thought I did, but – Police: - You lost your temper didn’t you? Accused: Oh, years ago … Police: It’s a shit situation, that’s why, hey? Accused: now you can add arson to it Police: Still not the best thing to be starting fires though … Accused: I did everything. I [unintelligible] Police: You should have just given us a call, alright? Accused: No, I’ve done that hundreds of times. Police: Yeah but still. Accused: No, that would not make a difference. Police: yeah, you not lighting the fire, that’s what it would have been. … Accused: I tried to complain three and a half fucking years ago. … Accused: I told the Court to fucking take the speakers away. … Accused: I tried so many times to complain and get … how are ACAT orders not enforceable, how are Magistrate orders not enforceable, how does nothing work? … Police: All we know now is you set your place on fire Accused: But not without trying to avoid this Police: Yeah but it still doesn’t mean you set your place on fire Accused: But it’s everyone … I know, I know and I am not trying to … there’s nothing logical about this to argue with.
On 21 June 2024, police discovered a large number of speakers in Mr DL’s unit.
Preliminary finding from agreed facts
It can be readily concluded from only the agreed facts that the accused endured significant disruption to his life as a result of the noise emanating from the adjoining unit. It can also be readily concluded that the accused spent significant time attempting to address this, through complaints raised to the Commissioner, to other government entities and individuals, and through the ACAT and Magistrates Court. The situation was not resolved permanently such that the accused could live comfortably in his unit. It can further be readily concluded from the agreed facts, that the accused came to set fire to his unit in the early hours of 9 April 2024.
The issue becomes why this occurred, and whether this conduct, in the circumstances of this matter, was done in self-defence. While no onus rests on the accused beyond the evidential burden raised, with the prosecution retaining the burden of proving the elements and disproving any legal burden raised beyond reasonable doubt, the primary consideration to determine this matter is the evidence of the accused.
Evidence
The accused was the only witness called in the trial. He gave evidence in chief and was cross examined.
His evidence in chief focused initially on many matters that were already essentially the subject of the agreed facts. That is, the accused gave evidence as to investigations undertaken regarding the extent that the noise from the neighbouring unit was disruptive, and the extent to which the accused comprehensively raised his concerns with various people and agencies. This included that the accused contacted police and politicians, he used an ‘app’ to measure the noise himself and provide this as evidence to support the concerns he was raising, and he sought legal assistance from Legal Aid (ACT). In circumstances where there is no dispute that the accused experienced significant disruption from his neighbour’s music, and that he took various measures to address it, it is unnecessary to detail this evidence. Suffice to say, that there was significant evidence, which I accept, as to the accused being exposed to highly disruptive and distressing music being played by his neighbour, and that the accused attempted multiple avenues and measures to address this. The accused’s evidence was that he began to experience the noise issue from around October 2020. The noise would bounce off of his walls, it was “very loud”, and would start at all times of the day, including the early hours, and would continue for “three or four hours”. The combination of the music being a “thumping bass” and the persistence of it, at various hours of the day and night, was plainly, I find on the evidence, a form of torment for the accused.
The extent to which the accused attempted to address the issue included that he moved his bedroom, he used earplugs, he tried speaking with his neighbour, he left his house more than he wanted to (which was particularly difficult during COVID-19 restrictions), and on 10 June 2022 he arranged for installation of, at his own expense of $2,420.00, a sound board. The accused explained that this insulation made no difference at all to the extent of disruptive noise. The accused also explained the hesitation he had to proceed with a housing transfer. He was “very reluctant to move” due to the risk that an alternative property would not be as suitable for his circumstances.
As to his threats to “buy petrol”, the accused said in chief that “it wasn’t my intention … it was just out of frustration”. The accused explained in relation to an occasion in October or November 2023 when he did purchase petrol from the station, but he didn’t pour it anywhere, that: I guess, like, like, almost every time this noise, it’s just – it got to me and I couldn’t cope and I – it doesn’t really make sense to think about, but I walked to the petrol station and bought petrol and – and then I got home and I put it there and I went back to sleep and then I woke up and called the police and asked them to come and take it away, and I just felt – I felt justified – I felt justified to just buy the petrol and do it, but I also don’t – I don’t think of myself as an arsonist, and I – I love the property. I wanted to live there for the rest of my life. I was really committed to be patient to go through the complaints process. So it actually kind of doesn’t make sense in my head how I would just get so angry and so justified to just buy petrol and just pour it everywhere. But I kind of feel it was a way to just get away from the noise.
The extent to which the accused’s quality of life was impacted by the noise was made clear by his evidence as to the disruption to the contentment he had experienced from moving into a unit that provided him with positive amenity and that was very suited to the disabilities he lived with. His neighbour’s noise significantly disrupted his ability to sleep, and impacted his mental health. The accused gave evidence of the contact he had with Canberra Health Services as to his mental health throughout this period, including with a crisis support team who visited him. Further as to the effect of the noise on the accused, the accused’s evidence in chief included: (a) After some time, he started to become affected by it as he would drink more coffee due to the disruption to his sleep, and he would feel irritable; (b) His routine was disrupted, and he started to feel anxious; (c) He became very frustrated and overwhelmed, with a feeling of not being able to cope with the situation; (d) He increased how much he was smoking as he would leave his unit and go down the street and smoke as a way of coping with it, with the increase in smoking detrimental to his health; (e) His mental health was impacted to the extent that he attempted suicide, and he engaged in “rude language”. He came to seek help from a psychologist via Everyman, as well as with mental health supports through Canberra Health Services; and (f) He was taking medication to assist with managing the symptoms he experienced from the noise issue.
The extent to which the accused’s mental health was impacted included that he threatened to kill a staff member of Housing ACT in April 2022. The accused acknowledged this had occurred in his evidence, a matter that has since been the subject of a sentence proceeding in the Magistrates Court. The accused explained that he “feel[s] horrible” and “terrible” for what occurred, and explained that it was borne out of feeling scared of being evicted, going to jail, and being homeless, and that the “situation was not – definitely not good”.
The accused’s mental health was also impacted by the eviction proceedings. It caused him stress, and: … caused me to have the thoughts of suicide and the attempt of suicide. The eviction caused me more stress because I strongly believed that my thoughts and my behaviour, which are not okay and not normal for me, were only caused because of this noise.
The accused further explained by this stage, after the ACAT orders made in December 2023, that he “wasn’t angry or retaliating, I was just frustrated that I couldn’t just resolve the noise which was – I – which was like the only problem in my life”. He acknowledged the enforcement orders that he received, which he recalled occurred in around March 2024.
He also sought the personal protection order in circumstances where on an occasion in public, Mr DL had allegedly called out some “really nasty names”. The accused explained that “it was that abusive language in addition to the noise which was bothering me”.
As to the noise, following the enforcement order being obtained, the accused said that: The noise continued, and I continued to make complaints to Housing ACT. I also went back to the Magistrates Court, and I provided the emails that I had sent to Housing ACT and said there was a hearing where I represented myself. And at that time that I – my ability to demonstrate that the noise had continued meant that there was – that the seizure of property order was made. … … an amount of time passed, and I was still bothered by the noise, so I wanted to ask [the Magistrates Court]. And from talking to the sheriff, there had been no action taken.
In relation to the lighting of the fire itself, in evidence in chief, the accused said that he was woken up at around 8:30pm to 9:30pm, which was a time at which he would normally be asleep. He was woken up “by the bass”, walked up the road and bought a pack of cigarettes and had one. He calmed himself down and went home. The noise was “going for a little bit longer and then it stopped”. He couldn’t remember in his evidence whether he called Access Canberra or not to talk to the EPA, but he did manage to get back to sleep.
He was woken up by the noise again somewhere between midnight and 1:00am. The accused said: And I – yes. I set my property on fire. Where the fire was set is in the main bedroom closest to Mr [DL]’s wall … in the main bedroom, there was, like, a stack of boxes, like, packing boxes. … Then I just – there was no petrol, there was no – nothing of that form. It was just very – it was impulsive in the sense that I just did it, but I – I don’t know. I feel like I’ve – I realised I sent a lot of emails warning that this is how I’m feeling. I’m feeling like setting my unit on fire. I’m not coping and I’m not sending those emails to make threats. And I didn’t feel like I was doing something that I had threatened to do, I was just – I just had enough. And so I walked outside. I – and I was down near my house but not far away, and I had a cigarette, and I think there was – there was, like, just that moment of just having a cigarette and feeling a sense of relief that I would never hear that noise again. But I also felt very horrible. There was voices screaming.
The accused further explained that: … all I wanted to do was just get away from the noise. I just didn’t want to hear it again. But – and I felt pretty pissed off that the noise wasn’t dealt with and I wasn’t – but I also felt like that’s not who I am. I am someone who’s not – I was – I also remember thinking when the seizure orders were made and they were going to confiscate the speakers or whatever was causing this noise, I felt really committed. I felt like I could be just patient enough for those speakers to – and I thought if I’d put up with this noise for so long, I could just put up with it for a little bit longer. So to just give up and just set everything on fire is so – I just feel angry at myself. And I feel – I just feel stupid. I couldn’t just be a bit more patient.
When asked as to what the accused believed would have happened if he continued to live with the noise and had not set fire to his own apartment, the accused said: I was really scared that I would be dead, or like – as a result of stress or smoking. Evicted back into shared accommodation. I know my behaviour is not okay. I also feel like, or I’d be just really not in a good place.
In cross examination regarding the circumstances leading to his lighting the fire, this being the essential issue in contention in the trial, the accused said: (a) With reference to an email sent on 13 April 2022, that he was feeling extremely frustrated at that stage, “because that’s probably about two years since the noise had started”. (b) That in May 2022, it was observed that he had used a hammer to bang on the wall. He did this to let his neighbour know that he was home, which he agreed was done with a fair bit of force such that it caused holes in the wall and that this was out of frustration with the noise. The accused agreed that he lost his temper. (c) That on 5 July 2022, after he made the threats, he said to the mental health team that the overdose was impulsive in a context of feeling overwhelmed. The accused accepted that he said that he felt like his long-term conflict with his neighbour had pushed him to the brink of desperation, making him do things that were out of character, and that this was “accurate”. (d) That he had expressed threats purely out of frustration with the noise that he was being subjected to, with the accused explaining in evidence that “it’s always been out of frustration”. (e) That on an occasion when he damaged property, he explained to mental health support that this was because he couldn’t cope, he got worked up, and then would escalate. In evidence, the accused said, “it seems to just go from one to a hundred very quickly, yes”.
The accused explained that the notion that he could simply move to another property was not to his mind satisfactory. He wanted to “fix” the “tangible thing” as he “had a right to quiet enjoyment” of the property, and that the noise would otherwise affect the next person living in the property. He was also of the understanding that the Commissioner would be unlikely to take into consideration his particular health needs in identifying a future property, as a property suitable to his needs had already been provided. He did not see the transfer as a solution or the most appropriate solution.
Nonetheless, in cross examination, the accused agreed that he did not feel like there was an imminent threat to his life, but rather it was a long-term issue he had to face. The accused expressed that [sic]: I feel it’s accurate to say that I got my frustration to the point that my thinking makes me feel justified to do so, otherwise I wouldn’t have done it, but it doesn’t mean that I – I don’t know how you can get so justified in doing something but knowing it’s wrong and regretting it at same time. It’s a very bizarre feeling …
Further, on an occasion in October 2023 when he threw a frypan in frustration with the noise, the accused explained that [sic]: It’s not like any impulsive reaction. It’s a – I lose it, and I seem go from – it’s like a shorter and shorter amount of time that I am able to – my reaction time is – well, at the start of this, we were talking about how the noise would wake me up, and my reaction was to make a coffee and do a puzzle, and maybe send out an email saying, ‘Hey, this is bothering me’, but over time, my reaction becomes more extreme, but also it’s, like, a shorter temper. And that’s certainly not sudden.
The accused explained that by the time of another apparent threat he made on 6 November 2023, he was “angry and frustrated, and tired”.
After the eviction decision was stayed, and the enforcement order was in place, and as at the day before he set fire to the unit, his understanding was that the enforcement order would still be enforced at some point. He had sent an email to the Magistrates Court on 8 April 2024, but had not received a response. He accepted in cross examination that he had, by this time, put in a lot of time and energy over the years to try and resolve the issue.
The accused agreed that by 9 April 2024, he was frustrated and had had enough, he was feeling very stressed, he lost it, and he said that he had “a long time of not coping”. The accused agreed that what he expressed to the police officer on the night was a reflection of what he was thinking and feeling at the time. He accepted that he risked the safety of everyone else who lived in the building. The accused agreed that there was nothing reasonable about lighting the fire, saying that: I didn’t put a lot of thought, logic into why I was doing it. …. Just that I got to the point that I couldn’t cope with it.
The accused accepted that in the past, police would attend if the noise concern was after 10pm, that threats to burn the unit down resulted in the Commissioner trying to evict him. He accepted that he understood that if he did burn the unit down it would surely result in his eviction, and he would have been unlikely to be transferred to another property. The accused accepted that he did not think about any of those factors as he set fire to his unit. He engaged in the following exchange in cross examination: Prosecutor: Because it was a response out of passion and frustration, rather than a logical response? Accused: That I now look back on and regret. Yes. Prosecutor: And there was nothing in particular about setting fire to your unit that meant the noise would have stopped, was there? Accused: Except for some reason that I wouldn’t have to put up with it.
Further, the accused explained that: Definitely it’s not logical. No. but I don’t know how I, like, it makes sense – I can understand I got to a point that I was so angry that I set fire to my unit, that while it’s not logical, I understand how I reached that point. But I don’t know how I reached the thought process that it’s – I remember thinking I just wanted to get away from the noise and I had tried everything else. I just can’t cope. I just need a solution to the noise. But I don’t know how the fire was the ---
The accused agreed in cross examination that on this night, when he was woken again, he could have walked down the street and smoked a cigarette, saying “as I had done many, many times”.
Finally, he said that: But I wish I could just – I wish the complaints process was easier. I wish the process of going through HR and the Magistrates Court was easier and I wish I could have – I wish I was stronger. I wish I was more patient. I wish I was smarter. I wish I was all these things that would have enabled me to get where I am now, where I had a bit of paper which was said that the speakers would be confiscated. So I can do it. I did it. I got through those steps, but I wish I could have done it without doing what was really horrible and which has brought me here today. Preliminary finding from accused’s evidence
The accused presented as a careful and earnest witness. He was intent on providing an honest account, which he plainly did. His reliability was also apparent, with his account consistent with the documentary evidence. It can be readily concluded that he was a credible witness, and I accept his evidence.
The prosecution did not submit any other finding ought be made. This is, I expect, because the accused’s version, as he came to explain it, was essentially consistent with the prosecution contention. That is, the accused accepts that he caused the fire, and, as his evidence developed, that it was not done in self-defence in the sense that the law contemplates.
I do not doubt that the accused maintains a, potentially justified, sense of grievance as to the years he experienced significant distress from his neighbour’s noise, and the leisurely response to the noise complaint being addressed. I also do not doubt that he may feel a sense of being justified in taking the action that he did. He, understandably given the circumstances, had reached the limits of what he could cope with in respect of the relentless noise from his neighbour’s unit, and his challenges in it being addressed.
But, in accordance with the law, he did not act in self-defence. This will be explained with reference to the elements and the defence raised.
Consideration
Element one – the accused engaged in conduct
Element two – the accused intended to engage in conduct
It is also undoubtable that the accused intended the alleged conduct, in the sense that, in accordance with s 18(1) of the Criminal Code, he “meant” to engage in the conduct. The accused’s own account reflects the intended nature of his conduct. Element three – the accused’s conduct caused damage to a building by fire or explosive
Similarly, it is undoubtable that the accused’s conduct caused damage to the building by fire. Again, the accused’s own account and admissions establish this.
Element four – the accused intended to or was reckless about causing damage to the building, or any other building
As to whether the accused intended to or was reckless about causing damage, it is readily apparent from the accused’s own account as to the manner in which he lit the fire that he was at least reckless about causing damage to the building. This element, as particularised, is therefore also established beyond reasonable doubt.
For the purposes of factual findings that will be necessary in respect of this element, the prosecution submitted in the trial that with reference to the photographs that showed the damage caused, the accused must have intended that damage to the building would be caused. On behalf of the accused, it was submitted that it cannot be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was intending to cause damage to the building itself as opposed to aspects of the bedroom, such as the cardboard boxes.
I accept that on only the accused’s account in his evidence, which focused on his conduct with respect to the boxes, the conduct was more in the nature of being reckless. However, on the entirety of the evidence adduced which I accept, the accused intended that fire would be used to damage the unit itself. His numerous previous threats in this regard make this clear. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused intended to cause damage to the building.
Each of the elements having been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, I then turn to whether self-defence is raised or established.
Self-defence: s 42 of the Criminal Code
The prosecution acknowledged that it was hard for the accused not to have been frustrated and “at his wit’s end” by the date of the alleged offence. It is this very circumstance that the prosecution submits led to the offending, rather than any conduct done in self-defence.
The prosecution submitted that self-defence did not arise on the evidence, that is, there was no evidence that suggests on the balance of probabilities a reasonable possibility that the conduct of the accused was done in self-defence. It was submitted in the alternative, that if it was found that the evidential burden was established, then the prosecution had disproved self-defence beyond reasonable doubt. That is, the prosecution had established that the accused did not believe the conduct was necessary to defend himself and/or that the conduct was not a reasonable response in the circumstances as the accused perceived them. The prosecution relied on four categories of evidence in support of this submission: (a) The contemporaneous statements made by the accused immediately following the alleged arson; (b) Threats made by the accused to burn down the premises and associated eviction action taken by the Commissioner; (c) Steps taken and not taken by the accused in relation to a housing transfer; and (d) Steps taken by the courts and orders that were in place.
On behalf of the accused, it was acknowledged that the reliance on self-defence was novel. It was nonetheless submitted that the accused was defending himself from a belief that he would die, by, for example, suicide or smoking, if the noise continued. It was submitted that the accused subjectively thought the noise issue was going to cause his death, and that the accused believed his conduct was necessary at the time he engaged in it. That is, “he genuinely and honestly thought that [lighting the fire] was the only way he could resolve that noise issue”, and accordingly, the accused acted in self-defence.
It is not in issue that the application of s 42 of the Criminal Code involves both subjective and objective tests. As the prosecution submitted, it is subjective in the sense that the accused must believe the conduct is necessary to, in this matter, defend himself (s 42(2)(a)(i)), and it is then to be determined whether the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives them (s 42(2)(b)). Again, as the prosecution submitted, the response must be objectively proportionate to the situation which the accused subjectively believed he faced.
Once raised by evidence that suggests a reasonable possibility that the actions of the accused were in self-defence, the onus is on the prosecution to exclude this beyond a reasonable doubt. It is convenient to consider each of the self-defence issues in turn.
Evidential burden of proof
The prosecution drew the Court’s attention to R v Zdravkovic [2020] ACTSC 251 (R v Zdravkovic), a decision in which Mossop J considered whether self-defence was available for the trier of fact in that matter, being a jury. His Honour observed at [34], [36]-[37]: In my view, s 42 must contain within it, either by reason of the references to “in self-defence” or, alternatively, by reason of the common law background against which it was enacted, a limitation which requires that the threat being defended against be an immediate one. That is obvious enough when self-defence is an issue raised to excuse what would otherwise be an assault or other crime of physical violence: see the discussion in R v PRFN [2000] NSWCCA 230 (R v PRFN) at [24]-[38]. However, in a case where the section is sought to be deployed in a manner that would excuse possession of an item, that requirement is essential in order to confine self-defence within bounds consistent with its function. … If the operation of the section is not confined to immediate harm in this way, then the scope of the “defence” of self-defence would be greatly widened. It would not be confined to actions immediately required to defend from an imminent threat of violence. It would have the effect of expanding the defence beyond an immediate and necessary defensive response to violence, so that it instead covered preparations against some future indefinite or possible adverse event. To hold that s 42 extended so far would be to extend it beyond the accepted scope of self-defence. It would be to greatly expand the scope of otherwise unlawful conduct which was rendered lawful. It would fundamentally alter the function of the finder of fact, requiring it to make not merely an assessment of the reasonableness of an immediate and urgent response to violence but, rather, a broader public policy consideration of the extent to which dispensation with the requirement of statute was “reasonable”.
His Honour further observed (at [41]) what was said by Gleeson CJ in R v Rogers (1996) 86 A Crim R 542 at 545, namely: … the imminence and seriousness of the threat to which the accused was supposedly responding are important, and often critical, factual considerations going to the accused’s supposed belief, and the reasonableness of his belief.
On behalf of the accused, it was submitted that it is not certain that the requirement of ‘imminence’ is imported into self-defence as defined in the Criminal Code. It was submitted that the conclusion reached in R v Zdravkovic is confined to the circumstances as they arose in that matter. As to this authority, it was submitted that it had not otherwise been cited with approval, and that his Honour’s reliance on an authority from the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal was done in a “rather peripheral manner without actually explaining why that decision actually supports the conclusion” that was reached.
The defence relied on the absence of the word “imminent” or “imminent threat” in s 42 of the Criminal Code and submitted that a textual interpretation of the Criminal Code does not support a conclusion that imminence is an inherent element of self-defence under the Criminal Code. It was submitted that the Criminal Code is prescriptive, and that the legislature, by including the concept of ‘suddenness’ in s 41 but not in s 42, did not intend for a requirement of imminence, or immediacy.
On behalf of the accused, it was acknowledged that if imminence forms part of self-defence in s 42 of the Criminal Code, then the Court would find that the evidential burden has not been met. That is, on the evidence, the accused could not have believed the conduct was necessary to defend himself from an imminent, or immediate threat, or otherwise could not have considered the conduct was a reasonable response in the circumstances.
I do not accept the submission made that imminence, or immediacy, has no role in self-defence pursuant to s 42 of the Criminal Code. I agree with the conclusion of Mossop J in R v Zdravkovic, for the reasons that were explained by his Honour. To apply the same reasoning as considered there, to permit self-defence to be expanded such that it is capable of application to the circumstance here, would widen the scope of the defence to incorporate responses to aggravating acts by a neighbour that do not necessitate immediate response. This is well beyond what is contemplated by the defence.
It follows that, as conceded on behalf of the accused, there is no evidential basis upon which the Court could find the accused’s conduct was done in self-defence. However, in the event that I am (and in the unlikely event that Mossop J is) wrong, I will consider the evidence and submissions made as to the defence.
Whether the accused believed the conduct is necessary to defend himself (s 42(2)(a)(i))
Ultimately, it matters little whether imminence is a requirement to enliven self-defence in this matter. This is because there was not a threat in the sense contemplated by the section that was imminent, immediate, or otherwise.
The circumstance that led to the accused engaging in the conduct on this occasion was not, in essence, any different to what he had experienced in the past, for a number of years. Nothing was different in terms of the detrimental strain that this had had on him on this particular night in contrast to previous occasions of the noise. If anything, the situation had improved with the prospect of the enforcement order being carried out, and with the accused having been placed on a high needs register for housing transfer. I am not satisfied that there was a real threat of harm in the sense required, and certainly not an imminent threat of harm.
I am not satisfied, on the evidence as given, that the accused believed the conduct was necessary to defend himself. The accused, while holding concerns about current and potential health impacts, also expressed that he “just wanted to get away from the noise” and that he couldn’t cope. He recognised that the conduct in lighting the fire was not logical, and he could not explain how the fire was capable of addressing the situation. It would only be that he would no longer have to put up with the noise. He acted in frustration, being “so angry”. Other evidence adduced, as to what the accused said to the other tenant and to police on the night, is also inconsistent with the accused holding the contended belief. Whether the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives them (s 42(2)(b))
On behalf of the accused, it was submitted that the law of self-defence recognises that context matters, and that reasonableness is not to be judged in a vacuum, that it is to be assessed in the circumstances as the accused perceived them. I accept this.
The circumstances as the accused perceived them included that despite patiently taking various measures to address the noise for a number of years, the torment of the noise continued. As was submitted on the accused’s behalf, the accused’s perception was not unfounded or exaggerated. There was a basis for it in the findings of the EPA. The accused also had documented information as to the impacts from the noise on his heath.
It was submitted that the accused found himself in a “Kafkaesque situation”. It may very well have been such a situation, but it was not, as submitted on the accused’s behalf, a situation where he could not wait longer. At the time that the alleged conduct occurred, the accused was in the best position he had been in for some time. He had an enforcement order pending execution, and the prospect of a housing transfer.
I accept, as submitted on the accused’s behalf, that the accused was acting as a reasonable person would for the “vast majority of this saga”. The measures the accused had taken to address the noise issue were emphasised. The accused also presented in his evidence, as submitted on his behalf, as an inherently reasonable person. But unfortunately, he did not maintain this at the time of the alleged offence. The accused himself accepted as much in his evidence.
The accused also accepted that he had options available to him, other than setting fire to the unit. The accused himself accepted that there were occasions, at least for a short time, where the orders obtained were effective. For example, he explained in his evidence in chief that from when the orders were made by ACAT in December, until March the next year “it was quiet”. I acknowledge that the evidence provides that the noise then did recommence, and the accused then recommenced his complaints process. Nonetheless, the accused’s experience was that the complaint processes he was undertaking, while likely frustrating and time consuming, were capable of being effective. He acknowledged that he did not take steps to call police as he had in the past, which had achieved at least interim relief. He did not leave his unit, walk down the street and smoke a cigarette as he had in the past, which had also achieved at least interim relief. These were reasonable responses available to the accused.
What was not a reasonable response, in the circumstances as the accused perceived them, was the lighting of a fire in his unit. I accept the prosecution’s submission that the accused acted out of frustration and without thinking. He did not act in self-defence.
On behalf of the accused it was submitted that the Court does not, and cannot, know, how a reasonable person would respond to the unique circumstances that the accused found himself in because “these circumstances are so rare that we don’t know how a reasonable person would behave, and we can’t forecast it”. Further, that “if a reasonable person facing an unrelenting torment, systemic inaction, deteriorating health, if that reasonable person might eventually crack”, then the Court would think that the objective limb cannot be disproven beyond reasonable doubt. It was submitted that “sometimes a person just reaches the end of their tether”, and that “a reasonable person might not remain reasonable or calm forever”.
These submissions may to a limited extent have some merit given the accused’s circumstances, but the role of this Court includes to draw inferences from evidence, and to determine from this whether, in accordance with the law, the “conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives them”: s 42(2)(b) Criminal Code.
The evidence, including the accused’s own account as to why he lit the fire, establishes that the conduct was not a reasonable response in the circumstances as he perceived them. The accused himself was unable to explain why the circumstance on this night were any different to all the many previous occasions he had been exposed to the unrelenting noise emanating from this neighbour’s unit. The accused himself acknowledged that he had other options available to him, and that lighting the fire was not capable of achieving his goal.
On the accused’s behalf, a question was posed as to whether someone who had acted with such reasonableness up until the alleged offence, even if he may have at times lost his temper and used abusive language, would suddenly stop being reasonable. The answer to this is, yes. At least in the sense that the accused did not suddenly stop being reasonable. It must be recalled that the evidence did not establish that the accused acted in an entirely reasonable and measured way at all times. While a loss of temper and use of abusive language was accepted by the defence as having occurred, it went beyond this. There were earlier occasions of irrationality and unreasonable conduct. I do not have regard to this in a ‘tendency’ sense. Rather, the occasions when the accused previously indicated an intention to engage in conduct with fire, including to the extent of purchasing petrol, are contrary to the submission that the accused entirely deviated from his “usual course of reasonable response”.
It was submitted that the question before the Court was: … when every legal avenue, every civil and mental health process has failed and the system turns on him rather than [his neighbour], the source of the underlying harm, is it beyond reasonable possibility that a person, any person, might respond as [the accused] did?
I would frame the question differently. The question before this Court is, in accordance with the issues raised, whether the prosecution have disproved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused’s conduct was a reasonable response in the circumstances as the accused perceived them, being circumstances which involved the accused having utilised extensive measures to address the noise issue without satisfactory rectification.
The answer to this question is that the prosecution has done so. Or, for completeness, to answer the question as posed on behalf of the accused, it is beyond reasonable possibility that any reasonable person might respond as the accused did in the circumstances. There were any number of other reasonable responses available in the circumstances.
It was further submitted on behalf of the accused that even if the Court was against the accused in terms of the reasonableness of the response, it would at least be found that the accused genuinely thought his conduct was necessary, albeit not a proportionate response. That is, that the Court should conclude that the accused acted with “excessive self-defence”.
I am not satisfied of this given the evidence from the accused. It was submitted that “the evidence unequivocally points to a state of mind where he thought that he had run out of options to address the noise issue”. I disagree. The evidence from the accused himself was that he was well aware and cognisant of the options available to him other than lighting a fire, and was well aware and cognisant of the pending measures that would become available.
Consideration
As the prosecution submitted, it is difficult not to have sympathy for the accused in this matter. However, as is trite in the reasoning process and decision to be made, in assessing the evidence, I must bring an open and unbiased mind. I must view the evidence clinically and dispassionately, and I must not let emotion enter into the decision-making process. Both the prosecution and the accused are entitled to my verdict free of partiality, prejudice, favour, or ill will.
The accused’s conduct in lighting the fire was plainly borne out of a long history of frustration and dissatisfaction with the lack of resolution of the issues. It was not, as the defence submitted, conduct borne out of self-defence.
On behalf of the accused it was submitted that this is a case that invites not only the application of the law, but required the Court to “grapple with its [the law’s] limits”. It was submitted that the Court not simply assess what the law prohibits, but what it permits when a citizen in the position of the accused is “pushed beyond all limits of endurance” and “takes action that might in the rarest of circumstances be condoned by this court”.
The submissions on behalf of the accused concluded that: Your honour is not being asked to set a precedent that arson is permissible. Your Honour is being asked to find that in this unique case under these extraordinary circumstances it cannot be excluded that a reasonable person would do the same thing. And so I submit your Honour would not be concerned that finding [the accused] not guilty would set a precedent that would embolden others. … … an acquittal would reinforce the law’s humane foundation. It would affirm that self-defence does not require passivity in the face of systemic neglect. Your Honour’s decision, if your Honour agrees with me, would say to authorities like Housing ACT and the other public authorities if a person cries for help, you must listen to them or else the system becomes complicit in the harm. …. … … [T]his isn’t a case about excusing arson. It is about acknowledging that [the accused] resisted violence longer than most would and that he sought help more persistently than anyone could reasonably expect, and then when he finally acted out, it wasn’t in malice or out of malice but from exhaustion, despair and a reasonable belief that he had no other course available to him. So it’s in that vein that I submit justice in this particular unique case, real, grounded humane justice, would require a finding of not guilty.
They were bold submissions, and ones that must be rejected. The law has a humane foundation, and one that is important for a court to reinforce. But I do not accept that an acquittal in this matter ignores the humane foundation of the law, nor would an acquittal say what it was submitted that it would. Rather, it would say that this Court is willing to ignore the law in preference of sympathy for an individual person who has acted contrary to the law. For this Court to enter an acquittal in such a circumstance would itself be contrary to the law.
The evidence adduced establishes the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. The defence relied upon is not enlivened on the evidence, or, at the very least, the conduct by the accused was not a reasonable response in the circumstances as the accused perceived them. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that each of the elements of the offence are established, that self-defence is not established, or is otherwise disproved beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is guilty of the charge of arson contrary to s 404 of the Criminal Code. Orders
For those reasons, the findings of the Court are as follows: (1) The verdict of the Court is that the accused is guilty of Count 1 (CAN 2024/5133, arson, s 404 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT)) on the indictment dated 27 May 2025.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and fourteen [114] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of her Honour Acting Justice Christensen. Associate: Date: 31 July 2025
DPP
Kazmar-Hall [2025] ACTSC 325
(1985) 159 CLR 507