DPC18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2026] FCA 253

(a) The learned primary judge did not identify a range of claims (Claims) that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal was required to take into account.

(b) The learned primary judge should have found that, on evidence, it could be established that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had failed to give proper consideration to the Claims. Indeed. The learned primary judge should have found that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal had not sufficiently [sic] those claims.

1. The learned primary judge erred in finding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal misapplied and misinterpreted s 5H(1), SJ and s 36 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth);

(a) The particulars of grounds of the application are repeated and relied upon.

1. The learned primary judge erred in concluding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal reasoning process was fundamentally flawed by reason of jurisdictional error.

(a) The grounds of the application [sic]

(b) Further, the learned primary judge erred in finding that the Administrative Appeals Tribunal failed to take into account merits of significance.

1. The learned primary judge's failure to consider the Applicant's proposed grounds constituted jurisdictional error. Jurisdictional error arises in the regard [sic] in any of a number of ways:

(a) When "a submission of substance" is not evaluated.

(b) Where there is a denial of procedural fairness referable to the second of the two aspects of the hearing rule, which requires both that the affected person have an opportunity to provide submissions and a reflex entitlement to be heard by the decision maker when the submission is given.

(c) Where there is failure by a Court to exercise jurisdiction; or

(d) When the decision of the Court fails to expose a path of reasoning.

1. The orders sought by the applicant included a writ of certiorari to quash the primary judgment and "certiorari to issue an order referring the applicant for legal assistance under 4 4.12 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth)".
2. For the following reasons, the application for an extension of time is dismissed with costs.

1. The applicant is a citizen of India who first arrived in Australia in February 2008 as the holder of a student visa.
2. That initial student visa expired on 18 April 2010. On 13 May 2010, the applicant applied for and was granted a bridging visa. After a week of holding the bridging visa, the applicant lodged a further application for a student visa, which was refused. The applicant sought merits review of that refusal decision. The refusal decision was affirmed by the Migration Review Tribunal, resulting in the applicant's associated bridging visa ceasing on 14 September 2011.
3. The applicant then held a series of bridging visas for short periods of time and became an unlawful non-citizen again before being arrested and remanded in custody for around three months on a criminal charge. The applicant was removed from custody on 4 November 2017 and was placed in immigration detention.
4. On 13 November 2017, the applicant applied for a Protection (subclass 866) visa. On 28 November 2017, the applicant attended a protection visa interview with a delegate of the Minister. The applicant's claim for protection is founded on him claiming to have witnessed a gang fight in Punjab, India in 2007 during which he says a father and son were killed. The applicant claims to have witnessed a group of people (some of whom he recognised as members of a local gang) running away from two bodies, and that the gang members saw the applicant fleeing the scene. The applicant claims that he knew the gang to be associated with the Shiromani Akali Dal political party which he says had a strong presence in Punjab. The applicant said to the delegate that on the day of the incident he went to a police office to report the incident, but did not report it because he received a call from his parents who told him that men had come to their house and threatened to kill the applicant and his family if he reported the incident to police. He claims that sometime after the incident he went to stay with his uncle in another village, but that two of the gangsters located him there and chased him on a motorbike. The applicant claims that after fleeing them he went to stay in a different village, but that his cousin who lived in that village was beaten by gangsters who were searching for the applicant. Shortly after, the applicant says he arranged to come to Australia.
5. The applicant claims that at some point after the gang incident, his parents received anonymous phone calls from persons purporting to be the applicant's friends enquiring about his whereabouts.
6. The applicant claims to fear returning to India because he claims that the gangsters would find him as they "have links everywhere", and the police are corrupt and would not protect him.
7. On 30 November 2017, the visa application was refused by the delegate of the Minister on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy the criteria in s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (delegate's decision). The delegate was not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations.
8. On 6 December 2017, the applicant lodged an application with the Tribunal for merits review of the delegate's decision, assisted by a migration agent.
9. On 26 February 2018, the Tribunal invited the applicant to attend a hearing on 8 March 2018, and to provide written submissions in support of his claims by 1 March 2018. The applicant did not provide any written submissions. The hearing was rescheduled to 6 April 2018.
10. On 4 April 2018, the applicant's migration agent notified the Tribunal that the agent would not be attending the hearing but the applicant would be and that the applicant did not require an interpreter. The applicant attended the hearing on 6 April 2018 without a representative.
11. On 6 June 2018, the Tribunal decided to affirm the delegate's decision, with notice of this decision given to the applicant the following day.
12. The Tribunal expressed reservations about the credibility of the applicant's evidence. The Tribunal noted the delay of almost nine years between the applicant's arrival in Australia and the applicant making his application for a protection visa: Tribunal's Reasons (TR) [34]. The Tribunal did not accept the applicant's explanation that he did not know he could make an application for a protection visa until he had been put into immigration detention, because the applicant had made a number of previous visa applications and consulted with migration agents: TR [35]. The Tribunal considered it unlikely that the applicant would have applied for a student visa after arriving in Australia rather than a protection visa application, or would have waited so long, if he genuinely feared for his life by reason of witnessing the gang fight: TR [35].
13. The Tribunal also did not find the applicant's evidence in response to questions asked at the Tribunal hearing about the gang fight to be plausible, compelling or persuasive: TR [36]. The Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the applicant belongs to a 'particular social group', being a "victim of a gang", but the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a genuine and credible fear of being harmed by the gang in the event he returns to India.
14. The Tribunal observed that on the applicant's own evidence as it was given before the Tribunal, neither he nor his family received any threats from the gang members (either at the time of the incident or in the period since), and the applicant accepted that his family was not in danger: TR [36], [38], [40].
15. The Tribunal was not satisfied that there was a real chance that the applicant would be seriously harmed in the event he returned to India, and accordingly was not satisfied that the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution. It followed that the applicant did not satisfy s 36(2)(a) of the Migration Act: TR [41], [42]. The Tribunal was also not satisfied that the applicant would face a real risk of significant harm if removed to India, and accordingly concluded that the applicant did not satisfy s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act: TR [44].
16. The Tribunal considered "[i]n the alternative" that, even if the applicant did have a well-founded fear of persecution or did face risk of significant harm, the applicant would be able to reasonably relocate to another part of India: TR [48], [52]. The Tribunal concluded that based on the applicant's own evidence and the country information, it was possible for the applicant to relocate to other areas of India, and the harm he claimed to fear was "localised" rather than nation-wide: TR [53].
17. On 10 July 2018, the applicant filed his proceedings in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) for judicial review of the Tribunal's decision.

1. The applicant's application for judicial review in the court below contained 14 unparticularised grounds of review. The applicant did not provide any written or oral submissions addressing those grounds: PJ [58].
2. On 14 February 2023, the primary judge heard the judicial review application, and delivered an ex tempore judgment dismissing it.
3. The primary judge noted that grounds one, two and four were unparticularised general statements that did not identify or explain any alleged error by the Tribunal: PJ [31], [32], [35]. The primary judge did not consider these grounds further.
4. Grounds three, nine and fourteen were broad allegations of denials by the Tribunal of procedural fairness. The primary judge considered that there did not seem to be any denial of procedural fairness by the Tribunal, observing that the Tribunal invited the applicant to appear at a hearing before it, listened to all of the arguments put to it and then made a decision: PJ [33]. There was nothing in the way that procedure unfolded that indicated that there was any contravention of the rules of natural justice and procedural fairness.
5. Ground five was that the Tribunal took into account irrelevant considerations. The applicant had not identified any matters that the Tribunal took into account in its deliberations that the Tribunal was prohibited from taking into account: PJ [37].
6. Ground six was that the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable. The primary judge was satisfied that the decision was one that was open to the Tribunal on the material before it: PJ [39].
7. Ground seven was that the Tribunal failed to take into account a relevant consideration. The applicant did not identify any material that the Tribunal was mandated to consider, and which the Tribunal failed to consider. The primary judge considered that on the face of the decision the Tribunal appeared to have looked at all the material it was mandated to: PJ [41].
8. Ground eight was that the Tribunal "failed to meet refugee law when making the decision" and ground ten alleged error in the Tribunal misapplying and misconstruing s 36(2)(a) and (aa) of the Migration Act, being the refugee and complementary protection criteria. Ground twelve was that the Tribunal did not consider the integers of the applicant's claim for complementary protection in s 36(2)(aa). The primary judge concluded that the Tribunal listened to, evaluated, discussed, considered and concluded all the integers of the applicant's claims: PJ [51]. The primary judge concluded that the Tribunal had considered whether the applicant met the refugee criteria and alternatively the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2) of the Migration Act, and the Tribunal had decided that the applicant met neither. The primary judge could find no error in the Tribunal's approach: PJ [43], [47], [51].
9. Ground eleven was that the Tribunal made findings with insufficient or no evidence to support them. The applicant did not identify any particular findings of fact that were alleged not to be supported by evidence. The primary judge considered that the findings made by the Tribunal were open on the evidence.
10. Ground thirteen was that the Tribunal's conclusion was vague and made without considering the "facts of [the applicant's] country report information". The primary judge noted that the only country report information that the applicant put before the Court was an article from the Hindustan Times which described the incident the applicant claims to have witnessed, titled "Gangsters exchange fire in Tarn Taran, one killed": PJ [12]. The primary judge was satisfied that the Tribunal looked at that article because the Tribunal found that the contents of that article were not consistent with the applicant's evidence of the incident, which was one of the reasons why the Tribunal did not accept the applicant's account: PJ [53].
11. The primary judge noted the submissions made orally by the applicant before his Honour, relating to the detriment that would be faced by him, his then-partner, and his many connections in Australia were he forced to leave Australia. Whilst the primary judge acknowledged that the effect of the applicant being forced to leave Australia "may be quite personally devastating" for the applicant and those affected persons, the primary judge considered that was not a matter that was relevant to the consideration of the criteria for a protection visa. The primary judge concluded that having regard to everything the applicant said and all the matters before the court, his Honour could find no jurisdictional error committed by the Tribunal and the judicial review application was dismissed: PJ [60].
12. On 30 March 2023, the applicant filed his application in this Court for an extension of time within which to appeal from the primary judgment. This proceeding was allocated to my docket in December 2025.
13. This application was listed for hearing on 18 February 2026. At that hearing, the applicant was self-represented and sought an adjournment on the basis that he was in the process of engaging lawyers to appear for him. The adjournment was granted with a direction that the applicant pay the Minister's costs of appearing on that day. Directions were also made to allow for the filing of a notice of address for service by the applicant's foreshadowed new solicitors, and the filing of any amended application and written submissions by the applicant, with the Minister given a right of reply.
14. As matters eventuated, the applicant was unable to engage legal representation for the hearing relisted for 24 February 2026, but obtained legal assistance in preparing written submissions that were filed on 20 February 2026. Prepared with the benefit of legal assistance, the applicant's written submissions developed the unparticularised grounds of appeal in a way that they had not been developed before the primary judge.

1. Section 36(2) of the Migration Act outlines some of the criteria for a protection visa, relevantly providing:

(1A) An applicant for a protection visa must satisfy:

...

(b) at least one of the criteria in subsection (2).

...

(2) A criterion for a protection visa is that the applicant for the visa is:

(a) a non-citizen in Australia in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the person is a refugee; or

(aa) a non-citizen in Australia (other than a non-citizen mentioned in paragraph (a)) in respect of whom the Minister is satisfied Australia has protection obligations because the Minister has substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the non-citizen being removed from Australia to a receiving country, there is a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or ...

(2A) A non-citizen will suffer significant harm if:

(a) the non-citizen will be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life; or

(b) the death penalty will be carried out on the non-citizen; or

(c) the non-citizen will be subjected to torture; or

(d) the non-citizen will be subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; or

(e) the non-citizen will be subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

(2B) However, there is taken not to be a real risk that a non-citizen will suffer significant harm in a country if the Minister is satisfied that:

(a) it would be reasonable for the non-citizen to relocate to an area of the country where there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or

(b) the non-citizen could obtain, from an authority of the country, protection such that there would not be a real risk that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm; or ...

1. Section 5H(1) of the Migration Act relevantly provides:

(1) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person in Australia, the person is a refugee if the person:

(a) in a case where the person has a nationality - is outside the country of his or her nationality and, owing to a well‑founded fear of persecution, is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country; or ...

1. Section 5J of the Migration Act relevantly provides:

(1) For the purposes of the application of this Act and the regulations to a particular person, the person has a well‑founded fear of persecution if:

(a) the person fears being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and

(b) there is a real chance that, if the person returned to the receiving country, the person would be persecuted for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (a); and

(c) the real chance of persecution relates to all areas of a receiving country.

(2) A person does not have a well‑founded fear of persecution if effective protection measures are available to the person in a receiving country.

(4) If a person fears persecution for one or more of the reasons mentioned in paragraph (1)(a):

(a) that reason must be the essential and significant reason, or those reasons must be the essential and significant reasons, for the persecution; and

(b) the persecution must involve serious harm to the person; and

(c) the persecution must involve systematic and discriminatory conduct.

(5) Without limiting what is serious harm for the purposes of paragraph (4)(b), the following are instances of serious harm for the purposes of that paragraph:

(a) a threat to the person's life or liberty; ...

1. Under s 65 of the Migration Act, the Minister must grant a visa if satisfied that, inter alia, the criteria for the visa prescribed by the Migration Act have been satisfied. If the Minister is not satisfied of the visa criteria having been met (or of one of the other requirements in s 65(1)(a)), the Minister "is to refuse to grant the visa": s 65(1)(b).
2. The role of the Tribunal, in conducting its review, is to remake the decision under review and to determine for itself on the material before it the decision which it can, and which it considers should, be made in the exercise of the powers conferred on the primary decision maker for the purpose of making the decision under review: see Miller v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 13; (2024) 278 CLR 628 at [14] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ).

1. The grounds of appeal as developed in the applicant's submissions were directed to the Tribunal, and departed significantly from the grounds of review put to the primary judge, such that the grounds are in substance new grounds. The applicant requires leave to rely upon new grounds not put to the primary judge. This is a further requirement to the leave required by the applicant for an extension of time.
2. The Minister conceded that there is no prejudice he would face from allowing the extension of time that cannot be rectified by an award of costs.
3. The overriding consideration in determining whether to grant an extension of time or to allow a party to rely upon grounds different from those put to the primary judge is the interests of the administration of justice. Having regard to the serious potential consequences for the applicant, and the fact that the applicant is self-represented, I consider it appropriate to determine the issue of whether leave should be granted for the applicant to be granted an extension of time and for him to rely upon his revised grounds of appeal, having regard to the substance of those proposed grounds. If none of the proposed grounds of appeal have a real prospect of success, I consider that any grant of leave would be futile and not in the interests of the administration of justice.
4. For the reasons which follow, I am satisfied that the applicant's proposed grounds of appeal do not have sufficient prospects of success to warrant an extension of time or the grant of leave to rely upon the proposed grounds of appeal.

Proposed Ground 1: Failure to engage with material claims

1. The applicant submits that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by reason of a failure to consider critical integers of a material claim for protection made by the applicant.
2. A failure by the Tribunal to consider a clearly articulated material claim is a jurisdictional error: Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] HCA 26; (2003) 77 ALJR 1088 at [24]-[25], [27] (Gummow and Callinan JJ), [87]-[88] (Kirby J).
3. The applicant submits that his claims included a claim that local police would not protect him from the gang members from which he claims to fear harm, due to corruption and the perpetrators' political connections. The applicant submits that the Tribunal failed to make a "clear finding" on this contention, merely describing the concerns about police corruption and gang links as "generalised statements" and that thereby the Tribunal failed to consider a critical integer of the applicant's claims.
4. The applicant's submission is not accepted. Firstly, the Tribunal did not describe the applicant's concerns as "generalised statements" - that was a description used by the delegate. The delegate's decision is not the subject of review by this Court. Secondly, the Tribunal rejected the applicant's protection claim because the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant had a genuine and credible fear of being harmed by the gang in the event he returns to India. The applicant's claim that the police would not protect him appeared to rely upon the applicant's claim that the gang members were associated with a political party that had a strong presence in Punjab. The applicant provided no independent evidence of this association, and the Tribunal noted that the news article which the applicant referred to did not refer to the political affiliations of the gang members involved in the incident which it described: TR [39]. The Tribunal found that, based on the applicant's own evidence given to the Tribunal, the applicant had never had any contact with gang members and had never received any threat from any member of the gang: TR [40]. The applicant provided no corroborating evidence to support his claim that there remained a real chance that he would be seriously harmed more than 10 years after the occurrence of the incident he claimed he witnessed.
5. Having found that the applicant did not face a threat of harm from any member of a gang, there was no need for the Tribunal to consider a further claim that the police would not protect him from such anticipated harm. That further claim was premised on there being a threat of harm to the applicant which the Tribunal found did not exist. It was unnecessary for the Tribunal to make a specific finding about police corruption and gang links because those issues were subsumed in the Tribunal's finding that there was no threat of harm to the applicant from the gang: WAEE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593 at [47] (French, Sackville and Hely JJ).
6. I am satisfied that proposed ground 1 has no reasonable prospect of success.

Proposed Ground 2: Misapplication of internal relocation criteria

1. The applicant submits that the Tribunal erred in its consideration of the applicant's ability to relocate elsewhere in India. The applicant contends that the Tribunal's analysis was conducted at too high a level of generality and did not have regard to the specific circumstances of the applicant. Such an approach was said to be legally unreasonable or to proceed from a misunderstanding of the Tribunal's task, being an error of the kind identified by the High Court in SZATV v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] HCA 40; (2007) 233 CLR 18.
2. Having found that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution or face a real risk that he will suffer significant harm should he return to India, the Tribunal's consideration of the applicant's ability to relocate within India proceeded by way of alternative reasoning: TR [48]. The Tribunal recorded the applicant's own evidence as being that it was possible for him to relocate to Delhi and that he would be willing to do so, but that the only reason he could not do that is because his Australian wife did not want to go. The applicant provided no evidence to the Tribunal of his marriage and the Tribunal was not satisfied that he was married: TR [50]-[51]. The Tribunal found that even if the persecution or real risk of significant harm from the gang which the applicant claimed to fear did exist, there was no real chance that it related to all areas of India: TR [51], [53].
3. Having regard to the evidence before it and the findings it had made about the applicant's particular circumstances, the Tribunal did not fail to perform its statutory task by the way in which it considered whether it was reasonable, in the sense of practicable, for the applicant to relocate within India.
4. I am satisfied that proposed ground 2 has no reasonable prospect of success.

Proposed Ground 3: Failure to consider complementary protection criteria

1. The applicant submits that the Tribunal did not properly consider his claim for complementary protection under s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act in circumstances where the applicant claimed to face a threat of harm from non-state actors. The applicant claims that the Tribunal erred in relying upon its analysis of a "real chance" of serious harm in the context of determining whether the applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution (and therefore is a refugee for the purposes of s 36(2)(a), applying s 5J(1)) to conclude that the applicant did not face a "real risk" of significant harm for the purposes of s 36(2)(aa).
2. The Tribunal expressed its conclusions in relation to s 36(2)(a) at TR [41]-[42]:

Therefore, based on the applicant [sic] evidence, the Tribunal does accept that he has a subjective fear regarding members of the 'Jagereara Boxers' gang. As a result the Tribunal finds that the applicant belongs to a membership of [sic] particular social group, namely a person who is a victim of a gang. However, based on the applicants [sic] own evidence and the fact that he was not able to provide any independent evidence to support his claim that there was a real risk he would suffer serious harm if he was returned to India, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant has genuine and credible fear of being harmed by the Jagereara Boxers gang in the event he returns to India. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the applicant does not have a real chance of being seriously harmed for any reason mentioned in s5J(1)(a), in the event he returns to India, now or into the foreseeable future.

Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that the applicant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution and finds that he does not satisfy s.36(2)(a) regarding his claim as a victim of the Jagereara Boxers' gang. Accordingly, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant is a person in respect of whom Australia has protection obligations under s.36(2)(a).

1. The Tribunal expressed its conclusions in relation to s 36(2)(aa) at TR [43]-[45]:

The Tribunal has also considered whether there are any substantial reasons for it to believe that the applicant, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of him being removed from Australia to his country of reference, faces a real risk of significant harm. While the Tribunal does accept that the applicant has a subjective fear of being harmed as a result of being a victim of the Jagereara Boxers' gang, the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant has a risk of harm that includes severe physical violence and ill-treatment that amounts to significant harm as outlined in s.36(2A). The applicant was not able to provide the Tribunal with any independent evidence that would that indicated [sic] there was a real risk he would suffer significant harm from members of the Jagereara Boxers' gang, including being arbitrarily deprived of his life, being subjected to cruel or inhuman treatment or being subjected to degrading treatment or punishment.

Therefore, having considered the applicants [sic] evidence and taking into account the absence of any independent evidence in support of the applicant's claim that he would be killed by members of the gang (as discussed under the Tribunal's findings for s.36(2)(a)) the Tribunal finds that, if removed from Australia to his country of reference, there is no real risk he will suffer significant harm. Accordingly, the Tribunal finds that there is no real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm in India and as such he does not satisfy s.36(2)(aa) of the Act.

Therefore, in all the circumstances the applicant does not have well-founded fear of persecution, based on his claim of being a victim of the Jagereara Boxers' gang and he therefore does not satisfy s.36(2)(aa), if he was returned to India.

1. It has been established that the test under s 36(2)(aa) which uses the words "real risk" is "as for s 36(2)(a)" - namely, whether there is a "real chance" that the non-citizen will suffer significant harm (as that term is defined in s 36(2A)) if the non-citizen is returned to the receiving country: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZQRB [2013] FCAFC 33; (2013) 210 FCR 505 at [246] (Lander and Gordon JJ, Besanko, Flick and Jagot JJ agreeing at [297], [342]). The Tribunal expressly considered the types of harm that are said by s 36(2A) to constitute 'significant harm' for the purposes of the complementary protection analysis, and it determined that the applicant did not face a real risk of such harm.
2. There was no error in the Tribunal determining that the applicant did not face a real risk of significant harm for the same reason it determined that he did not face a real chance of serious harm - it was the absence of any compelling evidence from the applicant or any independent evidence of risk which led the Tribunal to find that the applicant failed under both the refugee and complementary protection criteria. The Tribunal did not apply the wrong test or fail to consider the applicant's claims for complementary protection.
3. I am satisfied that proposed ground 3 has no reasonable prospect of success.

Proposed Ground 4: Unresolved inconsistency in the record

1. The applicant submits that the Tribunal did not engage with a clearly articulated and important "matter" because the Tribunal did not identify that the delegate's decision recorded the applicant's date of birth as being different from that found by the Tribunal. In the delegate's decision record, the delegate had referred to the applicant's date of birth as being the same date of birth as that recorded in the applicant's passport in four instances, but in one instance, under the heading 'Identity Finding', a different date of birth was recorded.
2. The Tribunal found the applicant's date of birth to be that date recorded in the applicant's passport: TR [15], [32]. The Tribunal did not refer to the different date of birth recorded by the delegate in one instance in the record of the delegate's decision. The applicant did not make a claim before the Tribunal that was related to his identity or date of birth or contend that his passport was not a correct or reliable record. The differences in dates was not a matter referred to by the Tribunal in its conclusions about the applicant's credibility. Given that the task for the Tribunal was to make the decision afresh and conduct a de novo review of the materials before it, the fact that a different date was recorded in the delegate's decision was not a material fact relevant to the Tribunal's task to come to the correct or preferable decision.
3. I am satisfied that proposed ground 4 has no reasonable prospect of success.

1. The applicant accepts that delay in making a protection claim (in this case, for nine years) may be relevant, but the applicant contends that the Tribunal placed too much reliance on the delay such that it "overshadowed a balanced evaluation" of the applicant's "explanation and individual risk".
2. The applicant's submission in this respect is no more than an attack on the merits of the Tribunal's decision and does not demonstrate jurisdictional error.
3. The applicant further submits that it was illogical for the Tribunal to infer from the absence of harm to the applicant's parents that the applicant himself was not at risk.
4. The Tribunal's findings that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution nor faced a real risk of significant harm were the product of the Tribunal's consideration of all the facts and evidence before it - including the applicant's own evidence that he had never had any contact with the gang members and never received any threat from any member of the gang, and the lack of independent evidence to support the applicant's claims. The Tribunal also considered that despite the gang members apparently knowing where the applicant's family lived, "they remained unharmed and unthreatened by any member of the gang" more than ten years after the incident: TR [37], [38]. There was nothing illogical in that reasoning process that would amount to legal unreasonableness.
5. I am satisfied that proposed ground 5 has no reasonable prospect of success.

1. The applicant submits that the Tribunal erred in law in assessing the ability of the applicant to relocate within India by relying on information from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade referring to the extent of internal mobility in India, and reasoning based on that information that the applicant could relocate and thereby be safe from "organised criminal networks with regional reach".
2. This ground misconstrues the Tribunal reasoning regarding relocation for the same reasons given above in relation to proposed ground 2.
3. I am satisfied that proposed ground 6 has no reasonable prospect of success.

1. For the reasons given above, I am not satisfied that it is in the interests of the administration of justice to grant the applicant an extension of time or leave to rely upon the proposed grounds of appeal. The proposed grounds of appeal as developed in the applicant's written submissions provide no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision of the primary judge. I am satisfied that the applicant's proposed grounds of appeal do not enjoy sufficient prospects of success to warrant the grant of leave.
2. The applicant's application for an extension of time is dismissed with costs, including costs thrown away by reason of the adjournment of the hearing of 18 February 2026 and the filing of the written submissions by the applicant on 20 February 2026, to be taxed if not agreed.

I certify that the preceding seventy-six (76) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hespe.