DPP v Crompton [2025] ACTSC 352

Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions Tony-John Crompton (Offender) Representation: Counsel G Meikle (ACT DPP) E Wallis (Offender) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Legal Aid (Offender) File Numbers: SCC 2, 3 of 2025 McWILLIAM J:

1. Tony-John Crompton is before the court for sentence, having pleaded guilty to the following offences, all committed on 22 April 2024: Charge number Offence Maximum penalty 1. CAN 4670/2024 Attempted aggravated robbery contrary to s 310 a fine of $400,000, by virtue of s 44 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) imprisonment for 25 (Criminal Code) years, or both 2. CAN 4667/2024 Assault occasioning actual bodily harm, contrary Imprisonment for 5 to s 24 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Crimes years Act)

2. CAN 9034/2024 Intentional wounding, contrary to s 21 of the Imprisonment for 5 Crimes Act years 4. CAN 4665/2024 Minor theft, contrary to s 321 of the Criminal Code A fine of $8,000, imprisonment for 6 months or both 5. CAN 6815/2024 Common assault, contrary to s 26 of the Crimes Imprisonment for 2 Act years 6. CAN 10626/2024 Damage property, contrary to s 116(3) of the A fine of $8,000 Crimes Act by virtue of s 45A of the Criminal Code imprisonment for 2 years, or both 7. CAN 4776/2024 Damage property, contrary to s 116(3) of the A fine of $8,000 Crimes Act imprisonment for 2 years, or both

3. Under s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act), a sentence of imprisonment is a sentence of last resort. Here, the offender conceded that in respect of the first three offences, terms of imprisonment inevitably follow from his conduct. He seeks that such sentences be served by way of a drug and alcohol treatment order (Treatment Order): s 12A of the Sentencing Act. The prosecution does not oppose the imposition of a Treatment Order. The offender has been assessed as suitable for such an order by ACT Health Services and ACT Corrective Services. For reasons that follow, I consider such an order is an appropriate and suitable one. Facts

4. The facts of each of the offences were agreed as between the parties. The following summary is drawn from those agreed facts. Minor theft

5. The offender attended the BWS store in Dickson at 7.29pm on 22 April 2024. He took two four packs of alcoholic lemon squash valued at $56 and left without paying for them. About twenty minutes later, he returned and took a twenty-four pack of a type of alcoholic Solo drink, valued at $110, and exited the store without payment.

6. The thefts were reported and CCTV footage of both incidents provided to police. Attempted aggravated robbery and common assault

7. At about 8.15pm on 22 April 2024, the offender entered the Little Wu Chinese Street Food take away restaurant in Dickson with a pair of scissors. He pointed the scissors towards the attendant (Victim 1) behind the counter and screamed, “Give me all your money” from a distance of approximately half a metre from Victim 1.

8. Victim 1 was scared and removed a $50 note from her purse. The offender then yelled words to the effect of “Give me ALL your money, give me your wallet”. Victim 1 picked up her computer and wallet and stepped away from the offender, saying “I don’t have money”.

9. The offender then stabbed the scissors in the air towards Victim 1 while he motioned towards himself with his right hand and continued to order Victim 1 to hand him her money. She repeatedly denied having any money.

10. The offender was then distracted by members of the public passing by the front door and exited the store. Victim 1 immediately locked the front door and contacted police to report the incident.

11. The offender followed two other males towards Dickson Tradies before turning around and approaching Flavours of Jiangnan, also located in Dickson. The offender threw a can towards the window, causing a male inside the restaurant (Victim 2), to come out onto the footpath. The offender approached Victim 2, yelling and waving his arms, before using his hand to slap Victim 2’s head. The degree of force used was hard. The offender then walked away from Victim 2 before returning to the front of the said restaurant and tapping on the front glass window with the pair of scissors. He then left the area. Assault occasioning actual bodily harm

12. At approximately 10pm, the offender and another person walked towards a male (Victim 3) who was walking to a gym in Dickson. The offender said to Victim 3, “What’s your name?” The man replied, “I’m just going to the gym” and continued walking.

13. Victim 3 felt that he had interrupted the males doing something. He felt uneasy and threatened. He ran across the street towards an apartment block in an attempt to get away from the males. However, as he was running the offender caught up to Victim 3 and punched him from behind to the left side of his face. Victim 3 continued to run from the offender but tripped and fell onto the road. The offender stood above Victim 3 and proceed to kick him five to six times in the head and right hip. Victim 3 yelled out “stop”. At this time, another male was walking his dog on the street in Dickson where this offence was taking place. He observed the offender assaulting Victim 3 and yelled out, startling the offender, who then ran away. Police were then called, and the helpful dog-walker remained with Victim 3 until they arrived.

Damage property (by joint commission)

13. At about 10:15pm, the offender and another male were at an apartment block on the corner of Moncrieff St and Morphett St in Dickson, swearing and screaming loudly. This was heard by a woman (Victim 4) inside her home in the apartment block. Their voices sounded angry and threatening. The words heard were “What the fuck have you done? I’m going to get you, cunt. I’m going to get you.” Victim 4 felt rattled and checked on her next-door neighbour. No one answered so she returned to her apartment. She heard further screaming and swearing coming from outside. She opened her front door and heard someone bashing on her neighbour’s fence. She returned inside and sent her daughters to their rooms. Victim 4 could still hear yelling, screaming and banging at the front of her own property and proceeded to call the police. One of Victim 4’s daughters also saw the males, when she looked out her window as they walked away.

14. Subsequently, Victim 4 discovered damage to her property. A sliding security door had been removed from its track and was not able to be realigned. A ceramic teapot that was in the courtyard of her unit was smashed into many small pieces. There were also dents and scratches to the two rear glass doors of the unit. Damage property

15. At about the same time that night, another male (Victim 5) was in his residence at the same apartment block. He and his wife heard a loud banging noise coming from outside, which sounded like something was banging on their fence. Victim 5 checked the rear of his property and then his front yard. From his front yard, he saw two males, one of which was the offender. He saw the offender climb onto the wall surrounding Victim 4’s property and throw things towards the windows and security screen while yelling and swearing in the direction of Victim 4’s unit. The offender then saw Victim 5 and jumped back, before running towards Victim 5’s property in the company of the other male. Both the offender and the other male yelled at Victim 5. Victim 5 could hear the sound of metal and felt scared, so he went inside to contact police. A short time later, Victim 5 observed the offender kicking the entry gate to his residence, causing damage to all panels, before departing.

Wounding

16. At about 10:30pm on the same night, a male (Victim 6) and a female were sitting in the rear courtyard of the female’s residence when they heard a loud smashing noise. They exited the courtyard onto Morphett Street in Dickson to see what was happening. They saw two males, one of which was the offender, screaming “come out” and yelling abuse towards a neighbouring residence about 100 metres west. Victim 6 yelled out “Oi, cunts, fuck off” in an attempt to deter the males, however, the two males began to approach Victim 6 in response. Victim 6 walked 10 metres down Morphett Street and met the two males. The offender held his left hand behind his back and used his right hand to punch Victim 6 in the right eye. Victim 6 saw at that point that the offender was holding a knife and told the female to go inside and get a baseball bat. The knife was about twelve centimetres long and resembled a “shiv”. The female went inside.

17. Victim 6 feared for his and for the female’s safety. He responded to the offender’s hit by punching the offender and causing him to fall backwards. The other male and Victim 6 then exchanged about thirty punches. The offender tackled Victim 6 and the other male to the ground, and they all landed in a garden box next to the footpath.

18. Victim 6 felt pain on the right side of his lower abdomen and observed the offender leaning over him and making jabbing motions with the knife towards him. Victim 6 realised he was being stabbed and thought he was going to die. Victim 6 continued to struggle with the other male who was still throwing punches while attempting to shield his abdomen from the knife with his arms. The offender used one of his feet to stomp on Victim 6’s body while stabbing Victim 6 with the knife at least three times in total.

19. The offender stepped back and said to the other male, “Let’s go, cunt” before running west on Morphett Street. The other male attempted to run, but Victim 6 grabbed onto the neck of his hooded jumper and punched him three more times. Victim 6 then released his hold on the other male and returned to the courtyard, telling the female, “I’ve been stabbed”. Victim 6 was bleeding heavily through the jumper he was wearing and left a trail of blood through the courtyard. He retrieved his baseball bat and exited the residence, whereupon he was apprehended by police. Victim 6 and the female provided a brief version of events to police, resulting in Victim 6’s release.

20. Victim 6 suffered a number of injuries including a laceration to his left forearm, a puncture wound to his right forearm just below the elbow, a cut to his lower right abdomen, bruising and swelling to his right eye and cuts above his right eyebrow and below his right eye. Paramedics from the ACT Ambulance Service attended the scene to assess and treat Victim 6’s injuries.

21. The offender was located with the other male on Moncrieff St at about 10.39pm. Police suspected the offender to be involved in the thefts as he was wearing the same clothing observed to be worn by the offender captured in the CCTV footage at BWS Dickson. Police also located a black kitchen knife on the corner of Moncrieff Street and Dooring Street. The offender was arrested and taken into custody on 22 April 2024. The other male was also arrested but released shortly thereafter.

The Court’s task

22. The court’s task is to sentence the offender in accordance with the sentencing purposes set out in s 7 of the Sentencing Act, which include (in summary form) making the offender accountable and denouncing and adequately punishing his conduct, deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences, recognising the harm done to the victims of the crimes and the community and promoting an offender’s rehabilitation. Those considerations have been taken into account in the reasoning that follows, mindful that a sentence of imprisonment should never exceed the minimum that is necessary to accomplish relevant sentencing objectives: Thorn v Laidlaw [2005] ACTCA 49 at [30].

23. The mandatory relevant considerations set out in s 33 of the Sentencing Act have also been considered below insofar as they relate to the offender’s circumstances, and in accordance with the principle of individualised justice: MT v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 26; 17 ACTLR 22 at [56].

Nature and circumstances of the offence (s 33(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act)

24. As I have stated in other cases, but repeat here for the benefit of the particular offender involved, the requirement to consider the nature and circumstances of the offences proceeds upon a number of established principles: (a) There is a theoretical spectrum from the least serious instance of the offence to the most serious. That spectrum takes into account both the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the criminal: R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; 259 CLR 256 at [19]. (b) In assessing the nature of the crime, the court takes an objective approach, in the sense that the court does not consider matters personal to the offender and determines the seriousness “wholly by reference to the nature of the offending”: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 at [27]. (c) The maximum penalty for an offence also provides a yardstick against which to assess the objective seriousness of the offences before the Court: Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at [31]. The maximum penalties here are in the table at the outset of these reasons. The attempted aggravated robbery offence is to be regarded as much more serious than the other offences. (d) The sentence which the court imposes must be proportional to the objective seriousness of the offence: R v Miller [2019] ACTCA 25; 279 A Crim R 232 (Miller) at [37], cited in R v Lindsay [2020] ACTCA 25 at [32].

25. It is also preferable to articulate the factors that inform the character of an offence’s objective seriousness: Miller at [22]; Laipato v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 35 at [156]. The specific features of each offence are considered next. They include the injury, loss or damage from the offending (s 33(1)(e) of the Sentencing Act).

Minor Theft

26. The features relevant to a consideration of the objective seriousness of the theft have been outlined in R v Elphick [2021] ACTSC 9 at [115] and R v Slattery [2021] ACTSC 154 at [38] (both of which were cited by Taylor J in DPP v Monaghan [2024] ACTSC 183 at [18]) as well as R v Dawson [2022] ACTSC 64 at [43], cited in R v Kirkwood [2022] ACTSC 148 at [79]. Drawing upon those authorities, I have considered the following features as being relevant here: (a) The motive for the theft; (b) The extent and value of the property taken; (c) Where the theft occurred; (d) Whether the stolen item was of sentimental value or utilitarian value, such that it would be difficult or inconvenient to replace; and (e) The degree of planning or premeditation.

27. For minor theft, the offence itself means that the value of the property is less than $2000. As indicated by the maximum penalty, this is what might be described as a low-level offence.

28. This was also a rolled-up charge. Though comprehending a number of offences, the court sentences on the basis that the conduct is the one offence: R v Beary [2004] VSCA 229; 11 VR 151 at 157; [14], cited in R v Forrest (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 83 at [163]. The maximum penalty for the offence applies but only one sentence can be imposed. As Refshauge J went on to explain in Forrest (No 2) at [163]-[164]: 163. …The sentence is not invariably the sum of the individual sentences that could have been imposed had the individual offences been separately charged, though it may be: R v Samia [2009] VSCA 5 at [12]. It, therefore, not only considerably simplifies the task of a sentencing judge, but it provides a considerable benefit to the offender: R v Jones at [13]. 164. Nevertheless, the criminality encompassed in a rolled-up count is greater than that of an individual count: Director of Public Prosecutions (Cth) v Watson [2016] VSCA 73 at [82]; Ly v The Queen [2014] FCAFC 175; 227 FCR 304 at 331; [125]; R v Richard [2011] NSWSC 866 at [65]…

29. I accept the offender’s submission that the motivation which can be inferred is the offender’s desire to consume the drinks taken, consistent with his level of substance use on the night (addressed separately below). The amount involved was of small value, but not de minimus due to the rolled-up nature. The property taken was not of sentimental value. The theft occurred from a commercial premises and there was some planning, as evidenced by the return to the premises. I agree with the parties’ characterisation of the conduct as an unremarkable example of minor theft.

Attempted Aggravated Robbery

30. Aggravated robbery covers both threats of force and the use of an offensive weapon. The assessment is nuanced, in that the brandishing of a butter knife in taking $5,000 from a person might be described as lower range, but the holding of the same knife to a person’s throat to extract $50 might well be considered more serious.

31. Where the offence is one of attempt, as is the case here, the objective seriousness is informed by: (a) The level of sophistication; and (b) The level of success.

32. In Cajina v The Queen [2009] ACTCA 2; 3 ACTLR 79, the Court of Appeal referred (at [29]) to the requirement to evaluate the seriousness of the offence as one of attempt rather than commission of the substantive offence. The Court of Appeal adopted the principles set out in R v Taouk (1993) 65 A Crim R 387 at 390. Relevantly here, the evaluation is as follows (emphasis added): In making such an evaluation, where the charge is of an attempt to commit a substantive offence, it will be relevant for the judge to consider, first, that the charge is of attempt only, and, by hypothesis, the substantive offence was not completed; and it will be relevant to consider the chances that the attempt, if not interrupted, would have succeeded. If on the facts it appears that the attempt was unlikely to succeed or indeed, that although physically possible there was in reality no prospect that it would succeed, this is a matter which might be seen to reduce the objective seriousness of the crime. However it must also always be necessary for the sentencing judge to consider the seriousness of that which was attempted. ... It may be postulated that where the offence attempted is grave, a sophisticated attempt which came close to success is likely to attract a heavier sentence than a naïve an ill-prepared attempt predestined to fail. On the other hand, a determined and all but effective attempt to commit a minor crime would attract perhaps a more severe sentence than a naïve and inefficient attempt to do the same thing, although the relative triviality of the offence would tend to narrow the margin between the two outcomes. It cannot necessarily be postulated, however, that a naïve and ill-prepared, even incompetent, attempt to commit a serious offence must necessarily attract a lesser sentence than would be incurred by a serious and all but effective attempt to commit an offence of less gravity. There is clearly an interrelationship between the seriousness of the intended consequences and the real prospects of having achieved them, and that relationship has to be weighed in each case in the light of all of the circumstances.

33. Features of the offending here are: (a) The circumstances of aggravation: The offender brandished a pair of scissors, which are an offensive weapon. Where only one circumstance of statutory aggravation is present, that is a relevant feature: see R v Gordon [2018] ACTSC 94 (Gordon) at [21]. (b) The nature of the weapon: A pair of scissors is a bladed object with the capacity to do harm. However, having regard to other weapons falling within the conduct, they are of a less serious type. Given that the aggravated form of the offence has been charged, they are not a separate or additional feature of aggravation. (c) The weapon was not actually used: Although the offender displayed the scissors to Victim 1, the conduct did not involve actual violence or an explicit verbal threat of violence. By comparison, cases where a weapon is actually used have been considered to be very serious examples of offending: R v Hall; R v Barker [2016] ACTSC 11 at [33], and Gordon at [21]. (d) The victim was vulnerable: Victim 1 was a more vulnerable victim as she was a shopkeeper at night (s 33(1)(gb) of the Sentencing Act). The impact upon her is considered separately below. (e) The degree of planning: The offender had a weapon with him, which indicates some planning. However, the attempt was ineffectual and unsophisticated. (f) Value of items: No items or money were successfully taken. (g) Circumstances of interruption: The offender was distracted by people walking past and left. However, that is not to take away from the fact that the offender was in immediate proximity to the victim and there was a real prospect of the offence succeeding. I do not think it falls into the category of an attempt that was predestined to fail.

34. It is worth observing that the lack of an aggravating feature does not mitigate the seriousness of the conduct; it is simply that the conduct is not aggravated by that feature: DPP v Moala (No 3) [2023] ACTSC 306 per McCallum CJ at [24]. Nevertheless, the above features and in particular, the lack of sophistication and lack of actual use of the weapon make this a less serious example of the offence that was attempted.

Assault occasioning actual bodily harm

35. The objective seriousness of the offence must be judged by reference to both the nature of the behaviour in which the offender has engaged, as well as the nature and extent of the actual bodily harm suffered by the victim: R v Newman; R v Reid [2016] ACTSC 102 at [14].

36. Here, it was accepted that this was a serious example of the offence, given its protracted nature, combined with the mechanism of the assault being a punch to the face and then 5-6 kicks to the head and hip.

37. The injuries suffered were the laceration to Victim 3’s top lip and facial swelling. The injuries themselves were fortunately of temporary duration, although that is not to detract from the clear impact of the offending on Victim 3 (considered separately below).

Common assault

38. This offence is of less objective seriousness than the other personal offences committed that night. Features relevant to evaluating the offence of common assault include any protracted nature of the conduct and whether force is applied: Bennett v Daley [2021] ACTSC 159 at [50]. Here, the assault involved an unprovoked slap to the victim’s head. While it was not protracted, it did involve actual force, not just threatened force, the degree of force used was described as “hard”, and the head is a vulnerable part of the body. I assess the conduct itself as being at the low end of objective seriousness. Intentional Wounding

39. Wounding is not defined in the Dictionary to the Crimes Act. As submitted by the prosecution, at common law, wound means “to break the layers of the skin”: R v Vimahi; R v Grech [2017] ACTSC 97 at [124]. The features that inform the objective seriousness of the offence here are: (a) the means by which the wound was inflicted; (b) the extent of the wounding; (c) the reason for the conduct; and (d) the degree of pre-meditation or planning.

40. Here, there is no doubt the conduct was serious. The wound was inflicted by a knife, which the offender was carrying. It involved a minimum of three stabs with the knife. The circumstances involved physical violence (a protracted assault), with the use of the knife following the victim and the offender’s friend being involved in exchanging physical blows. The photographs in evidence reveal the depth of the wound which required suturing.

41. Having regard to the circumstances that fall within this offence, including wounding to a greater extent of the body, or wounds requiring emergency surgery, the conduct here is approaching the mid-range.

Damage Property offences

42. This offence has been charged under the Crimes Act, rather than under the Criminal Code which itself is an indicator of the conduct being of lower objective seriousness. In line with cases such as R v Rosewarne [2021] ACTSC 217 at [120], I have taken into account the circumstances in which the damage occurred (including motive or intent) and the amount of damage caused.

43. With the first instance of damage property by joint commission, the offender’s role in causing the damage is not clear and the value of the damage is unknown. There is little evidence of planning or premeditation. For the second offence of damaging property, the offender repeatedly kicked the door. Both involved damaging property that provided security to residential properties. They are low level examples of the offence.

Victim impact (s 33(1)(f) of the Sentencing Act)

44. Three victim impact statements were before the court, from Victims 1, 3 and 4.

45. Victim 1 experienced the attempted aggravated robbery. She described her fear at having the man run into her shop, try to rob her, yell at her the whole time, and try to stab her. She said that she was crying and begging him not to hurt her. She is still afraid to go out at night and worried about whether this will happen to her again. Her statement puts a human face on the vulnerability felt by people who are working by themselves as shopkeepers at night.

46. Victim 3 experienced the assault occasioning actual bodily harm. On the night of the incident, he experienced dizziness, disorientation and significant pain related symptoms, including specifically facial swelling above his cheek.

47. His statement described that the incident was particularly traumatic for him because it was entirely unprovoked and when he tried to run away, he was pursued. The incident has changed how he feels when he walks around his neighbourhood, in that he is too scared to follow his normal routine of attending the gym in the quieter hours and instead will only go to the gym in daylight or drive if it is getting dark. He has stopped using headphones as he is now on alert when he walks. He had to take personal leave from work to recover physically and mentally. He worked remotely from Perth for a month because of his heightened sense of insecurity and need to be supported by friends and family.

48. Victim 4 experienced the first damage to property offence. She explained how her history included surviving domestic violence and previously staying at a women’s refuge where she was unable to see her children. She explained that the home in which she was living was the first home for her and her children where they had felt safe. In one night, the offender took away all feelings of safety and permanently scarred her and her daughters. She said she can still hear the offender screaming, smashing against her doors with a metal fence pole, raging and screaming with constant threats. She also says that she has never been so scared before and that she does not feel safe to leave her home, although staying at home does not feel safe either.

49. She also reported the impact the offending has had on her children, which she described as “soul crushing”. They do not feel safe and jump at any noise. If she goes to the mailbox, she has to announce when she gets back as her children are constantly on high alert at home. She said that the effect on her and her family has been horrendous and ongoing. Plea of guilty (ss 33(1)(j) and 35 of the Sentencing Act)

50. The offender pleaded guilty to all charges on 24 October 2024 following the provision of a brief of evidence and negotiations between the parties. No submission was made that the strength of the prosecution case for any of the offences was overwhelming.

51. The court may impose a lesser period than it would otherwise have imposed if the offender had not pleaded guilty to the offences: s 35(3) of the Sentencing Act. If it does so, the penalty that would otherwise have been imposed but for the guilty plea must be explicitly stated: s 37(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act.

52. The applicable discount for a guilty plea is a matter of discretion: Cranfield v The Queen [2018] ACTCA 3 at [37]-[38]. It is necessary to consider the particular circumstances in which the plea was entered, being the statutory matters set out in s 35(2) of the Sentencing Act. Some of those matters have been addressed already in these reasons, such as the seriousness of the offences and the impact of the offence on the victims.

53. Utilitarian value is a primary consideration: Monfries v The Queen [2014] ACTCA 46; 19 ACTLR 99 at [47] and R v Toumo’ua [2017] ACTCA 9; 12 ACTLR 103 (Toumo’ua) at [49].

54. Here, the pleas were not at the earliest stage of proceeding and followed negotiations where one of the charges became a rolled-up charge and others were discontinued. As stated in Toumo’ua at [56]: … s 35(2)(c) supports a focus on the utilitarian value that is associated with the timing of a plea of guilty. An offender can benefit either from a substantial discount for the utilitarian value of an early plea, or from a lower sentence flowing from a lesser charge or fewer charges following negotiations, but should not usually benefit in both ways.

55. With this in mind, having heard submissions from the parties on the negotiations, a discount of 25% properly reflects the clear value of the pleas in respect of the offences of wounding, attempted aggravated robbery, assault occasioning actual bodily harm and the two property damage offences.

56. I initially canvassed with the parties the fact that the offender did receive a benefit for what ultimately became the rolled-up minor theft charge, with a preliminary view that a discount of 21% would be appropriate. However, having reflected on the conduct and the fact that a sentence of imprisonment is a last resort, ultimately I have decided against imposing a sentence of imprisonment in relation to the minor theft charge. Similarly, in relation to the offence of common assault, I am not contemplating a sentence of imprisonment and accordingly, no consideration of any discount on a sentence of imprisonment applies.

Subjective circumstances of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

57. A number of relevant reports assist with understanding the offender’s subjective circumstances. There was a psychological report prepared by Ms Tabitha Frew, dated 18 July 2025. Ms Frew was not required for cross-examination, and I accept her evidence. There was also an intensive correction order assessment report dated 2 January 2025, and a Drug and Alcohol Suitability Assessment Report dated 24 June 2025. They do not make for easy reading.

58. The offender is 20 years old and has the support of his mother and maternal half-siblings. He is not currently in a relationship and has no dependants. The report of Ms Frew details the offender’s childhood, first with his mother, and then in a decision that threw the offender out of the metaphorical frying pan and into the fire, with his biological father. It is unnecessary to repeat the experiences to which this offender was subjected, and the court exercises caution in this regard, to avoid retraumatising the offender by laying his history bare in a published judgment. It appears formal education ceased from year 8.

59. I accept that the principles deriving from Bugmy v The Queen [2013] HCA 37; 249 CLR 571 concerning the social disadvantage experienced by the offender, which have in turn had consequences for the offender’s mental health, apply here. I accept his moral culpability is reduced and further, that general deterrence as an objective is also reduced. However, this disadvantage does have consequences for an increased risk to the community without targeted intervention.

60. Having regard to the unchallenged psychological evidence, and the various mental impairments and disorders detailed therein, the Verdins principles, derived from the case of the same name R v Verdins [2007] VSCA 102; 16 VR 269, also operate in respect of this offender. The principles were discussed in Higgins v The Queen [2022] ACTCA 26 at [40]-[45], with the Court of Appeal noting that the principles recognise the potential effect of a mental disability in any given case (citing Aslan v The Queen [2014] NSWCCA 114 at [34]) and call for a discretionary evaluation as to the significance of the operation of those principles in the broader sentencing process. This includes the impact of the offender’s underlying mental conditions on his experience in custody. I accept that the offender’s numerous psychological disorders means that a sentence of full-time custody would weigh more heavily upon him (s 33(1)(r) of the Sentencing Act) and that is consistent with the offender’s reported experience while on this lengthy period of remand.

61. While in custody, the offender has demonstrated aptitude, respect and trustworthiness. He is to be commended for that and for his attitude to employment. Prior to the offending, he was regularly employed in various trades.

Whether offender was affected by alcohol or controlled drug (s 33(1)(p) of the Sentencing Act)

62. The offender was affected by both drugs and alcohol at the time of the index offending and I consider that the offending is directly attributable to the offender’s drug-induced state (s 33(1)(v) of the Sentencing Act).

63. The offender submitted that the Henry principles apply, being a reference to R v Henry [1999] NSWCCA 111; 46 NSWLR 346. I consider that some of the principles do apply, insofar as the impulsivity of the offending and the lack of any planning is evident, the capacity of the offender to exercise judgment was plainly affected and most particularly, the addiction occurred at a very young age through coercion by those responsible for his welfare.

Criminal antecedents of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

64. The offender had no prior criminal history in the Territory, and a minor relevant criminal history as a young person when he was residing in Dubbo in NSW. While the offender does not have the benefit of leniency in respect of the property damage offences, I am prepared to accept that any offence involving violence being inflicted on or threatened to people was out of character for the offender and directly attributable to his drug induced state on the night.

Remorse (s 33(1)(w) of the Sentencing Act)

65. The offender wrote a letter to the court. For the benefit of the victims, who may not have seen that letter, the offender expressed his deepest remorse for his victims. He said that he understood his actions were very bad and had a severe impact upon the lives of the victims. He says he wishes it never happened and that not a day goes past that he has not thought about the incident.

Current sentencing practice (s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act)

66. It is also relevant to take into account sentencing patterns or practices. In NC v The Queen [2017] ACTCA 31, the Court of Appeal stated at [54]: ...Comparable cases may be useful in two ways: first, if it is possible to discern from them any unifying sentencing principles that should be applied; and second, if an analysis of the cases discloses discernible sentencing patterns or a range of sentences. However, the cases may not establish any relevant range, or the range may not necessarily be the correct range or otherwise determinative of the upper and lower limits of sentencing discretion: Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at [54]–[55] (per French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; 207 CLR 584 at [59] (per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ); R v Pham [2015] HCA 39; 256 CLR 550 at [26]–[27] (per French CJ, Keane and Nettle JJ). Much will depend on the number of cases referred to and whether they are truly comparable. ...

67. The objective in seeking consistency in sentencing practice, is not to bind the sentencing court to achieve numerical equivalence with similar sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction, but rather consistency in application of the sentencing principles: see Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at [48].

68. In Barrett v The Queen [2016] ACTCA 38 at [40], the Court referred to the ACT Sentencing Database in relation to sentences imposed for aggravated robbery offences and noted that most such sentences were generally terms of imprisonment of between 30 months and four years. These statistics were referred to again in Bloxsome v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 52 at [35]. I have referred to this to place in context the attempted offence here.

69. With regard to intentional wounding, I have considered the following: (a) In R v Forster-Jones (No 2) [2019] ACTSC 286, a youthful offender with a disadvantaged background and history of drug use which contributed to the offending was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years (following a discount of 10% for a guilty plea) for wounding a person’s arm with a machete. (b) In R v Gordon (No 2) [2019] ACTSC 254, a 23-year-old offender was sentenced to imprisonment for one year and six months (following a discount of 25% for a guilty plea) where the wounding was more significant than that under consideration here, involving three stab wounds, requiring surgery and resulting in permanent scarring. (c) In R v Lowe [2015] ACTSC 116, a 22-year-old offender with a troubled background, drug use from the age of 13 and schizophrenia was sentenced to 9 months (following a discount of 25% for a guilty plea) for conduct which involved stabbing a taxi driver with a barbecue fork.

70. In respect of the damage property offences, I have had regard to cases such as R v Thorn [2020] ACTSC 363 (damage to door frame). For context in assessing ranges in offences charged under the Criminal Code, I have considered two cases that were factually similar to the extent that they each involved minor damage to security doors, being DPP v Stasinos [2023] ACTSC 179 and DPP v Stewart [2023] ACTSC 252 where sentences of two to three months imprisonment were imposed.

71. The prevalence of theft and common assault offences and the vast degree of variables within the conduct mean that it is not of great utility to traverse the numerous sentencing decisions.

Pre-sentence custody

72. The offender was arrested on 22 April 2024 and has been in custody since that date. As at the date of sentence, he has spent 477 days (1 year, 3 months and 21 days) in custody in relation to the charges. This will be taken into account by way of backdating the sentence.

Totality

73. The approach to principles of concurrency and accumulation has been set out in Dawson v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 9 at [37] (and the cases there-cited).

74. I have taken whether this was the one course of conduct of offending (s 33(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act). I accept that the offender’s conduct might be properly characterised as a drug-induced crime spree during the course of one night which warrants partial concurrence, but the various crimes and number of victims mean that there should be a degree of accumulation, in order to properly reflect the different degrees of criminality involved in each offence.

Disposition

75. Drawing together the above considerations, for all offences save for the minor theft and common assault offences, I consider that a sentence of imprisonment is appropriate, acknowledging that this is a sentence of last resort but also that the offender was considered unsuitable for an intensive correction order for reasons articulated in the relevant report, which I accept without repeating here. The gravity of the offending for those 5 offences here, including proper recognition of the impact on the victims, means that no sentence other than one of imprisonment would be proportionate.

76. In respect of the minor theft and common assault offences, given the very strong subjective case as discussed above, a good behaviour order is the appropriate outcome. For structural reasons in stepping back and looking at the overall sentence, I have made a modest reduction to the good behaviour orders and made them entirely concurrent.

Should a Treatment Order be made?

77. For reasons that follow, I have determined that disposition by way of a Treatment Order is the appropriate outcome.

78. First, I have taken into account the relevant sentencing purposes, with general deterrence carrying less weight for reasons explained. Specific deterrence has in part already been achieved by the offender spending more than a year in custody. Denunciation is achieved by ensuring that the length of the sentence is proportionate to the gravity of the offending. That permits rehabilitation to be given priority in the manner in which the sentence is served.

79. Second, I have considered the objects of a Treatment Order set out in s 80O of the Sentencing Act as follows: (a) facilitating the rehabilitation of the offender by providing a judicially supervised, therapeutically oriented and integrated treatment regime; (b) reducing the offender’s dependency on alcohol or a controlled drug; (c) reducing the health risks associated with such dependency; (d) assisting the offender’s integration into the community; and (e) promoting community safety by reducing re-offending.

80. It is through rehabilitation that the long-term protection of the community will be promoted. Members of the community have already been harmed by this offender. I am mindful of the words of one of the victims, who was hopeful that the offender would take steps to address his anger. That opinion was shared by one of the contributors to the suitability assessment, with anger management and emotional regulation recommended. The underlying factors that fed into that explosive anger were addressed in the psychological evidence, but the drugs and alcohol consumed by the offender on the night were both a symptom and a cause. A wrap-around program of intervention through court supervised support may properly be viewed as one of those steps in addressing these concerns.

81. Third, I am satisfied of the other formal requirements for a Treatment Order: (a) On the reports provided to the court, the offender is both eligible and suitable for a Treatment Order: ss 80S and 80T of the Sentencing Act. (b) I have found that there is a strong degree of correlation between the offender’s dependency on drug use and his offending: s 12A(2)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Sentencing Act. (c) The offender has consented to the Treatment Order, having been given a clear explanation of what it involves (confirmed at the hearing): s 12A(2)(c) of the Sentencing Act. (d) The offender will live in the ACT for the duration of the sentence except as directed by the court: s12A(2)(a)(iii). (e) There are no concerns relating to the safety or welfare of any victim: s 12A(2)(b)(ii) of the Sentencing Act.

82. I conclude that a Treatment Order is the clear and obvious choice for this offender: s 12A(2)(b). It recognises that this is a youthful offender who needs support and targeted intervention.

83. It is worth repeating for the benefit of the offender that a Treatment Order is not a “soft option” on a sentence. It obviously does not involve the deprivation of liberty necessitated by a full-time custodial sentence. However, it is intensive, requires commitment and hard work to succeed, and often participants find the process more difficult than a term of imprisonment. Ultimately, this type of intervention is how I consider the community would be best protected in the longer term and accordingly a Treatment Order will be made.

84. It is not necessary to set a non-parole period because the making of a Treatment Order means that the sentence becomes an “excluded sentence of imprisonment” under s 64 of the Sentencing Act. Orders

85. The orders of the Court are as follows: (1) For the offence of attempted aggravated robbery contrary to s 310 by virtue of s 44 of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Criminal Code) (CAN 4670/2024), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 9 months (reduced from 12 months on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 22 April 2024 and conclude on 21 January 2025. (2) For the offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, contrary to s 24 of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (Crimes Act) (CAN 4667/2024), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 15 months (reduced from 20 months on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 1 November 2024 and conclude on 31 January 2026. (3) For the offence of wounding, contrary to s 21 of the Crimes Act (CAN 9034/2024), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 12 months (reduced from 16 months on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 1 August 2025 and conclude on 31 July 2026. (4) For the offence of damage property, contrary to s 116(3) of the Crimes Act by virtue of s 45A of the Criminal Code (CAN 10626/2024) the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 months (reduced from 2 months and 21 days on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 1 July 2026 and conclude on 31 August 2026. (5) For the offence of damage property, contrary to s 116(3) of the Crimes Act (CAN 4776/2024), the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 months (reduced from 2 months and 21 days on account of his guilty plea) to commence on 11 August 2026 and conclude on 10 October 2026. (6) For the offence of minor theft, contrary to s 321 of the Criminal Code (CAN 4665/2024), the offender is convicted and sentenced pursuant to s 12 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act) to a good behaviour order for a period of 9 months, to commence on 1 April 2026 and conclude on 31 December 2026. (7) For the offence of common assault, contrary to s 26 of the Crimes Act (CAN 6815/2024) the offender is convicted and sentenced pursuant to s 12 of the Sentencing Act to a good behaviour order for a period of 9 months, to commence on 1 April 2026 and conclude on 31 December 2026. (8) The total sentence of imprisonment is for a period of 2 years 5 months and 10 days, from 22 April 2024 – 10 October 2026. Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (9) A Treatment Order under s 12A of the Sentencing Act is made for Tony-John Crompton in respect of the eligible offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (CAN 4667/2024), for which he has been convicted and for which he has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for 15 months. (10) That Treatment Order is extended to the eligible offences of wounding (CAN 9034/2024) and property damage (CAN 10626/2024 and CAN 4776/2024) for which Mr Crompton has been convicted and for which he has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 year, 2 months and 10 days in total. (11) The convictions and sentences imposed for the said eligible offences are hereby incorporated into the Treatment Order in the Custodial Part of the Order. (12) A Treatment Order is made for 1 year and 2 months from today, 11 August 2025 to conclude on 10 October 2026. (13) The Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order is for 12 months from today, 11 August 2025 until 10 August 2026. (14) The Custodial Part of the Treatment Order for the eligible offences will be suspended under s 80W of the Sentencing Act from today, 11 August 2025, until 10 October 2026. (15) Under s 80ZA of the Sentencing Act, Mr Crompton is required to sign an undertaking to comply with the offender’s Good Behaviour obligations under s 85 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) (CSA Act) from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order, 11 August 2026, until the end of the total sentence that is the subject of the Treatment Order, 10 October 2026. (16) A probation condition is imposed that Mr Crompton accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or his delegate for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person supervising him considers appropriate and obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him including as to alcohol and drug testing, counselling and treatment. (17) For the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order: a. The core conditions of the Order set out in s 80Y of the CSA Act are hereby imposed. b. Mr Crompton is to travel to Canberra Recovery Services (CRS) on 11 August 2025 and admit himself to the drug rehabilitation residential program at that facility by 12:00pm. c. Mr Crompton is directed to complete the drug rehabilitation residential program at CRS or any other program of intervention, treatment or counselling he is directed to complete, including urinalysis or case management that may be required by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team. d. Mr Crompton is to obey all reasonable directions of any person in charge of the program and all the rules of the program and the facility, which may include directions about where he resides, with whom he associates and his attendance from time to time. e. Following completion of the residential component of the drug rehabilitation program, Mr Crompton is not to leave his approved place of residence between any curfew hours directed by the Treatment and Supervision team, other than for a medical emergency, and he is to present himself to the front door of the residence if required by an officer of ACT Policing. f. Should Mr Crompton leave or be discharged from the program before completing it, he is to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4pm on the next business day with a view to having his Treatment Order reviewed. g. Mr Crompton is not to consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs or prescription drugs not prescribed to him. h. Mr Crompton is to comply with any directions of the court from time to time about attendance at court in person or by electronic means. (18) Pursuant to s 12A(6) of the Sentencing Act, I direct that written notice of the order, together with a copy of these orders, be given to the offender. (19) I further direct that a copy of the report of Ms Tabitha Frew dated 18 July 2025 be provided to the treatment team and ACT Corrective Services.

I certify that the preceding eighty-five [85] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice McWilliam. Associate: Date: