Douglass v Isaac Regional Council [2026] QCAT 102

Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 9, s 58

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 17, s 20

Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd [1979] FCA 21; (1979) 41 FLR 338

Elze v Brisbane City Council [2025] QCAT 195

Gold Coast City Council v Sunland Group Pty Ltd [2019] QCA 118; [2019] 1 QR 304

JM Kelly (Project Builders) Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QCAT 502

Martinez v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another [2009] FCA 528; (2009) 177 FCR 337

Mr Gerard Elmore, Counsel, instructed by Fox Piper Lawyers

Mr James Dillon, Counsel for the Isaac Regional Council

[1] StevieRay Douglass ('the Applicant') lives at Coppabella, a small rural inland town south west of Mackay, Queensland, and is the owner of a blue cattle dog called Tina ('the Dog').

[2] On 23 September 2024, a delegate of the Isaac Regional Council ('the Council') issued a 'Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice' notifying the Applicant the Council proposed to declare the Dog a Regulated Dangerous Dog on the ground she attacked a person causing minor injury in a public place. The Applicant was permitted to make written representations regarding why the Council should not make the proposed declaration and did so within time on 6 October 2024. A further Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice issued in identical terms on 8 October 2024 however was withdrawn on 18 October 2024.

[3] On 22 October 2024, the Council issued a 'Regulated Dog Declaration Notice' notifying the Applicant the Council had decided to make a Regulated Dangerous Dog Declaration in relation to the Dog ('the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision') and an information notice about that decision.

[4] The Applicant sought internal review of the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision. On 28 November 2024, the Council issued an Internal Review Decision Notice notifying the Applicant the Council had made the decision to confirm the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision.

[5] On 6 January 2025, the Applicant filed in the Tribunal an application for review of the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision.

[6] On 22 January 2025, the Tribunal decided by consent of the parties to stay the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision subject to conditions ('the Stay'), pending the determination of the application for review.

[7] Section 89(1) of the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld) ('the AMCD Act') grants a local government the discretion to declare a dog a dangerous dog[1] and make a regulated dog declaration (dangerous dog declaration) only if the following ground exists: the dog has seriously attacked, or acted in a way that caused fear to, a person or another animal, or may do so in the opinion of an authorised person having regard to the dog's behaviour ('the s 89(2) ground'). Subsection (6) provides that "seriously attack" in relation to a person means attack the person in a way that causes the death of, or grievous bodily harm or bodily harm to, the person.

[8] Section 90(1) of the AMCD Act provides that if a local government proposes to make a regulated dog declaration, it must first give the dog owner a notice (proposed declaration notice) setting out certain particulars: the dog's breed and description; the proposal to declare the dog to be a regulated dog and the type of regulated dog declaration proposed; the reasons for the proposed declaration; and the dog owner's right to make written representations within a stated period to show why the proposed declaration should not be made.

[9] Section 94 of the AMCD Act requires the local government to consider any written representations and evidence submitted within time and, if after having done so, it is satisfied the s 89(2) ground still exists, it must make the regulated dog declaration (dangerous dog declaration).

[10] Section 95 of the AMCD Act provides that as soon as practicable after deciding to make a regulated dog declaration, the local government must give the dog owner an information notice setting out certain particulars including: the category of the regulated dog declaration (dangerous or menacing); the reasons for the declaration; the local government that made the declaration; and the day the decision takes effect.

[11] Section 180 of the AMCD Act provides that every review of an original decision must be, in the first instance, by way of an application for internal review.

[12] Schedule 2 to the AMCD Act provides that "original decision" means a decision about which an information notice must be given.

[13] Section 188 of the AMCD Act provides that a person given a review notice may apply to the Tribunal under the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ('the QCAT Act') for external review of the internal review decision.

[14] Section 186(4) of the AMCD Act provides that if the internal review decision confirms the original decision, for the purpose of an application for external review, the original decision is taken to be the internal review decision.

[15] Section 17(1) of the QCAT Act provides that the Tribunal's review jurisdiction is conferred by an enabling Act to review a decision made or taken to have been made by another entity under that Act.

[16] Section 20 of the QCAT Act provides that the purpose of the review is to produce the correct and preferable decision, and the Tribunal must hear and decide the review by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.

[17] The parties have filed the following evidence:

(a) Folder labelled "Respondent Submissions" including the statement of reasons and bundle of Council material numbered 1 to 30 filed on 13 February 2025.

(b) Statement of StevieRay Douglass dated 23 February 2025 and filed by the Applicant on 24 February 2025.

(c) Affidavit by Samantha van Moolenbroek sworn on 17 April 2025 and filed by the Respondent on 9 May 2025.

(d) Affidavit by Belinda Allen sworn on 23 April 2025 and filed by the Respondent on 9 May 2025.

(e) Affidavit by Emeka Cavanagh sworn on 8 May 2025 and filed by the Respondent on 9 May 2025.

(f) Affidavit by Karina Stennett sworn on 8 May 2025 and filed by the Respondent on 9 May 2025.

(g) Affidavit by Jessica Fraser sworn on 18 July 2025 and filed by the Applicant on 21 July 2025.

(h) USB of video filed by the Applicant on 21 July 2025.

[18] The parties have filed the following submissions:

(a) Outline of the Isaac Regional Council dated and filed 29 August 2025.

(b) Outline of Submissions on behalf of the Applicant dated and filed 22 September 2025.

(c) Supplementary Outline of the Isaac Regional Council dated and filed 5 February 2026.

[19] At hearing, the parties concurred that the single question for determination by the Tribunal was whether the Council had the statutory power to make the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision. The parties accept that if the Tribunal determines this question in the affirmative, the correct and preferable decision by the Tribunal is to confirm the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision, and if in the negative, it is to set aside that decision. In other words, the Applicant does not contest that the s 89(2) ground still exists; rather, the Applicant argues the Council lacked the statutory power to make the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision. The Respondent argues the contrary position.

[20] I summarise the Applicant's arguments as follows:

(a) The Council is required by section 90(1)(d) of the AMCD Act to state in a Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice (in this case, proposing to declare the Dog to be a Regulated Dangerous Dog) the reasons for the proposed declaration.

(b) When issuing a Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice, the Council is bound by section 27B of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) ('the AIA'), which provides that:

If an Act requires a tribunal, authority, body or person making a decision to give written reasons for the decision (whether the expression 'reasons', 'grounds' or another expression is used), the instrument giving the reasons must also -

(a) set out the findings on material questions of fact; and

(b) refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based.

(c) The reasons set out in the Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice do not comply with section 27B of the AIA.

(d) It is necessary to provide adequate reasons because: the dog owner is allowed by section 90(1)(e) of the AMCD Act to make written representations to show why the proposed declaration should not be made, and without adequate reasons, the dog owner does not know what they must respond to; a proposed declaration notice is not a reviewable decision; there is insufficient time to seek evidence through right to information processes; there is no mechanism under the AMCD Act to grant an extension of time to the dog owner to make written representations; the Council must make the regulated dog declaration if the s89(2) ground still exists; a dangerous dog declaration is a serious matter due to the nature of the conditions imposed; it is not a preferable decision to set the standard for local governments so low as to make the reasons requirement irrelevant; and several public policy grounds cited.

(e) Some details in the Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice conflicted with information in other documents.

(f) The Council, as a public entity, is bound by section 58 of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) ('the HR Act'), which provides that it is unlawful to make a decision that is not compatible with human rights, or in making a decision, fails to give proper consideration to a relevant human right, such as the right to own and not to be arbitrarily deprived of property (including a dog).

(g) The only statutory basis to make a dangerous dog declaration is section 89 of the AMCD Act, following compliance with the provisions of Chapter 4, Part 4. The jurisdiction of the Council as the original decision maker, and of the Tribunal standing in its shoes, is limited to circumstances where Chapter 4, Part 4 has been complied with. Given the defects in the Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice, neither the Council nor the Tribunal could be satisfied that Chapter 4, Part 4 has been complied with, nor could either remedy the defects.

(h) The argument in the preceding paragraph appears to be the rationale for the Applicant's overall submission that there was no statutory power for the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision to be made and the only correct and preferable decision (for the Tribunal) is to set aside that decision.

[21] I summarise the Council's arguments as follows:

(a) The purpose of the AMCD Act is to promote responsible ownership of dogs and to provide for the effective management of regulated dogs to ensure the community is protected.

(b) The mandatory language of section 94(2) requires the original decision maker or the review body to issue a regulated dog declaration if the pre-condition is satisfied, that is if the relevant section 89 ground still exists.

(c) The statutory framework governing decisions about issuing a regulated dog notice provides ample opportunity for review and challenge by a dog owner.

(d) With reference to principles and case law on statutory construction, the standard of reasons required to fill a statutory duty is determined by the nature of the function to be performed by the decision maker, whether administrative or adjudicative, and the statutory objective in requiring the reasons.

(e) Section 27B of the AIA does not apply to a section 90 Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice because it does not involve a substantive decision about whether to make a regulated dog declaration. All that is proposed is that a future substantive decision may be made under section 94 of the AMCD Act, and prior to that process occurring, an opportunity is given to the dog owner to make representations. All the AMCD Act requires is that sufficient reasons be given for that proposal to invoke the process which may result in a future decision.

(f) The section 90 position is in contrast with that under sections 94 and 95, which require the decision maker to make a final decision and to issue an information notice about the decision and review rights. To import the requirements of section 27B of the AIA to section 90 would be to require the decision maker to make findings on material questions of fact, which would be inconsistent with the process provided for under sections 94 and 95.

(g) Relying on Gold Coast City Council v Sunland Group Ltd [2019] QCA 118; [2019] 1 QR 304 at [108] and [111], the limited function and purpose of section 90 requires only limited reasons, which may be short and terse, so long as they are proper, adequate and intelligible.

(h) If the Tribunal finds that section 27B of the AIA does apply to a section 90 Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice, the reasons given comply with subparagraph (a), but not with subparagraph (b). However, despite non-compliance, the statutory intention is that the proposed declaration notice and subsequent regulated (dangerous) dog declaration remain valid because: the proposed declaration notice was not a final determination, and the dog owner was afforded future review rights; deeming invalidity would result in substantial inconvenience and public safety may be undermined.

(i) The correct and preferable decision (by the Tribunal) is to confirm the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision.

[22] The original decision in this case is the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision because, as defined in Schedule 2 of the AMCD Act, it is a decision about which an information notice must, according to section 95(1), be given.

[23] The Council's internal review decision dated 28 November 2024 confirmed the original decision, being the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision. The effect of section 186(4) of the AMCD Act is that the reviewable decision for the purposes of external review is the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision.

[24] I am satisfied the Tribunal has jurisdiction to review the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision.

[25] Simply put, the Applicant argues the Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice was defective (for the reasons set out above), and as a result, the Council had no power, and the Tribunal, standing in the Council's shoes on merits review, has no power, to make/confirm the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision.

[26] Whilst curiously not raised in either party's submissions, the logical consequence of the Applicant's reasoning would appear to be that the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision is invalid or void; in effect, there is no decision to review, no reviewable decision. If I were to accept the reasoning, I would dismiss the Applicant's application for review for lack of jurisdiction, having the perverse effect of denying the Applicant his review rights. However, I do not accept the reasoning.

[27] In JM Kelly (Project Builders) Pty Ltd v Queensland Building Services Authority [2013] QCAT 502, the builder argued that a decision by the building authority to direct the builder to rectify defective building work was tainted by denial of natural justice and therefore invalid, void and of no legal effect, and therefore in turn the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine the review application. Then Deputy President of the Tribunal, Judge Horneman-Wren, examined the case law and found the Tribunal had jurisdiction, making these comments:

[37] Where, in contrast, the Tribunal is exercising review jurisdiction, the only matter, the only jurisdictional fact, of which the Tribunal need satisfy itself is the existence of a decision of a kind the Tribunal has power to review. Whether there is such a decision which falls within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction is governed by the relevant statutes which confer the review jurisdiction on the Tribunal. It is a construction of those statutes which determines whether it is necessary that there be a valid decision made in a lawful exercise of the decision making power in order for the decision to be reviewable.

[38] In Collector of Customs (NSW) v Brian Lawlor Automotive Pty Ltd (1979) 41 FLR 328, at [13] a full court of the Federal Court of Australia considered the provisions of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT) and whether the AAT could review a decision which had purportedly been made in exercise of statutory powers, but which may not have been a valid exercise of those powers such that the decision may not have been legally effective.

[39] Bowen CJ found [14] in rejecting applicant's contention that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to review a decision which was asserted to be a nullity:

...in my opinion an applicant to the Tribunal has standing and the Tribunal has jurisdiction provided there is a decision in fact and provided that the decision purports to have been made in exercise of powers conferred by an enactment whether or not as a matter of law it was validly made and whether or not action on the basis there was power to make the decision was right or wrong.

[47] In Martinez v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and Another [2009] FCA 528; (2009) 177 FCR 337 at 346, at [20], Rares J, after citing Lawlor and Zubair, said of a Tribunal's power to review a decision which was affected by jurisdictional error:

The tribunal has power to cure a defect in the delegate's decision once the tribunal's jurisdiction has been invoked by an application for review: Zubair [2004] FCAFC 248; 139 FCR 344 at [32]. A party affected will elect to treat an administrative decision as valid, though erroneous, by exercising the right to have it reviewed by a second administrative body, in preference to exercising a right to have a court compel proper performance by the original authority of its duty. Such an outcome promotes administrative efficiency, provided that the party applying for the review subsequently receives a fair hearing by the second body. In that way, any defects in the process by which the original decision was reached are cured by the later determination on the administrative review or administrative appeal: Twist v Randwick Municipal Council [1976] HCA 58; (1976) 136 CLR 106 at 116 per Mason J.

[28] The Applicant's submissions are extensive in pointing out the alleged defects in the Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice, which they argue resulted in the Council having no statutory power to make the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision. On this basis, the Applicant is asking the Tribunal to set aside the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision, notwithstanding the logical consequence of their reasoning would appear to be the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to do so.

[29] In my view, the case law is clear that the Tribunal is not concerned with identifying whether there was an error in any aspect of the way the original decision (that is, the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision) was made. I am therefore not required to make a finding on whether the Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice was defective. Rather, I am only required to be satisfied, as I have already found, that the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision is a decision the Tribunal has the power to review. Thereafter, any defect in the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision, if it exists, is cured by the process of administrative review, which the Applicant has elected to apply for.

[30] If I am wrong in my interpretation of the case law, and I am required to make a finding about whether the Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice was defective, addressing the Applicant's arguments, I make the following observations and findings:

(a) Section 90 of the AMCD Act sets out the requirements for a proposed declaration notice. The Applicant argues the Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice was defective because the reasons for the proposed declaration given in accordance with subsection (1)(d) do not comply with the requirements of section 27B of the AIA. I reproduce the relevant part of the Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice as follows, the 'grounds' simply reflecting the wording of the s 89(2) ground:

a) The dog has attacked a person causing minor injury whilst in a public place.

1. On 7 September 2024 your dog Tina escaped your property at 25 Moriarty Street, Coppabella QLD 4741;
2. At approximately 4.30pm on the aforementioned date, your dog Tina attacked a person at Moriarty Street, Coppabella 4741;
3. The attack consisted of your dog escaping and did attack a person at Moriarty Street, Coppabella QLD 4741 causing minor injuries.

(b) Section 27B of the AIA provides that if an Act requires a body, which I am satisfied includes the Council, to give written reasons for a decision, the instrument giving the reasons must also set out the findings on material questions of fact and refer to the evidence or other material on which the findings were based.

(c) A proposed declaration notice is not a decision within the scope of section 27B of the AIA. It is a proposal to make a decision in the future. The language of section 90 of the AMCD Act does not include the use of the word 'decision'. This is in contrast with the language of section 95, which clearly identifies the making of a regulated dog declaration as a decision and requires the giving of an information notice such as to invoke the operation of section 27B. The obvious difference is that a proposed declaration notice flags that a section 89 ground may have been established and gives the dog owner the opportunity to make representations within a stated period before a final determination is made whereas the decision to make, or not, a regulated dog declaration is the final determination that the section 89 ground still exists, or not. A proposed declaration notice is therefore not capable of setting out findings of material questions of fact with reference to supporting evidence because at that stage of the process no such findings have been made.

(d) Section 90(1)(d) of the AMCD Act requires only that the notice state the reasons for the proposed declaration, it does not prescribe how the reasons must be expressed nor is it subject to the operation of section 27B of the AIA. In contrast, the reasons required to be stated in the information notice pursuant to section 95(4)(b) must be expressed in the manner prescribed by section 27B because at that stage of the process a final determination or decision has been made. These conclusions are consistent with the detail given in the Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice and the Dangerous Dog Declaration in this case.

(e) The Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice states reasons for the proposed declaration. The reasons are, as submitted by the Council and I concur, proper, adequate and intelligible. I am therefore satisfied the reasons comply with the requirements of section 90(1)(d) of the AMCD Act, and the Proposed Regulated Dog Declaration Notice is not defective.

[31] The next step would normally be to conduct a review of the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision on the merits and arrive at the correct and preferable decision in accordance with my obligations under section 20 of the QCAT Act. However, the Applicant does not contest that the s 89(2) ground still exists and that the Council (and therefore the Tribunal standing in its shoes) must make the Dangerous Dog Declaration for the Dog in accordance with the requirements of section 94(2) of the AMCD Act.

[32] In relation to the application of the HR Act:

(a) I accept the Tribunal is a public entity[2] when it is acting in an administrative capacity,[3] and in reviewing the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision, the Tribunal is exercising an administrative function and is acting in an administrative capacity.

(b) In making its review decision, the Tribunal must act compatibly with human rights and give proper consideration to human rights, unless the Tribunal cannot reasonably make a different decision because of a statutory provision.[4] I accept that dog ownership gives rise to a form of property right that is protected by the HR Act.[5]

(c) Section 94(2) of the AMCD Act requires that a regulated dog declaration must be made where a section 89 ground still exists after the proposed declaration notice process has been completed. There is no discretion to do otherwise.

(d) I am satisfied that I cannot reasonably make a decision other than to confirm the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision.

[33] I find the correct and preferable decision is to confirm the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision. Accordingly, I order that the Stay is lifted, and the Dangerous Dog Declaration Decision is confirmed.

[2] See s 9(1)(f) of the HR Act; see also Elze v Brisbane City Council [2025] QCAT 195, [56].

[5] See Elze v Brisbane City Council [2025] QCAT 195, [62].