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1. Johneric David Brymer is before the court for sentence, having pleaded guilty to 23 separate offences. They have been grouped as follows: Reference number Offence Max. Penalty CAN 2833/2023 Burglary contrary to s 311 of the $224,000 fine, CAN 2148/2023 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) (Code). imprisonment for 14 CAN 2574/2023 years, or both. CAN 2834/2023 Theft contrary to s 308 of the Code. $160,000 fine, imprisonment for 10 years, or both. CAN 3186/2024 Aggravated common assault contrary Imprisonment for CAN 7785/2024 to s 26(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 three years. (ACT) (Crimes Act). CAN 8560/2024 Contravene family violence order $80,000 fine, CAN 8562/2024 contrary to s 43(2) of the Family imprisonment for five CAN 1396/2025 Violence Act 2016 (ACT) (FV Act). years, or both. CAN 7347/2025 CAN 7348/2025 CAN 3084/2025 Aggravated dangerous drive contrary $48,000 fine, to s 7(1) of the Road Transport (Safety imprisonment for and Traffic Management) Act 1999 three years, or both. (ACT) (Safety and Traffic Management Act). CAN 1387/2025 Damage property contrary to s 403(1) $160,000 fine, CAN 1388/2025 of the Code. imprisonment for 10 years, or both. CAN 1391/2025 Drive motor vehicle without consent, $80,000 fine, CAN 1402/2025 contrary to s 318(2) of the Code. imprisonment for five years, or both. CAN 1404/2025 Aggravated assault occasioning Imprisonment for actual bodily harm, contrary to s 24(1) seven years. of the Crimes Act. CAN 2835/2023 Minor theft, contrary to s 321 of the $8,000 fine, Code. imprisonment for six months, or both. CAN 2576/2023 Unlawful possession of stolen $8,000 fine, property contrary to s 324(1) of the imprisonment for six Code. months, or both. CAN 1377/2025 Drive while disqualified (repeat $16,000 fine, CAN 1399/2025 offender) contrary to s 32(1)(a) of the imprisonment for 1 Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act year, or both. 1999 (ACT) (Driver Licensing Act). CAN 1379/2025 Numberplate not properly issued $3,200 fine. contrary to s 22(1)(a) of the Road Transport (Vehicle Registration) Act 1999 (ACT) (Vehicle Registration Act). CAN 1392/2025 Drive with drug in oral fluid (repeat $8,000 fine, offender) contrary to s 20(1) of the imprisonment for six Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) months, or both. Act 1977 (ACT) (Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act).

2. A sentence of imprisonment is a sentence of last resort: s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing) Act 2005 (ACT) (Sentencing Act). Here, the offender accepts that terms of imprisonment inevitably follow from his conduct. He seeks that such sentences be served by way of a drug and alcohol treatment order (Treatment Order): s 12A of the Sentencing Act. The prosecution does not oppose the imposition of a Treatment Order. The offender has been assessed as suitable for such an order by ACT Health Services and ACT Corrective Services. For reasons that follow, I consider such an order is an appropriate one for this offender.

Facts

3. The offending comprised seven series of offences committed between 20 January 2023 and 31 January 2025. Series 1 and Series 2 – Burglary, theft and minor theft (CAN 2833/2023, CAN 2834/2023, CAN 2835/2023 and CAN 2148/2023)

4. At about 5:52am on 20 January 2023, the offender walked up to a storage cage located in the basement of an apartment building in Franklin. He removed an item from his backpack and used that item to gain entry to the storage cage by damaging the lock. The offender then entered the storage cage (CAN 2833/2023).

5. He then exited, wheeling a red Trek Emonda SL6 road bicycle (valued at approximately $7000). The bicycle had attached to it a seat bag with spare pump and tube, a Bontrager headlight and a Wahoo Element bolt bike computer (together, valued at approximately $670). He returned to the storage cage minutes later (at about 6:00am), entered the storage cage and then exited, wheeling a dark grey Cervelo R3 road bicycle (valued at approximately $5000), carrying a box containing Bontrager Velocis bicycle shoes (valued at approximately $279) and wearing a white KASK Mojito bicycle helmet (valued at approximately $250) (CAN 2834/2023).

6. At about 5:44am on 22 January 2023, the offender walked up to the same storage cage in Franklin. He again entered the storage cage (CAN 2148/2023).

7. He then exited, carrying a black BH GC Aero time trial bicycle frame (valued at approximately $500). At about 6:11am on the same day, the offender returned to the storage cage. He entered the storage cage and then exited, carrying a blue toolbox with bicycle tools and bicycle cleaning products and wearing a white and grey coloured Bell bicycle helmet (CAN 2835/2023).

Series 3 – Burglary and unlawful possession of stolen property (CAN 2574/2023 and CAN 2576/2023)

8. On dates between 28 February 2023 and 10 March 2023, the offender attended an apartment complex in Kingston. The complex has three levels, all of which are only accessible to tenants. The offender was not a tenant. Using a fire escape door, the offender accessed the third floor of the complex (CAN 2574/2023).

9. On 10 March 2023, he had in his possession a black Focus Mares CX bicycle (taken from a bicycle rack located near a cluster of units) and a grey Trek FX2 bicycle belonging to another person (CAN 2576/2023).

Series 4 – Aggravated common assault (CAN 3186/2024 and CAN 7785/2024)

10. On 10 March 2024, the offender dragged his then-partner “S” down the stairs of their residence, into the driveway area. S laid in the foetal position on the ground as the offender held her down by the shoulder with his left hand. The offender struck S in the head two or three times with his right hand. The offender’s mother came out of the residence and yelled at the offender to stop. Further yelling ensued between the three. The offender drove off in a vehicle and returned driving the same vehicle, where further yelling occurred before police arrived and arrested the offender. The offender was on bail at the time and one of his bail conditions included not driving a vehicle.

Series 5 – Contravene family violence order (CAN 8560/2025 and CAN 8562/2025)

11. A Special Interim Family Violence Order was issued in the Magistrates Court on 2 May 2024 (FVO), naming the offender as the Respondent and S as a protected person.

12. One of the prohibitions in the order was that the offender could not be within 50 metres of S except in certain circumstances, that the offender could not contact S except in certain circumstances and that the offender could not engage in behaviour that constituted family violence towards S.

13. On 18 July 2024, the offender was arrested in Victoria on an unrelated ACT arrest warrant. At the time of the offender’s arrest, Victorian police identified S at the same location within 50 metres of the offender (CAN 8560/2025).

14. The offender was remanded into the custody of the Alexander Maconochie Centre (AMC) on 20 July 2024. The offender then proceeded to make phone calls to S (CAN 8562/2025) as follows: (a) 22 July 2024 – three phone calls. (b) 23 July 2024 – five phone calls. (c) 24 July 2024 – four phone calls. (d) 25 July 2024 – eight phone calls. During one of those phone calls, the offender spoke about the assault that occurred on 10 March 2024 and said that that incident did not occur. (e) 26 July 2024 – four phone calls. (f) Between 27 July 2024 and 6 August 2024 – 55 phone calls.

15. The offender was able to make these phone calls because he lied about the identity of the person he was contacting while filling out the relevant forms at the AMC. Series 6 – Drive motor vehicle without consent (CAN 1391/2025, CAN 1402/2025), Drive while disqualified (CAN 1377/2025, and CAN 1399 of 2025), Aggravated dangerous drive (CAN 3084/2025), Damage property (CAN 1387/2025, CAN 1388/2025), Contravene family violence order (CAN 1396/2025), Assault occasioning actual bodily harm (CAN 1404/2025), Numberplate not properly issued (CAN 1379/2025), and Drug drive (CAN 1392/2025)

16. Between 1:00am and 5:00am on 17 January 2025, a red Toyota Corolla was stolen from an address in Crace. At about 6:00am on 21 January 2025, registration plates were stolen from outside an address in Harrison.

17. On 25 January 2025, the offender drove the stolen red Toyota Corolla (CAN 1402/2025), bearing the stolen numberplates, as follows: (a) At about 12:32pm along a road in Harrison. The vehicle was excessively utilising the horn and travelling at high speeds. S was in the vehicle with the offender. At some point, she was screaming. (b) Later, after the offender had stopped the vehicle, he began driving again while S was hanging out of the front passenger door of the vehicle. While in the vehicle after resuming driving, the offender physically hit S several times (CAN 1404/2025).

18. On 27 January 2025, the offender drove the stolen Toyota Corolla (CAN 1391/2025), which was still bearing the stolen numberplates (CAN 1379/2025). The manner in which he drove was as follows (CAN 3084/2025): (a) At about 11:20am, he drove down a road in Watson with S inside the vehicle. Police activated lights and warning devices in an attempt to stop the vehicle, but the offender failed to stop the vehicle. (b) The offender then drove onto the wrong side of the road. He drove north, sometimes on the wrong side of the road, for at least a further 15 minutes. (c) At about 11:47am on the same day, police observed the offender sitting next to S in the common area of an address in Crace. When the offender and S saw the police, they ran. Police chased them towards the underground carpark at the Crace address. As police chased the offender and S down a flight of stairs, S stopped on the stairs, stretched her arms out and used her body to block police from getting down the stairs to continue chasing the offender. Police observed S to have significant bruising to both eyes and bruising to her arms. S said she caused the bruising around the eyes to herself. (d) Police then entered the underground carpark and observed the offender sitting in the driver’s seat of the same Toyota Corolla. The offender drove away from the location. (e) At about 11:49am, police successfully deployed a tyre deflation device that caused damage to the vehicle’s tyres. The offender drove the vehicle in the wrong direction against the flow of traffic through a roundabout. He subsequently crashed into another car, being a Hyundai Imax, damaging the front of that car (CAN 1387/2025) and damaging the red Toyota Corolla (CAN 1388/2025). The offender still did not stop the vehicle. (f) At about 11:51am, with police in pursuit, the offender stopped the vehicle and was arrested.

19. At that point, the offender underwent a drug screening test which resulted in a positive indication to a prescribed drug. The offender was conveyed to Canberra City Police Station at about 12:24pm. He underwent Oral Fluid Analysis, testing positive to the presence of methamphetamine (CAN 1392/2025).

20. At the time of this series of offending, the offender was disqualified from driving due to an order made on 26 April 2024 (CAN 1399/2025, CAN 1377/2025). He was also subject to the FVO, and the references to S in the above facts over 24-28 January 2025 contravened that order (CAN 1396/2025).

Series 7 – Contravene family violence order (CAN 7347/2025 and CAN 7348/2025)

21. The offender was remanded into the custody of the AMC on 28 January 2025. In further contravention of the FVO referred to above, the offender made phone calls to S as follows: (a) 29 January 2025 – one phone call. (b) 30 January 2025 – four phone calls (two of those calls were made by the offender, and two were made by a fellow AMC detainee but on the offender’s account). (c) 31 January 2025 – three phone calls.

22. As with the earlier offending of this nature, the offender was able to make these phone calls because he lied about the identity of the person he was contacting while filling out the relevant forms at the AMC. The court’s task

23. The court’s task is well-established. It is to sentence the offender in accordance with the sentencing purposes set out in s 7 of the Sentencing Act, which include (in summary form) making the offender accountable and denouncing and adequately punishing his conduct, deterring the offender and other people from committing the same or similar offences, recognising the harm done to the victims of the crimes and the community and promoting an offender’s rehabilitation. Those considerations have been taken into account in the reasoning that follows.

24. The mandatory relevant considerations set out in s 33 of the Sentencing Act have also been considered below insofar as they relate to the offender’s circumstances, and in accordance with the principle of individualised justice: MT v The Queen [2021] ACTCA 26; 17 ACTLR 22 at [56].

Nature and circumstances of the offence (s 33(1)(a) of the Sentencing Act)

25. A consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offences includes assessing the objective seriousness of each offence. A number of general principles guide that assessment. They are as follows: (a) There is a theoretical spectrum from the least serious instance of the offence to the most serious. That spectrum takes into account both the nature of the crime and the circumstances of the criminal: R v Kilic [2016] HCA 48; 259 CLR 256 at [18]-[19]. (b) An assessment of the nature of the crime is objective: Muldrock v The Queen [2011] HCA 39; 244 CLR 120 at [27]. The personal or subjective circumstances of the criminal are considered separately. (c) The maximum penalty for an offence provides a yardstick against which to assess the objective seriousness of the offences before the court: Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at [31]. (d) The sentence which the court imposes must be proportional to the objective seriousness of the offence: R v Miller [2019] ACTCA 25; 279 A Crim R 232 (Miller) at [37], cited in R v Lindsay [2020] ACTCA 25 at [32].

26. It is also preferable to articulate the factors that inform the character of an offence’s objective seriousness: Miller at [22] and the case there-cited; and Laipato v The Queen [2020] ACTCA 35 at [156]. Here, offences of the same type have been grouped together. Burglary

27. I have followed DPP v Clissold [2023] ACTSC 250 at [33] and the cases there-cited, in taking into account: (a) The nature of the premises that was burgled (here, residential, although each offence involved a storage cage in a carpark); (b) Whether damage, not separately charged, was caused to the premises (the lock was damaged); (c) Whether the occupants of the premises were present at the time the burglary was committed (the occupant was not present in the carpark where the storage cage was located); (d) The motivation for the burglary (personal gain – drug-related offending); and (e) Whether the burglary was pre-meditated, planned or organised and the level of sophistication (the conduct was planned but unsophisticated).

28. In each case, the conduct here was at the lower end of the range of conduct falling within the offence.

Theft and minor theft

29. In relation to the each of the theft offences, following R v Elphick [2021] ACTSC 9 at [115] and R v Slattery [2021] ACTSC 154 at [38] (both of which were cited by Taylor J in DPP v Monaghan [2024] ACTSC 183 at [18]), I have taken into account as being relevant: (a) The motive for the thefts; (b) The extent and value of the property taken; and (c) Whether the stolen items were of sentimental value or utilitarian value, such that they would be difficult or inconvenient to replace.

30. The theft offence is relatively more serious than the minor theft charged. Further, the theft at the Franklin apartment was approximately $13,000, representing a few items that were of significant, but not high, value. While bespoke items for the victim, they were not irreplaceable. The conduct falls at the lower end of the range of offending.

Unlawful possession of stolen property

31. I have taken into account the nature of the property (monetary and personal value, or difficulty to replace) and the length of time over which the property was possessed unlawfully. Here, the property was two bicycles and the length of the time for which possession was charged was a single day. Again, this was low range offending.

Aggravated common assault

32. In R v Kirkwood [2022] ACTSC 148, Kennett J stated in relation to common assault at [65]: Common assault can reflect a wide range of circumstances and encompasses both actual violence and threatened violence that causes the complainant to fear immediate harm. Where the offence is constituted by a threat of violence, the Court should consider the nature of the conduct that caused the [complainant] to fear immediate harm.

33. The circumstances of statutory aggravation were that the offence involved family violence, in that S was the offender’s partner at the time. It is thus affected by mandatory considerations under s 34B of the Sentencing Act. Some of those are matters that are relevant to the objective assessment of the nature of the offence: Murphy v The King [2025] ACTCA 10 (Murphy) at [137]. It has therefore been convenient to set out the application of the section here. The section provides: 34B Sentencing—family violence offences (1) In deciding how an offender should be sentenced for a family violence offence, a court must consider the nature of family violence and the context of the offending, including the following: (a) the matters mentioned in the preamble to the Family Violence Act 2016; (b) whether the offending occurred at the home of the victim, offender or another person; (c) whether the offending occurred when a child was present; (d) if the offence is a serious family violence offence—whether the offender has 1 or more other convictions for serious family violence offences. (2) A court must not reduce the severity of a sentence it would otherwise have imposed because— (a) the offence is a family violence offence; or (b) a family violence order under the Family Violence Act 2016 or a protection order under the Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 (repealed) is in force against the offender in relation to the family violence offence. (3) In this section: family violence—see the Family Violence Act 2016, dictionary. serious family violence offence means a family violence offence that is punishable by imprisonment for 5 years or more.

34. The reference to matters in the preamble to the FV Act includes principles that “family violence is unacceptable in any form”, that “freedom from family violence is a human right”, that “the justice system should respect and protect all human rights” and that “family violence is best addressed through a coordinated legal and social response of assistance to victims” and preventing violence by “promoting the accountability of perpetrators of family violence and the appropriate intervention by the police and the courts”.

35. It should be made clear that while the family violence context is part of the nature and circumstances of the offending, which increased the gravity of the conduct (Murphy at [126]), that is already an element of the aggravated form of the offence and the elevated gravity is reflected by the higher maximum penalty. Nevertheless, this was objectively serious conduct involving actual force inflicted upon the offender’s partner (as well as verbal assault). Although it was not conduct defined as a “serious family violence offence”, the offender struck the complainant in the head, which is a sensitive part of the body.

Contravene family violence order

36. Section 34B considerations apply again here. The object of the FVO was to ensure the protection of a vulnerable young woman from the offender. In DPP v Jewell [2023] ACTSC 348 (appeal dismissed: see Jewell v DPP [2024] ACTCA 30), I discussed the various features of conduct that may be involved in contravening a family violence order, drawing from cases such as: R v Loulanting [2015] ACTSC 172 (Loulanting) at [42]; R v Wright [2018] ACTSC 58 at [45]; R v Rogers [2021] ACTSC 355 (Rogers) at [52], [55]; R v Smith [2021] ACTSC 114 (Smith) at [27]; R v Elliott (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 390 (Elliott) at [52]; R v Michalopoulos [2020] ACTSC 27 (Michalopoulos) at [19]; Morrison v Maher (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 63 at [122], [125]; R v Elson [2020] ACTSC 264 (Elson) at [15]; and R v NX (No 2) [2019] ACTSC 131 (NX) at [14].

37. In Elliott at [44] it was stated (references omitted): ... Although such orders are known as Family Violence Orders, it is also known that family violence is not limited to the infliction of physical harm, but can include mental harm, such as may be caused by menacing, threatening or intimidating behaviour or, indeed, coercion. It is an exercise of power over, and instilling powerlessness in, the victim.

38. Features to take into consideration, drawn from the authorities above, include the following: (a) What: The content of the breach, such as whether there was actual violence: Rogers at [55], Smith at [27]; whether messages were threatening, intimidating or abusive: Elliott at [45]; whether the use of a weapon was involved: Elson at [15]; or whether the breach was committed in the presence of children: NX at [14]. (b) How: The means by which the breach occurred, such as whether it was made by personal approach, text message, phone call and so forth: Loulanting at [42]. (c) Where: The location of the breach, with an offence occurring in the victim’s home being a statutory factor of aggravation: s 34B(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act; Rogers at [53]. (d) Duration: Whether the breach was isolated or repeated, or whether it was of significant duration or over a sustained period: Rogers at [55], Smith at [27]; Loulanting at [42]. (e) Intention: Whether the breach was deliberate or in substantial defiance of the order the offender was required to respect: Michalopoulos at [19]; Rogers at [54]. (f) Premeditation: Whether the offending involved premeditation: Elson at [15].

39. All of the conduct may be characterised as being in deliberate defiance of a known order.

40. With regard to the conduct where the offender and the victim S were together (CAN 8560 and CAN 1396), that is more serious conduct than the three offences of making telephone calls from the AMC.

41. For the conduct involving the phone calls, there was a degree of premeditation, as the offender lied about who the telephone number belonged to in filling out the forms at the AMC. The conduct involving repeated telephone calls is also more serious than that involving fewer telephone calls. The repeated conduct also involved “rolled-up” offending (Series 5 and 7) and is therefore treated as being of increased objective seriousness in accordance with the principles set out in R v Forrest (No 2) [2017] ACTSC 83 at [161]- [164].

Aggravated assault occasioning actual bodily harm

42. The legal principles and features of assault occasioning actual bodily harm were considered in R v Pearson [2020] ACTSC 375 at [24]-[29] and in R v Redmond (No 2) [2022] ACTSC 295 at [12] (and the authority there-cited).

43. Actual bodily harm means “any hurt or injury calculated to interfere with the health or comfort of the victim. Such hurt or injury need not be permanent but must be “more than transient or trifling”: R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 at 509. Bruising may constitute actual bodily harm: R v Ball [2013] NSWCCA 126 at [67], although the bruising must be of some significance.

44. Drawing from those cases, relevant features include: (a) The degree of violence used or ferocity of the attack; (b) The circumstances surrounding the offending; and (c) The nature of the injury caused by the offender.

45. Again, this is the aggravated form of the offence, with the circumstance of aggravation being the fact that family violence was involved. It is unclear how much force was applied. However, the bruising was around the eyes of the protected person and a civilian witness had heard screaming and had seen the protected person hanging out of the front passenger door of the vehicle. This was a very serious example of an aggravated offence (itself, very serious).

Damage property

46. Considerations relevant to the objective seriousness of the offence were discussed by Murrell CJ in R v Rosewarne [2021] ACTSC 217 (Rosewarne) at [120]. They include: (a) The motive for the damage; for example, whether damage was malicious or occurred to facilitate a burglary; and (b) The extent or value of the damage.

47. Here the items damaged were vehicles. The value of the damage to such items is plainly considerable and although not malicious, occurred in a reckless context in the course of other criminal offending.

Driving offences Aggravated dangerous driving

48. Features relevant to this offence have also been discussed in Rosewarne at [122] and more recently by Taylor J in DPP v Clarke (No 2) [2023] ACTSC 261 at [38]. They are as follows: (a) the extent to which the public and other road users were put at risk, the number of people affected and their vulnerability (such as being children, elderly, frail or disabled); (b) the nature of the location where the driving occurred (for example: residential, busy commercial, shared user zone) and the time of day or night of the driving; (c) whether there were any passengers in the vehicle who were put at risk, especially if there were young children; (d) the variety and duration of aspects of the driving that were dangerous and the extent to which it was a multifaceted and/or a lengthy course of conduct, especially factors such as driving into oncoming traffic, onto footpaths or other places where pedestrians are, through stops signs, red lights or give way signs; (e) the distance driven and the period of the driving; (f) the speed of the vehicle and regard for the conditions; (g) whether the vehicle is engaged in a pursuit from police or fails to stop when directed to do so by police; (h) whether the offender was intoxicated by alcohol or drugs and the degree of intoxication; (i) whether there was competitive driving or street racing on a public road or showing off; (j) any damage occasioned to other vehicles, objects, houses or people; and (k) the extent to which police were put at risk when trying to terminate the driving.

49. Here, the offender was evading apprehension for his earlier offending. As the intoxication and damage to property has been separately charged, I have not included it as part of the assessment of seriousness here. The offence occurred on suburban streets where there were other drivers and the duration of time where the public were exposed to the risk was not a short period of time. That period involved high speed on the wrong side of the road, damage to two vehicles and police being at risk when deploying devices to try to terminate the driving. This was very serious offending.

Drive without consent

50. Applying R v Massey (No 3) [2021] ACTSC 156 at [29], the following considerations inform the objective seriousness of the offence: (a) The period of driving and the length of distance driven; (b) Whether the vehicle was used in the commission of another offence; (c) Whether the offender was the driver and not only the passenger; (d) The manner of driving, unless subject to a separate charge; (e) Whether the vehicle was damaged; and (f) Whether the vehicle was returned to the owner.

51. Here, the offender drove the vehicle in both instances. On the first occasion (25 January) it is unclear how long the offender was driving for. On the second occasion (27 January) he was driving for half an hour, which is not an insignificant period of time. While the vehicle was not used to aid the commission of another offence, such as burglary or robbery, the vehicle was the location where the assault occurred in relation to the protected person under the FVO.

52. Although the circumstances in this case were that the offender damaged the car, this is not given weight here due to it being separately charged. I otherwise accept the submissions of the prosecution in relation to the inconvenience or loss caused by taking the vehicle from its owner. In R v Blackburn (No 1) [2020] ACTSC 373 at [59]-[60] (and the authority there-cited) Refshauge AJ made the point that apart from buying a home, a motor vehicle is likely to be the most expensive purchase for a person or a family, and in Canberra, many people are dependent on it as their appropriate transport. Further, the five-year maximum penalty reflects the legislature taking a relatively serious view of this type of offence.

Drive with drug in oral fluid

53. The offender had one prescribed substance (methamphetamine) in his oral fluid. The presence of a prescribed substance is a statutory feature of aggravation for the purposes of the aggravated dangerous drive charge.

Injury, loss or damage from offending (s 33(1)(e) of the Sentencing Act)

54. The injuries to the primary victim, S, and the damage arising from the offending have already been addressed elsewhere in these reasons.

Victim impact statements (s 33(1)(f) of the Sentencing Act)

55. One of the victims of the burglary and theft provided a victim impact statement. He explained in sincere and eloquent terms how hard he had worked to be in a position where he was able to afford the things that he had. The victim described the traumatic experience of having his safety and security taken away, of the ongoing psychological impact the offender’s conduct has had on him, and the consequences that then had for his ability to sleep, to concentrate at work and to study. What he said was a poignant reminder of why burglary and theft require heavy weight to be given to general deterrence and denunciation. The offences involved were common, but no less serious for that fact. Plea of guilty and assistance to law enforcement authorities (ss 33(1)(j), 33(1)(l), 35 and 36 of the Sentencing Act)

56. The court may impose a lesser period than it would otherwise have imposed if the offender had not pleaded guilty to the offences: ss 35(3) and 36(2) of the Sentencing Act. If it does so, the penalty that would otherwise have been imposed but for the guilty plea must be explicitly stated: s 37(2)(a) of the Sentencing Act, including, if the lesser penalty is imposed under ss 35A or 36, the reason for the imposition of the lesser penalty.

57. These matters have been discussed separately in confidential reasons.

Subjective circumstances of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

58. The offender is currently 36 years of age. He was born in the Philippines and raised in Victoria. He has two children aged 7 and 9, who reside with their mother, his ex-partner. He has stable accommodation in Kingston. He completed year 12 and has previously held regular employment in different industries. His background involves a degree of hardship but not to the point where any mitigation in moral culpability might be operable. Similarly, there have been bouts of poor mental health, but there was no formal diagnosis of any mental health conditions that carried any particular significance for the sentencing considerations here.

59. The primary issue is the offender’s ongoing drug use. He really struggles with it. The suitability assessment before the court confirmed a likelihood of severe substance use disorder at the time of his offending. He has been to residential rehabilitation programs in the past, but not through the formal court supervised treatment orders that are available. He has previously managed to remain sober for a period of six years in adulthood and is strongly motivated to manage his addiction again, so as to improve his prospects of reconnecting with his children.

Criminal antecedents of the offender (s 33(1)(m) of the Sentencing Act)

60. The offender has a substantial relevant criminal history and accepts that specific deterrence will be a factor relevant to the sentencing synthesis. It disentitles him from leniency, in that such options as fines, good behaviour orders and suspended sentences have all been imposed in the past but have not apparently succeeded in deterring this offender from his recidivist criminal behaviour. That informs the court’s approach in working out what might steer the offender in a different direction from what appears to have become criminal habits. Financial circumstances of offender (s 33(1)(n) of the Sentencing Act)

61. Given his previous employment history, the offender is likely to be able to work to pay a modest fine in time in respect of the more minor offences. However, one of the requirements of a drug and alcohol treatment order is that the offender not undertake any employment at the commencement of the program, so as to keep their focus fully on their treatment which is initially intensive in nature. He will therefore need some time to attend to any sentence that includes payment of a fine.

Whether offender was affected by alcohol or control drug (s 33(1)(p) of the Sentencing Act) and reasons behind the offending (s 33(1)(v) of the Sentencing Act)

62. The offender was affected by drugs at the time of a number of his offences. His addiction has been discussed separately above. I emphasise that this is not taken into account as in any way excusing the offender’s conduct. It informs the court of the offender’s subjective features that may explain what drove some of the behaviour and require targeted intervention. I say some, because I want to make it clear that I do not accept the offender’s violence towards his ex-partner was a product of his drug addiction. The picture that has emerged in the evidence is one of ongoing violence against his ex-partner that bespeaks of a deeper issue with regard to respect for her specifically (but may extend more broadly), taking advantage of her vulnerability and transgressing personal boundaries. It is a separate matter that the offender needs to address as part of his rehabilitation. Managing his drug use alone is not the panacea for all the offender’s vices.

Remorse (s 33(1)(w) of the Sentencing Act)

63. The offender gave evidence under oath of his remorse. He was genuine, took full responsibility, and owned the abhorrence of his conduct towards his ex-partner, as well as the effect of his conduct on the victims from whom he stole. I accept he has demonstrated remorse.

Current sentencing practice (s 33(1)(za) of the Sentencing Act)

64. The prosecution helpfully provided a table of comparative cases to assist the court in ensuring consistency in sentencing practice. Among them were aggravated dangerous driving offences such as R v Guy [2022] ACTSC 373; R v Williams [2017] ACTSC 298; R v Law [2021] ACTSC 351 and DPP v Clifford [2025] ACTSC 307 in relation to aggravated common assault.

65. The objective in referring the court to previous authorities that bore some similarity to the present case was not to bind the sentencing court to achieve numerical equivalence with similar sentences imposed in the same jurisdiction, but rather to ensure the consistent application of relevant legal principles: see Hili v The Queen [2010] HCA 45; 242 CLR 520 at [48]. Current sentencing practice does not cap the upper nor lower ranges of a possible sentence: DPP (Vic) v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym) [2017] HCA 41; 262 CLR 428 at [83].

66. I have also exercised caution with regard to reviewing the historical sentencing practice for the offences involving family violence. The legislation providing for an aggravated offence when the conduct is in a family violence context only commenced on 10 August 2022. Previous authorities were not dealing with the aggravated offence and the consequent higher maximum penalties applicable. Under the present statutory regime, the terms of imprisonment have increased from what was previously imposed in other cases in an earlier statutory context.

Pre-sentence custody

67. As at the date of sentence, the offender has spent 363 days in custody. These days will be taken into account here by partially backdating the sentence.

Breach of Good Behaviour Order – s 108 of the Crimes (Sentence Administration) Act 2005 (ACT) (CSA)

68. Upon conviction, the offender will be in breach of a good behaviour order imposed simpliciter under s 13 of the Sentencing Act for two previous offences. These were: drive with oral fluid and drive while the offender’s licence was suspended (CAN 1495/2024 and CAN 1496/2024) for which the offender was convicted on 26 April 2024.

69. The conduct causing the initial breach was the Series 5 offending. The good behaviour order imposed in respect of CAN 1496/2024 was for three months and the breach occurred towards the end of that period. The good behaviour order imposed in respect of CAN 1495/2024 was for a 12-month period.

70. It was submitted that resentencing the offender or extending the good behaviour order were appropriate alternatives. However, the considerably graver offending that has since occurred has the consequence of a further sentence to be imposed, which will itself include a good behaviour order far exceeding the length of what was previously imposed. It will also be more severe in nature because it involves the threat of full-time custody under a suspended sentence. In light of those matters, any consequence will be subsumed in the later sentence. I have therefore determined that in the circumstances of this case, it is appropriate to take no further action in relation to those breaches, pursuant s 108(2)(a) of the CSA. Totality

71. The approach to principles of concurrency and accumulation has been set out in Dawson v The Queen [2019] ACTCA 9 at [37] and the cases there-cited, including O’Brien v The Queen [2015] ACTCA 47; 19 ACTLR 244 at [26]. They have been applied here to ensure that the aggregate sentence is “just and appropriate” for all the offences.

72. The principle of totality invites consideration of the concurrency and accumulation of individual sentences, and the requirement to ensure that the overall sentence is not “crushing”. A sentence of imprisonment should never exceed the minimum that is necessary to accomplish relevant sentencing objectives: Thorn v Laidlaw [2005] ACTCA 49 at [30].

73. However, it must be remembered that a sentence is not crushing merely because it may be of long duration. That may be simply a product of a just and appropriate sentence paying regard to the overall criminality.

74. I am also mindful of the comments of the Court of Appeal in R v White [2023] ACTCA 35 at [82], namely that offences committed in a “single drug induced criminal spree” should be taken into account through appropriate concurrency of terms of imprisonment. The Court of Appeal had earlier referred at [62] to the decision of R v Jarrold [2010] NSWCCA 69, where Howie J made the point that the course of conduct principle does not automatically require concurrency of sentences at [56] (citations omitted): ... [S]entences are not to be made concurrent simply because of the similarity of the conduct or because it may be seen as part of the one course of criminal conduct. The question to be asked is, can the sentence for one offence encompass the criminality of all the offences? …

75. The number of offences here and the different forms of offending have resulted in complexity in the structure of the sentence. The offences that form part of a series may generally be viewed as part of a course of conduct (s 33(1)(c) of the Sentencing Act).

76. Accordingly, the structure adopted here admits a substantial degree of concurrency for the offences that have been grouped by series, where the criminality of one offence may properly comprehend the criminality of another offence and as part of ensuring that the overall total sentence imposed is not of an undue length.

77. However, in some cases the criminality within a series is distinct, including with a different victim, and proper regard must still be paid to the interrelationship between the factual elements of the offences: Royer v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 139; 197 A Crim R 319 at [22]–[25]. I have thus also endeavoured to reflect the different criminality involved in some of the series offences through the degree of accumulation within the series and between each series of offences. Disposition

78. Conduct constituting family violence requires denunciation and punishment in the clearest of terms. Specifically, breaches of family violence orders require denunciation and punishment because such orders are the primary means used in the justice system to protect those at risk. Conduct which involves deliberate disobedience of a court order must therefore be treated as serious: Suksa-Ngacharoen v The Queen [2018] NSWCCA 142 at [132]. As accepted by the offender, sentences of imprisonment proportionate to that seriousness must be imposed.

79. The burglary, theft, and possession of stolen property offences also require general and specific deterrence to be given prominence and given the offender’s history, the prospects of rehabilitation are presently guarded. Sentences of imprisonment were conceded as appropriate for all of the offences under consideration, although I have ultimately determined that two of the offences may be disposed of by way of a fine in each case. Otherwise, the real question is the manner in which a sentence that will be of a number of years’ duration should be served.

80. With regard to four of the driving offences, there are automatic disqualification periods attached, relevantly here: (a) For CAN 1392/2025, 12 months under s 30 of the Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act; (b) For CAN 3084/2025, 12 months under ss 63(1)(f) and 63(4) of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999 (ACT) (General Act), (c) For CAN 1377/2025 and CAN 1399/2025, 24 months under s 32(5)(b) of the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999.

81. I will not order a reduction in the disqualification periods, but I will exercise the discretion under s 69 of the General Act to order that the disqualification periods run concurrently, applying my earlier reasoning in DPP v XK [2023] ACTSC 141 at [87]-[105], including the overlapping nature of the conduct and principles of totality. Accordingly, a two-year period of disqualification applies from the date of these orders.

Should a drug and alcohol treatment order be made?

82. Those circumstances give rise to the requirement to consider whether a drug and alcohol treatment order (Treatment Order) should be made, as submitted by the parties. Dealing first with the formal requirements for a Treatment Order to be made: (a) The offender has consented to the Treatment Order and will live in the ACT for the duration of the sentence except as directed by the court: ss 12A(2)(c) and 12A(2)(a)(iii) of the Sentencing Act. (b) On the reports provided to the court, the offender is both eligible and suitable for a Treatment Order: ss 80S and 80T of the Sentencing Act. (c) There are no concerns relating to the safety or welfare of any victim: s 12A(2)(b)(ii) of the Sentencing Act.

83. Having taken into account the relevant sentencing considerations as set out above and the objects of a Treatment Order, I have formed the view that a Treatment Order is appropriate for this offender: ss 12A(2)(b) and 80O of the Sentencing Act. He needs intervention to address one of the criminogenic factors that has contributed to the conduct and it may be that such an order provides other benefits, such as putting him in a position to address other factors relating to the conduct that constituted family violence.

84. Accordingly, I will make a Treatment Order under s 12A of the Sentencing Act. The offender has been found suitable for the day program at the Canberra Recovery Hub (given that his completion of residential rehabilitation has been relatively recent) and he will be able to commence that program immediately. The length of the sentence and the proportion of the Treatment Order have been crafted to give the treatment team and the subsequent supervisory team administering the good behaviour component of the order maximum flexibility to increase or reduce their supports and conditions as they deem appropriate. Orders

85. The orders of the Court are: For offences over 20 January 2023 – 22 January 2023 (Series 1 and 2) (1) For CAN 2835/2023: Minor theft, contrary to s 321 of the Code the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for one month to commence on 24 September 2024 and conclude on 23 October 2024. (2) For CAN 2148/2023: Burglary, contrary to s 311 of the Code the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for six months and 18 days to commence on 26 October 2024 and conclude on 13 May 2025. (3) For CAN 2833/2023: Burglary, contrary to s 311 of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for six months and 18 days to commence on 1 December 2024 and conclude on 18 June 2025. (4) For CAN 2834/2023: Theft, contrary to s 308 of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for seven months and 21 days to commence on 22 September 2025 and conclude on 12 May 2026. For offences over 28 February 2023 – 10 March 2023 (Series 3 and Series 4) (5) For CAN 2576/2023: Unlawful possession of stolen property, contrary to s 324(1) of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for one month and three days to commence on 1 October 2024 and conclude on 3 November 2024. (6) For CAN 2574/2023: Burglary, contrary to s 311 of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six months and 18 days to commence on 5 March 2025 and conclude on 22 September 2025. (7) For CAN 7785/2024: Aggravated common assault, contrary to s 26(1) of the Crimes Act, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for eight months and seven days to commence on 22 October 2025 and conclude on 28 June 2026. (8) For CAN 3186/2024: Aggravated common assault, contrary to s 26(1) of the Crimes Act, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for six months and 18 days to commence on 1 January 2026 and conclude on 18 July 2026. For offences over 18 July 2024 to 6 August 2024 (Series 5) (9) For CAN 8560/2024: Contravene family violence order, contrary to s 43(2) of the FV Act, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for four months and 12 days to commence on 8 July 2026 and conclude on 19 November 2026. (10) For CAN 8562/2024: Contravene family violence order, contrary to s 43(2) of the FV Act, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for four months and 12 days to commence on 1 August 2026 and conclude on 12 December 2026. For offences over 17 January – 27 January 2025 (Series 6) (11) For CAN 1402/2025: Drive motor vehicle without consent, contrary to s 318(2) of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for six months and 18 days to commence on 1 December 2026 and conclude on 18 June 2027. (12) For CAN 1391/2025: Drive motor vehicle without consent, contrary to s 318(2) of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for six months and 18 days to commence on 1 January 2027 and conclude on 18 July 2027. (13) For CAN 3084/2025: Aggravated dangerous drive, contrary to s 7(1) of the Safety and Traffic Management Act, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for nine months and 27 days to commence on 1 February 2027 and conclude on 27 November 2027. (14) For CAN 1387/2025: Damage property, contrary to s 403(1) of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for six months and 18 days to commence on 22 August 2027 and conclude on 10 March 2028. (15) For CAN 1388/2025: Damage property, contrary to s 403(1) of the Code, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for six months and 18 days to commence on 10 September 2027 and conclude on 27 March 2028. (16) For CAN 1377/2025: Drive while disqualified (repeat offender), contrary to s 32(1)(a) of the Driver Licensing Act, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for three months and nine days to commence on 22 March 2028 and conclude on 30 June 2028. (17) For CAN 1399/2025: Drive while disqualified (repeat offender), contrary to s 32(1)(a) of the Driver Licensing Act, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for three months and nine days to commence on 30 March 2028 and conclude on 8 July 2028. (18) For CAN 1404/2025: Aggravated assault occasioning actual bodily harm, contrary to s 24(1) of the Crimes Act, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for nine months and 27 days to commence on 1 July 2028 and conclude on 27 April 2029. (19) For CAN 1396/2025: Contravene family violence order, contrary to s 43(2) of the FV Act, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for eight months and seven days to commence on 20 September 2028 and conclude on 26 May 2029. (20) For CAN 1379/2025: Numberplate not properly issued, contrary to s 22(1)(a) of the Vehicle Registration Act, the offender is convicted and fined $250 with 12 months to pay. (21) For CAN 1392/2025: Drive with drug in oral fluid (repeat offender), contrary to s 20(1) of the Road Transport (Alcohol and Drugs) Act, the offender is convicted and fined $650 with 12 months to pay. For offences committed over 28-29 January 2025 (Series 7) (22) For CAN 7347/2025: Contravene family violence order, contrary to s 43(2) of the FV Act, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for four months and 12 days to commence on 8 May 2029 and conclude on 19 September 2029. (23) For CAN 7348/2025: Contravene family violence order, contrary to s 43(2) of the FV Act, the offender is convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment for four months and 12 days to commence on 10 May 2029 and conclude on 21 September 2029. (24) Pursuant to s 69 of the Road Transport (General) Act 1999, the offender’s driver’s licence is automatically disqualified for a period of 24 months, from 22 September 2025 to 21 September 2027.

Drug and Alcohol Treatment Order (1) Pursuant to s 12A of the Sentencing Act, a Treatment Order is made for Johneric Brymer for four years from today, 22 September 2025 to conclude on 21 September 2029, in respect of the following offences: a. CAN 2834/2023: Theft contrary to s 308 of the Code for which a term of imprisonment for seven months and 21 days has been imposed and which is the “eligible offence”; b. The Treatment Order is then extended to the following eligible offences, for which convictions and a total term of three years and 11 months have been imposed: i. CAN 7785/2024: Aggravated common assault contrary to s 26(1) of the Crimes Act; ii. CAN 3186/2024: Aggravated common assault contrary to s 26(1) of the Crimes Act; iii. CAN 8560/2024: Contravene family violence order contrary to s 43(2) of the FV Act; iv. CAN 8562/2024: Contravene family violence order contrary to s 43(2) of the FV Act; v. CAN 1402/2025: Drive motor vehicle without consent, contrary to s 318(2) of the Code; vi. CAN 1391/2025: Drive motor vehicle without consent, contrary to s 318(2) of the Code; vii. CAN 3084/2025: Aggravated dangerous drive contrary to s 7(1) of the Road Safety Act; viii. CAN 1387/2025: Damage property contrary to s 403(1) of the Code; ix. CAN 1388/2025: Damage property contrary to s 403(1) of the Code; x. CAN 1377/2025: Drive while disqualified (repeat offender) contrary to s 32(1)(a) of the Driver Licensing Act; xi. CAN 1399/2025: Drive while disqualified (repeat offender) contrary to s 32(1)(a) of the Driver Licensing Act; xii. CAN 1404/2025: Aggravated assault occasioning actual bodily harm, contrary to s 24(1) of the Crimes Act; xiii. CAN 1396/2025: Contravene family violence order contrary to s 43(2) of the FV Act; xiv. CAN 7347/2025: Contravene family violence order contrary to s 43(2) of the FV Act; xv. CAN 7348/2025: Contravene family violence order contrary to s 43(2) of the FV Act. (2) The Treatment Order comprises: (a) A custodial component, incorporating the sentences for the eligible offences from the period 22 September 2025 until 21 September 2029; and (b) A treatment and supervision component for 18 months from today, 22 September 2025 to 21 March 2027. Suspension of custodial component (3) From today (22 September 2025) until the conclusion of the sentence on 21 September 2029, the custodial component of the Treatment Order will be suspended under s 80W of the Sentencing Act, upon the offender complying with the conditions set out in Orders 4 and 5 of the Treatment Order.

Treatment and Supervision component conditions (4) For the Treatment and Supervision component of the Treatment Order: a. The core conditions of the Order set out in s 80Y of the CSA Act are hereby imposed. b. Mr Brymer is to travel to Canberra Recovery Hub (Day Program) (CRH) on 22 September 2025 and admit himself to the drug rehabilitation program at that facility by 1:00pm. c. Mr Brymer is directed to complete the said drug rehabilitation program at CRH or any other program of intervention, treatment or counselling he is directed to complete, including urinalysis or case management that may be required by any member of the Treatment and Supervision Team. d. Mr Brymer is to obey all reasonable directions of any person in charge of the program and all the rules of the program and the facility, which may include directions about where he resides, with whom he associates and his attendance from time to time. e. Mr Brymer is not to leave his approved place of residence between any curfew hours directed by the Treatment and Supervision team, other than for a medical emergency, and he is to present himself to the front door of the residence if required by an officer of ACT Policing. f. Should Mr Brymer leave or be discharged from the program before completing it, he is to report to ACT Corrective Services by 4:00pm on the next business day with a view to having his Treatment Order reviewed. g. Mr Brymer is not to consume or use alcohol, cannabis, illicit drugs or prescription drugs not prescribed to him. h. Mr Brymer is to comply with any directions of the court from time to time about attendance at court in person or by electronic means. Good behaviour order following completion of Treatment and Supervision component (5) Pursuant to s 80ZA of the Sentencing Act, from the day after the end of the Treatment and Supervision Part of the Treatment Order, 22 March 2027, until the end of the sentence, 21 September 2029, the offender is required to: a. Undertake (in writing) to comply with the Good Behaviour obligations specified in s 85 of the CSA Act; b. Pursuant to an additional probation condition, accept supervision by the Commissioner of ACT Corrective Services or their delegate for the period of the undertaking or such lesser period as the person supervising him considers appropriate; and c. Obey all reasonable directions of the person supervising him including as to alcohol and drug testing, counselling and treatment.

I certify that the preceding eighty-five [85] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Sentence of her Honour Justice McWilliam. Associate: Date: