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[2026] ACTSC 219
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-06-30
McWilliam J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: DPP v Guerin Citation: [2026] ACTSC 219 Hearing Date: 12 May, 26 June 2026 Decision Date: 30 June 2026 Before: McWilliam J Decision: Offender convicted and sentenced to a total effective term of imprisonment for 6 years 2 months and 21 days, to be suspended from the date of imposition with the remainder of the sentence subject to a Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – numerous burglary theft and driving offences – where offender had spent over two years in custody referable to offending – where offender obtained an immediate place in residential rehabilitation – drug and alcohol treatment order made Legislation Cited: Bail Act 1992 (ACT), s 49 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), ss 114C, 380 Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004 (ACT), s 19(1)(b) Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 85, 110 Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), ss 7, 10, 12A, 33, 35, 64, 80O, 80S, 80T, 80W, 80Y, 80ZA Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), ss 44, 308, 311, 312, 318, 321, 324, 361, 403, 603(7) Legislation Act 2001 (ACT), s 133 Prohibited Weapons Act 1996 (ACT), s 5 Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT), ss 32(1)(a), 32(5)(b) Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT), ss 63(1)(f), 63(4), 69 Road Transport (Road Rules) Regulation 2017 (ACT), r 287 Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT), s 7(1)(c) Cases Cited: Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 Bui v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 5 Cranfield v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 3 Dawson v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 9 DPP v Clarke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 261 DPP v Clissold [2023] ACTSC 250 DPP v Gardner (No 5) [2025] ACTSC 41 DPP v James [2025] ACTSC 546 DPP v Jember [2024] ACTSC 311 DPP v Kayvashokoohi [2024] ACTSC 386 DPP v Kristiansen [2025] ACTSC 536 DPP v Rohrlach (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 192 Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 Lawrence v The Queen [2007] ACTCA 10; 1 ACTLR 158 Monfries v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 46; 19 ACTLR 99 Nchouki v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 28 R v Celeski (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 393 R v Green [2021] ACTSC 356 R v Massey (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 156 R v McConnell-Imbriotis [2024] ACTSC 319 R v Merrilees (No 2); DPP v Merrilees [2024] ACTSC 364 R v Rosewarne [2021] ACTSC 217 R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103 R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102 R v Williams [2022] ACTSC 72 Saipani v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 5; 288 A Crim R 191 Thorn v Laidlaw [2005] ACTCA 49 Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions Brent Ian Guerin (Offender) Representation: Counsel E Priestly (DPP) R Mackenzie (Offender) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Legal Aid ACT (Offender) File Number: SCC 212 of 2025 SCC 213 of 2025 McWILLIAM J: Offences for Sentence
Brent Guerin (the offender) is before the court for sentence having pleaded guilty to 26 separate charges relating to offences committed in June and November 2014 and in April 2024.
Given the number and nature of the offences under consideration, it is perhaps worth recalling at the outset of these reasons the observation of Refshauge AJ in R v Green [2021] ACTSC 356 at [2]: …the causes of drug dependency and, indeed, of why people traffic in illicit drugs are complex, and not to be viewed through a simple and monochromatic lens. As with most things involving human beings, there are always multiple issues and perspectives that must be considered.
The offences for sentence have been grouped as follows:
Reference Offence Max. Penalty Number Series One – June 2014 20 years’ imprisonment, 2,000 1. Aggravated burglary contrary to s 312 CAN 5954/2024 penalty units or both. Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Code) 10 years’ imprisonment, 1,000 2. CAN 5955/2024 Theft contrary to s 308 of the Code penalty units or both.
10 years’ imprisonment, 1,000 3. CAN 5956/2024 Attempted theft contrary to s 308 of the penalty units or both. Code, by virtue of s 44 of the Code 10 years’ imprisonment, 1,000
Damage property, contrary to s 403 of the CAN 5957/2024 penalty units or both. Code Series Two – November 2014 5 years’ imprisonment, 500
Drive motor vehicle without consent CAN 10762/2014 penalty units or both. contrary to s 318(2) of the Code 1 year’s imprisonment, 10
Drive while disqualified, contrary to s penalty units or both, and CAN 10763/2014 32(1)(a) Road Transport (Driver disqualification of driver’s (transfer charge) Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) (Driver licence for a period of 24 Licencing Act) (repeat offender) months. Failure to appear before the court,
CAN 4165/2024 contrary to s 49 of the Bail Act 1992 2 years’ imprisonment. (transfer charge) (ACT) Series Three – April 2024 5 years’ imprisonment, 500
Drive motor vehicle without consent CAN 4159/2024 penalty units or both. contrary to s 318(2) of the Code 5 years’ imprisonment, 500
Drive motor vehicle without consent CAN 4160/2024 penalty units or both. contrary to s 318(2) of the Code 14 years’ imprisonment, 1,400
Burglary contrary to s 311 of the of the CAN 4161/2024 penalty units or both. Code 10 years’ imprisonment, 1,000 11. CAN 4162/2024 Theft contrary to s 308 of the of the Code penalty units or both. 5 years’ imprisonment, 500 12. Take motor vehicle without consent CAN 4163/2024 penalty units or both. contrary to s 318(1) of the Code Aggravated furious, reckless, dangerous 5 years’ imprisonment, 500 13. driving contrary to s 7(1)(c) of the Road penalty units or both, and CAN 4170/2024 Transport (Safety and Traffic disqualification of driver’s Management) Act 1999 (ACT) (Road licence for a minimum period Safety Act) (repeat offender) of 12 months. Traffic in controlled drug other than 10 years’ imprisonment, 1,000 14. CAN 4171/2024 cannabis contrary to s 603(7) of the Code penalty units or both. Damage property, contrary to s 403 of the 10 years’ imprisonment, 1,000 15. CAN 4175/2024 Code penalty units or both. Damage property, contrary to s 403 of the 10 years’ imprisonment, 1,000 16. CAN 4176/2024 Code penalty units or both. Possess prohibited weapon, contrary to s 5 years’ imprisonment, 500 17. CAN 4177/2024 5 of the Prohibited Weapons Act 1996 penalty units or both. (ACT) Traffic in controlled drug other than 10 years’ imprisonment, 1,000 18. CAN 7258/2024 cannabis, contrary to s 603(7) of the Code penalty units or both. Traffic in controlled drug other than 10 years’ imprisonment, 1,000 19. CAN 7259/2024 cannabis, contrary to s 603(7) of the Code penalty units or both. Possession of property suspected of 20. CAN 4186/2024 being proceeds of crime, contrary to s 2 years’ imprisonment. (transfer charge) 114C of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) 2 years’ imprisonment, 200 21. Aggravated furious, reckless, dangerous penalty units or both, and CAN 4164/2024 driving contrary to s7(1)(c) of the Road disqualification of driver’s (transfer charge) Safety Act (repeat offender) licence for a minimum period of 12 months. CAN 4167/2024 6 months’ imprisonment, 50 22. Minor theft, contrary to s 321 of the Code (transfer charge) penalty units or both. 1 year’s imprisonment, 10 23. Drive while disqualified, contrary to s penalty units or both, and CAN 4172/2024 32(1)(a) Driver Licencing Act (repeat disqualification of drivers (transfer charge) offender) licence for a period of 24 months Possess offensive weapon, contrary to s 6 months’ imprisonment, 24. CAN 4173/2024 380 of the Crimes Act 1900 $1,000 fine or both. Obstruct territory public official, contrary to 2 years’ imprisonment, 200 25. CAN 4174/2024 s 361 of the Code penalty units or both. Crash and not provide particulars, 26. contrary to r 287 of the Road Transport CAN 4178/2024 20 penalty units. (Road Rules) Regulation 2017 (ACT) (Road Rules Regulation) Unlawful possession of property 27. 6 months’ imprisonment, 50 CAN 7260/2024 reasonably suspected of being stolen, penalty units or both. contrary to s 324 of the Code 4. For completeness, the value of each penalty unit that applies to the offences dating back to 2014 is $150: s 133 of the Legislation Act 2001 (ACT). The value of each penalty unit is otherwise $160 for those offences committed in 2024.
The Court’s task 5. The offender is to be sentenced having regard to his particular circumstances and other mandatory statutory considerations, in a manner that makes him accountable, denounces and adequately punishes his conduct, with a purpose of deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences, and recognising the harm done to the victims of the crimes and to the community, but also with a view to promoting the offender’s rehabilitation, so as to protect the community in the longer term: s 7 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act).
Nature and circumstances of the offences (s 33(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act) 6. The facts set out below are drawn from the statement of facts that was before the court. Although it was not expressly stated as an agreed statement of facts, the critical features of the offending were not contested.
Series 1 – June 2014 (aggravated burglary, attempted theft, damage property, theft) 7. At about 3:25am on 5 June 2014, Victim 1 was asleep in her home in Kambah in the ACT when she awoke to find the offender, who was unknown to her, standing in her bedroom doorway holding a short pole. The offender then walked down the hallway and stood at the doorway of the master bedroom before engaging Victim 1 in a conversation as to the whereabouts of an individual (Victim 2), who sometimes stayed at Victim 1’s home, but was not there at the time. 8. Victim 1 subsequently observed the offender and another unknown male carry her Samsung television from the house and attempt to place it on the backseat of a vehicle they had driven into the driveway. Unable to place the television in the car, the offender placed it on the driveway and hit the television three times with the pole. The television was valued at $1,900. 9. The offender then approached a Holden Commodore owned by Victim 2, which was parked at the front of Victim 1’s home. The offender smashed the back windscreen with the pole, causing $60 worth of damage. 10. Victim 1 later identified a number of items that had been stolen from the property, with a total value of $2,723. The offender also caused damage to the front door in gaining entry to the property.
Series 2 – November 2014 (drive motor vehicle without consent, drive while disqualified, failure to appear)
At about 1:30pm on 1 November 2014, the offender drove a stolen Chrysler 300 SRT (Chrysler) to a property in Forde in the ACT. Police patrolling the area observed the vehicle. When police approached the vehicle, the offender and a female passenger accelerated the vehicle away quickly, driving over a concrete gutter at the rear of a car park before becoming lodged on an embankment. The offender subsequently exited the vehicle and fled on foot. The police located and arrested the offender on a residential street in Forde later that day, following several reports from residents that a male person had been in their backyards. Police located the keys to the vehicle in the backyard of a nearby property. The offender was a disqualified driver at the relevant time.
The offender was granted bail to appear at the mention of the matter before the Magistrates Court on 17 November 2014. He failed to appear in court on that date. A warrant was issued by the court, and the offender was arrested on that warrant over 9 years later, on 9 April 2024.
Series 3 – 2024 offending (Burglary, driving without consent, dangerous driving, property damage and drug trafficking offences)
On 3 April 2024 at about 4:30am, unknown persons entered into a residence in Mawson in the ACT and took keys belonging to a Mercedes GLC (Mercedes) and a wallet containing numerous cards. The Mercedes was also taken from the driveway of the property.
At about 8:02pm on 3 April 2024, the offender crashed the Mercedes into the front of a residence in Crace in the ACT while in the company of a female passenger (the co-offender) (dishonestly drive motor vehicle without consent, damage property (car) damage property (house)).
At the time the offender drove and crashed the vehicle into the house, three people were home, one of which was a child (Victims 3, 4 and 5). Victim 3 was in the room at the front of the house and saw the headlights approaching through a crack in the curtains. She heard the car tyres screech and then the impact of the car hitting the house (dangerous driving). The offender was also disqualified from driving until 13 April 2026 at that time (drive while disqualified).
Following the crash, the offender was seen rummaging through the Mercedes and removing a black satchel, red duffle bag and a dark backpack.
The offender and co-offender left the accident site, travelling along a footpath leading west across a green belt, before parting ways (crash and not give particulars). Multiple residents heard the accident, saw the offender and followed him across the green belt. The offender became aggressive and threatening towards some of those individuals and entered into the backyard of a residence in an attempt to lose his followers.
The offender was subsequently observed entering the backyard of another residence before jumping the fence into a neighbouring residence. At this time, the offender threw the black satchel onto the roof of the residence and the duffel bag onto the roof of the neighbouring residence.
Police attended the area a short time later and located the satchel bag on the roof of the residence. The bag was found to contain $9,610 in cash (part of rolled up offence of deal with proceeds of crime), drug paraphernalia, a small quantity of an illicit substance and identification documents, including photographic identification in the name of the offender.
Police also retrieved the duffle bag from the roof of the neighbouring residence, which was found to contain clothing, a number of sex toys, an improvised conducted energy weapon capable of discharging electricity (possess prohibited weapon), and prescription medication.
At around this time, further witnesses observed the offender moving through the area holding a black coloured duffle bag and a knife (possess offensive weapon).
At about 9.00pm on the same day, the offender entered a residence in Crace through an unlocked back door and without the permission of the resident (Victim 6). He demanded Victim 6’s phone (minor theft) and car keys to a Ford Fiesta (Ford) (theft), which were handed over, and the offender used the keys to access the vehicle and depart the residence (take motor vehicle without consent).
Later that night, police in a marked vehicle in the area sighted the offender driving the Ford. Police followed the vehicle as it headed down Gundaroo drive in Crace, towards the Barton Highway (drive motor vehicle without consent). The Ford was in the left turning lane to turn on to the Barton highway when it changed direction and headed towards Belconnen, crossing two sets of red traffic lights. Police activated their emergency lights and sirens and attempted to pursue the vehicle, but the offender sped off (dangerous driving and continuation of drive while disqualified).
On 4 April 2024, police located the Ford parked on a residential street in Flynn in the ACT and seized the vehicle.
At about 12:00pm on 9 April 2024, police were called to the Deco hotel in Braddon, where they arrested the offender. The circumstances here were in dispute but the offender accepted his conduct amounted to resisting arrest (obstruction of police).
At the time of his arrest, the offender was found to be in possession of prescription medication, $8,900 in cash (part of rolled up deal with proceeds of crime), and 24.026 grams of methylamphetamine concealed within a red balloon (traffic in controlled drug other than cannabis), as well as several empty red balloons.
Shortly after on the same date, police conducted a patrol of the underground carpark of the hotel, where the co-offender was located in the passenger seat of a Holden SS Commodore (Holden), and arrested. The Holden was seized by police.
Police executed a search warrant on the Holden the following day, locating identification documents, drugs, currency and a large amount of suspected stolen property, including: (a) $23,240 cash within a makeup bag that was inside a backpack; (b) identification documents in the name of the co-offender; (c) several bags of methylamphetamine, totalling 72.9803g (traffic in controlled drug other than cannabis); (d) a bag containing 16.338g of cocaine (traffic in controlled drug other than cannabis); (e) a bag containing cannabis; (f) electronic scales; and (g) a suitcase containing an extensive coin collection, jewellery and luxury watches, a vacuum cleaner, and a small safe containing approximately $900 in Australian coins and a large number of international currencies, and additional Australian coins in paper rolls, totalling approximately $600; (unlawful possession of property reasonably suspected of being stolen).
The objective seriousness of the offences
Take/Drive vehicle without consent
This is a relatively serious offence as indicated by the 5-year maximum penalty. Applying R v Massey (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 156 at [29], the following considerations have informed the objective seriousness of the three offences: (a) The period of driving and the length of distance driven; (b) Whether the vehicle was used in the commission of another offence; (c) Whether the offender was the driver and not only the passenger; (d) The manner of driving, unless subject to a separate charge; (e) Whether the vehicle was damaged; and (f) Whether the vehicle was returned to the owner.
The driving of the Chrysler (CAN 4159/2024) was brief, and the vehicle was recovered but the vehicle was used to evade police. The time over which the Mercedes was driven was unknown, but the manner of driving is the subject of separate charges.
The taking of the Ford without consent (CAN 4163/2024) was more objectively serious. The conduct overlaps with the driving of the Ford (CAN 4160/2024), and the offender used that vehicle in the commission of the aggravated dangerous driving offence, which again, was the subject of a separate charge (CAN 4170/2024).
Aggravated dangerous driving
The features informing the gravity of this type of offence were discussed in R v Rosewarne [2021] ACTSC 217 at [122] and more recently by Taylor J in DPP v Clarke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 261 at [38]. Acknowledging that the aggravated form of the offence is more serious, both were in the lower to medium level of the spectrum of conduct falling within that offence, for different reasons.
The first dangerous driving offence involved the Mercedes (CAN 4164/2024), the offender drove the stolen Mercedes through a quiet residential area in Crace. The circumstances of aggravation were that there was a passenger in the vehicle. The offender drove the car in such a way as to cause it to leave the road and collide into the front of a residence, in which a mother, her partner and young child were residing. The safety of those individuals was put at immediate risk. The distance driven is unclear, but the speed was excessive for the conditions. Damage was also caused to the residence and the vehicle, but that is excluded from the evaluation here because it has been separately charged.
For the dangerous driving offence in the Ford (CAN 4170/2024), the offender drove through two sets of red lights across arterial roads and further, at high speed away from police after failing to stop when the siren was activated (being the aggravating circumstance).
Crash and not provide particulars
Drive while disqualified (repeat offender)
Burglary, including aggravated burglary
Burglary and aggravated burglary are objectively serious offences, with maximum terms of imprisonment of 14 years and 20 years, respectively. Specific features that typically inform the offence were set out in DPP v Clissold [2023] ACTSC 250 at [33] and the cases there-cited.
The offence of aggravated burglary in series 1 was committed at a residential premises while the occupant was at home, with the offender forcing entry through the front door (causing damage to the door frame, which was not separately charged) in the early hours of the morning. Inside the premises, the offender engaged with the occupant in an impliedly threatening manner, demanding to know the whereabouts of another individual while wielding a weapon, which are the circumstances of aggravation. In terms of capability of causing harm, the weapon itself was not as serious as others on the spectrum, but it was nevertheless very threatening, and it was used during the incident.
The offender was also in company with another person. The motive of the offence appears to have been to secure a debt owed to the offender, as well as the use of a getaway vehicle and a weapon, suggests that there was a degree of organisation and premeditation.
The burglary in series 3 was less serious. It was committed at a residential premises while the occupant was at home. While the offence was not premeditated, it did involve an interaction with the occupant of the premises. The theft of the phone, the keys to the Ford, and the taking of the Ford, are the subject of separate charges.
Theft and attempted theft
Applying Rosewarne at [120] and other authorities cited in DPP v Kristiansen [2025] ACTSC 536 at [143], the following considerations inform the objective seriousness of these offences: (a) The motive for the thefts. (b) The extent and value of the property taken. (c) Where the thefts occurred. (d) Whether the stolen items were of sentimental value or utilitarian value, such that they would be difficult or inconvenient to replace. (e) The degree of planning or premeditation.
Each of the offences of theft (series 1 and 3) and minor theft (series 3) fall at the low end of offending. While the offences committed in the course of the series 1 offending were from a residential home, they were opportunistic, had a total value of $4,623, and did not have sentimental value. The theft in series 3 was spontaneous, with the offender taking the keys to the Ford as a means to quickly get away from the area. Property Damage
Considerations relevant to the objective seriousness of the offence were discussed in Rosewarne at [120]. They include: (a) the motive for the damage; for example, whether damage was malicious or occurred to facilitate a burglary; and (b) the extent or value of the damage.
Here, the property damaged was the back windshield of a vehicle, with the value of that damage amounting to $60. This is a low-level example of the offence.
Traffic in controlled drug other than cannabis
Possession of prohibited or offensive weapons and dealing with proceeds of crime offences
These offences are intimately linked to the offender’s drug trafficking activity. Weapons are a common tool of the trade for drug dealers, which reinforces the serious risk that drug dealing poses to the community.
The factors relevant in assessing the objective seriousness of an offence of possessing a prohibited weapon are set out in Nchouki v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 28 at [92]. In the present case, the prohibited weapon was improvised and capable of discharging electricity. There is no evidence before the court that suggests the offender either used, or threatened to use it, nor was there an imminent or grave danger to public safety.
The possession of an offensive weapon, being a knife, was a less serious offence and while the knife was actually held by the offender, the conduct here was of low gravity
For the conduct constituting dealing with proceeds of crime, the amount of the proceeds, the sophistication of the operation and the planning and premeditation of the operation leading to the possession of the proceeds of crime is relevant: R v Celeski (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 393 at [65]-[66]. Here, the total amount of cash involved was $18,510, which is significant, but the conduct involved possession only and there was nothing to suggest this was a sophisticated operation. Obstruct territory official
The series 3 offence of obstructing a territory official arose from the offender resisting arrest by police. It is a low-level example of the offence.
Victim impact statements and resultant injury, loss and damage (ss 33(1)(f) and 33(1)(e) of the Sentencing Act)
Two victim impact statements were before the court. One from Victim 3 and one from Victim 6. Those victims have each detailed the profound and far-reaching impact of the offender’s actions. Each described the shock and physical response they had to the respective incidents, followed by the psychological trauma they suffered, and continue to suffer, arising from the offences. Their feeling of community safety has been shattered.
In addition to the trauma, Victim 3 described the significant administrative burden and time-cost in organising work to repair damage caused by the offender to her house and garden. The detail of their careful and considered statements will not be repeated here but there is no question about the level of impact to the lives of those Canberra residents.
Whilst not all the victims have provided victim impact statements, I further accept the prosecution’s submission that there would have been an inconvenience caused to the owners of the vehicles that the offender unlawfully drove.
Pleas of guilty (ss 33(1)(j) and 35 of the Sentencing Act)
As the offender pleaded guilty, the court may impose a lesser penalty: s 35(3) of the Sentencing Act. The applicable discount is a matter of discretion, guided by the primary consideration of utilitarian value and the mandatory factors for consideration set out in s 35(2), some of which have been discussed above.
In this case, a discount of 25% is appropriate in respect of the offences because: (a) The series 1 offences did not require a brief of evidence and there was high utilitarian value to those pleas. (b) The series 2 and 3 offences did require a brief of evidence to be prepared, but those briefs were necessary to enable the offender to understand the charges and my view is that here, that did not detract from the considerable utilitarian value of the guilty pleas, which avoided the need for a trial in respect of 22 separate charges. (c) The nature of the offences and their objective seriousness (discussed above) makes it appropriate to adopt the common approach of a percentage discount.
Subjective circumstances of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)
The offender is a 38-year-old indigenous male. His background is before the court through three reports. Without setting it out, I accept that the principles deriving from Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 as to social disadvantage and the effect of early exposure to substance abuse by family members apply.
The offender reported having six children, the eldest four of which he speaks to regularly and with whom he maintains a close, supportive and loving relationship. The offender also has a close and supportive relationship with his second eldest sister, who has offered the offender permanent accommodation and ongoing support following his release from custody.
The offender ceased formal education in year 9 and completed various certificates and licences to attain employment in the hospitality, trades and construction industries. He has been employed in those industries at times, albeit with periods of unemployment over the years.
The offender has mental health challenges, also detailed in the reports. I accept that the offender’s mental ill-health is a significant contributor to his drug abuse and that the considerations in R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102 at [32] apply. The offender’s moral culpability is reduced but the need to promote community safety is enhanced.
The pre-sentence reports established a direct correlation between the offender’s drug use and criminal offending. The offender reported a long-term abstinence from all illicit substances between 2014 and 2019, which coincides with a gap in offending during that period. He relapsed into drug use following separation from his partner.
The offender has to date received only minimal intervention for his mental-health and drug addiction. He has accessed mental health counselling for the first time while in custody. He attempted, but did not complete, the Solaris Therapeutic Community (TC) program while in custody. The offender has been offered a further opportunity to address his drug addiction through a residential rehabilitation program at Canberra Recovery Services, with a spot available to commence on 30 June 2026 (today). Criminal antecedents of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)
The offender has a history of like offending in the ACT and NSW, which disentitles him from leniency. He was also subject to conditional liberty at the time of the offending, which aggravates the conduct.
Remorse and restorative justice (ss 33(1)(w) and 33(1)(y) of the Sentencing Act, s 19(1)(b) Crimes (Restorative Justice) Act 2004 (ACT))
Current sentencing practice (s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act)
Having regard to Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at [48] as to the approach to be taken to current sentencing practice, I was assisted by the prosecution’s table of comparable cases dealing with the more serious of the charges, and have had regard to other authorities contained within the cases relied upon by the prosecution. Trafficking in controlled drug other than cannabis
The most serious offending is the drug trafficking, notwithstanding the very real victim impact in respect of the driving and property damage offences, in part because a number of the features of those offences were separately charged. The sentences discussed below give an adequate sense of the principles and consequences in respect of this type of offending. In Lawrence v The Queen [2007] ACTCA 10; 1 ACTLR 158, the Court of Appeal was considering a sentence imposed for two offences against section 603(7) of the Criminal Code, at a time when the maximum penalty was the same as that applying here. In that case, the offender’s conduct was found (at [4]) to have arisen from “a relatively well organised drug distribution exercise”. He was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment and a non-parole period of 2 years, in respect of the count of trafficking in methylamphetamine, which had a total pure weight of 39.322 grams. The Court stated at [6] (approving the comments of the sentencing judge) and at [18]: 6. ... his Honour was obviously drawn to his conclusion that: drug dealing is a blight upon the Australian community ... the considerations of general deterrence require that a custodial sentence, a full-time custodial sentence, be imposed. ... 18. ... A person found in possession of 40 grams of methamphetamine, in the course of trafficking the drug, must be seen as committing a very serious offence, and the penalty must reflect this.
In R v Merrilees (No 2); DPP v Merrilees [2024] ACTSC 364, the offender was found to be a street level user-dealer who trafficked approximately 70g of cocaine. The offender was on conditional liberty at the time. The offender fled the country and achieved a degree of rehabilitation in that time. He was sentenced to 9 months’ imprisonment for the trafficking offence, within a total effective sentence of 3 years and 3 months.
In Celeski (No 2), following a guilty plea, the offender was sentenced to 11 months’ imprisonment for trafficking 26.158g of methylamphetamine and 1.6g of heroin, and 7 months’ imprisonment for dealing in proceeds of crime.
In R v Williams [2022] ACTSC 72, the offender held a position of trust within the trafficking operation and was motivated by profit alongside his own addiction. There was 790g of methylamphetamine involved. He was sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment, reduced from 4 years on account of his guilty plea, and placed on a drug and alcohol treatment order.
in R v McConnell-Imbriotis [2024] ACTSC 319, the offender trafficked about 32g of methylamphetamine, with a proceeds of crime offence taken into account. The offender was on an intensive corrections order (ICO) for an offence of drug trafficking at the time of the instant offence. He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 year and 8 months, reduced from 2 years on account of his plea, with the total sentence wholly suspended upon entry into a good behaviour order of 2 years and 2 months.
In DPP v Jember [2024] ACTSC 311, the offender trafficked 13g of methylamphetamine. He was 31 years old, had two previous convictions for the supply of illicit substances, and was on bail at the time of the offences. He was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment for the trafficking offence, which was reduced to 1 year and 4 months following his guilty plea, and a drug and alcohol treatment order was imposed.
In DPP v Kayvashokoohi [2024] ACTSC 386,the offender trafficked around 50g of amphetamine. The sentencing judge said he "may have been a street level dealer". The offender was 30 years old and had a significant criminal history. The starting point for the trafficking offence was 24 months’ imprisonment.
In DPP v James [2025] ACTSC 546, the offender had a lengthy criminal history and trafficked 28g of heroin and 3.5g of methylamphetamine (which was under the traffickable quantity). He played a role at the low end of the chain of drug supply. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years following a discount of 25% for a plea of guilty. However, this was taking into account a scheduled offence for possession of a prohibited weapon, and the sentencing judge indicated (at [42]) that this had resulted in a longer sentence being imposed than otherwise would have been the case.
Pre-sentence custody
Parity
Some of the offences were committed by the offender in the company of a co-offender. This enlivens consideration of principles of parity in sentencing the offender. The co-offender pleaded guilty to charges of riding in a stolen motor vehicle and possessing proceeds of crime. She was sentenced to terms of imprisonment for 4 months and 7 months respectively, which were then suspended.
The involvement of each offender in a joint offence and differences in their antecedents guides the court: Saipani v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 5; 288 A Crim R 191 at [56]. The offender’s role in the offending was significantly more serious (he was the driver of the Mercedes) and the offender also has a considerably more extensive criminal history than the co-offender. However, those sentences did somewhat moderate the relevant sentences to be imposed for the series 3 offending, and in this case, that has an indirect effect on consistency of sentencing across the series as a whole.
Consequence of Offending
The series 2 offending has a consequence for a good behaviour order attaching to a possession of a prohibited substance offence imposed by the ACT Magistrates Court on 17 September 2014, in that the court must cancel the good behaviour order and either impose the suspended sentence originally imposed for the offence (being a total term of imprisonment of 6 months) or re-sentence the offender: s 110(2) of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT).
For completeness, the series 1 offending was also committed while on conditional liberty, because he was subject to a suspended sentence order imposed on 12 September 2013. As stated above, this is an aggravating feature although the consequences of the breach have already been addressed by the Magistrates Court.
The court’s discretion is guided by a number of considerations, which are set out in cases such as DPP v Rohrlach (No 2) [2025] ACTSC 192 at [7]-[14] and in DPP v Gardner (No 5) [2025] ACTSC 41 at [17]-[18] and applied here without repeating them.
In the present case, the good behaviour order imposed on 17 September 2014 was for a period of 18 months and the sentence was suspended immediately. The series 2 offending was committed on 1 November 2014, being less than two months after the commencement of that order. The offending was of a different nature, but it cannot be said that the breach was trivial. I also accept the prosecution’s submission that there is no evidence that the offender attained any form of rehabilitation in the period between the imposition of the order and the series 2 offences, or that he has demonstrated a commitment to any significant rehabilitation since. The breach offences demonstrate a complete disregard of any obligation to be of good behaviour.
Taking all those matters into account, ordinarily the imposition of the suspended sentence is appropriate and necessary to ensure the integrity of the suspended sentence regime is respected and protected. However, the ultimate outcome is affected by the other sentences for which the offender is being sentenced today. While the sentence will be imposed in the same length, it will be suspended again as part of a treatment order also imposed for reasons next explained.
Totality
The approach to principles of concurrency and accumulation has been set out in Dawson v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 9 at [37] (and the cases there-cited). In the present case, given the number of offences, their nature and the separate series of offending, the structure is necessarily complex.
For transparency, I will explain the approach I have taken here in a little more detail than might otherwise be the case. It must also be borne in mind that the prosecution submitted that the length of the sentences here that could be made the subject of a drug and alcohol treatment order from the date of imposition would exceed 4 years, which is a statutory limit and would prevent such an order from being available to the offender. The court must not impose a lesser sentence of imprisonment on the offender than the circumstances of the offence would ordinarily require only to allow the court to make a treatment order: s 12A(5) of the Sentencing Act. The reasons that follow are to demonstrate that the application of the totality principle is what causes the total effective sentence of the offences that will be the subject of a treatment order to fall at the very upper limit of 4 years but not exceed it, rather than the arbitrary shortening of the total sentence solely for the purpose of making a treatment order.
By way of explanation: (a) The series 3 offending, while somewhat of a crime spree, also had two separate components – one directly related to drug trafficking and the other related to driving. Because the drug trafficking was the most serious, it was appropriate to deal with those offences and the offences associated with drug trafficking of less gravity first in the sentencing structure. That resulted in those sentences being entirely served as at the date of imposition. (b) As between the drug trafficking offences, the three separate offences related to different packages of drugs but overall, the conduct warranted a high degree of concurrency, particularly in respect of the methylamphetamine offences and the proceeds of crime offence. (c) The suspended sentence to be cancelled and resentenced was the same in length as the original sentence, but its imposition as part of many other offences meant that the lengthy period of pre-sentence custody must now be taken into account, and this resulted in a substantial adjustment for concurrency to avoid the overall sentence being crushing. (d) The offender’s submission that the offending in series 1 was inextricably linked was accepted and there is a high degree of concurrency for that series, with the minor theft, theft and damage property each being conduct within the comprehension of the aggravated burglary. (e) The series 2 offences involved a course of conduct and therefore also warranted a high degree of concurrency. (f) With regard to the driving offences in series 3, the take motor vehicle without consent was more objectively serious and was thus imposed before the two offences of driving of a motor vehicle without consent, even though it was the last in time in that series. Again, there was a significant amount of overlapping conduct, and this is seen in the one accident in respect of the Mercedes vehicle giving rise to 5 distinct offences, which warranted a high degree of concurrency for those offences. (g) One of the disqualified driving offences also straddled the driving of two separate vehicles on the same day, which affected how those driving offences were structured. Disposition
Although terms of imprisonment are sentences of last resort (s 10 of the Sentencing Act), the seriousness of the offending means that save as for the obstruct territory official and failure to provide particulars conduct, no sentence other than terms of imprisonment is appropriate here.
The length of each individual term must be proportionate to the gravity of the offending but should never exceed the minimum that is necessary to accomplish relevant sentencing objectives: Thorn v Laidlaw [2005] ACTCA 49 at [30].
The offender has now spent more than two years in full-time custody. The longer a person spends in full-time custody, the less emphasis that specific deterrence may have for a person. Given this offender’s particular circumstances and background, general deterrence also has less weight.
At some point in the future, he is going to be released. Having regard to the ramifications for the community, as evidenced by the victim impact statements and in recognition of that impact, the biggest concern for this court is what course may be most likely to protect the community going forward. The difficulty is how to minimise the risk of the offender engaging in conduct of the kind for which he is now being sentenced again.
Plainly, removing the criminogenic risk factor of drug addiction must be given immediate priority. It is through rehabilitation that the long-term protection of the community will be promoted.
I have therefore determined that disposition by way of a Treatment Order is the appropriate outcome. Such a sentence is still punishment and the length of the sentence serves the purpose of proper denunciation, as does the lengthy period in full-time custody already served.
I have considered the objects of a Treatment Order set out in s 80O of the Sentencing Act. In particular, I consider that facilitating the rehabilitation of the offender by providing a judicially supervised, therapeutically oriented and integrated treatment regime is what is required for this offender. He has tried to beat drug addiction in the past and not succeeded. He is strongly motivated now to try again. Having considered the views of the authors of the report, the time is right for him to try again but this time, with support.
I am satisfied of the other formal requirements for a Treatment Order: (a) On the reports provided to the court, the offender is both eligible and suitable for a Treatment Order: ss 80S and 80T of the Sentencing Act. (b) There was a strong degree of correlation between the offender’s dependency on substance use and his offending: s 12A(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Sentencing Act. (c) The offender has consented to the Treatment Order, having been given a clear explanation of what it involves: s 12A(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act. (d) The offender will live in the ACT for the duration of the sentence except as directed by the court: s 12A(2)(a)(iii) of the Sentencing Act. (e) There are no specific concerns relating to the safety or welfare of any victim: s 12A(2)(b)(ii) of the Sentencing Act.
Accordingly, a Treatment Order is the appropriate choice for this offender: s 12A(2)(b).
It is not necessary to set a non-parole period because the making of a Treatment Order means that the sentence becomes an “excluded sentence of imprisonment” under s 64 of the Sentencing Act.
Finally, in terms of the automatic disqualification periods prescribed they are: (a) In respect of the aggravated dangerous driving offences, 12 months under ss 63(1)(f) and 63(4) of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) (General Act). (b) In respect of the drive while disqualified (repeat offender) offences, 24 months under s 32(5)(b) of the Driver Licensing Act.
I will not alter those default or automatic periods, but I will exercise the power under s 69 of the General Act and make an order that each of the disqualification periods run concurrently.
Orders
Series 3 – April 2024 (Drug trafficking and associated offences) (1) For CAN 4173/2024, possess offensive weapon, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 2 months reduced to 1 month and 15 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 8 April 2024 and conclude on 22 May 2024. (2) For CAN 4177/2024, possess prohibited weapon (energy weapon), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 3 months, reduced to 2 months and 7 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 17 April 2024 and conclude on 23 June 2024. (3) For CAN 7259/2024, traffic in controlled drug other than cannabis (16.3g cocaine), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 1 year, reduced to 9 months on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 30 May 2024 and conclude on 28 February 2025. (4) For CAN 7258/2024, traffic in controlled drug other than cannabis (72.8g meth), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 2 years, reduced to 1 year and 6 months on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 8 August 2024 and conclude on 7 February 2026. (5) For CAN 4171/2024, traffic in controlled drug other than cannabis (24.02g meth), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 1 year and 6 months, reduced to 1 year, 1 month and 15 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 7 March 2025 and conclude on 21 April 2026. (6) For CAN 4186/2024, deal with proceeds of crime, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 1 year reduced to 9 months on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 18 September 2025 and conclude on 17 June 2026. (7) For CAN 7260/2024, unlawful possession of property reasonably suspected of being stolen, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 2 months and 21 days, reduced to 2 months on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 30 April 2026 and conclude on 29 June 2026.
Suspended sentence (8) Pursuant to s 110 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT), the sentence imposed in the Magistrates Court on 17 September 2014 in respect of CC2014/5835 is cancelled, and the offender is resentenced to a term of imprisonment for 6 months, to commence on 30 June 2026 and conclude on 29 December 2026. Series One – June 2014 (9) For CAN 5954/2024, aggravated burglary, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 1 year and 4 months reduced to 1 year on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 1 September 2026 and conclude on 31 August 2027. (10) For CAN 5956/2024, attempted theft, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 3 months reduced to 2 months and 7 days on account of his guilty plea, backdated to commence on 1 April 2027 and conclude on 7 June 2027. (11) For CAN 5955/2024, theft, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 4 months reduced to 3 months on account of his guilty plea to commence on 8 June 2027 and conclude on 7 September 2027. (12) For CAN 5957/2024, damage property, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 2 months, reduced to 1 month and 15 days, to commence on 1 August 2027 and conclude on 15 September 2027.
Series 3 – April 2024 (burglary, theft and driving offences) (13) For CAN 4161/2024, burglary, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 11 months reduced to 8 months and 7 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 8 September 2027 and conclude on 14 May 2028. (14) For CAN 4167/2024, minor theft (phone), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 4 months reduced to 3 months on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 1 October 2027 and conclude on 31 December 2027. (15) For CAN 4162/2024, theft (key to Ford vehicle), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 4 months, reduced to 3 months on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 1 March 2028 and conclude on 31 May 2028. (16) For CAN 4170/2024: a. In respect of the aggravated furious, reckless or dangerous driving (Ford), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 7 months, reduced to 5 months and 7 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 30 May 2028 and conclude on 5 November 2028; and b. The offender’s driver’s licence is automatically disqualified for a period of 12 months, from 30 June 2026 to 29 June 2027. (17) For CAN 4163/2024, take motor vehicle without consent (Ford), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 1 year and 1 month, reduced to 9 months and 23 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 7 June 2028 and conclude on 29 March 2029. (18) For CAN 4160/2024, drive motor vehicle without consent (Ford), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 10 months, reduced to 7 months an 15 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 7 June 2028 and conclude on 21 January 2029. (19) For CAN 4172/2024: a. In respect of the drive while disqualified (repeat offender) the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 5 months reduced to 3 months and 22 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 1 January 2029 and conclude on 22 April 2029; and b. The offender’s driver’s licence is disqualified for a period of 24 months, with such period to be made entirely concurrent, to commence on 30 June 2026 and conclude on 29 June 2028. (20) For CAN 4159/2024, drive motor vehicle without consent (being the Mercedes vehicle) the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 10 months, reduced to 7 months and 15 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 15 April 2029 and conclude on 29 November 2029. (21) For CAN 4164/2024, aggravated furious, reckless, dangerous driving: a. the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 7 months, reduced to 5 months and 7 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 15 July 2029 and conclude on 21 December 2029; and b. The offender’s driver’s licence is disqualified for a period of 24 months, with such period to be made entirely concurrent, commencing on 30 June 2026 and concluding on 29 June 2028. (22) For CAN 4175/2024, damage property (house), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 8 months, reduced to 6 months on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 1 August 2029 and conclude on 31 January 2030. (23) For CAN 4176/2024, damage property (Mercedes), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 7 months, reduced to 5 months and 7 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 15 August 2029 and conclude on 21 January 2030. (24) For CAN 4174/2024, obstruct territory public official, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a good behaviour order for a period of 12 months to commence on 30 June 2026 and conclude on 31 December 2026 with core conditions only. (25) For CAN 4178/2024, crash and not provide particulars, the offender is convicted with no further action taken.
Series 2 – November 2014 (26) For CAN 10762/2014, drive motor vehicle without consent (Chrysler), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 10 months reduced to 7 months and 15 days on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 1 November 2029 and conclude on 15 June 2030. (27) For CAN 10763/2014: a. In respect of the drive while disqualified (repeat offence), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 4 months reduced to 3 months on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 29 March 2030 and conclude on 28 June 2030; and b. Pursuant to s 32(5)(b) of the Driver Licensing Act, the offender’s driver’s licence is automatically disqualified for a period of 24 months, with such period to be made entirely concurrent, from 30 June 2026 to 29 June 2028. (28) For CAN 4165/2024, failure to appear, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 2 months and 21 days, reduced to 2 months on account of his guilty plea, to commence on 1 May 2026 and conclude on 30 June 2026. (29) Overall, the total effective term of imprisonment is 6 years 2 months and 21 days, from 8 April 2030 to 28 June 2030.
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (1) A Treatment Order under s 12A of the Sentencing Act is made for Brent Ian Guerin in respect of the following eligible offences: (a) CC2014/5835, Possession of prohibited substance; (b) CAN 3146/2015, Aggravated burglary; (c) CAN 3147/2015, Theft; (d) CAN 3148/2015, Attempted theft; (e) CAN 3149/2015, Damage property; (f) CAN 4161/2024, Burglary; (g) CAN 4162/2024, Theft; (h) CAN 4167/2024, Minor theft; (i) CAN 4163/2024, Take motor vehicle without consent; (j) CAN 4164/2024, Aggravated furious, reckless, dangerous driving; (k) CAN 10763/2014, Drive while disqualified (repeat offence); (l) CAN 10762/2014, Drive motor vehicle without consent; (m) CAN 4159/2024, Drive motor vehicle without consent; (n) CAN 4170/2024, aggravated furious, reckless, dangerous driving; (o) CAN 4172/2024, Drive while disqualified (repeat offender); and (p) CAN 4165/2024, Fail to appear. (2) The convictions and sentences imposed for the said eligible offences are hereby incorporated into the Treatment Order in the Custodial Part of the Order. (3) The Treatment Order is for 3 years, 11 months and 30 days to commence on 30 June 2026 conclude on 28 June 2030. (4) The Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order is for two years from today, 30 June 2026 to 29 June 2028. (5) The Custodial Part of the Treatment Order for the eligible offences will be suspended under s 80W of the Sentencing Act from today, 30 June 2026, until 28 June 2030. (6) Under s 80ZA of the Sentencing Act, Brent Guerin is required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender’s Good Behaviour obligations from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order on 30 June 2028, until the end of the total sentence, 28 June 2030, with the following conditions: (a) The core conditions under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT); (b) A probation condition that he accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or his delegate for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person supervising him considers appropriate and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him including as to alcohol and drug testing, counselling and treatment. (7) For the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order: (a) The core conditions of the Order set out in s 80Y of the Sentencing Act are hereby imposed. (b) Mr Guerin is to travel to Canberra Recovery Services on 30 June 2026 and admit himself to the residential drug rehabilitation program at that facility today. (c) Mr Guerin is directed to complete the said program or any other program of intervention, treatment or counselling she is directed to complete, including urinalysis or case management that may be required by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team. (d) Mr Guerin is to obey all reasonable directions of any person in charge of the program and all the rules of the program and the facility, which may include directions about where he resides, with whom he associates and his attendance from time to time. (e) Following the completion of any residential program, Mr Guerin is not to leave his approved place of residence between any curfew hours directed by the Treatment and Supervision team, other than for a medical emergency, and he is to present himself to the front door of the residence if required by an officer of ACT Policing. (f) Should Mr Guerin leave or be discharged from the directed program before completing it, he is to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4:00pm on the next business day with a view to having his Treatment Order reviewed. (g) Mr Guerin is not to consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs or prescription drugs not prescribed to him. (h) Mr Guerin is to comply with any directions of the court from time to time about attendance at court in person or by electronic means. (8) The offender is directed to attend court for DASL review in person or via AVL on 3 July 2026 at 12:30pm. I certify that the preceding ninety-seven [97] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of hers Honour Justice McWilliam. Associate: Date: 3 July 2026
DPP
Guerin