Doan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 1411

The statutory framework - s 501CA(4) and Direction No 110

1. Before the Tribunal, it was accepted that the applicant did not pass the character test, by operation of s 501(7)(c) of the Migration Act. The question for the Tribunal was therefore whether there was 'another reason' for the visa cancellation to be revoked.
2. In undertaking its task under s 501CA(4), the Tribunal was bound by s 499(2A) of the Migration Act to comply with written directions given by the Minister pursuant to s 499(1) of the Migration Act. Relevantly, the Tribunal was required to comply with Direction No 110 - visa refusal and cancellation under section 501 and revocation of a mandatory cancellation of a visa under section 501CA, which commenced on 21 June 2024.
3. Pursuant to the Direction, the Tribunal was obliged to take into account the five primary considerations outlined in para 8, being:

(1) protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct;

(2) whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence;

(3) the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia;

(4) the best interests of minor children in Australia; and

(5) expectations of the Australian community.

1. The considerations relevant to this judicial review application are (1) and (3).
2. Paragraph 8.1(2)(b) provides that a decision-maker should give consideration to the risk to the Australian community, should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct. Paragraph 8.1.2 addresses how such risk is to be assessed, providing in particular that the decision-maker must have regard to the likelihood of the applicant re‑offending having regard to information and evidence on such risk.
3. Paragraph 8.3 provides relevantly that in considering the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia, decision-makers must have regard to matters including the time spent in Australia and the applicant's family or social links with people who have a right to reside in Australia.
4. Ground 1 deals with the Tribunal's consideration of the risk of re-offending, and so para 8.1(2)(b), para 8.1.2 and para 8.3 are relevant in this regard.
5. The Tribunal was also obliged to take into account the non-exhaustive considerations, where relevant, set out in para 9(1) of the Direction. It provides:

(1) In making a decision under section 501(1), 501(2) or 501CA(4), the considerations below must also be taken into account, where relevant, in accordance with the following provisions. These considerations include (but are not limited to):

a) legal consequences of the decision;

b) extent of impediments if removed;

c) impact on Australian business interests

1. Ground 2 of the review (which I will deal with first) relates to the Tribunal's treatment of the legal consequences of the decision for the applicant. Ground 1 also deals with the Tribunal's consideration of the extent of impediments faced by the applicant if returned to Vietnam. Paragraph 9.1 and para 9.2 provide additional context to the Tribunal's task in relation to these considerations, and so are relevant.
2. Paragraph 9.1 provides:

9.1. Legal consequences of decision under section 501 or 501CA

(1) Decision-makers should be mindful that unlawful non-citizens are, in accordance with section 198, liable to removal from Australia as soon as reasonably practicable in the circumstances specified in that section, and in the meantime, detention under section 189, noting also that section 197C(1) of the Act provides that for the purposes of section 198, it is irrelevant whether Australia has non-refoulement obligations in respect of an unlawful non-citizen.

(2) A non-refoulement obligation is an obligation not to forcibly return, deport or expel a person to a place where they will be at risk of a specific type of harm. Australia has non-refoulement obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 1967 Protocol (together called the Refugees Convention), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the CAT), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol (the ICCPR). The Act, particularly the concept of 'protection obligations', reflects Australia's interpretation of non-refoulement obligations and the scope of the obligations that Australia is committed to implementing.

(3) International non-refoulement obligations will generally not be relevant where the person concerned does not raise such obligations for consideration and the circumstances do not suggest a non-refoulement claim.

(1) Decision-makers must consider the extent of any impediments that the non-citizen may face if removed from Australia to their home country, in establishing themselves and maintaining basic living standards (in the context of what is generally available to other citizens of that country), taking into account:

a) the non-citizen's age and health;

b) whether there are substantial language or cultural barriers; and

c) any social, medical and/or economic support available to them in that country.

1. The Tribunal's decision is therefore to be considered in this statutory context.

1. The applicant relevantly relies on two grounds of review, each expressed generally in his amended originating application. However, the submissions made by counsel on his behalf refined those grounds and they can fairly be paraphrased as follows:

(1) The Tribunal's assessment of the applicant's employment prospects in Australia and upon any return to Vietnam and the weight they were accordingly given were illogical, irrational or legally unreasonable; and

(2) The Tribunal erred in assessing the legal consequences of its decision in that it wrongly found that indefinite exclusion from Australia was an intended consequence of the cancellation of his visa by operation of law and of neutral weight and misunderstood or misapplied para 9.1 of the Direction.

1. The text of para 9.1 refers to legal consequences by way of the detention of unlawful non-citizens pending removal, and immigration detention pending resolution of non-refoulement and protection claims. It does not expressly refer to the legal consequence of excluded return. However, para 9.1 is not exhaustive.
2. In NBMZ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCAFC 38; (2014) 220 FCR 1 the majority (Allsop CJ and Katzmann J) indicated that the Minister must take into account the operation of the Migration Act and the legal consequences that flow from the decision where those consequences form part of the legal framework of the decision: at [9]. It is the 'practical realities' in 'human terms' of the legal consequences that are important, rather than the legal consequences in the abstract: at [3], [9]-[10]. See also Singh v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 1273 at [17]‑[20] (Rangiah J); and Rano v Minister for Home Affairs, Minister for Cyber Security [2024] FCA 1003 at [5], [12]-[14] (Feutrill J).
3. Further, as Rangiah J observed in Singh at [21]:

The obligation is not just to consider the legal consequences of a decision, but to do so reasonably, rationally and logically and on a correct understanding of the law: see Plaintiff M1/2021 v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 27; (2022) 275 CLR 582 ... at [25].

1. The indefinite exclusion of the applicant from returning to Australia was a legal consequence of the Tribunal's decision to affirm the non-revocation of the applicant's visa cancellation and it follows that the Tribunal was obliged to consider it.
2. It appears that the applicant did not specifically raise any matter for the Tribunal's consideration as to the legal consequences of affirming the non-revocation decision. However, counsel for the Minister apparently raised a number of possible legal consequences. Relevantly the Tribunal addressed this issue in one paragraph, stating (at TR [102], footnote omitted):

Counsel for the Minister also noted [Mr Doan's stepson's] concern that Mr Doan 'will not have access to come back to Perth due to legal reasons.' Whilst not relied on by Mr Doan, perhaps because it is implicit, I acknowledge that a legal consequence of a decision not to revoke is that Mr Doan would be indefinitely excluded from Australia by operation of the Special Return Criterion in clause 5001(c) of Schedule 5 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). I accept that is a consideration which needs to be taken into account, but it is an intended consequence of the cancellation of Mr Doan's visa by operation of law. As counsel for the Minister pointed out, this question was recently considered by this Tribunal, per M Gallagher, in Dalzell [at [134]-[135]]. I agree with M Gallagher's conclusion that this consideration needs to be taken into account but it weighs neither for nor against revocation of the cancellation decision: it is simply an inherent and intended aspect of the decision.

1. This reasoning discloses that the Tribunal was cognisant of certain matters: that the legal consequence of refusing to revoke the delegate's decision was that the applicant would be indefinitely excluded from Australia, and that such consideration 'need[ed] to be taken into account'.
2. However, TR [102] does not reveal that the Tribunal properly took this legal consequence into account. Rather, the Tribunal's reasoning suggests that it only considered the matter to the point of observing that because the exclusion was an 'intended consequence' of the law, it was a neutral factor. That conclusion is not tethered in any manner to the particular circumstances of the applicant.
3. The Tribunal appears to have placed significant weight on the cross-referenced paragraphs from Dalzell and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] ARTA 17 at [134]‑[135]. The Tribunal's reasons in Dalzell, properly understood were as follows:

(1) removal and visa limitations are intended consequences of a decision not to revoke a visa cancellation made under s 501 of the Migration Act;

(2) where a further visa cannot be granted, indefinite exclusion is not a matter of speculation but is known;

(3) although the legal consequence of indefinite exclusion is not one of the matters specifically addressed by para 9.1 of the Direction, the Tribunal is bound to take it into account, including its practical reality in human terms, citing NBMZ; Rano at [12];

(4) in the absence of any non-refoulement obligations or protection claim (which would direct attention to the text of para 9.1, para 9.1.1 or para 9.1.2), the Tribunal might not expressly address indefinite exclusion when considering para 9(1)(a), but might do so when addressing the other matters it is required to consider where relevant under the Direction;

(5) for example, the consequence may be considered as part of the consideration of the strength, nature and duration of ties to the Australian community; and

(6) accordingly as the consequence generally needs to be addressed as part of other considerations, care needs to be taken not to overstate its significance when undertaking the weighing exercise.

1. Importantly in Dalzell, the Tribunal concluded (footnote omitted):

[136] As such, the Tribunal acknowledges and accepts the removal and visa limitations which result from a decision not to revoke the Cancellation Decision are an intended consequence of the operation of s 501 of the Migration Act. These consequences are not a matter of speculation and the Tribunal has taken this into account in terms of the practical 'reality in human terms.'

[137] The Tribunal considers this consideration weighs neither for nor against revocation of the Cancellation Decision.

1. With respect, there is a significant difference between the reasoning in Dalzell and the paraphrasing of that reasoning at TR [102]. In Dalzell, the Tribunal did not diminish the significance of the issue to merely an inevitable response to the legislative regime, but acknowledged that legal consequences had to be considered 'in human terms' and that the consequences might be dealt with in undertaking other aspects of its task. It acknowledged Mr Dalzell's personal circumstances. Its conclusion that the consideration weighed 'neither for nor against' came after a consideration of the practical reality for Mr Dalzell.
2. In contrast, although citing two paragraphs from Dalzell (but not [136] of Dalzell) it is not at all clear from TR [102] that the Tribunal in this case understood the task it was obliged to undertake. I cannot fairly see in TR [102] a recognition by the Tribunal that it was obliged to consider the legal consequence of indefinite exclusion having regard to the particular circumstances of the applicant, and factor that into its weighing exercise. Its reasoning at TR [102] suggests that it considered that because indefinite exclusion is an intended consequence, it is a factor that weighs neither for nor against revocation. Even taking a more generous view, and assuming the Tribunal understood it was to consider the applicant's circumstances in this context, there is no disclosure of how it took them 'into account': for example, there is no reference to taking care not to overstate the significance or double count, nor reference to the route taken between any reasoning elsewhere and the assessment that the legal consequence weighed 'neither for nor against' revocation of the visa cancellation. The Tribunal did not return to legal consequences when undertaking the express weighing of different considerations. Nor is there any reference to (or express rejection of) the Minister's submission before the Tribunal that legal consequences ought be given limited weight in favour of revocation'.
3. I should add that the conclusion that a factor is neutral or weighs neither for nor against revocation may be a legitimate assessment, provided it comes after proper consideration: see, for example_, Uelese v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection_ [2015] HCA 15; (2015) 256 CLR 203 at [67] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ).
4. There are two decisions that further inform the consideration of this ground of review.
5. The first decision is Singh, in which a review applicant's visa had been cancelled under s 501(3A) of the Migration Act but he also sought protection by invoking Australia's non‑refoulement obligations.
6. In Singh, the Tribunal considered the legal consequences of its decision, noting that the applicant would continue to be detained in immigration detention pending removal under s 198, but that it remained open to the applicant to apply for a protection visa. To the extent that non‑refoulement obligations were raised, the Tribunal deferred consideration until the applicant sought a protection visa, assuming those obligations would be considered in the context of a protection visa application. The Tribunal noted that as there were no other visa options available to the applicant, the applicant would otherwise be deported and permanently excluded from Australia, and said '[w]hilst these are inevitable legal consequences of an adverse decision, they are the consequences intended by the Parliament'. The Tribunal appeared to proceed on the basis that the legal consequence of a decision not to revoke the visa cancellation was that the applicant would remain in immigration detention, but in the event of either applying for and being refused a protection visa or not applying for a protection visa, he would then be deported and excluded. The Tribunal concluded by giving this consideration 'neutral weight': noted by Rangiah J at [16], [27].
7. Rangiah J found the Tribunal erred (relevantly) in finding that deportation and permanent exclusion were consequences intended by Parliament and so should be given neutral weight. His Honour said that by reasoning in that way the Tribunal had erroneously proceeded on an assumption that Parliament had expressed a preference for there to be a non-revocation decision. In addition, his Honour held that the Tribunal's failure to take into account the immediate and direct statutory consequence of an adverse decision that the applicant became liable to removal and exclusion amounted to jurisdictional error: at [39]. His Honour found that the Tribunal failed to deal with the applicant's claim that a legal consequence of the non-revocation decision included his prolonged detention: at [42].
8. The applicant in this review relied on Singh. There are some similar but also distinguishing features. I do not find in TR [102] the identical error to that which Rangiah J found in relation to an absolute assumption about Parliament's intention. The Tribunal in this case referred to both the legal consequence as an intended aspect of the 'decision' and the intended consequence of visa cancellation 'by operation of law'. While such drafting is somewhat confusing, the jurisdictional error in this case is apparent from the fact that the Tribunal stopped at that point - as if those matters directed a neutral weighting - without demonstrating an appreciation that the question of adverse legal consequences of its decision was a matter for its own evaluation, having regard to the particular facts and circumstances of the applicant's case. Singh is, however, useful in that it reinforces the obligation on the Tribunal to take into account the statutory consequences of its decision, including the potential for excluded return, even where non-refoulement obligations are invoked or a protection claim may be pursued.
9. The second decision is Stoneley v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FCA 143 (Charlesworth J). In Stoneley, the applicant had made clear representations about the significant human consequences including emotional hardship that would befall him if he were separated from his family (including minor children), and the Tribunal had addressed these in some detail. The applicant relied on Singh in asserting that the Tribunal had failed to lawfully consider the legal consequences of its decision by attributing neutral weight to this consideration. It was apparent from its reasons that the Tribunal in Stoneley was cognisant of the need to weigh the legal consequences: it correctly identified the legal consequence of its decision; it referred to an absence of separate submissions on the subject; its reasons demonstrated 'an appreciation ... that the question of whether the applicant should suffer the adverse legal consequences of the cancellation decision was a matter for its own evaluation having regard to the particular facts and circumstances of his case' (at [37]); and whilst accepting that removal and visa restrictions were an intended consequence of the operation of s 501 of the Migration Act, it considered the consideration carried 'neutral weight in the Applicant's case' (at [27]). Stoneley confirms that it is not necessary for the Tribunal to separately grapple with the legal consequences when addressing paragraph 9.1 (or its equivalents), as its consideration may be subsumed in its evaluation of the other considerations prescribed by the relevant direction: at [37]. It is an example where such consideration by the Tribunal was apparent. The approach of the Tribunal in Stoneley is distinguishable from that in the case before me.
10. I acknowledge in reading TR [102], and in reading the Tribunal's reasons as a whole, the principle that reasons of a decision-maker are not to be read with an eye finely attuned to error: Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ). But this principle does not permit the Court to fill in gaps in the path of reasoning: LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 64: (2023) 297 FCR 1 at [61] (Markovic, Thomas and Button JJ) (not disturbed in this regard by LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 280 CLR 321).
11. The Minister submitted that 'the particular consequence of exclusion was subsumed into the overall consideration and weighing exercise' in this case. With respect, such reasoning may be legitimate and may be apparent, even if implicit, in a decision-maker's reasons, as was the case in Stoneley. However, it is not apparent in this case. To the contrary, the text of TR [102] suggests that the Tribunal proceeded on the incorrect basis that its obligation to consider the issue was limited. The Tribunal's failure to carry out the task required by the Direction as to the manner in which matters are to be considered and weighed constitutes jurisdictional error. I uphold ground 2 of the review on this basis.
12. I should add that I have not accepted the applicant's contention that a similar error arose in relation to the absence of specific reasons addressing the legal consequence of immigration detention. The contention was only made in submissions and was not a formal ground of review. Regardless, I note that immigration detention was a legal consequence of the visa cancellation decision pending removal. A non-revocation decision by the Tribunal would have the legal consequence that immigration detention would continue pending removal under s 198 of the Migration Act, but noting the absence of any non-refoulement or protection issues raised by the applicant in this case, there was nothing to suggest that immigration detention could or would extend beyond resolution of the review (or possibly any related judicial review or appeals). It is unremarkable that nothing was said by the Tribunal in such circumstances. The position is distinguishable from that in Singh where the prospect of non-refoulement obligations or protection issues remained live.

1. The applicant's employment prospects were considered by the Tribunal in two contexts.
2. First, employment was considered in the context of primary consideration 1 in para 8 of the Direction, being protection of the Australian community and particularly para 8.1.2 of the Direction, which required the Tribunal to consider the risk to the Australian community should the applicant reoffend or engage in other serious conduct.
3. Second, it was considered in the context of primary consideration 8.3, being the strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia.
4. Third, it was considered in the context of the impediments that might be faced by the applicant upon return to Vietnam.
5. The applicant asserts that the Tribunal's findings relating to his employment prospects were illogical and irrational or legally unreasonable.
6. He also contends that the Tribunal's approach to his employment prospects in Australia as against in Vietnam differed, resulting in findings that were illogical and irrational.
7. The Tribunal said the following in various parts of its reasons about the applicant's employment in Australia (emphasis added, footnotes omitted):

[15] From 2005 until around 2013, Mr Doan ran a sewing business with [former wife], which operated under the name TT Sportswear. The business was properly run and provided an income for Mr Doan and his family.

[16] The sewing business ceased around 2013. From 2013 to 2018 (or so), Mr Doan set up a billiard hall for billiards, snooker and pool. It had seven or eight tables and people paid to play. Mr Doan stated the business generated an income of about $400 gross a day from which he then paid rent and tax. Mr Doan used remaining money to support his family and his domestic expenses. Mr Doan gave oral evidence that the billiard table business closed in 2017 and that he was unemployed from then.

...

[56] ... Mr Doan committed the [relevant] offences purely for financial gain in circumstances of him being unemployed and with limited means of paying his daily living expenses, however frugal his lifestyle. Mr Doan's circumstances have not materially changed. I refer to the report from Dr Lim, relied on by Mr Doan, in which she comments that the risk of Mr Doan re-offending 'is likely to become elevated' if his psychosocial circumstances, such as financial stress and unstable housing, remain unstable upon completion of his prison sentence.

[57] True, Mr Doan has an offer of full-time employment as a kitchen hand in a Vietnamese restaurant and claims to have an offer of accommodation were he to return to live in Perth, but I have concerns about the weight I should place on those offers for the reasons set out below.

[58] In my view, the evidence suggests Mr Doan's existing and future financial circumstances are likely to be materially the same as they were prior to him committing the offences. Where the offences were committed purely for financial gain, and where he 'appeared to be fully cognisant of the unlawfulness of his offending at the time', yet was willing to commit the offences, I feel obliged to conclude the risk of him re-offending for financial gain may be low but is nevertheless real.

...

[62] Counsel for Mr Doan focused on the 20 years or so from when Mr Doan arrived in Australia, age 30. He noted the successful sewing business run by him and his wife followed by him running the billiard hall. ... He submitted Mr Doan worked hard and contributed to his community, until everything unravelled around 2020 consequent on his wife's gambling problem.

...

[64] Regarding employment, were Mr Doan to remain in Australia, the Tribunal received evidence in the form of a letter to Mr Doan entitled 'Formal Job Offer' from Mr Nguyen, the manager of a Vietnamese restaurant in Perth, offering Mr Doan permanent, full-time employment as a kitchen hand in the restaurant. There were no details regarding Mr Doan's proposed wages or what his work would entail. Mr Nguyen gave oral evidence. He stated he knew Mr Doan had been in prison but did not know why.

[65] I was unable to place material weight on this evidence. Employment as a kitchen hand is heavily dependent on performance. In 2017, Mr Doan closed his billiard hall and was unemployed for several years afterwards. I expect opportunities to work as a kitchen hand in a restaurant during those years would have been readily available which suggests Mr Doan could have obtained work as a kitchen hand but chose not to. Mr Doan is now 54 years old. In all, I accept he has the offer, but I am concerned about his willingness to work as a reliable kitchen hand in the longer term and, therefore, the willingness of his prospective employer to continue his employment in the longer term were his performance to wane.

[66] My concerns about him working as a kitchen hand were compounded by his evidence at hearing. When asked about what would happen if he again needed money, he said he would visit Centrelink and ask them to help him find employment and that his friends have offered or would offer him employment opportunities. He made no mention of the offer as a kitchen hand.

...

[77] More broadly, there was no evidence of Mr Doan having friendships with anyone else living in Australia or community ties to any aspect of the Australian community. I accept he contributed positively to the Australian community, in the context of running his sewing and billiard room businesses, but he was unemployed from 2017. There was no evidence as to whether he sought or tried to engage in further work.

1. The Tribunal, having taken into account these and other matters found that the real risk of re‑offending weighed against revocation, but not heavily 'where [the Tribunal] consider[ed] the risk to be low' (TR [59]) and that the strength, nature and duration of the applicant's ties to Australia weighed 'lightly' in favour of revocation (TR [81]).
2. The applicant submitted that the Tribunal's refusal to place material weight on the applicant's evidence that he had secured employment as a kitchen hand in a restaurant in Perth was illogical and irrational. He submitted that the Tribunal's findings about his age, willingness to work, alleged choice not to find work during his previous period of unemployment and performance as a kitchen hand were purely speculative and had no logical or rational basis. He indicated that concerns about his willingness to work were illogical in the context of the applicant's long work history. He submitted that the Tribunal ignored or mischaracterised the offer for kitchen hand work, and that the Tribunal should have understood that the reference to friends giving him work included the kitchen hand position.
3. In short, the applicant complains about the fact-finding exercise undertaken by the Tribunal in regard to the prospect of him obtaining and maintaining employment in Perth, findings that are relevant to the Tribunal's conclusions as to both the applicant's prospect of reoffending and his ongoing contribution to and ties to the Australian community.
4. The threshold to establish jurisdictional error based on irrational or illogical findings is high, as 'extreme' irrationality or illogicality must be shown: Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZRKT [2013] FCA 317; (2013) 212 FCR 99 at [148] (Robertson J). The establishment of the requisite standard of irrationality or illogicality of fact finding which leads to the final decision can establish jurisdictional error: ARG15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCAFC 174; (2016) 250 FCR 109 at [47] (Griffiths, Perry and Bromwich JJ). To meet this standard, the applicant must do more than show that the question of fact is one on which reasonable minds may come to different conclusions or that a lapse in logic has occurred: SZRKT at [148]; ARG15 at [47]; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16; (2010) 240 CLR 611 at [130], [135] (Crennan and Bell JJ). It must be shown that the conclusion arrived at by the decision-maker was one which no other rational or logical decision-maker would have arrived at on the same evidence: SZMDS at [130] (Crennan and Bell JJ).
5. The Tribunal was required to undertake a predictive assessment in relation to the assessment of the risk of the applicant re-offending. In this context, it can be seen from the above reasons that it took into account relevant matters, including, as the Minister submitted: the applicant's lengthy history of unemployment (during which time he had been financially stressed); his engagement in criminal conduct as a response to financial stress; his lack of experience in the specific role of kitchen hand; the absence of any evidence as to the income the role would generate and what the applicant would be required to do in that role; the applicant's age; and the applicant's answer that his financial needs in the future may be met by Centrelink or unspecified offers of employment from friends. Having regard to these matters the Tribunal concluded that it could not be satisfied there was sufficient certainty concerning the applicant's ongoing employment as a kitchen hand in the longer term or that the offered role would provide a protective factor relevant to the risk of reoffending (TR [57]-[59]).
6. The Tribunal did not doubt the offer of work as a kitchen hand was a genuine offer. Rather, it took into account a number of matters that it considered might impact maintaining such a position going forward. In turn this was important because the Tribunal considered the risk of re-offending may well be elevated in the absence of financial security, having regard to the applicant's history.
7. Such reasoning is neither illogical nor irrational. Those matters properly inform the issue being considered, even if reasonable minds might have come to different conclusions. I accept that whether the age of the applicant may restrict his potential or willingness to work as a kitchen hand and maintain performance, in circumstances where he has not undertaken such work before, is a matter on which reasonable minds might differ, but that does not of itself reach the level of illogicality.
8. I also accept that the reference at TR [66] to the applicant's failure to specifically refer to the job offer as a kitchen hand might appear incongruous, if one accepts the applicant's contention that his evidence about employment offers from friends encompassed that particular offer. I consider this finding by the Tribunal is more fairly described as a response to ambiguous or unclear evidence, a response that was available having regard to that evidence. It is not clear that the job offer (which the Tribunal clearly considered) was from a 'friend'. After all, the job offeror apparently did not know why the applicant had been imprisoned. The word 'friend' encompasses a range of different relationships and the interpretation of the Tribunal was open to it. The Tribunal's fact-finding in those circumstances does not lead to reasoning that is illogical or irrational.
9. Similarly, testing the nature of the job offer and the applicant's work history were relevant to considering whether it might constitute a future and ongoing tie to Australia. No irrationality or illogicality is disclosed in the Tribunal's findings in this regard.
10. Separately, the applicant also asserted that the Tribunal's findings in relation to his prospects of obtaining and maintaining gainful employment in Vietnam revealed illogicality and irrationality.
11. The emphasised findings set out above insofar as they relate to the applicant's sewing business are relevant in this regard. Additional findings were as follows (emphasis added):

[104] At hearing, Mr Doan said that if he had to go back to Vietnam he would struggle to find work because he is old. ...

[105] Notwithstanding Mr Doan's evidence about the limited assistance his family would be able to provide if he were returned to Vietnam, the relationships with his family appear to be meaningful. As mentioned above, Mr Doan chose to return to Vietnam 16-17 times since coming to Australia and stayed with his parents when doing so.

....

[107] I accept Mr Doan will have difficulty finding work and accommodation, were he deported to Vietnam, having regard to his age and it being 20 years since he lived in Vietnam. However, as counsel for Mr Doan acknowledged, Mr Doan has skills as a tailor, having run his own sewing business, and has a certificate in accounting although he says he has not practised as an accountant. Counsel acknowledged as 'possibly correct' that Mr Doan's skills were more likely to enable Mr Doan to get a job in the sewing and tailoring industry in Vietnam than in Australia. At hearing, Mr Doan said that his father although elderly (80 years old) may be able to help him find a job.

[108] In my view with his skills as a tailor, his fluency in the Vietnamese language, his familiarity with Vietnam consequent on his frequent visits back to his family and the prospect his father and siblings will assist him to find employment and accommodation even if they cannot themselves accommodate him in the longer term suggests Mr Doan's difficulties in finding work and accommodation in Vietnam would not be materially worse than they will be in Australia, in particular in Perth.

[109] No evidence was put forward as to why Mr Doan would be impeded in establishing himself and maintaining basic living standards, in the context of what is available to other citizens of Vietnam, having regard to his skill as a tailor, his command of the language and support from his family. True, his age may be an impediment but that is equally true in Australia and for others in his circumstances and of his age in Vietnam.

1. The Tribunal concluded that there were no material impediments, if the applicant were removed to Vietnam, that should be weighed in favour of revocation (at TR [112]).
2. The applicant submitted that the Tribunal emphasised different characteristics of the applicant and failed to account for others when undertaking this assessment in comparison to the earlier assessment of the applicant's prospective job offer in Australia.
3. It is to be recalled, however, that the Tribunal was undertaking a different assessment in this regard. The applicant's potential employment in Vietnam was not being considered in the context of potentially reducing the risk of re-offending, a consideration that took into account the particular kitchen hand job offer and the prospective certainty of financial security it may provide upon any return to the Australian community. Rather, in considering the position in Vietnam, the Tribunal was hypothetically placing the applicant in Vietnam for the purpose of assessing the impediments he may face if he returned.
4. The Tribunal was justified in taking into account the prospect of the applicant obtaining sewing or tailoring work in Vietnam. Although the applicant had undertaken successful tailoring work in Australia, it was not something he had done in recent times and its relevance upon a return to the Australian community was unclear. On the other hand, the Tribunal reasoned that although he also had prior experience suited to that industry in Vietnam, he additionally had the benefit of fluency of language and meaningful family support to assist him in obtaining work.
5. This reasoning does not reveal illogicality or irrationality, nor does it otherwise reveal legal unreasonableness. The applicant's opportunities to work were assessed by the Tribunal for different purposes and in different countries, and the Tribunal was therefore entitled to take different matters into account in making its findings. The commonality of employment as an issue for both assessments does not direct a common finding. The Tribunal's reasons properly recognised this.
6. No error is established in relation to ground 1.

1. I have held that the applicant succeeds on the second ground of his application but not the first.
2. I will order that a writ of certiorari issue to quash the Tribunal's decision and that a writ of mandamus issue directed to the Tribunal requiring it to determine the applicant's request for revocation of the visa cancellation decision according to law.
3. I will order that the Minister pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding in a fixed sum to be determined by a registrar of this Court if not agreed.

I certify that the preceding sixty-nine (69) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Banks-Smith.