(a) Whether the NDIS is unlawfully denying the Severely Autistic Child Applicant who also suffers from a serious Thermoregulatory disorder his legally approved supports by refusing to pay invoices via an unlawful block placed on the Child Applicant's NDIS portal and also denying the Child Applicant access to his critical supports and as a result he cannot access said critical supports unless the supports are self managed as detailed in the SIFC dated 22 December 2025 (Exhibit 320).

(b) Whether the NDIS have placed an unlawful block on the Child Applicant NDIS Plans since the day of the last AAT hearing on 18 July 2024 and the serious detriment this has caused the Child Applicant as it has effectively denied him of his critical supports

(c) Whether the NDIS only allowed the Child Applicant to utilise only 15% of his plan of $240k worth of supports last year and the same issues continue unresolved with the current NDIS Plan as the unlawful block still remains on the Child Applicant's NDIS Plan of $212K by refusing to pay invoices, via the unlawful block on the Child Applicant's NDIS Portal as per strong undisputed evidence including screen shots from 2024 until last week still showing rejected invoices for legally approved supports and providers still chasing payments from 9 months ago is completely unacceptable and therefore essentially denying the Child Applicant access to his legally approved supports 2 years in a row.

(d) Whether the excuses to refuse the Child Applicant to use his plan since the last day of the AAT hearing on 18 July 2024 is extremely insidious and has caused the Child Applicant serious detriment

(e) Whether the Child Applicant has lost his Providers as a result of the NDIS failing and refusing to pay for invoices as clearly demonstrated by NDIS internal records showing an unacceptable 15% usage as a result of their systemic failures and denial of legally approved supports.

(f) Whether the previous plan and the new plan is severely deficient, for the Child Applicant's needs

(g) Whether critical supports such as incontinence and safety products, Occupational therapy and speech therapy resources as listed in the Child Applicant's SOIs are reasonable and necessary consumable low cost supports and whether the Occupational therapist, Developmental paediatrician, Physiotherapist and Support Coordinator all supported in writing these reasonable low cost consumables including incontinence and

1. There are three fundamental flaws in the applicant's contention that this evidence is relevant.
2. First, the Tribunal's jurisdiction is to review the decision, not to investigate the conduct of the Agency. The review is a de novo review. The Tribunal's task is to determine, afresh, the correct composition of the applicant's plan and the appropriate management mode. The internal administrative processes, historical motivations of Agency officers, or the specific reasons why a 'payment block' was applied in the past are not determinative of the issues which are presently before the Tribunal. Whether the plan should be self-managed depends on an objective assessment of risk and capacity regarding the applicant's funds going forward, not on a critique of the Agency's past administrative actions.
3. I accept the submission that the substantive issues for determination in this proceeding are:

(a) whether the requested supports are reasonable and necessary; and > > (b) whether the decision to change the management of the plan from self-managed to Agency-managed was the correct or preferable decision.

4. I am not determining whether there was an 'unlawful block', whether the respondent has acted in an 'extremely insidious' manner in connection with the applicant's plan or whether the respondent has been guilty of 'systemic failures'. The applicant is at liberty to make submissions to that effect at the hearing of the review application, but a focus on what the correct outcome should be, rather than attempting to demonstrate malfeasance on the part of the respondent, may well be more useful and consistent with the Tribunal's objectives as set out in s 9 of the ART Act.
5. Save perhaps in one respect, the question as to whether the requested supports are reasonable and necessary is not a question in respect of which I consider that Mr McNaughton, Mr Swainson, Mr Davis-Arthur, or Ms Jasper would have information relevant to the determination of. The qualification expressed in the preceding sentence is that one or more of Mr McNaughton, Mr Swainson, Mr Davis-Arthur, or Ms Jasper may have a subjective opinion about those questions. However, as lay witnesses, their subjective opinions about those questions are not information which is 'relevant' to this question.
6. In relation to the question of the management of the applicant's plan, the critical question is not why the decision was made to change the applicant's plan from self-managed to Agency-managed, but rather what decision should be made by the Tribunal, standing in the respondent's shoes. The actual reasons, or subjective opinions, of Mr McNaughton, Mr Swainson, Mr Davis-Arthur, or Ms Jasper (to the extent they were involved in any such decision) is not relevant to my determination.
7. Second, and as the applicant appears to recognise albeit to a limited extent, the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to determine claims of discrimination, victimisation, or fraud. The applicant's submissions plainly indicate a desire to use the hearing to air grievances regarding the Agency's corporate conduct and alleged systemic failures. Whilst frustration with past service delivery is evident, the Tribunal is a creature of statute. It has no power to grant relief for discrimination or to superintend the internal management of the Agency. I am satisfied that evidence adduced for these purposes is legally irrelevant.
8. Third, I am not satisfied that the senior executives sought by the applicant to give evidence (Mr McNaughton and Mr Swainson) are unlikely to have direct, personal knowledge of the specific facts regarding the applicants functional needs or the day-to-day management of the plan. Their evidence would necessarily be limited to high-level policy or administrative oversight, which does not assist the Tribunal in determining which supports are reasonable and necessary for the applicant.
9. Accordingly, the requirement in s 74(1) is not met. For these reasons, I refuse to issue these summonses requested by the applicant. I am not satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe these individuals possess information relevant to the proceeding, as defined by the Tribunal's statutory task.

1. The respondent seeks to summon the following individuals, who are treating professionals or service providers for the applicant:

(a) Dr John Wray (Developmental Paediatrician); and > > (b) Jacinta Gabbedy (Occupational Therapist).

1. The applicant objects on the basis that these witnesses are busy professionals who will suffer financial loss and disruption to their private practices if required to attend. The applicant further submits that they have already provided comprehensive written reports, rendering their oral evidence unnecessary. The applicant characterises the request to cross-examine them as a form of harassment or an attempt to distort facts.

1. These witnesses are the authors of the clinical evidence upon which the applicant relies. Their opinions regarding the applicant's functional capacity, the necessity of the requested supports, and the risks (if any) associated with plan management go to the very heart of the substantive issues. Against this background, it should be obvious that I am readily and easily satisfied that each of Dr Wray and Ms Gabbedy, have information relevant to the proceeding.
2. The applicant's objection regarding the sufficiency of written reports is misconceived. A fundamental element of procedural fairness is the right of a party to test the evidence by cross examination. The respondent is entitled to cross-examine the experts to test the basis of their conclusions, clarify ambiguities, and explore the robustness of their recommendations. This is standard forensic practice and does not constitute harassment.
3. In relation to the objection based on inconvenience and financial loss, the Tribunal acknowledges that attending a hearing may impose a burden on professional witnesses. There is no evidence from Dr Wray or Ms Gabbedy as to the nature and extent of any inconvenience or loss that they may experience. However, the proper administration of justice and the need for the Tribunal to reach the correct or preferable decision must take precedence. The applicant seeks to obtain government funding based on the opinions of these professionals; it is therefore not only necessary, but desirable, that those opinions be open to testing and scrutiny.
4. I make no specific direction regarding the mode of their attendance at this stage. However, I observe that it is open to the summons recipients to request to give evidence by audio-visual link to mitigate disruption to their clinical practice. Such requests are commonly granted and accommodated by the Tribunal. I would expect the respondent to take a pragmatic approach in this regard to minimise inconvenience to independent witnesses. Furthermore, if a witness considers the summons to be oppressive, they retain the right to apply to the Tribunal to have it set aside. This possibility does not, however, preclude the issuance of the summonses in the first instance.

(a) the request to issue summonses to Scott McNaughton, Matthew Swainson, Zac Davis-Authur, and Melissa Jasper is refused; and > > (b) the summonses to Dr John Wray and Jacinta Gabbedy be issued;

I certify that the preceding 29 (twenty-nine) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member F Robertson

.........[SGD]..............................................................

On the papers (final submissions dated 1 January 2026)

[1] Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), s 74(1)(a).

[2] Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth), s 56.

[3] Applicant's submissions dated 1 January 2026, [3], [14].

[4] Applicant's submissions dated 1 January 2026, [14].

[5] Applicant's submissions dated 1 January 2026, [14].