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[2004] VSC 207
Supreme Court of Victoria
2004-06-04
Cummins J
Original judgment source is linked above.
[2004] VSC 207
Criminal law - Sentencing - Arson causing death: s.197A Crimes Act 1958 - Reckless conduct endangering life: s.22 Crimes Act 1958 - Pleas of guilty - Lighting of fires - Young offender - Unrevealed psychiatric or psychological condition - Non-applicability of Jones v Dunkel [1993] HCA 65; (1993) 178 CLR 217 - Articulated discount for pleas of guilty - Considerations applicable.
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(Prisoner removed.)
Sine die.
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[1] Inserted by s.55 Sentencing and Other Acts (Amendment) Act 1997. For the second reading speech, see (1997) 43 Hansard (Assembly) 871. This is the second sentence imposed under s.197A, the first being R v Chambers (2003) VSC 506 (19 December 2003).
[2] As was correctly stated in R v Williscroft & Ors [1975] VicRp 27; (1975) VR 292 at 300 per Adam and Crockett JJ.
"... ultimately every sentence imposed represents the sentencing judge's instinctive synthesis of all the various aspects involved in the sentencing process". The reasons for that correctness are stated in AB v The Queen [1999] HCA 46; (1999) 198 CLR 111 at [13] - [18] per McHugh J and in Wong v The Queen [2001] HCA 64; (2001) 207 CLR 584 generally and at [74] - [78] per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ. (quaere Kirby J at [102] - [103]). However in R v Taing; R v Ly (2004) VSCA 46 (2 April 2004) Coldrey A.J.A. (in whose reasons Vincent JA. and Smith A.J.A. agreed) stated:
"... it is important, if the administration of justice is to be facilitated, that defendants not only receive appropriate credit for pleas of guilty, but that they appear to do so. If legitimate pleas of guilty are to be entered, it is necessary that barristers are able to assure their clients, and their clients are able to accept, that any purported sentencing discount is real and not illusory."
For some time, as here, on sentence I have been stating the quantum of discount I have given on pleas of guilty. Such statement in my view does not derogate from the Williscroft principle of instinctive synthesis, which should be retained. The discount for a plea of guilty is qualitatively distinct from the other multiple factors involved in the sentencing discretion; and its articulation should serve the purpose stated by Coldrey A.J.A. quoted above. It may also go an acceptable distance to the transparency spoken of by Kirby J. at [102] in Wong but without abandoning the instinctive process.
[3] By analogy with Dyers v The Queen (2002) 210 CLR 285 especially at [5] - [6] per Gaudron and Hayne JJ., Kirby J at [52] - [53] and Callinan J at [121]; contra McHugh J.
[4] In particular, D.F. Koson and J. Dvoskin "Arson: a diagnostic study" (1982) 10 Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and Law 39, H. Prins, G. Tennent and K. Trick "Motives for arson (fire-raising)" (1985) 25 Medicine, Science and the Law 275, J.L. Geller "Arson in review: from profit to pathology" (1992) 15 Clinical Forensic Psychiatry 623 and R.N. Kocsis and R.W. Cooksey "Criminal psychological profiling of serial arsonists" (2002) 46 International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 631.
DPP
Bennett [2004] VSC 207
(1993) 178 CLR 217
(1999) 198 CLR 111
(2001) 207 CLR 584
(2002) 210 CLR 285