//
© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2026] ACTSC 148
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-05-15
Muller J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: DPP v Armstrong Citation: [2026] ACTSC 148 Hearing Date: 15 May 2026 Decision Date: 15 May 2026 Before: Muller J Decision: (1) The application for bail is dismissed; and (2) I reserve my reasons and they will be published at a later date. Catchwords: CRIMINAL LAW – BAIL – Section 9D, Bail Act 1992 (ACT) – special or exceptional circumstances – residential rehabilitation program – previous breaches of bail – family violence offending – bail application dismissed
Legislation Cited: Bail Act 1992 (ACT), ss 9D, 22 Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), s 8 Cases Cited: Application for bail by David Celeski [2016] ACTSC 101 R v Watson [2017] ACTSC 311; 326 FLR 110 Parties: Director of Public Prosecutions Paul C Armstrong (Accused/Applicant) Representation: Counsel E. Bayliss (DPP) R. Mackenzie (Accused/Applicant) Solicitors ACT Director of Public Prosecutions Legal Aid ACT (Accused/Applicant) File Number: SCC 262 of 2025 MULLER J:
Mr Armstrong applies for bail.
His application is supported by an affidavit affirmed by his solicitor Ryan Mackenzie on 11 May 2026.
On 15 May 2026, I dismissed the application. My reasons for doing so are set out below.
Mr Armstrong is in custody pending a trial scheduled to occur on 25 August 2026. He is charged with the following, arising from incidents occurring on 22 May 2025 in family violence circumstances: (a) intentionally and unlawfully strangling another person rendering that person insensible; and (b) assaulting that person occasioning actual bodily harm.
At the present time Mr Armstrong also has charges pending for the offence of recklessly inflicting grievous bodily harm, in family violence circumstances, following an incident on 5 March 2026 whilst he was then on bail. All of the offending relates to his former intimate partner. In those circumstances the parties agree that section 9D of the Bail Act 1992 (ACT) applies.
Section 9D of the Bail Act provides: 9D Bail for serious offence committed while charge for another pending or outstanding (1) This section applies if— (a) a person is accused of a serious offence; and (b) the person is alleged to have committed the offence while a charge against the person for another serious offence is pending or outstanding. (2) A court or an authorised officer must not grant bail to the accused person unless satisfied that special or exceptional circumstances exist favouring the grant of bail. (3) However, even if special or exceptional circumstances are established, the court or officer must refuse bail if satisfied that refusal is justified after considering— (a) for an adult—the matters mentioned in section 22 (Criteria for granting bail to adults); or (b) for a child—the matters mentioned in section 23 (Criteria for granting bail to children). (4) Also, if the serious offence mentioned in subsection (1) (a) or (b) is a family violence offence, an authorised officer must not grant bail to the accused person if satisfied that refusal of bail is required under section 9F (Family violence offence—bail by authorised officer). (5) This section does not affect the application of section 9F (4) and (5) to the accused person if— (a) the serious offence mentioned in subsection (1) (a) or (b) is a family violence offence; and (b) an authorised officer grants bail to the accused person. … (examples omitted by this court)
Do special or exceptional circumstances exist favouring the grant of bail?
Mr Armstrong has been accepted into a residential rehabilitation program conducted by Canberra Recovery Service, administered by the Salvation Army. The program “incorporates a range of interventions and prevention therapy models including but not limited to one-on-one case management and consultations, cognitive behavioural therapy, acceptance commitment therapy, relapse prevention and motivational enhancement strategies.” The program is voluntary at all times. Essentially, Mr Armstrong proposes he be released on bail to attend the residential rehabilitation program in circumstances where, should he cease to participate in the program for any reason, his bail conditions are to be revisited.
The special or exceptional circumstance he identifies is the lack of availability of the CRS program whilst he remains incarcerated. Although he acknowledges the availability of the Solaris rehabilitation program whilst in custody, he has been advised that it may take a few months before he can commence that program.
Mr Armstrong places reliance upon the decision of Penfold J in R v Watson [2017] ACTSC 311; 326 FLR 110. In that case Penfold J found the lack of availability of a rehabilitation program for an incarcerated person to create a special or exceptional circumstance for the purpose of s 9D of the Bail Act. However, her Honour did so because the applicant was a woman and, at the time, a rehabilitation program was only available to male incarcerated persons. Her Honour thus, relied upon s 8 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) as the basis for finding a special or exceptional circumstance in the case of that applicant. Section 8 provides for equality before the law without discrimination, and for the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination. Although finding special or exceptional circumstances in that particular case, in the course of her reasons, Penfold J observed at [26]: That is, there is generally nothing special or exceptional about an un-sentenced prisoner having been offered a place in a residential rehabilitation program, and in the normal course of events, the offer of a place in a residential rehabilitation program for an offender subject to s 9D would, of itself, rarely be found to be special or exceptional circumstances (see for instance, Application for bail by David Celeski [2016] ACTSC 101 at [22]-[25]; and Wilkins at [39]).
In Application for bail by David Celeski [2016] ACTSC 101, Murrell CJ held the availability of a residential rehabilitation program and the applicant’s willingness to undertake treatment did not rise to the level of special or exceptional circumstances, acknowledging placement in such programs is not always easy to find and the refusal of bail in the circumstances may result in a missed opportunity that is not reinstated.
I have reached the same view in the case of Mr Armstrong. That is, he has not established special or exceptional circumstances simply by demonstrating there is an available residential rehabilitation program into which he has been conditionally accepted. In reaching that view, I have also been influenced by the fact Mr Armstrong has been in custody since 5 March 2026 and could, at any time following the commencement of his most recent incarceration period, have applied for acceptance into the Solaris program available to him at the AMC. For reasons that are not disclosed, he elected not to apply for entry to that program until about a week prior to his application for bail. As the prosecution pointed out, a timely application may well have afforded Mr Armstrong the opportunity to access the Solaris program at a much earlier time.
Would a grant of bail have otherwise been appropriate?
After due consideration of the criteria in s 22 of the Bail Act that question must also be answered negatively.
Mr Armstrong is in custody because of a breach of the bail conditions initially applied to him in the context of the subject offending. In particular, he breached the condition requiring him not to contact his former partner. He also breached the condition requiring him not to drink alcohol. He is accused of not only being in direct contact with his former partner and drinking alcohol, but of a further serious physical assault upon her whilst under the influence of alcohol.
In those circumstances, I accept, as the prosecution submits, there is a real risk Mr Armstrong will again breach his bail conditions and the safety or welfare of the complainant may be compromised if he is released. In that regard, the complainant has expressed a fear for her safety, should Mr Armstrong be released from custody. The prosecution highlighted what I accept is a pattern of repeated and escalating offending in family violence circumstances, giving me no confidence of future compliance with bail conditions.
For the reasons set out above the application for bail was dismissed. I certify that the preceding fifteen [15] numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of his Honour Justice Muller.
Associate: MG Malouf Date: 18 May 2026
DPP
Armstrong