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[2025] ACTSC 124
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of the ACT
2025-03-31
Christensen AJ
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Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: DPP v Gill Citation: [2025] ACTSC 124 Hearing Date: 25 March 2025 Decision Date: 31 March 2025 Before: Christensen AJ Decision: See [61] Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – DRUG AND ALCOHOL SENTENCING LIST – Judgment and Punishment – Sentence – drive motor vehicle without consent – drive motor vehicle at police – aggravated dangerous driving – use number plate not properly issued for vehicle – repeat offender – reduction in sentence for plea of guilty – some remorse and insight into offending – no leniency available with reference to criminal history – unstable accommodation – whether drug and alcohol treatment order suitable and appropriate – likelihood of severe substance use disorder – offender of older age and maturity – offender has not had previous opportunity for intensive supervision in community – treatment order provides ‘wrap-around’ support – treatment order imposed Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 29A Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) ss 12A, 80M, 80T, 80S Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) s 318 Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT) s 32 Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT) s 7 Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) 1999 Act (ACT) s 22 Cases Cited: DPP v Allred [2023] ACTSC 184 DPP v Djerke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 341 R v Crawford (a pseudonym) [2022] ACTSC 166 R v Rowlands (No 2); DPP v Rowlands [2024] ACTSC 143 R v Seymour [2021] ACTSC 152 Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions Barry Gill (Offender) Representation: Counsel E Bayliss; G Meikle (DPP) J Masters (Offender) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Peter Agoth & Associates (Offender) File Numbers: SCC 186, 187 of 2024 CHRISTENSEN AJ: Introduction
Barry Gill is to be sentenced with respect to a number of driving offences committed on 14 January 2024. The charges involved are: - Drive motor vehicle without consent, contrary to s 318(2) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, 500 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/4382); - Drive motor vehicle at police contrary to s 29A of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Crimes Act), carrying a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment (CAN 2024/4380); - Aggravated dangerous driving (repeat offender) contrary to s 7(1)(b) of the Road Transport (Safety and Traffic Management) Act 1999 (ACT), carrying a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment, 500 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/4379). An automatic minimum 12 month period of licence disqualification applies; - Drive while disqualified (repeat offender) contrary to s 32(1)(a) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT), carrying a maximum penalty of 1 year imprisonment, 100 penalty units, or both (CAN 2024/5977). An automatic minimum 24 month period of licence disqualification applies; and - Using a numberplate which is not properly issued for the vehicle, contrary to s 22 of the Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) 1999 Act (ACT), carrying a maximum penalty of a fine of 20 penalty units (CAN 2024/4383).
Mr Gill accepts that periods of imprisonment are warranted to reflect the seriousness of his offending. He seeks that the term to be imposed be served by way of a drug and alcohol treatment order (treatment order): s 12A Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act). The prosecution does not oppose the imposition of such an order, per se, but caution that Mr Gill may not demonstrate the commitment to rehabilitation that a treatment order requires.
ACT Health Services have found Mr Gill suitable for a treatment order, having regard to his established substance dependency, and the role this has in his offending behaviour. A therapeutically recommended treatment program is available for him. ACT Corrective Services find Mr Gill not suitable for a treatment order, with reference to his history of noncompliance with community based orders.
It is trite that the Court’s decision as to whether to impose a treatment order is not determined by the assessments, but with reference to the considerations provided in ss 12A, 80T and 80S of the Sentencing Act. Having considered those matters, I am satisfied that Mr Gill is eligible for a treatment order, and such an order is an appropriate and suitable one for him. The reasons for this conclusion follow.
The offending Background
On 3 July 2023, Mr Gill was served with a Court Attendance Notice that required him to attend court with respect to minor driving offences. Mr Gill did not attend court as required and a warrant came to be issued for his arrest on 6 December 2023.
Between the hours of 12:00pm on 18 December 2023 and 12:00pm on 9 January 2024, a burglary occurred at an address in Pearce. During the burglary, keys belonging to a white Volkswagen Polo (the Polo) were taken from inside of the premises and the Polo was taken from the driveway of the residence.
Agreed facts
On Sunday 14 January 2024 at about 5:30pm, police were called to the Amaroo Playing fields in relation to a group of five people drinking and making a bong in a vehicle. This vehicle was later identified as the Polo taken following the burglary in Pearce. When police arrived at the fields, checks ascertained that the number plate on the Polo was not the correct one, and that the plate belonged to a vehicle located in Evatt.
The six people were near to the Polo. When police approached, four of the people rushed into the Polo. Police activated emergency lights and parked their vehicle near the Polo. The police officers got out of their vehicle and yelled at the driver to stop several times. The driver of the Polo was later identified to be Mr Gill.
Mr Gill reversed the Polo and nearly hit the front passenger side of the police vehicle, where police were standing. The police feared they would be struck by the Polo and moved backwards away from the police vehicle. The police continued to yell “stop”, before the Polo commenced driving forward.
Police immediately turned the police vehicle around and commenced following the Polo. The police emergency lights and sirens were activated, but the Polo did not stop for police.
A pursuit was not commenced due to the manner in which Mr Gill was driving, being on the wrong side of the road, travelling at high speeds (estimated to be 100 km/h), and switching between the correct and incorrect side of the road. This was driving along Horse Park Drive towards the Taylor area, with a medium level of traffic.
Police returned to the fields and located and identified the two males who did not get into the Polo. They provided information as to who the driver and passengers of the Polo were.
Police commenced a search for the Polo and received information that it was at an address in the Belconnen area that belonged to one of the passengers. Police attended at the location. On arrival, the Polo was observed to exit the location at high speed.
Shortly after, police commenced a search of the Belconnen area and located two of the passengers from the Polo. Police were informed that they had been dropped off by Mr Gill, that they were not aware that the Polo was stolen, and that they were not aware where Mr Gill was travelling to. Police continued their search for the Polo without success.
On 16 March 2024 at about 10pm police attended at an address in Dunlop as they suspected Mr Gill to be staying there. An occupant of the premises informed police that no one else was present, and consent to search the premises was provided. Police entered and located Mr Gill curled up in the rear back seat of a vehicle in the garage. He was arrested.
There is no information provided as to whether any others allegedly involved with the stolen vehicle were charged, and I infer from this that there is no application of the parity principle in the sentencing exercise.
Assessment
The most serious of the offending was clearly the driving at the police officers. Any offending of this type warrants a stern sentence that particularly reflects the sentencing purposes of denunciation, deterrence, and accountability. The driving of a vehicle, even in a reckless manner, that puts the safety and welfare of police at risk is not to be tolerated. Police officers are entitled to expect that they can undertake their duties without such risks to their safety.
In this matter, the safety of two police officers was put at risk. While it appears the driving at the time was brief and involved a low speed, it was driving done with a deliberate intention to ignore the police requests to stop, and it appears that it was only the police officer’s actions that ensured they were not struck with the vehicle. There is a high degree of recklessness in the offender’s conduct, and it involved the greater objective seriousness of driving ‘at’ the police officers.
The manner in which the drive at police offence occurred appears to me to not be factually comparative with the authorities provided by the prosecution for the purposes of current sentencing practice: R v Rowlands (No 2); DPP v Rowlands [2024] ACTSC 143 and DPP v Allred [2023] ACTSC 184; R v Seymour [2021] ACTSC 152; R v Crawford (a pseudonym) [2022] ACTSC 166. These authorities, in which higher speeds and different circumstances were involved, resulted in sentences ranging from 36 months (before reduction for a plea of guilty) to 13 months (reduction for plea of guilty not specified). Here, the offending has the aggravating feature that the police officers were outside of the vehicle at the time they were driven at, but it does not have the aggravating feature of high speeds.
The duration and distance of the driving of the stolen vehicle is not specified in the facts. It appears that the aggravated driving was within one suburb, and that the driving of the stolen vehicle was across multiple suburbs. Mr Gill had possession of, and drove, the stolen vehicle for a relatively lengthy period. It is apparent that either directly, or indirectly, Mr Gill’s involvement in the vehicle had a role in it being unavailable to the owners for a lengthy period of time, and that the vehicle was damaged. The manner in which Mr Gill and his associates were using the vehicle before police arrived demonstrates the complete disregard he had for the valuable property of another community member.
During the driving, Mr Gill drove with passengers in the vehicle. His driving commenced with the statutorily aggravated aspect that he is a repeat offender, and that he failed to stop for police. He maintained this failure to stop and engaged in a determined police pursuit. It is inherently serious that he drove the vehicle deliberately to avoid police detection, putting police officers, his passengers, and other road users at risk. He drove in a manner that involved other forms of aggravation, being the high speeds and driving on the incorrect side of the road. There is no suggestion of his having entered intersections against lights, travelled on footpaths, evaded tyre deflation devices, or that he caused other vehicles to take evasive action.
Effect on the victims
The owner of the stolen vehicle that Mr Gill drove in the offending provided a victim impact statement. While Mr Gill is not criminally responsible for the theft of the vehicle, his conduct in driving the stolen vehicle still had significant effects on the owners, as explained in the victim impact statement.
The vehicle was one that was relied upon by the family, and the absence of the vehicle was disruptive, inconvenient, costly, and time-consuming. The family also experienced deep emotional impacts, experiencing a feeling of violation of autonomy and vulnerability. The owner describes that the vehicle was recovered by police almost six weeks after it was taken, with Mr Gill obviously driving the vehicle during that time. When it was returned, there were alterations and damage to the vehicle that the owner describes as being deeply unsettling. The family was caused stress and frustration that permeates every aspects of their lives.
The victim impact statement serves as a valuable reminder of the significant impacts that the use by offenders of stolen vehicles has on the owners of such vehicles.
Pleas of guilty and remorse
Mr Gill pleaded guilty in the Magistrates Court before provision of the brief of evidence. The prosecution accepted this was an early plea of guilty that warrants a full reduction to reflect the extent of utilitarian value. A reduction in the sentence in the order of 25 per cent is appropriate.
As to his remorse and insight into the offending, Mr Gill attributes his offending to substance use. He is described as expressing that he was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of the offences, and that he was committing offences in order for him to “survive being homeless”. He feels “embarrassed” and an “idiot”. In an initial report, Corrective Services describe that he “appeared to minimise his responsibility, and he failed to demonstrate victim empathy”. In a subsequent report, Mr Gill is described as claiming to accept responsibility for his actions, but stated that he had “taken the wrap” for some of the offences. He informed Corrective Services that he wished to distance himself from anti-social peers, having come to realise that these people were not his friends.
In the most recent report, Mr Gill is described as having “verbalised remorse” for the victims of the offences. It appears that during the period in custody, Mr Gill’s remorse and insight has developed, but it clearly needs to develop further if it is to act as a deterrence from further offending.
Corrective Services advised that they were in contact with the “victim(s) of the offences” and “they noted they did not have concerns regarding their need for protection from violence or harassment from the offender”. It is not clear which of the victims this relates to, but the information addresses that there are no concerns as to the eligibility criteria pursuant to s 12A(2)(b)(iii) of the Sentencing Act.
Subjective circumstances
Assessments have been undertaken as to Mr Gill’s subjective circumstances in a presentence report, an intensive correction order assessment report, and reports prepared by Corrective Services and Health Services for the purposes of suitability for a treatment order.
He is now 46 years of age and was aged 45 years at the time of the offending. He was born in Canberra and raised primarily by his grandmother and mother. His mother was 13 years of age at the time of his birth. Mr Gill reports an abusive childhood, but this was disputed by his grandmother, who was nominated by Mr Gill to verify the information provided for one of the reports.
The basis for Mr Gill’s claim is not otherwise explained in the assessments. It is explained that his parents separated when he was aged two, and that thereafter he had limited contact with his father. His father has since passed away. He reports problems with his stepfather, leading him to run away when he was 14 years of age. He has not had a relationship with his mother for an extended period, and has no contact with his half-siblings. His grandmother and uncle have been his closest familial relationships, but his uncle passed away in recent years and he has had little recent contact with his grandmother. Mr Gill has three children, two of whom are adults. He has had limited contact with his children.
Mr Gill has worked in various roles during his adulthood, but his last employment was in 2015. He has been unable to engage with employment due to his substance abuse. He has obtained various certificates, and has engaged in employment while in custody. He expresses interest in continuing with employment once in the community.
In recent years, Mr Gill has had unstable accommodation, but he has been approved for housing with the Justice Housing Program. Corrective Services have found his proposed accommodation to be suitable, but caution that securing stable housing will be a considerable focus for the treatment team. It warrants noting that s 80M of the Sentencing Act contemplates inclusion of the director-general of ACT Housing as a member of the treatment order team. It is expected that this entity will be available to assist in supporting a treatment order participant to obtain secure housing.
In terms of prosocial activities, Mr Gill has an interest in bike riding. He otherwise reports that most of his companions are not prosocial, and that boredom is an issue that leads to substance use. He has no physical health concerns and reports no mental health concerns.
Criminal history and custody
As observed by Corrective Services, Mr Gill possesses an extensive criminal history. It is one that dates back to 2001 and involves convictions for offences in the ACT and in New South Wales (NSW). His history primarily consists of property related offences, motor vehicle and traffic related offences, some violence offending, and possession of prohibited substances.
Mr Gill has been known to Corrective Services since the beginning of his criminal history in 2001. He was first supervised by Corrective Services under a good behaviour order, and since that time has been supervised under ten further good behaviour orders and numerous bail undertakings. He has been sentenced to suspended terms of imprisonment, and has been imprisoned. Corrective Services describe his compliance while subject to community-based orders as unsatisfactory. Breach action has been initiated on numerous occasions, often in relation to failures to accept supervision, or as a result of re-offending.
His most recent sentence by the Magistrates Court in August 2024 involved a term of imprisonment that concluded on 25 March 2025. Mr Gill was not subject to any period of parole with respect to that sentence, having served the sentence to completion, followed by a period on remand with respect to the offences the subject of the sentencing exercise. A period of six days in presentence custody applies (26 March 2025 – 31 March 2025).
In addition, Mr Gill has been in custody for a continuous period since his arrest on 16 March 2024, with the sentence imposed relating to offences from the same period of time the subject of the current sentencing exercise. Indeed, the offending the subject of the earlier sentencing exercise included driving offending involving the same Polo that was used in the current offending. This is informative in an application of the totality principle, which has relevance in the sentencing exercise. It is apparent that Mr Gill has now spent a not insignificant period in fulltime custody in relation to the offending from this period of time.
The criminal history of Mr Gill demonstrates that the offences the subject of this sentencing exercise are his most serious examples of driving offending. It also establishes that on this occasion of offending, he was not on conditional liberty, that is, he did not breach any community based orders. Nonetheless, no leniency is available with reference to the criminal history.
The trajectory of this criminal history appears to be consistent with Mr Gill’s reported substance use history. It is a history which suggests that supporting Mr Gill’s substance dependency rehabilitation is of importance in order to address his offending behaviour and to achieve community protection in the sentence to be imposed.
Substance dependency
Mr Gill reports a history of illicit substances and severe alcohol abuse. His substance use commenced after he began associating with the “wrong type of people”. He began consuming alcohol as an adolescent, which he continued at a high level of use until the age of 30 years. He commenced cannabis at the age of 17 years and used this daily until he was aged 19 years, and thereafter decreased use of cannabis with the commencement of methamphetamine use. Mr Gill reported commencing use of this at 22 years of age, although in one report he stated that he was 25 years of age, and in another, 30 years of age. Regardless of when he commenced, it has been a lengthy history of methamphetamine use with daily use for an extended period. He identified dependence on methamphetamine as a significant factor in his offending history. He reported that he uses illicit substances as a coping mechanism to deal with the stressors in his life.
Mr Gill has had limited engagement in substance use recovery. He reported to the assessors that his last substance use was in March 2024, immediately prior to be being placed in custody. Testing undertaken in the AMC is consistent with this claim. He expressed to assessors that he was ready to address his drug dependency and create a positive life for himself. He has goals to “wean” of the DASL program with a view to securing employment, and he wants to stay “straight” and keep away from negative associates.
Corrective Services report that Mr Gill expressed that he would likely benefit from the intensive support available under a treatment order. He is described as being polite, engaged and forthcoming with information. He reported having proactively organised a bank card, identification documents, and researched bus timetables to know his transport options for court and programs.
Health Services found Mr Gill as presenting with a likelihood of severe substance use disorder at the time of the offending and find him suitable for a treatment order. A therapeutically recommended day program that is available for Mr Gill to engage with from the imposition of any treatment order has been identified.
Disqualification periods
Mr Gill is a repeat offender with respect to the aggravated dangerous driving offending, having been convicted in April 2020 of failing to stop a motor vehicle for police in August 2019. He was sentenced to the rising of the court for that offence. It was driving that occurred some four years before the offending that occurred here. It underscores the limitation to leniency that can be afforded to Mr Gill with respect to driving offences.
The repeat offending as a disqualified driver arises from a conviction in April 2020 for driving while his licence was suspended in August 2019. As noted above, the offending having occurred here as a disqualified driver relates to a disqualification order of the Magistrates Court on 25 March 2008. The criminal history provides that the order was that Mr Gill is ‘disqualified from holding/obtaining a licence for 12 months, further disqualified until disqualification set aside by court’. This was for an offence of a special driver with a prescribed concentration of alcohol in blood that was committed on 6 November 2007 (CAN 2007/11075). Since then, Mr Gill has been convicted of driving while disqualified in 2008, unlicensed driving in 2016, driving while his license is suspended by law in 2020, and convicted for two offences of driving while disqualified that occurred in July 2023 and February 2024.
No submissions were made as to the curious nature of the 2008 disqualification order and its ongoing impacts on the lawfulness of Mr Gill’s driving some 16 years later. The curiosity of the implications of this order includes that Mr Gill’s conviction for driving while his licence was suspended in 2020 suggests he has lawfully held a driver’s license since 2008.
In the absence of any submissions as to this, and having regard to the plea of guilty entered to the disqualified driving offence, it seems that there is nothing to be done other than to observe that Mr Gill has been aware that he was not to drive for a lengthy period of time. He has continued to do so. I do not consider it appropriate to impose anything more than a recognition of this offending by way of a conviction. The disqualified driving is not a seemingly egregious example of it. That is, it was not, for example, blatant disregard for a court order imposed shortly before the driving conduct.
The prospect of Mr Gill achieving rehabilitation will be assisted by Mr Gill at some point having the ability to drive lawfully. This typically facilitates securing employment. I will therefore order that the automatic minimum disqualification periods that are to apply are to be served concurrently. It will though seemingly be necessary for Mr Gill to address the 2008 disqualification order if he is to ever be lawfully licensed to drive.
Consideration
Mr Gill has been granted numerous opportunities for community based orders by the ACT courts. He has not demonstrated an appreciation for the opportunities afforded to him, nor does he give confidence from his history as to his prospects of compliance with a further such opportunity. It can be readily understood why Corrective Services have found him unsuitable for a treatment order, and that the prosecution caution as to the imposition of such an order. Mr Gill lacks substantial protective factors, he has multiple risk factors, and is assessed by Corrective Services as having a high risk of general reoffending.
Nonetheless, there are a number of factors that weigh towards Mr Gill being someone for whom a treatment order is a suitable and appropriate one.
Firstly, the offending on this occasion did not occur while on conditional liberty. It appears that after completion of his last period in custody, Mr Gill was not subject to any supervision while in the community. He has not yet had the opportunity to demonstrate whether he would comply with a parole order. He plainly would benefit from supervision upon release from custody, and a treatment order is a form of community based order that has not yet been attempted with respect to Mr Gill.
The extent of supervision and judicial oversight of the order will be something that Mr Gill has not experienced before. He will not have scope to take any advantage of the delays upon non-compliance that are inherent in the system of enforcement that exists in other sentence orders. A treatment order is capable of rapidly holding to account any non-compliance and expects of a participant that they genuinely advance their rehabilitation. If they do not, a return to custody can be expected.
Secondly, Mr Gill is at an age, and maturity and stage of life, such that he would be regarded as being in the category of “older participants” that are likely to have greater success on a treatment order: see DPP v Djerke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 341 at [23]. The information before me on sentence suggests that Mr Gill is tired of a life of substance use, offending behaviour, and homelessness. He is ready to secure stable accommodation, employment, and live a prosocial life. He has not previously had the opportunity to engage with a comprehensive alcohol and drug program, nor to receive the supports that will be available under a treatment order. Mr Gill presents as someone who is ready to embrace the opportunity to make the changes he seeks.
Thirdly, the subjective information available as to Mr Gill is limited, but sufficient to conclude that there are likely past traumas and challenges that he needs to address. Without being presumptive that there are such matters, it appears likely that greater insights and growth would assist Mr Gill if he is to address the underlying matters that have informed his substance dependency. A treatment order is a measure that provides ‘wrap-around’, comprehensive supports with a view to addressing the causative factors of substance dependency in order to support participants to achieve recovery, and rehabilitation.
Orders
Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (6) A Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order pursuant to s 12A of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) is made for Barry Gill, in respect of the eligible offences set out in Orders 1 to 3, of which Barry Gill has been convicted, and for which he has been sentenced to a total term of 2 years imprisonment. (7) The drug and alcohol treatment order be for 1 year, 11 months, and 25 days, to commence on 31 March 2025 and end on 25 March 2027. (8) The Custodial Part of the drug and alcohol treatment order for the eligible offences be suspended under s 80W of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) from 31 March 2025 to 25 March 2027. (9) The Treatment and Supervision Part of the drug and alcohol treatment order be for 12 months, to commence on 31 March 2025 and end on 30 March 2026. (10) Under s 80ZA of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT), Barry Gill be required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender’s Good Behaviour obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order, 31 March 2026, until the end of the total sentence, 25 March 2027, with a probation condition that he accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or his delegate for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person supervising him considers appropriate and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him. (11) For the Treatment and Supervision Part of the drug and alcohol treatment order: (a) The core conditions of the order set out in s 80Y of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) be hereby imposed. (b) Barry Gill undertake any program, treatment or counselling, alcohol and drug testing or case management, and comply with any direction as to where he resides, or any curfew that may be required, by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team and obey all reasonable directions of any member of that Team. (c) If Barry Gill is discharged from or leaves any treatment program, he is to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4:00pm on the next business day. (d) Barry Gill not return a positive test sample under alcohol and drug testing. (e) Barry Gill not consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs and prescription drugs not prescribed to him. (f) Barry Gill comply with any directions of the Court from time to time about attendance at Court in person or by electronic means. (12) Barry Gill be directed to sign a sealed copy of this Order and an undertaking to comply with the Order and any obligations under the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) for the period that this Order is in force before he leaves the Court precincts on 31 March 2025. (13) Barry Gill be directed to appear in person in Court for DASL Review on Friday, 4 April 2025 at 11:30am.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one [61] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Acting Justice Christensen. Associate: Date: 23 July 2025
DPP
Gill [2025] ACTSC 124
At the time of Mr Gill’s driving on 14 January 2024, he was a disqualified driver. The agreed facts provide that his licence was disqualified by the ACT Magistrates Court on 25 March 2008, being an order for disqualification for a period of 1 year on 25 March 2008 and continuing until further order of the Court.
In relation to the authorities provided by the prosecution as to current sentencing practice for the offence of aggravated dangerous driving, which included authorities in addition to those identified above, sentences from six months imprisonment to 24 months imprisonment have been imposed. The authorities also suggest that there is a wide variety of circumstances that this offence involves, with distinctions in the distances travelled and the features of the dangerous driving.
There are a number of serious aspects to each of the offences, although it is relevant to observe from the outset that the offending is inextricably linked. Where there are features of aggravation that are separately charged, this will be reflected in the appropriate penalties and the structure of the sentences.
The sentences to be imposed must plainly only be ones of imprisonment for the driving of the stolen motor, the driving at police, and the aggravated driving given the seriousness of this offending. As to the disqualified driving, for reasons explained below (at [52]), I am satisfied that imprisonment is the only appropriate penalty, but only a nominal term is appropriate. As to the numberplate offence, this carries only a maximum penalty of a fine. That the stolen vehicle had numberplates that were affixed with an apparent intention to deceive from detection by police will be taken into account with respect to all of the driving offending, and the order to be made for the offence will reflect this.
I am satisfied, having considered the matters provided in ss 12A, 80S and 80T of the Sentencing Act that Mr Gill is eligible for a treatment order, and that it is a suitable and appropriate one for him.