DPF19 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FedCFamC2G 429

1. This judgment is about whether a decision of the then Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) concerning the Protection visa of DPF19 (Applicant) is affected by jurisdictional error.
2. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of the then Minister for Home Affair's (Delegate) to refuse the Applicant a Protection (subclass 866) visa (Protection Visa).
3. To obtain relief from this Court, the Applicant must show that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error. For the reasons that follow, this Court has determined that no jurisdictional error arises from the Tribunal's decision.
4. Consequently, the application for judicial review must be dismissed.

1. The Applicant is a citizen of Malaysia who arrived in Australia on 31 March 2017 as the holder of an Electronic Travel Authority visa.[1]
2. On 3 May 2017, the Applicant applied for a Protection (subclass 866) visa (Protection Visa). The Applicant claimed to have left Malaysia due to his inability to repay loans from a money lender, who had threatened and beat him, and attempted to kill him.[2] The Applicant claimed he was unable to return Malaysia, for fear of the money lender. He further claimed he did not seek help in Malaysia as "everyone [was] scared to speak" to the money lender, and that he could not relocate within Malaysia because he would be found "easily".[3]

1. On 31 July 2017, the Delegate refused the Protection Visa application.[4] This power refusal is conferred on the Minister (and their Delegates by extension)[5] by s 65 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act).
2. In short, the Delegate was not satisfied that the Applicant satisfied either s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Act; these provisions are known as the Refugee and Complementary Protections criteria respectively. The Delegate was unsatisfied the criteria were met, because "country information... indicate[d] that the Malaysian authorities... are reasonably effective in combating illegal money" and thus, that the Applicant "could obtain protection from the RMP and other Malaysian authorities such that there would not be a real risk they will suffer significant harm".[6]

1. On 10 August 2017, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the Delegate's decision;[7] the application was acknowledged that same day.[8]
2. On 17 June 2019, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to attend a hearing listed for 12 July 2019. Appended to the invitation was a Information about hearings - MR Division fact sheet and a blank Response to hearing invitation form.[9]
3. On 7 July 2019, the Applicant confirmed his attendance at the scheduled hearing and requested the assistance of a Malay interpreter.[10]
4. On 10 July 2019, the Applicant forwarded an amended Response to hearing invitation form in which it was requested that the Tribunal take evidence from his "cousin['s] sister".[11]
5. The Tribunal hearing proceeded as scheduled; the Applicant was assisted by a Malay interpreter - his relative did not attend as indicated in the amended response.[12]

1. On 20 August 2019, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision not to grant the Applicant the Protection Visa.
2. The Tribunal's decision is 9 pages and spans 51 paragraphs.
3. At paragraphs 9 to 11 of their outline of submissions filed on 18 February 2026, the Minister's representative summarised the Tribunal's reasons. The Court as presently constituted has carefully read the Tribunal's reasons and accept the summary as comprehensive, fair and properly referenced. The Court adopts it for the purposes of this judgment. The paragraphs are as follows (reproduced without amendment):
   1. Based on country information, the Tribunal accepted that borrowing from illegal money lenders was widely advertised in public spaces in Malaysia and was a practice adopted widely by individuals in financial hardship. Accordingly, the Tribunal was prepared to accept that the applicant borrowed money in 2011 from a loan shark and when he was unable to make the expected repayments, his shop was damaged. The Tribunal also accepted that the applicant's stepsister in Malaysia was making repayments on the applicant's behalf and despite sporadic repayments being made, the applicant's stepsister had not been threatened by the loan sharks (CB 86, [37]-[38]).
   2. The Tribunal found that the applicant was unable to explain discrepancies in his claims and had given unclear and conflicting evidence with respect to repayments being made to the loan sharks. Having regard to the conflicting evidence, the Tribunal did not accept that the applicant was beaten up by loan sharks before leaving Malaysia or that the loan sharks identified the applicant and travelled 150 kilometres to where he was working (CB 86, [39]).
   3. Having regard to country information, the Tribunal found that even if it were to accept the applicant's evidence at its highest, the authorities of Malaysia were able to offer the applicant state protection against the harm he feared if returned to Malaysia (CB 86-87, [40]-[44]). The Tribunal found that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution as it found that effective protection measures were available to the applicant upon to return to Malaysia, in the foreseeable future (CB 87, [45]). The Tribunal also found there was not a real risk the applicant would face significant harm if returned to Malaysia (CB 87-88, [48]-[49])...
4. Based on the Tribunal's finding, it was not satisfied that the Applicant met either the Refugee or Complementary Protections Criterion. Accordingly, the Tribunal affirmed the Delegate's decision to refuse the Protection Visa's grant.

1. On 19 September 2019, the Applicant applied to this Court for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision dated 20 August 2019 (Originating Application).
2. The Originating application was filed within the 35-day time limit prescribed by the Act[13] and brought pursuant to section 476 of the Act, which confers upon this court, in relation to migration decisions, the "same original jurisdiction as the High Court under s 75(v) of the Constitution". That is, the Court may undertake judicial review, in respect of matters "where a writ of mandamus or prohibition, or an injunction, is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth."[14]
3. The application was brought within the 35-day time limit prescribed by section 477(1) of the Act.
4. The Originating Application sought only to quash the decision of the Tribunal (writ of certiorari). The Originating Application was therefore deficient in not seeking a writ of mandamus. This Court invited the Applicant to amend his Originating Application. He accepted the invitation. The Minister did not oppose amendment. Consequently, at the hearing, to properly invoke the jurisdiction of the Court, the following Order was made:
   1. Pursuant to r 8.09 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules) the application filed on 19 September 2019 is taken to have been amended so as to seek a writ of mandamus.
5. The Applicant lists seven purported grounds of alleged error (reproduced as best as possible having regard to the state of the filed document without amendment and considered below).

1. On 3 October 2019, the First Respondent (Minister) filed its response and opposed the making of the orders sought by the Applicant. The Minister submitted that the application failed to establish any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
2. On 24 November 2021 (in compliance with the orders of a registrar, issued 10 November 2021), the Minister filed a bundle of relevant documents (Court Book).
3. On 26 March 2025, a Registrar of this Court issued an Order (Registrar's Order) directing the:

(a) Applicant to file any amended application with proper particulars, written submissions and further evidence at least 28 before the final hearing; and

(b) Minister to file any written submissions and further evidence in reply at least 14 days before the final hearing.

1. The Applicant did not file an amended application and nor did he provide further particulars of the grounds for judicial review, despite being invited to do so.
2. On 18 February 2026, the Minister complied with the Registrar's Order by filing written submissions.
3. Therefore, the materials before the Court are as follows:

(a) the Originating Application for judicial review filed 19 September 2019 (superseded by the Amended Application);

(b) a Court Book numbering 91 pages filed 24 November 2021 (marked as Exhibit R1); and

(c) Written Submissions filed by the Minister on 18 February 2026.

(a) allocated to the Court as presently constituted on 22 December 2025;

(b) listed for hearing on 8 January 2026; and

(c) heard on 11 March 2026 in person in the Court's Melbourne Registry (11 March Hearing).

1. At the hearing, the Applicant appeared before the Court on his own behalf, assisted by a Malay interpreter. Amron Rath, solicitor at Sparke Helmore, appeared on behalf of the Minister.
2. At the commencement of the hearing, orders were made:

(a) amending the name of the First Respondent to the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship; and

(b) amending the Originating Application, such that it included a writ of mandamus and thus, properly invoked the Court's jurisdiction.

1. To assist the Applicant, the Court explained that this Court can only turn its attention to the issue of jurisdictional error in the Tribunal's decision. The Court explained that the possible categories of jurisdictional error are not exhaustive and sometimes overlap. For migration decisions of this sort, however, they most commonly include (but are not limited to) the following categories:

(1) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question;[15]

(2) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material;[16]

(3) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material;[17]

(4) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures;[18]

(5) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias;[19] and

(6) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable.[20]

(a) this Court cannot review the merits of the Tribunal's decision or grant the Applicant the visa they seek;

(b) he role of the Court is restricted to determining if the Tribunal made a material error in arriving at the decision it arrived at.[21]

1. The Court then asked the Applicant whether they had received the Court Book. The Applicant expressed uncertainty that he had, explaining that he was "not so savvy in the IT" department.[22] The matter was briefly adjourned in order to enable the Court associates to procure a hard copy of the Court Book.[23]
2. At the resumption of the hearing, the Court took the Applicant to an affidavit of service, filed by the Minister's representatives the day of hearing. In short, the following chronology of events emerged:

(a) on 19 September 2019, the Applicant filed his Originating Application which specified an email address for service (First Email Address);

(b) on 29 November 2021, solicitors for the Minister sent an email to the Applicant which attached the Court Book. The affidavit of service affirmed that the Court Book had been served on the Applicant via the email specified in his Originating Application. This was not the case - the email had actually been sent to a second email address (Second Email Address);

(c) on 28 September 2022, the Applicant filed a Notice of Address for Service, which specified the Second Email Address as his address for service;

(d) on 18 February 2026, solicitors for the Minister sent an email to the Applicant's Second Email Address which attached the Minister's submissions.

1. In light of this chronology, the Court was not confident that the Applicant received the Court Book or had an opportunity to familiarise himself with the materials it contained prior to the hearing.[24] Accordingly, the Court printed and provided the Applicant with a copy of the Court Book. The hearing was adjourned until 2.00 pm the following day (12 March Hearing).
2. At the 12 March Hearing, the Court confirmed with the Applicant that he had had an opportunity to read the Minister's submissions. The Applicant, whilst unable to read English, confirmed that a friend had assisted him the previous night to "look through them".[25]
3. Noting that the Applicant was unrepresented, the Court gave him an opportunity to elaborate on his grounds of review and to outline any other concerns he might have had with the Tribunal's decision. This is now the standard procedure in this Court following the decision in Bala v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection.[26]
4. Before this Court, the Applicant made vague submissions in support of the grounds set out in his application. Those submissions are considered below.
5. The Minister relied on their written submissions.

THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

1. In Bhasker v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs[27] his Honour Judge Fary summarised the role of the Court in judicial review proceedings:
   1. Section 476 of the Migration Act provides that the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court has under s 75(v) of the Constitution.
   2. Section 75(v) of the Constitution provides that the High Court has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Thus, subject to the statutory exceptions provided for in s 476 of the Migration Act, the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) has original jurisdiction in all matters in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth. Further, s 474 of the Migration Act does not preclude judicial review of decisions under the Migration Act where jurisdictional error is alleged.[28]
   3. "The task of the Court [in an application for judicial review] is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it." The court neither consider the merits of the decision nor remakes it.[29]
   4. The Court may grant relief if it is satisfied that the decision of the Tribunal is affected by jurisdictional error.[30] Jurisdictional error by a statutory decision maker may manifest itself in a variety of ways. Recognised categories of jurisdictional error include "misunderstanding the applicable law; asking the wrong question; exceeding the bounds of reasonableness; identifying a wrong issue; ignoring relevant material; relying on irrelevant material; in some cases, making an erroneous finding or reaching a mistaken conclusion; or failing to observe some applicable requirement of procedural fairness".[31] Different kinds of error may overlap.[32] The categories are not closed.[33] The critical question is whether the decision maker has exceeded the authority or power conferred by the statute.[34]
   5. In most but not all cases, for an error to be jurisdictional, the error must be material to the decision being challenged. The test is whether there is a "realistic possibility" that the decision that was made "could" have been different, but for the error.[35] This is to be determined as "a matter of reasonable conjecture within the parameters set by the historical facts that have been determined".[36] It has been described as an "undemanding" standard.[37]
2. The Court as presently constituted respectfully adopts his Honour's summary of the task before it.
3. Further, disagreement with a decision, even emphatic disagreement, does not of itself give rise to jurisdictional error.[38]

1. The Applicant was largely unable to speak to the grounds for review enumerated in his Originating Application, explaining that he "paid someone to prepare [the application] for [him]... [and that he was] not able to answer the [Court's questions regarding his grounds of review] because [he] didn't go to school".[39]

1. The application for protection visa was vcalid because I was't prevent by section 48A of the migration act 1958 from lodging a protection visa application in Australia onshore. My visa has been refused immigration offi[cer ?] and tribunal member has affirm the decision not to grant 866 visa subclass to me in Australia. As I believe the decisions of immigration and tribunal unfair to me I am bring this matter.

1. The first limb of Ground One appears to assert that the Protection Visa application was treated by the Delegate and/or Tribunal as invalid. That is not correct. The refusal of DPF19's application for a Protection Visa by the Delegate (a decision this Court cannot review), and the subsequent affirmation of this refusal by the Tribunal, was premised on neither decision maker accepting that the Applicant would face harm on returning to Malysia.[40]
2. The second limb of Ground One asserts that the decision of the Tribunal was unfair. When the Court asked the Applicant to elaborate upon this claim, he stated the decision was unfair "because [he] wish[ed] to reside [in Australia], and [the] Tribunal asked [him] to return home" despite the Applicant "lik[ing] it here in Australia".[41] The Applicant's submissions were merit based arguments. To have regard to them this Court would be engaging in impermissible merits review and usurp the function of the executive.[42] As was explained to the Applicant, the task of this Court is to consider whether the Tribunal Decision was attended by jurisdictional error - this is an inquiry distinct from broader considerations of "fairness", even if there will inevitably be some degree of overlap between the two.
3. In fairness to the Applicant, and in light of his lack of legal expertise and education, the Court as presently constituted is willing to read Ground One as an allegation that the Tribunal decision was "unfair" in the sense of being unreasonable. Unreasonableness is a ground of jurisdictional error well recognised by the Court's, and in a broad sense, refers to decisions which lack an evident and intelligible justification.[43] Even on this more generous reading of Ground One, there was no unreasonableness in the Tribunal decision: the member asserted that, "even were the Tribunal to take the applicant's evidence at its highest, the Tribunal finds that the authorities of Malaysia are able to offer the applicant state protection against the harm he states he fears if returned to Malaysia".[44] This was a conclusion open to the Tribunal in light of the probative evidence before it; it clearly possessed an evident and intelligible justification.
4. Ground One is dismissed.

2. I am applying judicial review at federal circuit court wider the s 476 of the migration act 1958 related to federal court regulations.

...

4. I am fears are genuine and fear is well-founded fear persecution in Malaysia. I don't have anything left in Malaysia. I will be killed become victims by bad people money launder.

5. According to this situation I have entered in to Australia to save myself and I did no[t?] have an right to enter in any other country legally except Malaysia, there is no intention making to wrong protection claims in Australia.

6. Also my claims and documents true and genuine, all evidence can be investigated and questioned at the court hearing.

7. I beg the judge and registrar to help in this matter. I don't have much money on me to hire solicitor. I will hire the lawyers when my court case allocated for hearing.

(a) recount this matter's procedural history;

(b) reiterate the Applicant's claims for protection, as raised before the Tribunal;

(c) stress the verity of the Applicant's materials; and

(d) detail the difficulties experienced by the Applicant in engaging with the Australian legal system.

1. They make no contention that the Tribunal's decision was affected by error and in this sense, are not valid grounds for review.
2. Grounds Two, Four, Five, Six and Seven are dismissed.

3. The AAT member failed to conduct a review as required by s 5J(1)(a)(b)(c) of the migration act 1958 as she did not consider a claim wich [sic] arose clearly from that material.

1. The Applicant provided no further particulars in relation to Ground Three. The Court remains none the wiser about what claim it is said the Tribunal did not consider.
2. Section 5J(1) of the Migration Act does not require the Tribunal to "consider a claim" arising on the materials before it - it merely defines the circumstances, for the purposes of the Refugee Criterion, in which an individual will be taken to have a well-founded fear of persecution.
3. Further, there is no evidence that the Tribunal failed to consider a claim arising from the materials before it: as has been said, the Tribunal was willing to take the Applicant's claims at their highest. It was on a different ground - namely, that country information did not indicate that the authorities in Malaysia would be unable to offer the Applicant protection, were it necessary - that the Tribunal did not accept that the Applicant was an individual to whom Australia owed protection obligations. The following passages from the Tribunal decision highlight the evidence before it on this point (emphasis added):

[23] The Tribunal asked whether the applicant had gone to the police and he said no, because loan sharks have connections with the police and no action would be taken.

[31] The Tribunal observed that the country information indicates that police have been arresting loan sharks over the past five years and the applicant agreed with this observation. As to why the police would not intervene in his particular circumstances, he stated that this is because there are so many loan sharks.

[32] The Tribunal stated to the applicant that it had considered country information, including the most recent DFAT report from April 2018, which states that overall the security situation in Malaysia is generally stable; that petty crime is common but violent crime is uncommon; that amendments to the Moneylenders Act occurred in 2003 and 2011 and have increased policem investigative powers; and that individuals convicted of involvement in illegal money lending faced fines and jail up to five years. The Tribunal stated that this country information suggests that the applicant could approach the police and ask them to investigate, and there are significant penalties for people convicted of money lending. The applicant stated in response that the money lenders had already said to him if he wanted to make a police report, nothing would be done.

[33] The Tribunal stated that it had also considered other country information which states that police had made several high profile arrests and investigations of syndicates during 2017 and that this suggested to the Tribunal that police take allegations of money lending seriously and are prepared to investigate. The applicant did not want to respond to this information.

[34] The Tribunal stated that media reports had reported on arrests having been made in 2013, police raids during May to June 2014, thousands of posters having been taken down in 2015, and arrests during 2016 from one of the largest syndicates. The Tribunal stated that this suggests that police are investigating and arresting people involved in these activities. The applicant did not want to respond to this information.

[35] The Tribunal stated that country information states that police and other authorities have taken action against loan sharks over a number of years; that there had been some concerns raised about corruption in the police force although other information described the police as professional and effective; and that while courts had issued contentious verdicts, particularly in instances involving high profile opposition politicians, in most cases the courts comply with the rule of law and legal procedure. The Tribunal stated that this information suggests that there are functioning arms of government that suggests he could expect the police would investigate and prosecute illegal money lending. The applicant did not want to respond to this information.

[36] The Tribunal asked the applicant whether he has any other concerns about returning to Malaysia and he stated that is his main issue...

1. Importantly, none of the Applicant's evidence was documentary in nature - it comprised solely of his oral testimony concerning the unavailability of police protection. This can be contrasted to the extensive country information reports, including DFAT reports, relied upon by the Tribunal. This is not an instance of the Tribunal failing to consider the material before it, but rather, of the Tribunal refusing to accept the Applicant's claims in light of the dearth of (more compelling) information contradicting such claims. Significantly, the weight to be given to evidence before the Tribunal is a factual matter for the Tribunal alone.
2. Ground Three is dismissed.

1. After Ms Rath made clear that she was content to rely on the Minister's written submissions, the Court invited the Applicant to say anything further on his application for review. The Applicant:

(a) stated he could not return to Malaysia "because there would be many enemies waiting for him";[45]

(b) that while residing in Australia, he had married a permanent resident of Singapore. The Applicant stated that he was in the process of trying to obtain a spousal visa, but that there had "been some predicaments"; [46]

(c) sought sympathy from the Court, so that he could reside in Australia and "contribute towards tax";[47] and

(d) discussed having suffered a heart attack in 2023 and expressed uncertainty as to his ability to afford treatment in Malaysia.[48]

1. None of these statements speak to error in the decision of the Tribunal. Whilst the inability to obtain medical treatment in one's country of origin may, in some circumstances, ground a claim for protection, the Applicant's medical issues plainly arose after the Tribunal's decision. The Tribunal cannot be faulted for failing to consider claims that were not before it.
2. These additional matters do not establish jurisdictional error and must be dismissed.
3. Mindful of the Court's obligations towards unrepresented litigants as outlined in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [49] at [59]-[77], [100] and [112]-[113], the Court has scrutinised the application, the materials before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's decision to identify any jurisdictional error. The Court has also read the applicant's grounds as broadly as possible and remain alive to the possibility of jurisdictional error on the Tribunal's part. Nevertheless, the Court is of the view that error has not been disclosed on the Tribunal's part.

1. For the reasons set out above, this Court is satisfied that the Tribunal's reasons were not affected by jurisdictional error. Accordingly, the application for judicial review must be dismissed. An order to that affect will be issued concurrently.
2. At the hearing, Ms Rath stated that if the Applicant was unsuccessful the Minister would seek costs fixed in the amount of $5,000.00. This figure did not include the costs that would have otherwise been incurred by the Minister due to attendance at the 11 March Hearing. This reflected the cause of adjournment - namely, the failure to properly serve the Court Book - having been occasioned by the Minister's representatives.
3. In deciding the question of costs, the Court is required to consider:

(a) whether it is appropriate that the applicants should pay any costs at all, noting that the usual rule in courts in Australia is that an unsuccessful party pays the party/party costs of the successful party; and

(b) if the Court is so satisfied that the applicants should pay costs, what the reasonable quantum is.

1. These principles were explained to the Applicant, who was then invited to comment on the figure sought by the Minister. Beyond expressing his desire to pay any ordered amount in instalments and stressing that his family in Malaysia were financially dependent upon him, he made no comment as to the appropriateness or reasonableness of the figure sought.[50]
2. The Court is satisfied that costs ought to follow the event, and that it is appropriate to make an order in the amount sought by the Minister having regard to the scale and the extent of work undertaken as evidenced by the court file.

I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.

[5] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 496.

[13] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 477(1).

[14] EDO19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 826, [64].

[15] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.

[16] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.

[17] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.

[18] SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor (2005) HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294, [207]-[208].

[19] SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80, [2].

[20] Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, [131]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332, [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437, [44].

[21] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272.

[23] 11 March Transcript, 5 lines 39-43.

[24] 11 March Transcript, 9 lines 16-25.

[25] 12 March Transcript, 2 lines 36-47.

[26] [2019] FCA 600 at [7].

[27] [2025] FedCFamC2G 620.

[28] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[29] Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21, [17] (Allson CJ, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ).

[30] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth (2003) 211 CLR 476.

[31] LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 418 ALR 152, [3] ('LPDT').

[32] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323, [82].

[34] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351, [82].

[36] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] HCA 17; (2021) 273 CLR 506, [38] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ).

[37] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80, [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ).

[38] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21, [40].

[39] 12 March Transcript, 3 lines 43-4.

[41] 12 March Transcript, 3 lines 16-7.

[42] Attorney-General (NSW) v Quin (1990) 170 CLR 1.

[43] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 139 ALD 181, [76].

[47] 12 March Transcript, 4 lines 10-3.

[48] 12 March Transcript, 5 lines 35-8.

[49] [2015] FCA 1391

[50] 12 March Transcript, 5 lines 5-44.