defendant. Convicted and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment for causing injury recklessly (with 157 days declared as time already served), placed on a 2-year community correction order (with mental-health...
Key principles
Where an offence is Category 1 and the victim is an emergency worker, the Sentencing Act provision requiring a term of imprisonment of not less than six months unless a special...
A sentencing court is not required to find a causal link between the offender's mental impairment and the offending unless evidence establishes such a link; absent that causal...
Where the court is not satisfied that Verdins principles or s 10A special reasons are enlivened, the statutory minimum for a Category 1 offence committed against an emergency...
A plea of guilty, entered in circumstances saving court time (including pandemic-related backlog), attracts significant mitigation under s 6AAA and the court should indicate what...
Issues before the court
Whether a 'special reason' under s 10A of the Sentencing Act existed so as to displace the statutory minimum custodial term for a Category 1 offence...
Plain English Summary
Mr Akoch pleaded guilty to causing injury recklessly and assaulting an on-duty Protective Services Officer after an incident at Footscray Station where he punched two officers, fracturing one officer's eye socket. He has a long history of paranoid schizophrenia and substance use, and his NDIS funds were misused by third parties. The court considered whether his mental impairment or Verdins principles provided special reasons to avoid the statutory minimum custodial term for a Category 1 offence committed against an emergency worker, but found insufficient causal connection to the offending. The judge imposed six months imprisonment for causing injury recklessly (with 157 days credited as already served) and a two-year community correction order (with mental-health treatment and supervision) for the assault on an emergency worker. The judge indicated that but for the guilty plea the sentence would have been 16 months with a 10 month non-parole period.
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Deep Dive
1,921 words · generated 14/08/2026
Whether Verdins principles (mitigation for mental impairment) apply to reduce sentence or support non-custodial disposition.
Appropriate sentencing disposition for simultaneous convictions: custodial term for primary offence, community correction order for secondary...
Quantum of plea discount to reflect early guilty plea and pandemic backlog.
Cited legislation
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
What happened
This is a sentencing decision delivered by His Honour Judge Wraight in the County Court of Victoria on 14 July 2023 in DPP v Akoch [2023] VCC 1213. The accused, Emmanuel Akoch, pleaded guilty to:
causing injury recklessly contrary to s 18 Crimes Act 1958 (Charge 1), and
assaulting an emergency worker on duty contrary to s 31(1)(b) Crimes Act 1958 (Charge 2).
A related summary charge of committing an indictable offence while on bail (s 30B Bail Act 1977) was also admitted (Summary Charge 4). The offending occurred on 8 February 2023 at Footscray Train Station and involved the accused punching two Protective Services Officers after he passed through Myki barriers without a valid fare. One officer suffered bruising and swelling; Sergeant Paniagua sustained a fractured left eye socket (Circumstances of offending [6]–[9]).
The accused has a lengthy psychiatric history: diagnosed with schizophrenia (paranoid type) in 2007, PTSD in 2009, repeated psychiatric admissions and a history of Community Treatment Orders. He also has a significant history of polysubstance misuse. The Court received and considered psychological and clinical reports, and a victim impact statement from Sergeant Paniagua (Personal circumstances [3]–[9]; Victim Impact Statement [1]–[3]).
At sentence the judge was required to confront statutory sentencing requirements for Category 1 offending and the specific statutory minimum that applies where the victim is an emergency worker (Nature and gravity [1]). After evaluating the evidence and submissions, the court imposed 6 months imprisonment for Charge 1 (with 157 days declared as already served), a two-year community correction order with mental-health treatment and supervision conditions for Charge 2, and convicted and discharged the summary bail charge (Sentence [2]–[5]). The judge also indicated that, but for the guilty plea, the sentence would have been 16 months with a 10 month non-parole period (Sentence [6]).
Why the court decided this way
There are several discrete legal and factual strands that determine the outcome:
Statutory framework for Category 1 offences and emergency-worker protections
The judge began from the statutory position that Charge 1 is Category 1 and normally attracts a custodial sentence unless an exception is established. Moreover, where the victim is an emergency worker, s 10A of the Sentencing Act requires special consideration and, unless a special reason is found, a term of imprisonment of not less than six months must be imposed (Nature and gravity [1]). This statutory structure places the onus on the offender to establish a special reason to avoid the statutory minimum.
The evidential evaluation of mental impairment and the Verdins principles
Defence relied on the offender's long-term diagnoses and clinical material to argue that the Verdins principles (mitigation for mental impairment) and s 10A special-reason grounds applied. The judge reviewed the psychologist's report and other clinical material, noting the diagnoses (paranoid schizophrenia, substance use disorder) and the background of exploitation of the accused's NDIS package (Personal circumstances [4]–[7]; Sentence considerations [3]).
Crucially, the judge concluded that the evidence did not establish a realistic or causative connection between the offender's mental functioning and the particular offending such as would enliven Verdins limbs 1–4. The judge also found that limbs 5 and 6 of Verdins were not satisfied, given the offender's stable conduct in custody and voluntary medication (Sentence considerations [4]). Thus, the judge rejected the argument that the offender's mental impairment constituted a special reason under s 10A(2)(c)(i) or that imprisonment would be substantially more burdensome under s 10A(2)(c)(ii) (Sentence considerations [6]–[7]).
Balancing culpability, harm, and mitigation
Even accepting some mitigating features, short duration, unplanned, no weapon, acting alone, the court viewed the offending as relatively serious because it was violent conduct in public that caused actual injury, including a fractured eye socket (Nature and gravity [2]–[3]).
The judge accepted the plea of guilty and assessed the appropriate discount under s 6AAA, noting the plea saved court time and was entered in circumstances of pandemic backlog (Sentence considerations [2]; Sentence [6]).
Prospects of rehabilitation and appropriate combination of punishments
The offender's limited prior record, past compliance with community orders, the availability of a properly managed NDIS package, and ongoing mental-health supports led the judge to conclude the prospects of rehabilitation were reasonable (Sentence considerations [5]).
This supported imposing a custodial term for the Category 1 offence but using a CCO (with mental-health treatment and supervision conditions) for the assault-on-emergency-worker charge (Sentence considerations [8]; Sentence [3]).
In short, statutory obligations (Category 1 + emergency-worker minimum), insufficient causal evidence linking mental impairment to the offence, and the serious nature of the offending led to imposition of the statutory minimum custodial sentence, albeit with a substantial plea discount and credit for time served.
Before and after state of the law
This decision applies well-established sentencing principles within the Victorian statutory framework:
The Sentencing Act scheme for emergency-worker offences and Category 1 offending imposes stronger custodial presumptions and minimum terms unless special reasons are proved. The judgment illustrates the court's application of s 10A and the pathway for assessing special reasons grounded in impaired mental functioning.
The judgment confirms how the Verdins principles operate in practice: mental impairment must be causally connected to the offending to substantially affect culpability and justify downward departure; general diagnoses without a clear causal nexus are insufficient (Sentence considerations [4]–[7]).
The decision does not herald a change in law. Rather it exemplifies the application of existing provisions and common law sentencing principles. The court cited Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169 in relation to plea discount principles (Sentence considerations [2]; footnote), but did not purport to alter precedent.
Key passages with plain-English translation
Selected passages from the reasons and a plain-English translation:
Passage: "Charge 1 ... is also a Category 1 offence and as such the Court must impose a custodial sentence unless an exception is established. Further as the victim ... was an emergency worker, unless a special reason exists pursuant to s 10A ... a term of imprisonment that is not less than six months must be imposed." (Nature and gravity [1])
Translation: The law usually requires custody for this kind of offence, and because the victim was an emergency worker there is a statutory rule that normally demands at least six months prison unless the accused proves a special justification.
Passage: "I am not satisfied that your mental functioning is causally linked to the offending. Further ... I am not satisfied that your condition would subject you to substantially and materially greater than the ordinary burden or risks of imprisonment." (Sentence considerations [7])
Translation: Although you have serious mental illness, the court did not find convincing evidence that your illness caused this crime or would make prison much worse for you than it is for other prisoners, so those factors do not avoid the usual custodial outcome.
Passage: "Pursuant to s 6AAA ... I indicate that had you not pleaded guilty, I would have sentenced you to a period of 16 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 months." (Sentence [6])
Translation: The judge sets out what would have been the harsher sentence without the guilty plea, demonstrating the substantial discount the plea produced.
Passage: "You will be required to undertake treatment for your mental health and you will be subject to supervision." (Sentence [3])
Translation: The non-custodial part of the overall sentence (the CCO) is linked to mental-health treatment and supervision, reflecting rehabilitation aims and community protection.
What fact patterns trigger this precedent
The decision is instructive where the following factual and legal combination arises:
An offender with diagnosed severe mental illness commits a violent, unplanned public assault on uniformed emergency workers causing physical injury.
The offence is Category 1 and involves an emergency worker, thereby engaging s 10A and the statutory minimum custodial expectation.
There is clinical material tendered, but the evidence does not establish a clear causal nexus between the mental illness (or intoxication) and the offending act.
The offender has limited prior record and some demonstrable engagement with treatment, supporting reasonable rehabilitation prospects.
In those circumstances, this judgment exemplifies the pathway where the court is likely to impose at least the statutory minimum custodial term for the primary Category 1 offence while potentially using a supervised, treatment-oriented community correction order for secondary offences, assuming suitability.
How later courts have treated it
This judgment itself does not record any later appellate treatment. The reasons rely on established sentencing provisions and do not purport to depart from appellate authority. The only case expressly cited in the reasons is Worboyes v The Queen [2021] VSCA 169 in relation to plea discount considerations (Sentence considerations [2]; footnote). Absent later judicial treatment within this text, no authoritative statement can be made here about how higher courts have treated Akoch since 14 July 2023.
Still-open questions
The judgment leaves several factual and doctrinal issues that often recur in cases where mental illness and statutory minimums intersect:
Proof of causal nexus between mental disorder and offending
The decision reiterates that diagnosis alone is insufficient; a realistic causal link is required. The particulars of what clinical evidence will satisfy that causal link remain a practical evidentiary question for future cases. How detailed must expert opinion be to demonstrate causation for s 10A or Verdins limbs 1–4? The judgment shows the court expected direct causal connection evidence (Sentence considerations [4]).
Interaction of substance use with mental illness
The judge noted uncertainty about whether the accused was drug affected and observed the clinical view that substance misuse compounds psychotic symptoms (Personal circumstances [9]–[10]). Where co-morbid substance use exists, courts face complex questions about whether impairment attributable to mental illness (rather than voluntary intoxication) can mitigate culpability.
Quantification of plea discounts
The judge identified the sentence that would have been imposed but for the plea (16 months with 10 month NPP) and imposed a markedly lower sentence after plea and credit for time served. How precisely sentencing judges quantify and articulate the components of plea discounts within s 6AAA reasoning will remain a live area for close practitioners.
Use of combined custodial and community dispositions
This judgment imposed immediate custody for the Category 1 offence followed by a CCO for the assault offence (and treatment conditions). The mechanics and sequencing of such combined disposals, and their interaction with parole and supervision frameworks, raise practical implementation questions when mental-health supports are incorporated.
Practical access to supports on release
The judge relied on the availability of a properly administered NDIS package, likely CTO placement, and the offender's engagement with Mercy Mental Health (Sentence considerations [5]). The real-world availability and reliability of such supports can be decisive for rehabilitation and for future courts assessing risk and suitability for non-custodial orders; however, systemic questions remain about ensuring continuity of care.
Conclusion: DPP v Akoch is a clear application of statutory sentencing duties for Category 1/emergency-worker offences and a careful evidential evaluation of psychiatric mitigation. It provides a useful example of the level of clinical proof a sentencing judge requires to find special reasons under s 10A or to apply Verdins mitigation, and it illustrates how courts may combine custody with supervised, treatment-focused community orders where rehabilitation prospects exist.
This is general legal information, not legal advice. I can make mistakes. Before you act on this, rely on it, or use any draft based on it, get a qualified Australian lawyer to check it.
Judgment (10 paragraphs)
[1]
Sentence: Imprisonment for a period of 6 months and following the period of imprisonment to be placed on a 2 year community correction order.
[2]
(a) one charge of causing injury recklessly contrary to s 18 of the Crimes Act 1958 ('Crimes Act'), which carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment (Charge 1); and
>
> (b) one charge of assaulting an emergency worker on duty contrary to s 31(1)(b) of the Crimes Act, which carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment (Charge 2).
[3]
You have also pleaded guilty to the related summary offence of commit indictable offence whilst on bail contrary to s 30B of the Bail Act 1977, which carries a maximum penalty of 3 months imprisonment (Summary Charge 4).
You have also admitted your Criminal Record.
[4]
A prosecution opening was tendered on the plea and may be summarised as follows:
You were born in 1989 and were 33 years old at the time of the offending.
On 8 December 2022, you were bailed from the Footscray Police Station to attend the Melbourne Magistrates' Court on 16 February 2023. You were therefore on bail at the time of this offending.
The victims in this matter are Acting Protective Services Officer Sergeant Emerald Paniagua and Protective Services Officer Patrick Farrugia.
On 8 February 2023 the victims and Protective Services Officer Arshpreet Kaur were on duty at Footscray Train Station. All three officers were wearing their uniforms which clearly identified them as members of Victoria Police, including high visibility vests with the words 'Protective Services Officer' clearly displayed on the front and back.
At about 6.50 pm, you got off the train on Platform 5 at Footscray Station. You walked through the Myki barriers without touching off a valid Myki ticket.
Officer Farrugia approached you and asked you if you had a valid ticket. He attempted to stop you to confirm your ID. You attempted to get past Officer Farrugia by pushing him in the chest with your right hand. Officer Farrugia grabbed your shirt to stop you. You punched him in the head causing swelling and bruising to his head. The marking on his head was in the shape of the rings you were wearing.
Sergeant Paniagua attempted to help restrain you, but you turned and threw punches with your left and right hands connecting with her face. A punch from you struck her right eye causing immediate swelling and minor bruising, and momentarily disorientating her. Medical scans revealed that you had fractured her left eye socket.
Officer Kaur deployed OC spray on you and you were then restrained and arrested by the three officers. The incident was partially captured on CCTV footage.
You were taken to the Footscray Police Station for interview. You were assessed to be unfit for interview and were remanded into custody.
[5]
Both victims of your offending were emergency workers on duty and there is no dispute that you were aware of this fact when you assaulted them. Charge 1 carries a maximum penalty of 5 years imprisonment. It is also a Category 1 offence and as such the Court must impose a custodial sentence unless an exception is established. Further as the victim in relation to Charge 1 was an emergency worker, unless a special reason exits pursuant to s 10A of the Sentencing Act 1991 ('Sentencing Act'), a term of imprisonment that is not less than six months must be imposed. Such provisions reflect the intention of Parliament that conduct such as yours is considered to be serious conduct.
In this instance the two victims were acting Protective Services Officers simply doing their job when they approached you after you had walked through the Myki barriers without touching off a valid ticket. Rather than responding to the enquiries of the officers, you assaulted each of them by punching them both to the head. Officer Farrugia suffered bruising and swelling while Sergeant Paniagua suffered a fracture to her left eye socket.
Ms Edwards who appeared on your behalf, highlighted that the offending lacked features of aggravation in that it was of short duration, it was unplanned, that you did not use any weapon and that you did not act in company. In effect, that your offending was spontaneous and reactive. Ms Farrell, who appeared on behalf of the Director of Public Prosecutions, submitted that in circumstances where you did not have a valid ticket, simply answering the enquiries of the officers may have only led to a fine.
While I accept that your offending was spontaneous and absent some features of aggravation, in the circumstances your conduct was entirely unwarranted, violent conduct in public and in my view still remains serious.
[6]
Tendered on the plea was a victim impact statement prepared by Sergeant Paniagua.
In describing the emotional impact of your offending, Sergeant Paniagua states that ever since the incident, she has been thinking of ways that she and her fellow officer could have avoided being injured. In terms of the physical impact, Sergeant Paniagua notes that she was advised by her GP not to return to work for three weeks until she had completely recovered from the concussion. She was also unable to participate in recreational physical activities for a period after being injured. Sergeant Paniagua describes having to switch from night shifts to day shifts because of the injuries she sustained, resulting in the loss of penalty rates thereby negatively impacting her personal finances.
I take the contents of the victim impact statement into account.
[7]
You are now 34 years of age. You are the youngest of four siblings, and you were all raised by your mother after your father passed away from illness when you were just a child. You are of South Sudanese descent, having fled South Sudan in 2001 due to the outbreak of civil war. You arrived in Australia in 2003 as an adolescent refugee after spending two years in Egypt.
Upon arriving in Australia, you and your family initially resided with an uncle in Werribee and then settled into housing in St Albans. You were enrolled in a language school and then matriculated to mainstream schooling, completing Year 11 at a Catholic Regional College in Sydenham. You have since worked in various labour roles, including as a welder, in a meat packing factory, and in a laundromat. At the time of this offending, you were unemployed and in receipt of the Disability Support Pension ('DSP'), although it was submitted on your behalf by Ms Edwards that you did not have unfettered access to these funds in reality, a matter which I will address in further detail below.
You report first experiencing symptoms of mental illness in 2006 and received a formal diagnosis of schizophrenia in 2007, followed by a diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in 2009. Whilst living in St Albans, you left the family home due to your worsening mental health symptoms, which caused conflict within the family unit. You found yourself experiencing homelessness during this time, and this went on for some years until you were able to secure accommodation in Richmond. You later moved into DFFH accommodation in an apartment complex in Werribee with your older brother. In 2021, after your brother was prohibited from remaining in the apartment complex, you moved into your own one bedroom flat in the same building.
Your discharge summary from Mercy Health, tendered on the plea, confirms you have been admitted as an inpatient to psychiatric impatient units on numerous occasions due to your schizophrenia, and you have also been the subject of continuous Community Treatment Orders ('CTO'), the most recent one ultimately being revoked once you were remanded on these matters.
Your complex mental health condition was the basis on which you were found eligible for a NDIS package in 2021. However, a letter from senior Registered Nurse and your mental health care case manager, Katelyn Acciarito, dated 28 June 2023, explains how you were approached by a couple who held themselves out to you as your cousins and members of your community. They operated an unaccredited NDIS provider which purported to coordinate support services for NDIS participants in the western suburbs. They made an application for NDIS funds on your behalf, which was approved for a start date in June 2021 and amounted to over $282,000 in total, to be used over a period of three years. They went on to invoice your NDIS package for services that were ultimately never provided to you, exhausting your funds within months of them being received.
[8]
Ms Edwards highlighted a number of matters in mitigation.
First is your plea of guilty. The matter proceeded to this court by way of straight hand-up brief and no witnesses have been cross-examined. As such your plea has saved significant court time and expense and therefore has facilitated the course of justice. Your plea carries additional weight which must be reflected in a further amelioration in sentence, as the plea was entered in circumstances where the pandemic has caused a substantial backlog of cases in the criminal justice system.[1]
It was submitted on your behalf that your offending in this instance must be viewed within a matrix of not only your significant and longstanding schizophrenia symptoms, but also your exploitation by the couple whom you trusted and believed to be your next of kin, and who ultimately deprived you of much needed financial and mental health care support. Ms Edwards notes that it was your failure to have a valid Myki ticket which brought you to the attention of police, and the severity of your mental illness symptoms was such that you were not able to explain to the officers why you did not have money for the fare.
Ms Edwards also submitted on your behalf that all six limbs of Verdins are enlivened on the basis of Ms Cidoni's report. Your long term diagnoses are undoubtedly debilitating and difficult for you to manage on a day to day basis and I take them into account as part of your personal circumstances. However in my view in all the circumstances, the evidence does not provide for a realistic or causative connection to the offending in order to enliven limbs 1 to 4 of Verdins. Also, there remains some uncertainty as to whether your substance use played a part in the offending - you maintain that you were not under the influence however, as noted, you were assessed as unfit for interview due to being drug affected in the view of the police. As to Verdins limbs 5 and 6, I note the comments of Ms Acciarito in her letter of 3 July 2023, that during your time in custody your mental state has remained very stable and you have continued to voluntarily accept your psychiatric medication. As such in all the circumstances I am not satisfied that Verdins principles 5 and 6 are enlivened.
Turning to your prospects of rehabilitation, you come before the court with a limited prior criminal history and you have in the past complied with community dispositions. You now have the availability of a properly managed NDIS package upon your release and the support of Mercy Mental Health and it likely that you will be placed on a further CTO. In all the circumstances, while your future direction depends largely on you utilising the supports offered to you in the community, you have demonstrated that you are willing and able to engage with health professionals and you have good insight into your illness. As such in my view your prospects of rehabilitation are reasonable.
[9]
Mr Akoch, would you please stand.
Emmanuel Akoch, on Charge 1, causing injury recklessly, you are convicted and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment.
On Charge 2, assaulting an emergency worker on duty, you are convicted and will be placed on a community correction order for a period of 2 years. In addition to the standard conditions, you will be required to undertake treatment for your mental health and you will be subject to supervision. You will also be required to attend court for Judicial Monitoring.
On Summary Charge 4, commit indictable offence whilst on bail, you will be convicted and discharged.
Pursuant to s 18 of the Sentencing Act, I declare that 157 days be reckoned as the period of imprisonment already served under the sentence I have imposed. That does not include today.
Pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act, I indicate that had you not pleaded guilty, I would have sentenced you to a period of 16 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of 10 months.
Convicted and sentenced to 6 months imprisonment for causing injury recklessly (with 157 days declared as time already served), placed on a 2-year community correction order (with mental-health treatment and supervision) for assaulting an emergency worker, and convicted and discharged on summary bail charge; judge indicated a higher sentence (16 months, 10 months NPP) would have been imposed but for guilty plea (Sentence [2]–[6]).
Ms Edwards submitted that the couple involved themselves in your life to such an extent that they had full control over your finances, including your DSP payments, and issued to you only a small stipend. Ms Acciarito states in her letter that if the NDIS package had been properly administered, it would have allowed for you to receive, among other things, assistance in accessing free or reduced public transport fares. The couple have since been referred to law enforcement for further investigation.
Ms Acciarito advises in a subsequent letter to the Court, dated 3 July 2023, that a new NDIS package was approved for you last month. It will be administered by an accredited NDIS provider but has been placed on hold until you are released into the community. Ms Acciarito understands that upon your release, you will be placed on an Inpatient Assessment Order and will likely return to being on a CTO. Having remained involved with your mental health care whilst you have been on remand, Ms Acciarito observes that you remain very motivated to engage with your treatment and notes you are proactively making requests for supports to be put in place upon your release, to assist you with daily household tasks, accessing public transport, attending medical appointments and skill building.
You were assessed by psychologist Gina Cidoni across two sessions on 13 and 20 June 2023, and the subsequent psychological report of Ms Cidoni, dated 20 June 2023, was tendered on the plea. You did not engage well in your first session with Ms Cidoni but engaged better at the second session, answering questions for about an hour. You displayed perceptual disturbances and the content of your thoughts consisted of delusions. Due to your condition during the assessments, Ms Cidoni was not able to complete any psychometric testing with you or comprehensively assess your cognitive function. She concludes that you meet the diagnostic criteria for Paranoid Schizophrenia and Substance Use Disorder. She notes that you also have a historical diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.
It is clear that you have a history of problematic substance use which started when you first left home back in 2007. Your counsel submits that you were not drug affected at the time of offending and your presentation when stopped by the police was simply a reflection of your disarrayed mental state. It was further submitted that your drug use has historically been sporadic and opportunistic, something you only engage in when your finances permit it. Your history does not reflect criminal offending in order to fuel your substance dependency. Nevertheless, Ms Cidoni opines that you have a 'significant and extensive history' of substance misuse, and specifically polysubstance misuse. She notes that your schizophrenia symptoms - namely delusions of persecution and harm - are compounded by 'a chronic pattern of cannabis and methamphetamine abuse'.
Ms Acciarito also notes that in the months leading up to your imprisonment, although you had made some gains in stabilising your mental state, she also observed some fluctuations that were suspected to be 'in the context of opportunistic substance use' and that you were at an increased risk of offending when intoxicated. I am ultimately of the view that it is difficult to draw a conclusion either way about whether or not you were drug affected at the time of the offending, although I note your condition on the day of the offending was such that you were not able to be interviewed following your arrest, according to the police, because you appeared drug affected. In any event, the clinical evidence of Ms Acciarito, who has worked closely with you since 2017, supports the conclusion that you must genuinely engage with support services targeting substance use if you are to stabilise your mental health and ultimately reduce your risk of reoffending.
Ms Edwards submitted that a special reason exists pursuant to s 10A(2)(c)(i) of the Sentencing Act, as you had impaired mental functioning that is causally linked to the commission of the offence and/or pursuant to s 10A(2)(c)(ii), you have impaired mental functioning that would result in you being subject to substantially and materially greater than the ordinary burden of imprisonment.
In my view, for similar reasons I have found in relation to the application of Verdins principles, I am not satisfied that your mental functioning is causally linked to the offending. Further, while I have taken your mental functioning into account in the general sentencing discretion, I am not satisfied that your condition would subject you to substantially and materially greater than the ordinary burden or risks of imprisonment.
Ms Edwards submitted that while a term of imprisonment may be required in relation to Charge 1, that in the circumstances a community correction order would be able to meet the relevant sentencing principles in relation to the remaining charge. I accept that submission. I had you assessed for such an order and you have been found suitable. As part of the assessment it was also recommended by the Mental Health Advice and Response Service that a mental health condition should form part of any community correction order with the intention that you also maintain your current supports.