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[2026] ACTSC 207
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-06-22
McWilliam J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: DPP v Hemmingsen Citation: [2026] ACTSC 207 Hearing Date: 16 June 2026 Decision Date: 22 June 2026 Before: McWilliam J Decision: Offender convicted and sentenced to a total effective term of imprisonment for 3 years, 11 months and 12 days, to be suspended from the date of imposition, with a drug and alcohol treatment order imposed. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence –joint commission aggravated burglary and driving offences – childhood trauma and drug dependence – application of Bugmy, Henry and Verdins principles – strong prospect of rehabilitation – Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order imposed Legislation Cited: Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 85, 108(2)(a) Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 7, 10, 12A, 33, 35(2), 57, 80W, 80Y, 80ZA Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), ss 312, 318(1), 318(2), 403 Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT), ss 32(1)(a), 32(5)(a) Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT), ss 63(4), 69 Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT), ss 7, 7A(1)(a)(i) Cases Cited: Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 Dawson v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 9 DPP v Clarke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 261 DPP v Clissold [2023] ACTSC 250 DPP v Massey [2025] ACTSC 50 Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 Laipato v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 35 Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 MT v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 26; 17 ACTLR 22 Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 R v Barton [2001] NSWCCA 63; 121 A Crim R 185 R v Campbell [2010] ACTCA 20 R v Dawson [2022] ACTSC 64 R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111; 46 NSWLR 346 R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; 259 CLR 256 R v Knight [2021] ACTSC 165 R v Massey (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 156 R v Miller [2019] ACTCA 25; 279 A Crim R 232 R v Rosewarne [2021] ACTSC 217 R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269 Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions Tania Hemmingsen (Offender) Representation: Counsel T Kelliher (DPP) S Lynch (Offender) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Aboriginal Legal Service (Offender) File Number: SCC 198 of 2025 SCC 199 of 2025 McWILLIAM J: Introduction
Reference Offence Max. Penalty Number Ride/drive motor vehicle without consent by joint commission, 5 years’ imprisonment, CAN 1855/2025 contrary to s 318(2) of the Criminal $80,000 fine, or both. Code 2002 (ACT) (Code). Aggravated burglary by joint CAN 1856/2025 20 years’ imprisonment, commission, contrary to s 312 of the $300,000 fine, or both. of the Code. Take motor vehicle without consent, CAN 1860/2025 5 years’ imprisonment, by joint commission, contrary to s $80,000 fine, or both. 318(1) of the Code. Aggravated furious, reckless, or 3 years’ imprisonment, dangerous driving (first offender, fail $48,000 fine, or both, to stop), contrary to ss 7 and and automatic licence CAN 1864/2025 7A(1)(a)(i) of the Road Transport disqualification for a (Safety and Traffic Management) Act period of at least 12 1999 (ACT). months. Aggravated burglary by joint 20 years’ imprisonment, CAN 719/2025 commission, contrary to s 312 of the $300,000 fine, or both. of the Code. Transferred Offences Drive while disqualified (first 6 months’ imprisonment, offender), contrary to s 32(1)(a) of $8,000 fine, or both, and CAN 1862/2025 the Road Transport (Driver automatic licence Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) (Driver disqualification for a Licensing Act). period of 12 months.
The court’s task
The offender is to be sentenced in accordance with the sentencing purposes set out in s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act), which include (in summary form) making the offender accountable and denouncing and adequately punishing her conduct, deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences, recognising the harm done to the victims of the crimes and the community, and promoting an offender’s rehabilitation.
I have also taken into account the mandatory relevant considerations set out in s 33 of the Sentencing Act insofar as they relate to the offender’s circumstances.
While the imposition of a term of imprisonment is a sentence of last resort: s 10 of the Sentencing Act, it was accepted that in all the circumstances, a term of imprisonment was the only appropriate sentence for the above offences. In accordance with the principle of individualised justice: MT v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 26; 17 ACTLR 22 at [56], I have determined that the long-term protection of the community is best served by a sentence that is primarily directed to the offender’s rehabilitation. Accordingly, she will be allowed to serve that sentence by way of a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order.
Other offending to be taken into account (s 33(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act)
The offender has elected to have additional charges arising from the same course of conduct to be taken into account: s 57 of the Sentencing Act: (a) Damage property by joint commission, contrary to s 403 of the Code (CAN 1858/2025) attaching to CAN 1856/2025 as the principal offence. (b) Take motor vehicle without consent, contrary to s 318(1) of the Code (CAN 720/2025) attaching to CAN 719/2025 as the principal offence.
In the reasoning that follows, I have taken the additional offences into account in accordance with the approach set out in R v Campbell [2010] ACTCA 20 at [46]-[50] in that: (a) The offender is not to be sentenced for the additional offence. (b) Any penalty imposed for the offences cannot exceed the maximum penalty for those offences, notwithstanding that the additional offence is taken into account: s 57(3) of the Sentencing Act. (c) Following R v Barton [2001] NSWCCA 63; 121 A Crim R 185 at [64], the additional offence is taken into account by giving greater weight (than may otherwise be given when sentencing for the primary offences) to: (i) the need for personal deterrence, which the commission of the other offence will frequently indicate; and (ii) the community’s entitlement to extract retribution for serious offences when there are offences for which no punishment has in fact been imposed (d) The additional offence may also affect the assessment of the offender’s character and prospects of rehabilitation. (e) The consideration occurs in the same way as other matters are taken into account for the purpose of sentence. Generally, the result will be to increase the sentence about to be imposed and may alter the nature of that sentence. (f) Other relevant principles still apply and may constrain that consideration, such as totality. (g) It is not necessary for the court to indicate precisely what effect the taking of the additional offence into account has on the sentence that is imposed.
Nature and circumstances of the offence (s 33(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act)
The sentence proceeded on an agreed statement of facts that was before the court. I have not set out the facts relating to the additional offences that are to be taken into account to make it clear that they are not separately sentenced.
In evaluating where the conduct falls on the spectrum of objective seriousness, I have had regard to the general principles that guide that assessment, being that matters personal to the offender are considered separately, the maximum penalty for the offence provides the yardstick for the seriousness, and the sentence to be imposed must be proportional to the objective seriousness.
CAN 1855/2025 – Ride/drive motor vehicle without consent by joint commission
At about 9:30pm on 7 January 2025, Victim 1 parked a White Holden Barina, which belonged to her daughter (Victim 2), on a residential street in Coombs in the ACT. Victim 1 exited the Barina, leaving the keys on the seat, and walked away from the vehicle for a brief period of time. When Victim 1 returned to the spot where she had parked the vehicle, it was no longer there.
At about 9:40pm on that day, Victim 2 reported the vehicle as stolen to the police.
On 9 January 2025, police seized the Holden Barina from a residential property in Coombs. Forensic analysis was conducted of fingerprints throughout the vehicle, which were found to match the fingerprints of the offender.
In terms of the features informing the character of this offence and applying R v Massey (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 156 at [29], this was a low-level example of the offence because, the manner, duration and distance that the vehicle was driven were unclear, but the Barina was used by the offenders to arrive at the Property in Conder the following night. I have assumed in the offender’s favour that the vehicle was not damaged and was eventually returned to its owner. CAN 1856/2025 – Aggravated burglary by joint commission (inc. damage property)
CAN 1860/2025 – Take motor vehicle without consent, by joint commission
At about 10:30pm on 8 January 2025, the offender, in company with two co-young persons, attended a residential property in Conder in the ACT. Victim 3 was at home at the time with his daughter (Victim 4). Victim 3 heard the front gate of the property open and, looking through the peep hole of the front door, observed individuals in balaclavas trying to open the screen door. The offender and co-young persons yelled out at Victim 3 to open the door.
Victim 3 walked to Victim 4’s bedroom and told Victim 4 to call the police. Both Victim 3 and Victim 4, returned to the front door, with Victim 3 putting his back against the door in an effort to keep it shut. The offender and co-young persons continued to yell at Victim 3 to open the door. The offender and co-young persons subsequently walked away from the door and began to smash the windows of the property. One of the offenders gained entry to the property via one of the smashed windows, and once inside the house, partially opened the screen door to allow another of the offenders to enter the property.
Once inside, one of the offenders raised a machete towards victim 3, before taking a set of car keys resting on a stand next to the front door. The offenders then exited the property.
An occupant of the neighbouring property (Victim 5) who had heard noise coming from next door went outside and observed a person wearing a balaclava. That person told victim 5 to ‘Fuck off’ before striking him in the hand with a baseball bat.
Two of the offenders were subsequently observed leaving the property in a Blue Holden Commodore SV-6 that belonged to Victim 3. The other left in a white car.
Police attended the property and observed damage to the front door and to the windows in two of the bedrooms. The total value of the damage to the property was $1,805.43.
The factors informing the objective seriousness for the offence of aggravated burglary were set out in DPP v Clissold [2023] ACTSC 250 at [33] and the cases there-cited.
I consider this conduct in respect of the aggravated burglary in Conder on 8 January 2025 to fall within the mid-range of seriousness for this type of offence because: (a) The offence was committed in company (which is the aggravating feature here). (b) The conduct occurred at a residential premises while the occupants, including an 11-year-old child, were at home. (c) While it was a single incursion, it was serious and prolonged, with both occupants being verbally threatened, and the adult occupant physically assaulted. (d) Damage was caused to the front flyscreen and two-bedroom windows, with the total cost of repairs amounting to $1,805.43. (e) There was also a degree of pre-meditation, as seen from the presence of face coverings and weapons, including machetes and a baseball bat, which further aggravates the offence.
In respect of the take vehicle offence, the Holden Commodore was taken from the property in Conder and was used by the offenders to get away from that area. The vehicle was involved in a high-speed chase with police. However, as that has given rise to a separate charge, I have excluded that from consideration and accordingly, the conduct again falls at the low-end of the range for offences of this type.
CAN 1864/2025 – Aggravated furious, reckless, or dangerous driving (first offender, fail to stop)
CAN 1862/2025 – Drive while disqualified (first offender)
At about 10:50pm on the same day (8 January 2025), police in an unmarked vehicle observed the Holden Commodore exiting a roundabout on Tharwa Drive and Box Hill Avenue in Conder in the ACT. Police followed the vehicle before activating their emergency lights and signalling for the vehicle to stop. The vehicle failed to comply with the direction to stop and continued in a northern direction on Drakeford Drive in Oxley. During the pursuit, police observed their speed to be 180km/h, however the distance between the police vehicle and the Holden Commodore continued to grow. During the pursuit, police observed the vehicle to run red lights and move across unbroken lines to move past other vehicles on the road while travelling in excess of the posted speed limit. Police eventually lost sight of the vehicle and the pursuit was terminated.
At about 11:20pm, police conducting patrols on Dixon Drive in Holder noticed a Holden Barina travelling at excessive speeds. Police unsuccessfully attempted to catch up to the vehicle before losing sight of it.
At about 11:40pm, police attended a slip lane behind Arthur Blakely Way in Coombs. Upon arrival, police observed the Holden Commodore, which was unoccupied, parked across a visitors parking spot. The vehicle’s front windows were open, and police observed a burnt orange baseball bat in the front passenger footwell and a black sheath for a large knife in the driver’s side footwell. The vehicle was seized by police and transported to the exhibit management centre for forensic analysis.
DNA samples matching the DNA profile of the offender were found on surfaces throughout the interior of the vehicle and on items located in the vehicle.
Features relevant to this offence have been discussed in R v Rosewarne [2021] ACTSC 217 at [122] and more recently by Taylor J in DPP v Clarke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 261 at [38]. Here, the Holden Commodore was driven as a getaway vehicle and was involved in a police pursuit, during which it was driven along main roads, crossing solid white lines and reaching speeds of up to 180km/h. While the offence occurred at night when the roads and footpaths were less busy, the manner of driving would have posed a significant risk to the safety of police, and any other road-users. I consider the conduct to fall within the mid-range of seriousness for this offence.
With the manner of the driving being separately charged, the drive while disqualified conduct was a typical example of the offence.
CAN 719/2025 - Aggravated burglary by joint commission
At about 11:00am on 9 January 2025, police attended an apartment complex in Gungahlin. There, they spoke to an individual whose motorbike had been stolen from the carparking area of the complex during the early hours of that morning. Police reviewed footage captured by CCTV cameras in the carpark, which showed two individuals at 4:14am using a screwdriver to force open the door to the carpark. One of those individuals was identified as being the offender.
This burglary is a less serious example of the offence. It was committed in the underground carpark of a residential premises at a time when it was unlikely that members of the public would be present. The offender was in company (aggravating the offence) and used a screwdriver to gain access to the carpark, which indicates a degree of planning. While the motive for the offence is unclear, a motorbike was damaged and another stolen.
Victim impact statements (s 33(1)(f) of the Sentencing Act)
There were no victim impact statements. While the court does not speculate as to the impact of the offending upon the victims, I accept the submission made by the prosecution that such crimes may have a lasting psychological impact on victims, particularly so in cases such as this where one of the victims was a child who experienced a violent intrusion into their home. Plea of guilty (ss 33(1)(j) and 35 of the Sentencing Act)
Having regard to the statutory matters set out in s 35(2) of the Sentencing Act, I have exercised my discretion to apply a 20% discount on account of the offender’s pleas of guilty because: (a) There is some force in the submission that the finalisation of the proceedings was delayed by the DPP, who took 8 weeks to respond to the offender’s representations. (b) However, pleas of not guilty had been entered in the Magistrates Court, a brief of evidence was prepared, and the offender obtained a benefit through the representations, with various charges discontinued. (c) There was significant utilitarian value in the pleas, which circumvented the need for a trial, thereby saving both the court and the community considerable time and expense.
Subjective circumstances of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)
The offender’s subjective circumstances are before the court through a Drug and Alcohol List Suitability Assessment report, an Intensive Correction Order Assessment report, and a psychological assessment report. The offender is a 25-year-old female of both Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander descent. She is one of six siblings born to her parents’ union and has an additional five half siblings.
The offender experienced a family environment characterised by violence and frequent conflict between her parents while growing up. The offender’s parents eventually separated, with the offender primarily residing with her father until his death in 2014. The offender recalls that her father was an alcoholic and was physically abusive towards the offender and other family members.
The offender reported only limited engagement with formal education, completing schooling up to Year 10, the last two years of which being completed while in custody at Bimberi Youth Justice Centre. The offender has attained construction-based certificates through trade colleges and has previously undertaken paid employment as a landscaper and gyprock installer. The offender is currently unemployed and relies on Centrelink benefits as her primary source of income.
The offender reported first consuming alcohol recreationally with friends at the age of 14. The offender commenced using 3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) and methylamphetamine concurrently at the age of 15, immediately progressing to daily use of the latter. The offender recalled commencing use of Gamma-Hydroxybutyric Acid (GHB) and Heroin in her early twenties. She has also used cocaine socially. Heroin continues to be the offender’s primary substance of concern. The offender, who has been diagnosed with certain mental health disorders (discussed in the reports), described her use of illicit substances as a coping mechanism to deal with significant trauma that she has had to endure, including the loss of her father, and more recently, the loss of her younger brother. The offender’s use can be further attributed to a lack of pro-social supports in the community and instability with her accommodation.
Against this background, counsel for the offender invited consideration of the Bugmy, Henry and Verdins principles (as to which see, Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571, R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111; 46 NSWLR 346, and R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269). Having regard to the psychological assessment report, which sets out a comprehensive summary of the offender’s deprived background and the factors giving rise to the offender’s illicit substance misuse, I was satisfied that those principles are enlivened in this case. Application of the principles does not result in a precise mathematical reduction in the term of the sentence. Instead, the principles feed into a broader consideration as to the appropriate disposition of the matter, having regard to both a reduction of the offender’s moral culpability, and the offender not being an appropriate means by which to further the sentencing objective of general deterrence.
The offender has achieved intermittent periods of abstinence from drugs in the past while engaging with narcotics anonymous. She has also previously attempted residential rehabilitation through Kamira in NSW, although she did not complete that program. The offender has expressed a renewed desire to achieve abstinence from illicit substances and must be commended for her efforts in seeking medical treatment, including counselling, to address her mental health concerns, and for her engagement with rehabilitation service providers, including recently self-referring to the residential rehabilitation program at Canberra Recovery Services (CRS). She has been offered a place in the associated day-program in the interim, with an indicative start date of 22 June 2026 until there is an available spot in the residential program.
The offender has described being in a positive and healthy relationship with her current partner of three years, with whom the offender intends to reside with. The offender has also described having a positive relationship with her mother and stepfather. Stable accommodation and supportive relationships with her partner and other pro-social family members and friends, will be key for the offender if she is to succeed on the DATO and overcome her addiction. Criminal antecedents of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)
The offender has a considerable criminal history for someone of her age, which includes charges for assault and aggravated burglary in the ACT Children’s Court. Such history disentitles the offender from leniency.
The offender was also on conditional liberty at the time of the offending, which is an aggravating feature. The court accepts the joint position of the parties that it is appropriate to take no further action on that breach. The fact of the breach is, nonetheless, one of the matters contributes to the length of the individual sentences, and to a lesser extent, the structure of the sentence overall, and the manner of the sentence to be imposed.
Pre-sentence custody
Current sentencing practice (s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act)
The prosecution provided a sample of comparable cases for the offences of aggravated burglary and drive motor vehicle without consent, including: DPP v Massey [2025] ACTSC 50; R v Knight [2021] ACTSC 165 and R v Dawson [2022] ACTSC 64. I have taken these cases into account with a view to ensuring the consistent application of principles in sentencing practice.
Of significance here, the offences were committed in company with two co-offenders who were young persons. There was no submission that the offender had a considerably greater, or lesser, role in the offences than the co-young persons. However, the application of the parity principle in this case is complicated by virtue of the fact that the co-offenders are before the Children’s Court, which has its own sentencing objectives and principles. I will return to that matter at the conclusion of these reasons.
Totality
Disposition
Denunciation, punishment and recognition of victim impact means that sentences of imprisonment must be imposed and for a considerable period of time to reflect the gravity of the offending.
However, the evidence before the court suggests that the offender has spent her time in the community productively and has proactively sought treatment and engaged with a number of service providers in an effort to address her mental health concerns and drug addiction. The offender has demonstrated that she has strong prospects of rehabilitation, which if it can be achieved, is the most likely guarantor of continuing community safety.
Although the offender has only spent a modest period of time in full-time custody, sentencing the offender to further full-time custody at the expense of the rehabilitation program available to her now would likely undo the significant efforts she has made, and continues to make, to live a life without drugs and crime.
Accordingly, on balance, I have determined that disposition by way of a Treatment Order is the appropriate outcome. Such an order recognises that although she is not a young offender, she is still a youthful offender who needs support and targeted intervention to prevent her from continuing on a recidivist criminal path and I consider that parity with the young co-offender can be achieved by the manner in which the sentence here will be served.
Considering the requirements in s 12A(2) of the Sentencing Act: (a) I am satisfied, that the offender more than likely suffered from severe substance use disorder at the time of the offending and that the offending was substantially contributed to by the offender’s drug dependency. (b) Despite the offender’s continued efforts, I am satisfied that on the balance of probabilities she remains dependant on a controlled drug. (c) The offender intends to reside at her partner’s mother's home for the term of the sentence. The offender has resided at this property intermittently throughout bail, and cites the relationship with her partner as stable, supportive and protective. (d) There is no concern about a victim’s safety or welfare. (e) A treatment order for this offender would be consistent with the objectives of such an order, being, to facilitate rehabilitation, reduce drug dependency and its associated health risks and promote community safety.
The offender’s rehabilitation journey under this order will commence with her admission into the day-program at Canberra Recovery Hub on 22 June 2026, which will reinforce the positive steps she has taken while out in the community, before she will be given the opportunity to step up into the residential program at CRS once a spot becomes available.
Finally, in terms of the automatic 12-month disqualification periods prescribed in s 32(5)(a) of the Driver Licensing Act and s 63(4) of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) (General Act), I will not alter those default or automatic periods, but I will exercise the power under s 69 of the General Act and make an order that each of the disqualification periods run concurrently.
Orders
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (1) A Treatment Order under s 12A of the Sentencing Act is made for Tania Hemmingson in respect of the following eligible offences: (a) CAN 1856/2025, aggravated burglary by joint commission; (b) CAN 719/2025 aggravated burglary by joint commission; (c) CAN 1855/2025, take/ride/drive motor vehicle without consent; (d) CAN 1860/2025, take/ride/drive motor vehicle without consent; (e) CAN 1864/2025, Aggravated furious, reckless, or dangerous driving; and (f) CAN 1862/2025, Drive while disqualified (first offender). (2) The convictions and sentences imposed for the said eligible offences are hereby incorporated into the Treatment Order in the Custodial Part of the Order. (3) The Treatment Order is for 3 years, 10 months and 9 days from today, 22 June 2026 to conclude on 30 April 2030. (4) The Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order is for two years from today, 22 June 2026 to 21 June 2028. (5) The Custodial Part of the Treatment Order for the eligible offences will be suspended under s 80W of the Sentencing Act from today, 22 June 2026, until 30 April 2030. (6) Under s 80ZA of the Sentencing Act, Tania Hemmingson is required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender’s Good Behaviour obligations from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order, 22 June 2028, until the end of the total sentence, 30 April 2030, with the following conditions: (a) The core conditions under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT); (b) A probation condition that she accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or his delegate for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person supervising her considers appropriate and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising her including as to alcohol and drug testing, counselling and treatment. (7) For the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order: (a) The core conditions of the Order set out in s 80Y of the Sentencing Act are hereby imposed. (b) Ms Hemmingson is to travel to Canberra Recovery Hub on 22 June 2026 and admit herself to the drug rehabilitation day program at that facility by 12:00pm. (c) Ms Hemmingson is directed to complete the said program or any other program of intervention, treatment or counselling she is directed to complete, including urinalysis or case management that may be required by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team. (d) Ms Hemmingson is to obey all reasonable directions of any person in charge of the program and all the rules of the program and the facility, which may include directions about where she resides, with whom he associates and her attendance from time to time. (e) Save for 24-25 June 2026, during completion of the day or following the completion of any subsequent residential program, Ms Hemmingson is not to leave her approved place of residence between any curfew hours directed by the Treatment and Supervision team, other than for a medical emergency, and she is to present herself to the front door of the residence if required by an officer of ACT Policing. (f) Should Ms Hemmingson leave or be discharged from the directed program before completing it, she is to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4:00pm on the next business day with a view to having her Treatment Order reviewed. (g) Ms Hemmingson is not to consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs or prescription drugs not prescribed to her. (h) Ms Hemmingson is to comply with any directions of the court from time to time about attendance at court in person or by electronic means. (8) The offender is directed to attend court for DASL review in person or via AVL on 26 June 2026 at 12:30pm.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two [52] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice McWilliam.
Associate: Date:
DPP
Hemmingsen