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[2026] ACTSC 217
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-06-29
Burns AJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: DPP v Barlow (No 2) Citation: [2026] ACTSC 217 Hearing Dates: 3-4 March 2026 Decision Date: 29 June 2026 Before: Burns AJ Decision: (1) For Count one, money laundering (CAN 2352/2024), contrary to s 114B of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), I find the accused not guilty. (2) For the transfer charge of dealing with the proceeds of crime (CAN 402/2024), contrary to s 114C of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), I find the accused guilty. (3) For the transfer charge of possession cannabis (CAN 403/2024), contrary to s 171AA(2) of the Drugs of Dependence Act 1989 (ACT), I find the accused not guilty. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE –Trial – trial by judge alone – money laundering – dealing with proceeds of crime – possession of cannabis – compellability of mother – whether the accused’s mother could be compelled to give evidence in these proceedings Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), s 114B Evidence Act 2011 (ACT), ss 18, 38, 65 Parties: ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Nigel Jeffrey Barlow (Accused) Representation: Counsel A Chatterton (DPP) E Chen (Accused) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Legal Aid ACT (Accused) File Numbers: SCC 188 of 2024 SCC 189 of 2024 BURNS AJ: Introduction
The accused is charged on the indictment with one offence of money laundering, contrary to s 114B of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) (CAN 2352/2024) in the following terms: (a) That on or about 5 January 2024 at Canberra in the Australian Capital Territory Nigel Jeffrey Barlow dealt with money or other property and the money or other property was proceeds of crime, and Nigel Jeffrey Barlow knew, or was reckless, about the fact that the money or other property was derived, realised, directly or indirectly, from some form of unlawful activity.
In addition, two related charges were transferred to this Court from the Magistrates Court. The first is a charge of dealing with the proceeds of crime (CAN 402/2024), relating to a sum of $2,135. The second is a charge of possession of cannabis (CAN 403/2024). These charges were heard at the same time as the charge on the indictment.
The prosecution case may be stated briefly. On 5 January 2024, police executed a search warrant at a residential premises (the Gowrie premises) in the suburb of Gowrie. In a locked room within the Gowrie premises police found and seized 24 bundles of Australian currency totalling $120,780 (the money) in a “Spar”-branded bag. Two jars of what was alleged to be cannabis leaf were also found in that room. The accused was not at the premises when police attended. The premises were leased by the accused’s mother, AR, who was present during the search.
The execution of the warrant was both video and audio recorded on police body-worn cameras. During the search, AR answered questions asked of her by police. Regarding the locked room where the money was found, AR told the police that it was the accused’s room, though soon to be her grandson’s room, and that anything in the room belonged to the accused. The video taken of the search by police shows that the contents of the locked room were in considerable disarray, with the money being located in a “Spar”-branded bag in a pile of material within the room.
Later that day, the accused was arrested and monies totalling $2,135 were found in his possession. This is the money relating to the transferred charge of dealing with the proceeds of crime.
The prosecution case is that the accused was a drug dealer at the time of the alleged offence and that the cash found at the Gowrie premises was the proceeds of the accused’s business of supplying illicit drugs. It is alleged that the accused dealt with those monies by placing them in the locked room within the premises. It is further alleged that the money found on the accused when he was arrested is the proceeds of drug dealing. Finally, it is alleged that the alleged cannabis found in the locked room at the premises was the accused’s cannabis.
In his opening address, counsel for the accused conceded that the Court would be able to find that the accused was a drug dealer at all material times. The questions posed by the accused as arising in the present trial were whether the Crown could prove that the cash was placed in the locked room by the accused and, if so, whether the money was the proceeds of crime, whether the green vegetable matter was cannabis, and whether the sum of $2,135 was the proceeds of crime.
Trial by judge without a jury
The accused entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of money laundering. The accused had previously elected to have the charge determined by a judge sitting without a jury. The trial of the accused on the charge commenced on 3 March 2026 and the taking of evidence and submissions from the parties concluded on 4 March 2026. At that time, I indicated that I would deliver my verdicts and reasons at a later date.
In considering my verdicts, I am obliged to take into account any warning or direction which would have been given, or any comment which would have been made, to a jury in the proceedings should this matter have been tried before a jury. I will now briefly set out the directions which I have given myself in determining my verdict.
The prosecution bears the onus of proving the guilt of the accused on each of the charges. The accused is presumed innocent unless and until the evidence which I accept satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt of the accused’s guilt. The accused does not have to prove anything in this trial, and in particular does not have to prove his innocence. He is presumed by law to be innocent until such time as the evidence which I accept satisfies me beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt on any particular charge.
My verdicts must be verdicts based upon the evidence that I saw and heard during the trial. I am not entitled to take into account any other material. I must view the evidence dispassionately and I must not allow sympathy or prejudice to affect my decision-making.
I am entitled to draw inferences from the facts which I find established on the evidence. Before I do so, however, I must examine any possible inference to ensure that it is a justifiable inference, and I must not draw an inference against the accused from the direct evidence unless it is the only rational inference that is available in the circumstances.
In this trial the accused did not give evidence. There was no obligation on him to give evidence because there was no obligation on him to prove anything in this trial. I must draw no adverse inference from the accused’s decision not to give evidence. I cannot take into account the accused’s decision not to give evidence in any way.
The case against the accused is a circumstantial one. There is no direct evidence that the accused engaged in the conduct which the prosecution alleges with regard to the charges of dealing with the proceeds of crime on the indictment and possession of cannabis. Instead, the prosecution asked me to draw the inference that the accused engaged in that conduct from all of the circumstances which have been proved by the evidence. There is direct evidence that the accused was in possession of the money relating to the transferred charge of dealing with the proceeds of crime, but the prosecution asks me to draw an inference that the money was the proceeds of crime.
In assessing the weight of a circumstantial evidence case, I determine what evidence I accept and then, considering all of that evidence together, I determine whether the guilt of the accused on any particular charge is the only reasonable inference available. Such evidence does not need to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The one exception to this approach is where an individual fact which the prosecution seeks to prove is an essential fact in a chain of reasoning leading to a finding of guilt. In such circumstances that fact must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Only two witnesses were called in the prosecution case, being the informant, Constable Arnold, and AR.
A preliminary issue – the compellability of AR
After the accused was arraigned, and before the prosecution called its witnesses, a preliminary issue was raised. As I have noted, the prosecution proposed calling the mother of the accused, AR, as a witness in its case. While there was no doubt that AR was a competent witness, she was not automatically compellable to give evidence as a witness for the prosecution in the accused’s trial. The reason for this is found in s 18 of the Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) (‘Evidence Act’), which relevantly provides: 18 Compellability of domestic partners and others in criminal proceedings generally (1) This section applies only in a criminal proceeding. (2) A person who, when required to give evidence, is the domestic partner, parent or child of a defendant may object to being required— (a) to give evidence; or (b) to give evidence of a communication between the person and the defendant; as a witness for the prosecution. …. (6) A person who makes an objection under this section to giving evidence or giving evidence of a communication must not be required to give the evidence if the court finds that— (a) there is a likelihood that harm would or might be caused (whether directly or indirectly) to the person, or to the relationship between the person and the defendant, if the person gives the evidence; and (b) the nature and extent of that harm outweighs the desirability of having the evidence given. (7) Without limiting the matters that may be taken into account by the court for subsection (6), it must take into account the following: (a) the nature and gravity of the offence for which the defendant is being prosecuted; (b) the substance and importance of any evidence that the person might give and the weight that is likely to be attached to it; (c) whether any other evidence about the matters to which the evidence of the person would relate is reasonably available to the prosecutor; (d) the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the person; (e) whether, in giving the evidence, the person would have to disclose matter that was received by the person in confidence from the defendant.
AR was called on the voir dire and confirmed that she did not want to give evidence in the accused’s trial. Her stated reason was because she did not want “to ruin” her relationship with the accused. AR testified that her relationship with the accused was important to her because they had always been close. AR also has a daughter, but they are estranged. The accused also has a son with whom AR is close and who lived with AR for a time. AR described the accused and his son as the most important people in her life. AR felt that her relationship with the accused had already been strained in the period after police executed the search warrant at her house in 2024.
The evidence which the prosecution anticipated AR could give was vital to the Crown case. AR was present at the time that police executed the search warrant on 5 January 2024. She participated in a recorded conversation with police at the time the search was undertaken. Police found a locked room in the house which AR told them was the accused’s room. She told them that everything in that room belonged to the accused. It was in that room that police located an amount of $120,780 in cash that is the subject of the charge on the indictment against the accused. Also within that room was the substance alleged to be cannabis for the purpose of the transferred charge of possession of cannabis. Without the evidence of AR, the Crown accepted that it would have great difficulty in establishing those charges against the accused.
I was satisfied on the evidence of AR that there was a likelihood that harm might be caused to her relationship with the accused if she was required to give evidence. But I was not satisfied that the nature and extent of that harm outweighed the desirability of having AR give the evidence. In coming to the latter conclusion, I took into account those matters set out in s 18(7) of the Evidence Act, including that the charge against the accused is a serious one (albeit not amongst the most serious of cases to come before this Court), and that it was unlikely that the prosecution would be able to adduce the evidence through any other means.
The Crown had foreshadowed that, in the event that AR was not required to give evidence, it would make an application that the recording of AR’s statements during the execution of the search warrant be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule on the basis that AR was not available to give evidence to the effect of the statements which she made during the recording pursuant to s 65 of the Evidence Act.
At the time of making the decision under s 18 it was not clear that the Crown’s application under s 65 of the Evidence Act must succeed, so I approached the s 18 issue on the basis that there was no clear alternative method by which the Crown could adduce the evidence it anticipated AR could give if AR was not required to give evidence. I also took into account that there was no real suggestion that in giving evidence AR would be required to disclose any matter revealed to AR in confidence by the accused.
For these reasons, the application under s 18 of the Evidence Act was refused and AR was required to testify.
The Crown case
A large number of exhibits were tendered by the prosecution without objection. Included in those exhibits were text messages demonstrating that the accused was conducting a business in the supply of illicit drugs, being methylamphetamine and heroin, in the period leading up to the execution of the search warrant on 5 January 2024. That enterprise was substantial, with deals worth tens of thousands of dollars being referenced in the messages. In addition, the tendered calendar entries referred to the accused spending time in expensive hotels in Canberra and Sydney.
The first witness for the prosecution was the informant, Constable Arnold. Constable Arnold gave evidence that in January 2024 he had reason to believe that the accused was living at the premises in Gowrie. He believed that also living at that residence at that time was AR and another male who I will refer to by the initials NP. Constable Arnold testified that NP had been a person of interest in their investigations relating to drug supply in the Canberra region.
It became apparent in cross-examination of Constable Arnold that the execution of the search warrant at the Gowrie premises was part of an investigation into an importation of 106 kg of methylamphetamine. One of the suspects with regard to that importation is NP. The brief of evidence against the accused provides no details of why police believe NP was linked to the importation as that information is subject to public interest privilege. What does emerge from the terms of the search warrant is that police suspected that there was a link between particular businesses conducted by NP’s father, and of which NP was the only employee, and the importation.
When police arrived at the premises on the afternoon of 5 January 2024, NP was observed driving away from the premises in a utility vehicle. His vehicle was stopped and he was spoken to by police. His vehicle was searched, but nothing of interest relating to the supply of drugs or possession of drugs was found in the vehicle. NP was not called to give evidence in the accused’s trial because police were unable to locate him. AR told police that NP was a friend of hers and that she believed he was in Western Australia. NP’s then phone number was saved as a contact in AR’s mobile phone at the time the search warrant was executed.
In cross-examination, Constable Arnold was asked about what occurred when NP’s vehicle was stopped by police as it was leaving the Gowrie premises. Constable Arnold said that the vehicle was the subject of a traffic stop about 1 km from the premises. When asked about any conversation with NP which occurred at that time, Constable Arnold said that it was his understanding that NP said that he did not own any property at the premises.
Constable Arnold was then taken to his contemporaneous notes of that conversation, which record “[NP] relinquish any claim to property at [the premises]”. Constable Arnold agreed that his memory of the conversation was better at the time he made the notes than his memory on the day he gave his evidence.
Another person who was identified as potentially residing at the premises around the time of the search was a person who I will refer to by the initials MP. She is the mother of the accused’s son.
A BMW vehicle and a Toyota HiLux vehicle were parked on the front drive of the premises when police conducted the search. Those vehicles were also searched. Within the BMW police found 22 rounds of loose 9 mm ammunition and a number of shotgun shells were found in the HiLux. Within the loungeroom of the premises, police found a reload box with ammunition, a 12 gauge shotgun shell and a taser.
Constable Arnold was not present when the money was located in the locked room. It was established through AR that she held the key to the locked room and gave it to the police to allow them to enter the room. AR retrieved the key from her BMW before giving it to police.
Constable Arnold gave evidence that the accused was located later that day at the address of his then partner, KM, in Belconnen and detained. He was taken to Belconnen Police Station where he was formally arrested for the present charge. He appeared to be drug affected. During a search of the accused’s property after his arrest, he was found to be carrying cash totalling $2,135.
A number of exhibits were tendered through Constable Arnold. Many, such as the accused’s mobile phone records, were intended to demonstrate that the accused was conducting a business as a drug trafficker at the time of these events. It is unnecessary to refer to those records because it is conceded that they demonstrate that the accused was conducting such a business. I will add that they demonstrate that the business being conducted by the accused was capable of generating large sums of money.
Amongst the exhibits tendered through Constable Arnold are records showing that the accused and AR are joint owners of a property at Clear Range in New South Wales, located south of Michelago (the Clear Range property). Police executed a search warrant at that property on 15 February 2024. It was described as a rural property with no permanent buildings. At the time police searched the property, there was some farm machinery, two camp sites with camp trailers, a couple of dirt bikes and a Toyota HiLux vehicle on site. The HiLux was a different vehicle to that found at the Gowrie premises on 5 January 2024. There was uncontested evidence that photographs on the accused’s mobile phone were taken at the Clear Range property. In her recorded conversation with police on 5 January 2024, AR stated that she had been out to the Clear Range property “a few times, but not a lot” and that the accused and his father (her ex-partner) were the only people who went to the Clear Range property. AR said she believed that her ex-partner took a campervan to the property.
The recording of the conversations between AR and police which occurred during the search on 5 January 2024 were also tendered through Constable Arnold. During the execution of the search warrant on 5 January 2024, AR told police that she had received an inheritance from the estate of her father. Constable Arnold testified that police had confirmed that AR had received an inheritance of about $360,000. She had used money from that inheritance, she said, to purchase the Clear Range property. AR said that the purchase price of the Clear Range property was $295,000.
AR also told police that she was the owner of the HiLux found at the Gowrie premises. AR described the vehicle as brand new and said it was purchased from a dealer in Yass in December 2023 for $65,000 using part of the inheritance money and money she had saved. AR also said that she was the owner of four cars. Besides the HiLux and the BMW found at the premises, she also owned an MG and a Lexus. AR said that she purchased the Lexus the previous October or November for $20,000 cash. The MG had been purchased for about $10,000 to replace another vehicle that had been destroyed by arson using insurance money, part of her inheritance money and other money in a bank account.
Constable Arnold also briefly referred to AR having stated that she received a payout from the Australian Federal Police “in relation to an accused arson or something along those lines” but no further information was provided.
During the police attendance on 5 January 2024, AR was questioned regarding her knowledge of any money within the premises. This was after police had found the money in the locked room but before they told AR that they had found it. After being told that the police had removed some cash from the house that they had located, AR told police that there was “maybe five grand” in her bedroom, but she was not really sure. AR said that she was unaware of any other money in the house. When she was shown the money taken from the locked room, AR said that she could tell police nothing about it and that she had never seen it before.
With regard to the locked room, AR told police that it was the accused’s room, but it was being packed up with a view to it becoming the accused’s son’s room. AR said that she and the accused’s ex-girlfriend, KM, had packed the room up “before Christmas”. When asked whether the room was always locked, AR replied, “When [MP’s] around it is”.
AR initially told police that the accused did not have a job, but she thought he may receive a pension. AR said that the accused used to be a glazier, but he now has lupus. AR said that she provides the accused with money if he needs anything, but he does not ask for money often. AR told police that she was employed in the Commonwealth Public Service. AR also said that she had an account from which she received $1,000 per month interest, but no further details of that account were provided to police at that time.
The second, and final, prosecution witness was AR. She testified that she commenced renting the Gowrie premises in 1982 when the accused was three years old. There was a period after she separated from her ex-husband during which the accused had resided with the ex-husband, but he returned to live with her when he was 16 or 17. AR testified that the accused was not living at her residence in January 2024 but was living with KM in Belconnen. Despite this fact, AR said that the accused continued to have a bedroom in the Gowrie premises. AR said that the locked room had been the accused’s bedroom for five or six years.
On 5 January 2024, AR identified NP, MP, MP’s 14-year-old son and herself as persons staying overnight at the premises. NP would either sleep on the lounge or in the outside shed. MP and her son occupied the bedroom next to the locked room. MP and her son were “in between moving out”.
AR testified that when police arrived at the premises on 5 January 2024, NP had left the premises and police “chased him down the road”. AR said that NP had been at the premises for about a week or two, having arrived before Christmas 2023. AR testified that she kept the locked room locked because she did not want anyone going through the accused’s belongings and that she held the key. No-one slept in that room as of 5 January 2024, but it is not clear for what period prior to that date that this was the case.
AR testified that as of 5 January 2024 there was a BMW motor vehicle, a Toyota motor vehicle and “a couple of old bombs” in the driveway of, or out the front of, the Gowrie premises. She agreed that she also owned a Lexus and an MG, but neither were at the premises at that time.
AR said that she purchased the Lexus almost new for $30,000. The BMW was a 2014 model purchased by AR in 2017 for $12,000. This was purchased as a replacement for another BMW that was destroyed in an arson attack at the Gowrie premises and AR used the insurance money from the burned-out vehicle to purchase the BMW she owned at 5 January 2024. AR said that she usually drove the BMW but the accused and her ex-husband also drove it. The Toyota HiLux was purchased brand new in December 2023 for $63,000. The accused drove the HiLux but another person who I will refer to as BC also drove it.
AR testified that she and the accused jointly purchased the Clear Range property around August 2023 for $280,000. The accused did not contribute any money to that purchase. AR agreed that she told police during the search on 5 January 2024 that she provided the accused with money to fund his living expenses. She also testified that the accused did odd jobs for a man named “Mark”.
When asked if she had any money in the Gowrie premises on 5 January 2024, AR said that police had taken $600 from her wallet “and then I had other money that me and dad had saved before dad passed away”. It then became clear that the “other money” AR was referring to was the $120,780 found by police in the locked room.
AR testified that in January 2024 she was employed casually at Services Australia. If she worked full-time she received between $2,900 and $3,000 net per fortnight. From that she paid $700 per fortnight in rent and then paid for the registration, servicing and insurance on all four vehicles registered in her name, with the exception of the MG which was not insured. The insurance premium for the HiLux was $1,200 per year, that of the Lexus was $1,400 and that of the BMW was $2,200. The cost of registering each vehicle was about $600.
Multiple aspects of AR’s evidence were inconsistent with statements made by her to police during the search of the premises. A clear example of that was her evidence concerning the money found in the locked room. AR told police during the search that she knew nothing about that money whereas in her evidence-in-chief she claimed that she owned the money. Other aspects of AR’s evidence were unfavourable to the prosecution. I allowed a prosecution application under s 38 of the Evidence Act to cross-examine AR on those issues.
Under cross-examination by the prosecutor, AR denied knowing that the accused was dealing in drugs in the period around January 2024. When asked if it surprised her that the accused had accepted at the outset of the current proceedings that he had been dealing in drugs at that time, AR replied “Yes. A little bit.” AR denied being aware of negotiations engaged in by the accused in the lead up to Christmas 2023 to purchase significant quantities of methylamphetamine and heroin and to pay many thousands of dollars for these drugs. AR also denied any knowledge of a block of heroin being photographed by the accused at the Clear Range property inside the trailer tent.
AR was taken to her notice of assessment from the Australian Taxation Office for the year ended 30 June 2023. She agreed that it showed a taxable income of about $73,000. AR agreed that her take-home pay on this income was approximately $2,300 per fortnight. AR agreed that after paying rent of $700 per fortnight she was left with $1,600 per fortnight from her income. From this she needed to pay all of her other household bills and expenses, such as shopping and motor vehicle expenses.
AR agreed that the only income the accused had, to her knowledge, was the money that she provided to him and also money from a part-time job for “Mark”. She did not know the surname of that person. She only knew that he built walls. AR said that she usually gave the accused a couple of hundred dollars per week.
It was put to AR that her salary could not support all of those things which she said she was paying for in the period around January 2024. AR agreed with this proposition. She explained the apparent incongruity by reference to “an untold amount” of money found by her father under her mother’s mattress when her mother died in 2013. AR said that before her father died, he gave her $40,000, probably in 2018. She said that she and her father had been saving every fortnight for a proposed trip to Scotland before her father died in 2019. AR said that she and her father had saved $60,000, separate to the $40,000 which he gave her. AR said that this was some of the money that was found in the locked room. She further testified that her brother had given her $40,000 to look after for him and that the accused’s father had borrowed $20,000 from her father and had returned that money to AR so that was part of the money found in the locked room as well.
When asked why she had not explained this to police on 5 January 2024, AR said it was because she thought they found the money in the shed and she was not going to get into trouble for NP’s money. AR claimed that she did not realise that the money in the locked room was gone until after police left.
The body worn video of the search of the premises on 5 January 2024 was played for AR. It was played in tranches interposed by questioning by counsel for the prosecution. AR agreed that she had told police that anything in the locked room would belong to the accused. She accepted that she had not told police that there was anything in the locked room which belonged to her.
AR was taken to copies of text messages found on the accused’s phone concerning the purchase of the HiLux in December 2023. On 13 December 2023, the accused sent a message to an unknown person with regard to the purchase of the HiLux, saying “It will be going in mums [sic] name”. About one hour later the accused sent a message to AR saying, “Will u [sic] be able to come to Yass before 5.30 to sign for this car please mum?”. About half an hour later, the accused sent AR another message saying, “I’m heading out there now so I’ll let u [sic] know”. The accused then sent AR an address in Yass, which has been agreed in this trial to be the address of the Toyota dealer in Yass from where the HiLux was purchased. There was also a text from AR to the accused saying “All done.”. AR agreed that this was a reference to her signing the paperwork for the purchase of the HiLux.
AR denied that it was the accused who purchased the HiLux and that she had agreed to have the vehicle purchased in her name. AR maintained that she purchased the vehicle using money from her inheritance. AR said that, as of 5 January 2024, she had about $55,000 in her inheritance account. This was, of course, after she had purchased the Clear Range property and the HiLux. AR said that she was depositing about $500 each fortnight from her earnings into that account.
AR told police during the execution of the search warrant that she had an account which generated $1,000 per month in interest. In response to questions from the prosecutor, AR agreed that the inheritance account was paying good interest. When asked why, then, she had not deposited the approximately $120,000 from the locked room into her bank account to gain the benefit of interest on it, she said that she did not know how to explain to the bank that “all of a sudden I’ve got this money”.
AR was asked to breakdown how she came by the money. She said that her ex-partner gave her $20,000 that he had owed to AR’s father before AR’s father passed away. AR said that her little brother had given her $40,000 “to look after”. The balance of about $60,000 was explained as, “That was me and dad saving since mum passed away, and dad had found money of mum’s that was in there too”.
After a further tranche of the body worn video was played to AR, she was questioned about her failure to make any claim to ownership of the money in the locked room during the period police were at the Gowrie premises on 5 January 2024. AR initially claimed that she made no claim regarding the money at the time police were at the premises because she thought the money had been found in the shed and she did not want to be blamed for anything NP had done. When it was pointed out to AR that police had told her that they located the money in the house and that she had denied to police that there was any money in the house other than possibly $5,000 in her cupboard, she said: I didn’t realise they had found the 120, so I wanted to keep – it was my fault. I wanted to keep it quiet because I didn’t want them to question me where I got the 120,000.
AR agreed that she had lied to police when she told them that there was no money in the house except what may be found in her bedroom cupboard. AR agreed, after being shown part of the video of the execution of the search warrant, that police had told her that the money was found in the accused’s room. When asked why she did not then say that the money was hers, she said “How was I supposed to explain it to them?”. AR said that she had panicked.
AR also agreed that she had not made any claim to ownership of the money until she gave evidence at the accused’s trial, although she had informed the accused’s lawyer of this claim a few weeks before the trial. AR claimed that on one occasion she tried to ring police to make a claim for the money, but she had been advised by a solicitor not to do so. AR said that she effectively gave up trying to recover the money.
AR also agreed that she had told police that she had borrowed money from her brother to purchase the Lexus. When asked why she had borrowed money from her brother when she had $120,000 in cash at her disposal, AR said “Because I didn’t want to spend the 120,000 in the bedroom”.
AR denied any knowledge of the alleged cannabis located in the locked room.
In cross-examination by the accused’s counsel, AR said that the key to the locked room was not normally kept in her car. AR said it was normally kept on a key hook near the front door.
Submissions
The prosecution submissions may be briefly summarised as follows: (a) The $120,780 was found in the locked room at the Gowrie premises. (b) AR told police during the search that the locked room was the accused’s room and that anything in there belonged to the accused. (c) The accused was engaged in an enterprise as a drug dealer in the period leading up to the search. (d) The enterprise engaged in by the accused was of sufficient size to generate a sum of the size of that located in the locked room. (e) AR was lying when she claimed that the money was hers. (f) AR’s financial position was inadequate to explain her possession of such a sum if it was obtained lawfully. (g) AR’s income was inadequate to support her evidence that she provided substantial amounts of money to the accused for his living expenses whilst also paying her own living expenses. (h) It was not open to the accused to submit that someone else other than the accused or AR may have used the key to the room to hide the money because the accused had not suggested to AR that the money was not hers. (i) The only reasonable inference available is that the money belonged to the accused and that he had placed it in the locked room. (j) The $2,500 found on the accused when he was arrested was in his possession. (k) The inevitable inference from the evidence of the accused’s limited legitimate income, and the acceptance that he was conducting a substantial business as a drug dealer, is that this money was the proceeds of drug dealing. (l) The alleged cannabis was also found in the locked room containing the accused’s property.
The accused’s submissions may be summarised as follows: (a) The prosecution has failed to prove that someone other than the accused could have placed the money in the locked room. (b) There were a number of people staying at the Gowrie residence, or who had visited the residence, in the period leading up to the search who had the opportunity to hide the money in the locked room. (c) There was no evidence which would allow the Court to determine how long the money had been in the locked room and therefore the list of people who had the opportunity to place the money in the room is indeterminate. (d) The evidence establishes that NP was residing at the Gowrie premises at the relevant time and that he is suspected by police to have been involved in the importation of 106 kg of methylamphetamine. (e) No search was undertaken of the premises in Belconnen where the accused was living on 5 January 2024, so any implication that the money found in the locked room must be the accused’s working capital for his drug dealing enterprise because no other substantial amount of money was found lacks cogency. (f) The accused’s father was not called as a witness by the prosecution so the prosecution had not negatived the possibility that the money in the locked room had been given to the accused by his father. (g) Regarding the $2,135 found on the accused when he was arrested, the accused pointed to evidence that the accused was given money by his mother and that he did some casual work so it could not be inferred that this money was the proceeds of drug dealing. (h) With regard to the cannabis said to have been found in the locked room, the accused submitted that there was no evidence that the material seized was cannabis.
Consideration
I am satisfied beyond any doubt that AR lied when she testified that the $120,780 was her property which had been legitimately accumulated by her. Her explanations for keeping it at the Gowrie premises and for failing to claim it when it was located by police during the search are unbelievable. Two possibilities arise from the evidence: either the money was AR’s, but she was unwilling to acknowledge it because she had not accumulated it legitimately, or the money was not hers.
The evidence creates grave suspicion that AR at least knew of the accused’s drug dealing enterprise, but it does not permit me to make a finding that she was involved in that enterprise or any other unlawful activity. AR was not on trial and neither the prosecution nor the accused suggested that she was involved in illegal activity. For that reason, I rule out the first of the two possibilities set out above.
I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that what AR told police about the money during the search was true to this extent: AR was not the owner of the money. The question arises: did AR know of the presence of the money in the locked room on 5 January 2024?
AR was not a credible witness. I have no doubt that she lied when she claimed in her evidence that the money was hers. For the purpose of trying to claim the money as her own, she was willing to admit that she lied to police during the search. I am satisfied that she at least grossly exaggerated the extent to which she provided funds to the accused for his living expenses. AR gave the impression that she was making up her evidence concerning her finances as she was being questioned, but in a way that made confirmation impossible, at least within the confines of the accused’s trial.
As the evidence was adduced, NP appeared to be a peripheral character. This was undoubtedly because the prosecution case was that the accused was the owner of the money and the one who had placed it in the locked room, based largely on the statements made by AR to police during the search.
There is evidence that NP was a long-time friend of AR, that he was living at the Gowrie premises at the relevant time and that he was a person suspected by police of involvement in a large-scale drug importation. NP was a person who could reasonably be expected to also have access to substantial amounts of illegitimately gained cash. Because of the (no doubt legitimate) claim for privilege by the Australian Federal Police regarding information as to the evidence of the level of NP’s involvement (if any) in the importation, I cannot rule out the possibility that the money belonged to NP and he had placed it in the locked room. The evidence regarding NP’s opportunity to have access to the locked room and his suspected involvement in a large drug importation elevate the possibility of him being the person who placed the money in the locked room to more than mere speculation.
If that were the case, AR may or may not have been aware of the presence of the money. If she was aware of its presence, she may well have been reluctant to admit that she was aware of its presence because she was unwilling to become involved in any police investigation into how NP came by the money.
The contemporaneous notes taken by Constable Arnold of his conversation with NP when NP’s vehicle was stopped by police as it was leaving the Gowrie premises on 5 January 2024 provide some support for the proposition that NP was aware that he had property remaining at the Gowrie premises on 5 January 2024. Constable Arnold’s notes record that NP said that he relinquished any claim to property at the premises. This would be an odd statement if NP was attempting to say that he had no property at the premises. It would also be odd for Constable Arnold to have written his notes as he did if NP had simply said that he had no property at the Gowrie residence.
There is a strong suspicion that the money was that of the accused and placed in the locked room by him. In my opinion, however, there is also a reasonable possibility that the sum of $120,780 found in the locked room belonged to someone other than the accused and was not placed there by him. On the evidence, if that were the case the money was probably the property of NP and had been placed in the room by him. Whether that was with or without the knowledge of AR I cannot say. The prosecution case depended largely on the acceptance of the statements made by AR during the search concerning who had access to the room and I am satisfied that she is not generally to be believed regarding this matter.
I reject the prosecution’s submission that it is not open to the accused to submit that someone other than the accused or AR may have used the key to the room to hide the money because the accused had not suggested to AR that the money was not hers. The case for the accused was that the money was not his and he did not know whose it was. The accused was not required (or necessarily in a position) to put it to AR that the money was not hers before he could rely on a reasonable possibility arising from the evidence that it belonged to a third party and was placed in the locked room by the third party.
I will therefore enter a verdict of not guilty on the charge on the indictment.
Regarding the charge of possession of cannabis, I accept the accused’s submission that the prosecution led no evidence that the material located in the two jars in the locked room was cannabis. I therefore find the accused not guilty on that charge.
I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the charge of dealing with the proceeds of crime, being the $2,135 found on the accused when he was arrested, has been proven. There could be no doubt that the accused was knowingly in possession of, and therefore dealing with, this money. On the evidence concerning AR’s financial position, I am satisfied that it was not a reasonable possibility that the accused received that money from AR. There was no evidence of any contact between the accused and his father leading up to 5 January 2024 and any suggestion that the accused received that money from his father is speculation.
On the basis of the evidence that the accused was conducting a substantial enterprise as a drug dealer at the time, that his legitimate income was small, and that he was living a lifestyle well beyond what he could afford on his legitimate income I am satisfied that the only reasonable explanation for the accused’s possession of the sum of $2,135 was that it was the proceeds of crime, being the accused’s drug dealing. I therefore find the accused guilty of that charge.
Orders
I certify that the preceding eighty-three [83] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Acting Justice Burns. Associate: Date: 3 July 2026
DPP
Barlow (No 2)