DPP v Jones [2026] VCC 244

1. Bail was twice refused.
2. You indicated your intention to plead guilty at a committal mention on 9 October 2024.
3. You were arraigned on 21 February 2025 before this court. Another judge granted you bail on that date to Teen Challenge, a holistic faith-based residential program. Your sentence was deferred for 12 months to allow you to demonstrate efforts towards rehabilitation and to allow you to participate in programs aimed at addressing the underlying causes of your offending.
4. You left Teen Challenge in May 2025, and your bail was varied to the Wangaratta Therapeutic Community. On 27 November 2025 your bail was again varied, and you were to reside with your father and comply with drug screening requirements.
5. On 7 January 2026 you were arrested along with two co-accused in relation to separate offending including trafficking various drugs. You pleaded guilty to that offending and on 12 January 2026 you were sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 14 days with four days pre-sentence detention declared. You were released on 21 January from that sentence, but your bail was then revoked in relation to this matter and you have remained in custody.

1. Aggravated carjacking offences are a reasonably recent introduction to the criminal calendar in this State. They are serious offences reflected in the maximum penalty of 25 years' imprisonment.
2. Carjacking is an offence involving violence or the threat of violence to steal an item of value both financially and likely significant personal value to the owner. The aggravated form of that offence involves the use of a weapon to achieve that end. By nature, therefore, it is an offence placing another person in fear of serious violence and resulting in the theft of a valuable item.
3. This offence is often committed on people alone in vehicles and who are therefore isolated and easy targets.
4. The sentencing principles in relation to the offence of aggravated carjacking are clear. The sentence I impose must generally deter others from this sort of violence and aggression, it must denounce such behaviour, and it must aim to achieve community protection.
5. Your offence has additional and disturbing features which serve to increase the seriousness of it.
6. This is a significant breach of trust of your mother.
7. It was a planned, manipulative act from the outset. You were no doubt aware that your appearance at her workplace would create in her an emotional response. You played on her emotion, creating a story about her daughter which would obviously serve to convince her to go with you in the car. The act of hugging her was Judas-like.
8. You then strung her along, convincing her to take you to an isolated place and then convincing her to get out of the car under the guise of going for a walk together - something you had done with her growing up. This was a rather cruel and elaborate charade intended to give your mother the false hope that you were willing to reconnect.
9. Seeing you pointing a gun at her was no doubt devastating. While all aggravated carjacking involves use of a weapon, the type of weapon is nonetheless part of the consideration of the objective gravity of the offence. Use of a firearm makes this incredibly serious. Real or fake, it had the desired effect of instilling fear into your mother. You added to that fear by saying you did not want to shoot her, obviously intending her to believe that you could if she did not comply with your demand.
10. You then left her.
11. In my view this is a serious offence.

1. In addition to the maximum penalty, the seriousness of an aggravated carjacking offence is also evident from the applicable Sentencing Act 1991 provisions.

(a) Under s10AD of the Act, I must impose a term of imprisonment and fix under s11, a non-parole period of not less than three years unless I find that a special reason exists under s10A[1].

1. I may make a finding that a special reason exists if, relevantly here, I find that:

(a) you have assisted, or given an undertaking to assist, after sentencing, law enforcement authorities in the investigation or prosecution of an offence; or

_(c) you prove on the balance of probabilities that - _

(i) subject to sub-section (2A), at the time of the commission of the offence, you had impaired mental functioning that is causally linked to the commission of the offence and substantially and materially reduces your culpability;

(ii) that you have impaired mental functioning that would result in you being subject to substantially and materially greater than the ordinary burden or risks of imprisonment;

Sub-section (2A) is to the effect that this exception does not apply if your impaired mental functioning was caused substantially by self-induced intoxication;

(e) that there are substantial and compelling circumstances that are exceptional and rare and that justify a departure from the mandated term.

1. Before I turn to those considerations, I will outline your personal circumstances.

1. In that regard I have been assisted by the psychological report of Carla Lechner dated 19 November 2024, various Bendigo Health letters, a CISP report, as well as the thorough submissions of your counsel, Ms Temperley.
2. You are now 21 years of age. You have no prior criminal history.
3. You are the older of two children born to Danielle Schuffelen and your father who is now known as Zara Jones. You have a younger sister, Cody, who is 18.
4. You recall lots of arguments between your parents who separated when you were about five or six. You then lived week about with each parent. At some point your mother re-partnered and you felt displaced by her new partner. You told Ms Lechner that you and your mother's partner did not get along. Although you denied any exposure to substance abuse or physical violence, you reported an occasion where your mother's partner put you into a chokehold for stealing biscuits, as well as occasions where food was withheld and where you were yelled at and subjected to a range of name calling.
5. You were living primarily in Bendigo and attending local schools until Year 9, after which you attended TAFE for a few months.
6. Records from Bendigo Health from 2018, when you would have just turned 14, confirm a referral to the Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS) on account of your parents' concerns regarding you seeing visions, experiencing poor sleep, social difficulties and making some statements that were concerning regarding safety.
7. The conclusion at that stage was that these were symptoms of stress and anxiety rather than an emerging psychotic disorder. You reported ongoing social difficulties and bullying at school and your feeling that you were falling behind academically and socially. Loss of friendship and changes in routine between your parents' houses were contributors.
8. You were seeing Headspace for psychological support, which was to continue, along with a referral to community-based services. A post-separation program was recommended along with regular school meetings. Both of your parents were clearly involved in those discussions and the CAMHS referral.
9. When you were about 15 your father started gender transition. That was confusing and difficult for you to deal with. You report that you got angry about it, saying your family was not going according to plan.
10. Your relationship with your mother and her partner ultimately deteriorated to a point where you were twice told to leave their home. At that stage your relationship with your parent Zara was such that you could not live with them. You subsequently became homeless. You report abuse by an older person during that period.
11. You left school for a year when you were not living at home. You later attempted two terms of Year 10 in Melbourne before leaving school permanently. You have had work in hospitality and labouring, however, report having to leave jobs after arguments with employers. You have not worked for the last two years.
12. A Bendigo Health letter written to your mother and dated February 2020 when you were 15 refers to your recent contact with their service. Your reported concerns were living away from home on a history of running away from home, impulsive risk-taking behaviours. Your mother expressed her concern for your mental health.
13. You were still attending school, Scouts and engaged with friends. You were still seeing a clinician at Headspace and engaging with Anglicare who were to mediate between you and your mother in an effort to return you to her home.
14. In May 2020 you and your mother had a video conference with Bendigo CAMHS' Consultant Child and Adolescent Psychiatrist, Dr Samuel Robson. You were almost 16 and living with her. The report states that you have a history of ASD and oppositional behaviour which was diagnosed as a child at 'BEARS clinic'. You had been seen at emergency for deliberate self-harm. You were reported at that point no longer engaging with Headspace and Anglicare.
15. Your mother reported being concerned about your behaviour, low mood, anxiety, risk-taking behaviour, deliberate self-harm and drug and alcohol use.
16. Case management was recommended with a medication review by a psychiatrist.
17. By the age of 16 you were using cannabis and Xanax. Later on you experimented with cocaine, LSD, mushrooms and speed. At the time of this offending, you were using cannabis daily, smoking several grams per day, and report you were also abusing benzodiazepines and drinking alcohol to excess.
18. By September 2020 you declined further involvement from CAMHS. A letter

From our assessment, it is clear that a high level of conflict and mistrust exists between Declan's parents which appears to have been the case for a long time. For a child with Autism, the long-standing conflict and having to navigate his relationship with both parents has been difficult, which has provided the environment for his oppositional and self-harming behaviours.

Counselling was recommended for you and your parents.

1. Ms Lechner describes you as experiencing trauma in relation to what she describes as 'emotional neglect, experiences of rejection, and more recently, exposure to violence on the streets.' She says you have 'some symptoms of complex PTSD such as chronically low self-esteem, interpersonal mistrust, avoidance through substance use, intrusive thoughts and emotional and behavioural dysregulation.' Those symptoms 'in conjunction with symptoms of ASD and substance abuse, have undermined his social, emotional and vocational development.'
2. She also says your ASD condition makes it hard for you to experience empathy.
3. On testing for Autism, you scored 22, where a score of 29 or more is deemed to be evidence of 'clinically significant ASD traits.' On testing for Adult ADHD, you endorsed 10 of 18 criteria. According to Ms Lechner your reported childhood diagnosis of ADHD 'appears to have persisted into adulthood.' She recommends a psychiatric assessment to confirm those diagnoses.
4. I accept, given the contents of the Bendigo Health material, that you have a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder, diagnosed in childhood, along with a cannabis use disorder as diagnosed by Ms Lechner. I will return to this.

1. In terms of your rehabilitation, you will carry your mental impairments through your life, however, it is your drug use which is a significant impediment to your success.
2. I do take into account the efforts you have made in that regard. According to a CISP report of August 2024, you managed a period of abstinence from cannabis for about six months without professional assistance.
3. In addition, you remained substance free on your initial remand and subsequently opted to attend Teen Challenge to undertake what was hoped to be a 12-to-18-month rehabilitation program.
4. The homepage description of Teen Challenge refers to the Christian nature of that organisation. It distinguishes itself from other recovery centres by its 'focus on faith-based recovery to encourage healing and transformation. Students complete SOAP (scripture, observation, application, prayer) bible studies and attend chapel and church services.' Apparently visits from your parent Zara were uncomfortable in that religious setting. You experienced some other issues regarding the religious focus. You left the facility after about two and a half months and made an application to attend a different residential rehabilitation facility.
5. You were subsequently bailed to Wangaratta Therapeutic Community where you remained for almost six months. You found that a more structured, holistic place. Unfortunately, you had a falling out with a counsellor who was newly assigned to you. There was then confusion about whether you had been exited from the program or given leave to reside with your parent Zara for a short period. On enquiry it was confirmed you had been exited which was a surprise to you. Somewhat surprisingly also you were told that you could return in the new year.
6. To your credit, on return to Bendigo you made contact with the Salvation Army and were engaging with their day-hab program. I have received letters from Wangaratta Therapeutic Community and the Salvation Army to confirm those matters.
7. I do not call those attempts at rehabilitation a failure. It is well known in these courts that people often need multiple attempts to conquer the insidious grip of drug addiction. You are young and addiction is a challenge. In my view your engagement over the better part of 2025 is significant. You receive the benefits of those efforts in sentence.[2]
8. What is concerning is your drug related offending in January 2026.

1. As a young offender your rehabilitation forms a critical part in sentencing you. As higher courts of this State have made plain, there are very particular features which a sentencing judge must take into account when dealing with a young offender.
2. Higher courts have long recognised that youthful offenders are more prone to ill-considered or rash decisions and that they may lack a degree of insight, judgment and self-control that is possessed by an adult. Courts recognise the potential for youthful offenders to be redeemed and rehabilitated and that potential exists because they are typically still in a state of mental and emotional development and may be open to influences designed to positively change their behaviour.[3]
3. It is for this potential that it has been stated that the rehabilitation of young offenders is one of the greatest objectives of the criminal law. The restrictive provisions now in the Sentencing Act 1991 have an impact on those considerations.
4. Nonetheless, in my view your prospects of rehabilitation are reasonable, and they will improve if you can remain drug free. I take them into account.

1. You have pleaded guilty to this offending, and you receive the benefit of that plea. A plea of guilty has a utilitarian benefit in that it saves the court and the community the cost and time of a jury trial.
2. Importantly in your case it saves your mother from having to give evidence. It saves her the additional trauma of reliving this upsetting event and of giving evidence against her son. That is significant and you receive the benefit of your plea.
3. Having reviewed the material closely, while you made certain negative comments about your mother in the context of your offending, I do accept that your plea of guilty is a reflection of a level of shame and remorse. You acknowledged your mother's distress to Ms Lechner and the fact that no matter your history you had no right to put her in that situation.

1. I have had regard to current sentencing practices for this offence including a number of cases on the Judicial College of Victoria Sentencing Manual[4].
2. As always there are similarities and differences between both offending and offender and ultimately I am required to impose a just sentence in all the circumstances, and that is what I have endeavoured to do.

Special Reasons under s10A Sentencing Act 1991

1. Turning back to the submissions regarding the existence of a special reason to depart from the legislated mandatory minimum.

1. Ms Temperley submits that the assistance you provided to police in nominating the location of your mother's car meets the requirement pursuant to s10A(2)(a).
2. Mr Cordy argues this is not the type of assistance contemplated by the Act.
3. Commonly, assistance will involve giving evidence against a co-offender. However, the section is not limited in that way on its face, it merely recites that the offender has assisted in the investigation or prosecution of an offence.
4. On one view your assistance in providing the location of your mother's car meets that definition. However, you were already charged and remanded by the time you gave that information. As such it added very little assistance to the police investigation or the prosecution against you. The information you provided is akin to other cases where it has been argued that admissions made in a record of interview can meet the sub-s(a) definition. That has been rejected.[5]
5. If I am wrong in that regard, the nature and quality of your assistance is so low that it does not enliven my discretion under s10A(2)(a). In that regard I am heartened by the Court of Appeal decision in Siilata v R[6] where the applicant made a statement and gave an undertaking to give evidence in the prosecution of his co-offenders, at least one of whom was charged with murder. The Court of Appeal stated, with apparent approval:

The sentencing judge was satisfied that the applicant's assistance could not significantly help the authorities. He determined not to give any discount in respect of it, nor to exercise his discretion under s10A(2) of the Sentencing Act to impose a non-parole period of less than three years.

1. That is consistent with what the Court of Appeal described in Farmer v R[7] drawing on R v Goulding[8] about the need to assess various factors and determine the nature and benefit of assistance - not simply that it was offered or given. [9]

1. Turning to sub-s(c) regarding impaired mental functioning. That term is defined specifically to mean, inter alia, an autism spectrum disorder.
2. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that you have impaired mental functioning on account of your autism spectrum disorder.
3. I must then consider pursuant to sub-s(2)(c)(i) whether that impairment is causally linked to your offending and substantially and materially reduces your culpability; or pursuant to sub-s(2)(c)(ii) whether that would result in you being subject to substantially and materially greater than the ordinary burden or risks of imprisonment.
4. I must also disregard your mental impairment if it is substantially caused by self- induced intoxication.
5. Looking at the material from Bendigo Health, I am satisfied on balance that your dysregulated behaviours were occurring prior to the introduction of drugs to your life. The report from 2018 and the early reports from 2020 attest to that fact.
6. However, I cannot reach a conclusion that it was your mental impairment which was causally linked to this offending as distinct from the overlay of your drug use. Ms Lechner in the concluding paragraphs of her report states:

There appear to be several contributing and interacting elements to his offending. These include: i) being homeless and unable to secure proper accommodation for himself and his sister (who he reports was particularly vulnerable)

I pause to note that you told Ms Lechner that your purpose in stealing the vehicle was to obtain rental accommodation for you and your sister.

ii) substantial drug use in the period leading up to the offending, this no doubt adversely impacting on his judgement and decision-making; iii) a limited capacity for idea-generation and problem-solving (once fixed on an idea, Declan finds it hard to shift his focus); and iv) some level of resentment towards his mother whom he felt had not been supportive of him in the past and whom he blamed (rightly or wrongly) for being homeless in the first place. Declan stated that at the time, in the context of substance intoxication and a high level of emotional arousal, he did not consider the ramifications of his actions or the impact on his mother.

1. In those circumstances I cannot conclude that there is a causal link, or that if there is, it substantially and materially reduces your culpability.
2. Equally, pursuant to sub-s(2)(c)(ii) I am not satisfied that the existence of your mental impairment would result in you being subject to substantially and materially greater than the ordinary burden or risks of imprisonment. I note the comments of Ms Lechner that prison, while it will provide an opportunity for sustained abstinence from drugs, will not provide you with the intensity of psychological treatment that you require. She says in light of your 'psychosocial immaturity, poor ability to read social situations and limited coping skills, his mental health is likely to deteriorate if he is imprisoned for a lengthy period.'
3. While I accept that potential exists, that does not amount to a burden which is materially and substantially greater than the ordinary risk or burden of imprisonment.
4. To your credit you appear to be making the most of your time in custody and the material bears out you are learning new skills, finding a passion for cooking and looking at ways to improve yourself. A letter from the YMCA Bridge Project at Ravenhall confirms your involvement in a program aimed at work readiness and life skills. Those matters bode well for your mental health while incarcerated.

Circumstances which are substantial and compelling that are exceptional and rare

1. Lastly, I turn to s10A(2)(e), whether there are substantial and compelling circumstances that are exceptional and rare so as to justify a departure from the mandatory scheme. That is a residual category of limited scope.[10]
2. I must:

(a) identify whether there are substantial and compelling circumstances, which means circumstances that are sufficiently weighty and powerful to justify departing from the legislated mandate; and

(b) if so, whether the circumstances are also 'exceptional and rare' in the sense that they are 'wholly outside the "run of the mill" factors' typical of the offending or circumstances of the offender.[11]

1. In determining whether substantial and compelling circumstances exist, I must have regard to the legislated requirements that general deterrence and denunciation are to be given primacy, that your personal circumstances are to be given less weight than matters such as the gravity of the offending, and that regard must not be had to your early plea of guilty, your prospects of rehabilitation, parity with other sentences or your previous good character other than your lack of prior convictions[12].
2. I have taken into account the matters that I am permitted to, in particular the fact you pleaded guilty, your efforts at rehabilitation and the fact that you lack prior convictions.
3. I must also have regard to Parliament's intention that a sentence of imprisonment with a non-parole period of not less than three years should ordinarily be imposed for an offence covered by s10AD, namely aggravated carjacking.
4. If I reach the point of satisfaction that there are substantial and compelling circumstances that are exceptional and rare so as to justify a departure from the mandated minimum, that is not the end of the matter.
5. Aggravated carjacking is a Category 1 offence.
6. Under s5(2GA) of the Sentencing Act, in sentencing an offender for a Category 1 offence, if I find that a special reason exists under s10A, I must still impose a custodial sentence, not in combination with a community correction order. In other words, I must still impose a term of imprisonment but am not bound to order the three-year minimum, rather, the length of that term is at my discretion.
7. Ms Temperley relies on a combination of features to submit that the test is met here. Bearing in mind the restrictions in relation to what I am permitted to take into account, relevantly she relies on the following matters:

a) Your plea of guilty; > > b) Your youth and prospects of rehabilitation; > > c) Your lack of prior criminal history; > > d) Your mental health diagnoses; > > e) Your genuine and ongoing remorse; > > f) Your co-operation with police; > > g) Your vulnerability in custody and risk of institutionalisation.

8. I have referred to a number of those matters throughout my reasons.
9. This type of offence is not uncommonly committed by young people. Not uncommonly drugs and mental health issues are at play. That is not to say they are not taken into account, but I am looking at matters that must be substantial and compelling, and which are exceptional and rare.
10. I do not accept your level of co-operation with police elevates these considerations, nor do I accept that your remorse is extensive or that you are in any way at risk of institutionalisation given this is your first term of imprisonment.
11. In combination, even if I could conclude those matters are substantial and compelling, I could not form a view that they are exceptional and rare.
12. Ultimately, I must therefore reject the submission that a special reason exists under s10A.

1. For those reasons the sentence I impose on you, Mr Jones, is as follows:
2. On Charge 1 of aggravated carjacking, you are convicted and sentenced to a term of three years and six months' imprisonment.
3. I direct that you are to serve a minimum term of three years' imprisonment before becoming eligible for parole.
4. I declare that you have already served 265 days' imprisonment and that that term should be reckoned as having been served under this sentence.
5. But for your plea of guilty the sentence I would have imposed would have been one of four years and eight months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of three years and ten months' imprisonment.
6. Are there any matters to raise counsel.
7. MR CORDY: Yes, in relation to s89 - - -
8. HER HONOUR: Yes, thanks - - -
9. MR CORDY: The Sentencing Act asserts it's the licence, Your Honour, and also a declaration that drugs were involved at the time of the commission of the offence.
10. HER HONOUR: Yes. I make that declaration, as I have in my reasons essentially, but I make that declaration pursuant to s89 that drugs and alcohol were involved in the commission of the offence. In that respect I cancel and disqualify your licence, Mr Jones, for a period of two years.
11. MR CORDY: As Your Honour pleases.
12. HER HONOUR: Thank you. Are there any other matters.
13. MR CORDY: No - - -
14. MS TEMPERLEY: Nothing arising.
15. HER HONOUR: All right, thanks very much. Thanks for your assistance, we'll stand down.

[1] Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic)

[2] Akoka v The Queen [2017] VSCA 214.

[3] R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235; Azzopardi v The Queen [2011] VSCA 372; 35 VR 43.

[4] Buckley v The Queen [2022] VSCA 138; Farmer v The Queen [2020] VSCA 140; Judicial College of Victoria, Victorian Sentencing Manual (v 20 Oct 2025).

[5] Farmer v The Queen [2020] VSCA 140.

[6] Siilata v The Queen [2019] VSCA 277 [21].

[7] Farmer v The Queen [2020] VSCA 140.

[8] R v Goulding (1980) 24 SASR 161.

[9] A summary of the applicable principles can be found in Haamid (a pseudonym) v The Queen [2018] VSCA 33; Farmer v The Queen [2020] VSCA 140; R v Goulding (1980) 24 SASR 161.

[10] Farmer v The Queen [2020] VSCA 140 [51].

[11] DPP v Lombardo [2022] VSCA 204 [71].

[12] DPP v Kenneison [2023] VSCA 321 [37], citing the Sentencing Act 1991, ss5(2HC)(a)-(c), 5(2I).