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[2026] NSWSC 1000
Supreme Court of NSW
2026-08-11
Cavanagh J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
Medium Neutral Citation: Douglas v Lin (No 2) [2026] NSWSC 1000
Hearing dates: 11 August 2026
Date of orders: 11 August 2026
Decision date: 11 August 2026
Jurisdiction: Common Law
Before: Cavanagh J
Decision: (1) The plaintiff’s statement of claim filed 28 October 2025 is struck out pursuant to r 14.28(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
(2) If the plaintiff wishes to, the plaintiff is to serve an amended statement of claim on the defendants by 5pm on 30 August 2026.
(3) The amended statement of claim is to be served on the first defendant at the office of the real estate agency where the earlier documents were served.
(4) The matter is listed for directions at 9:30am on 7 September 2026.
(5) The plaintiff is to pay the second defendant’s costs of the notice of motion filed 8 July 2026.
(6) The plaintiff is to write to the defendants by 30 August 2026 providing particulars of his loss, that is, particulars of the financial loss he says he has suffered as a result of the conduct of the defendants.
(7) Liberty to apply on three days’ notice.
Catchwords: CIVIL PROCEDURE — case management — first defendant previously served by way of substituted service — where first defendant seeks short adjournment in order to obtain legal representation — no issue of principle
CIVIL PROCEDURE — application of second defendant to strike out statement of claim — whether statement of claim discloses a reasonable cause of action — no issue of principle
Legislation Cited: Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 13.4, 14.28
Category: Procedural rulings
Parties: Joseph Douglas (Plaintiff) (Self-represented)
Rui Lin (First Defendant)
State of New South Wales (Second Defendant)
Representation: Counsel:
J Chapman (Second Defendant)
Solicitors:
Crown Solicitor’s Office (Second Defendant)
File Number(s): 2025/415167
HIS HONOUR: This matter comes today before me for two purposes:
To deal with any appearances by the first defendant in response to the orders for substituted service I previously made; and
To hear the second defendant's motion dated 8 July 2026 seeking that the plaintiff’s statement of claim dated 28 October 2025 be struck out pursuant r 14.28(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) or in the alternative, the proceedings be dismissed pursuant to UCPR, r 13.4(1).
Mr Douglas again appears in person. On behalf of the first defendant two persons appeared, a representative of the real estate agency who received the statement of claim in accordance with the orders for substituted service, and a person who did not speak English who I was informed was a cousin of the first defendant who lives in China.
Ms Chapman of counsel appears for the second defendant.
In terms of the proceedings against the first defendant, I heard from the representative of the agency, Mr Cai, who explained to me that the first defendant will be seeking legal representation to defend these proceedings. I obviously encouraged him to do so. In circumstances in which the first defendant will be obtaining legal representation I stood this aspect of the matter over for further directions before me at 9:30am on 7 September 2026.
I informed Mr Cai on behalf of first defendant that the legal representative should attend and be able to indicate what their response to the plaintiff's claim is. Mr Cai raised the prospect of filing a cross-claim. I indicated that that would be a matter for the legal representatives to explain to me in due course. I then proceeded to deal with the second defendant's motion.
Ms Chapman indicated at the outset that the second defendant was no longer (meaning at this stage) seeking dismissal of the proceedings pursuant to UCPR, r 13.4(1), having regard to some absence of information perhaps as to the timing between when the orders of the Court which were said to have been made staying the eviction and the eviction actually taking place.
Instead, the second defendant is seeking to have the statement of claim struck out on the basis the statement of claim does not disclose any reasonable cause of action or has a tendency to cause prejudice and embarrassment or delay in the proceedings or is otherwise an abuse of process: see UCPR, r 14.28(1). Specifically, the second defendant maintains that on any reading of the statement of claim, it does not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the second defendant.
As is well known, the purpose of pleadings is to enable the other party to understand the case that that party has to meet. The purpose of a statement of claim is to identify both the facts and circumstances and the cause of action on which the plaintiff relies for the purposes of requiring the defendant to pay damages to him.
In this case the plaintiff says that, in effect, he was wrongfully evicted. He says that he had obtained orders from Rothman J of this Court on 21 May 2025, staying orders previously made by an Appeal Panel of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal to the effect that he could be evicted. He says that despite those orders of 21 May 2025, the first defendant, being the owner of the premises, instructed the second defendant, being the Sheriff’s Office, to go ahead with the eviction. As he pleads in paragraph 11 of his statement of claim, the plaintiff says that on 30 May 2025 at approximately 9.00am, Sheriff's officers, as encouraged by the first defendant, made their own decision to evict the plaintiff and did so without any prior notice and in contempt of the orders made by this Court.
I apprehend that there is a significant factual issue in this case, that is, that the defendants will be disputing that the plaintiff was evicted in the circumstances as pleaded. However, that significant factual issue is not the basis on which the second defendant seeks to strike out the statement of claim.
The second defendant says that, although it is pleaded that the plaintiff was wrongfully evicted, the plaintiff does not go on to then plead what cause of action he relies on. As submitted by Ms Chapman, it is plain from the submissions served by the plaintiff in response to this application that the plaintiff is aware that he should be pleading a cause of action.
At paragraph (85) of his submissions, the plaintiff raises the question:
“85 Is It a Wrongful Act?
Yes. Ignoring a judicial command is a breach of statutory and common-law duties. Depending on what the Sheriff’s Office failed to do, this failure can manifest as several distinct legal wrongs: …”
(emphasis in original)
The plaintiff then refers to various causes of action, including misfeasance in public office, breach of statutory duty and then other civil torts such as trespass to property, conversion and detinue. The plaintiff then says that he is entitled to sue the State of New South Wales for damages because the State is vicariously liable for the wrongful acts or omissions committed by its public servants. I am sure the State would agree with that latter proposition.
On any analysis of the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff, he does not plead those causes of action to which he refers in his written submissions. Thus, the second defendant does not know the case it has to meet. I anticipate that when the legal representatives of the first defendant appear in due course, they might say the same thing, that is, it is not clear from the statement of claim the case that the defendants are required to meet.
The obligation of the plaintiff is to set out in his statement of claim:
Firstly, the facts which he asserts for the purposes of seeking damages from the defendants;
Secondly, the cause of action on which he relies; and
Thirdly, the losses which he says he has suffered as a result of the conduct of the defendants.
The plaintiff’s statement of claim does not do so.
In the circumstances, it must be struck out pursuant to UCPR, r 14.28. However, as appropriately acknowledged by Ms Chapman, the striking out of pleadings pursuant to r 14.28 does not preclude the plaintiff from re-pleading. The plaintiff wishes to do so and should be given an opportunity to do so.
In these circumstances the orders I make are:
The plaintiff’s statement of claim filed 28 October 2025 is struck out pursuant to r 14.28(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
If the plaintiff wishes to, the plaintiff is to serve an amended statement of claim on the defendants by 5pm on 30 August 2026.
The amended statement of claim is to be served on the first defendant at the office of the real estate agency where the earlier documents were served.
The matter is listed for directions at 9:30am on 7 September 2026 before me.
The plaintiff is to pay the second defendant’s costs of the notice of motion filed 8 July 2026.
The plaintiff is to write to the defendants by 30 August 2026 providing particulars of his loss, that is, particulars of the financial loss he says he has suffered as a result of the conduct of the defendants.
Liberty to apply on three days’ notice.
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Douglas
Lin (No 2)