DJX18 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1799

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographic, clerical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 of the Rules.

1. Before the Court is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority) affirming a decision of a delegate of the first respondent to refuse the applicant a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa (visa).

1. The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka, who arrived in Australia on 1 May 2013 (Court Book (CB) 57). On 10 August 2016, the applicant applied for the visa (CB 37). The applicant claimed to fear harm if returned to Sri Lanka on the basis of his Tamil ethnicity and an imputed political opinion of alliance with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). He claimed to have been targeted, detained and tortured by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and by police because of his imputed with connections to the LTTE (CB 74).
2. On 21 November 2017, a delegate of the first respondent refused to grant the applicant the visa (CB 150). On 28 November 2017, that decision was referred to the Authority for review under Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) (CB 164). On 19 December 2017, the applicant, by his representative, provided a statement and other material to the Authority (CB 185). On 12 January 2018, the applicant submitted further documents (CB 206).
3. On 18 June 2018, the Authority affirmed the delegate's decision (CB 214).

1. The Authority had regard to the material given by the secretary under s 473CB of the Act, which included, inter alia, a bundle of supporting documentary evidence relating to the applicant's detention and release in 2007, recognition of his refugee status by the UNHCR in 2009, and evidence of his brother's involvement in the LTTE.
2. The Authority noted that it received further bundles of information from the applicant's representatives which reiterated the information already before the delegate and contained arguments addressing the delegates, findings. The Authority was satisfied that this was not new information, and had regard to it (CB 215 at [3]).
3. However, the Authority observed that there was a considerable amount of new information regarding new claims and documentary evidence also included in the bundles. This included new information which related to additional details and evidence provided in support of claims the applicant raised with the delegate, which met the requirements of s 473DD of the Act. The Authority remarked that, while the delegate's questioning in the TPV interview was relevant and not inappropriately narrow, it appeared to be specific to the issues it considered to be determinative at the time. The delegate also specifically told the applicant that he found his claims credible and the Authority accept that the combination of these factors may have affected the applicant's ability to organically tell his claims and to comprehend where he should provide more contextual detail (CB 215 at [5]).
4. The Authority took a different view about the other information provided by the applicant (CB 216 at [6]). The applicant claimed to the delegate that the only issue he had encountered with the authorities before he was detained in a sweep with 100 other Tamils in 2007, occurred in 2005 when he was briefly in custody with other young Tamils following a search and cordon operation responding to the abduction of a naval officer. He claimed to have quickly returned home before travelling to Colombo with the intention of going to Qatar. It was there, in Colombo, that he was arrested in 2007. He also claimed to the delegate that he had not previously travelled overseas until he departed Sri Lanka for Malaysia in 2008 and that he was recognised as a refugee by the UNHCR in Malaysia in 2009.
5. The new information provided to the Authority also included further details about the applicant's travel history, as follows (CB 216 at [8]):

(a) the applicant fled to India in December 2006 to avoid targeting aimed at young Tamil men in his village;

(b) he faced constant harassment in India from Q-Branch officers accusing him of having LTTE membership so he used an agent to facilitate his undetected return to Sri Lanka and his onward departure to Malaysia;

(c) upon returning in October 2007, he was interrogated by the Terrorist Investigation Department (TID) to whom he admitted he had travelled to India by boat. The TID accused him of having Sea Tiger involvement and working for them from India. The TID only released him after an hour of interrogation because his agent paid a bribe;

(d) from the airport, the agent took him to a lodge in Colombo however he was too fearful to register with the Sri Lankan authorities;

(e) the applicant's departure to Malaysia in 2008 was facilitated by an agent who escorted him all the way through the airport including to certain counters and onto the plane, paying bribes to airport officials; and

(f) the applicant's passport may not have been genuinely issued.

1. New information was provided to the Authority relating to the following matters (CB 216 at [9]):

(a) the applicant's LTTE member brother disappeared during an attempt to flee Sri Lanka through the airport;

(b) the applicant was named as an LTTE terrorist in various newspapers;

(c) the applicant was taken to the Fourth Floor headquarters of the CID and it was here that the authorities attempted to coerce his confession;

(d) since his departure from Sri Lanka, the authorities have searched for him and because of his name appearing in the newspapers, his entire family were accused of being LTTE suspects, facing constant harassment and interrogation.

1. The applicant acknowledged that he had not previously disclosed the details about his travel to and asylum in, India in his TPV application. The Authority accepted that the applicant travelled to, sought asylum in, and returned from India, having gone there to avoid targeting of young Tamil males in his village and it accepted the associated documentation including the Refugee Identity Card from a particular refugee Camp, an Emergency travel document issued by the Sri Lankan High Commission and flight reservation details as genuine. However, the Authority had concerns about the explanations and other matters raised by the applicant and his representative (CB 217 at [11]).
2. Having regard to all the circumstances before it, the Authority was satisfied the applicant had ample opportunity in his application and interview to raise his claims about:

(a) being harassed in India and on return;

(b) needing the help of an agent and bribes to re-enter and depart the country;

(c) a brother going missing from the airport;

(d) the applicant being taken to the "Fourth Floor" and named as an LTTE terrorist or of the authorities searching for him; and

(e) harassment of his family because of him (CB 218 at [17]).

1. The Authority had concerns about why the applicant could not have provided the Police document or the letter from the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL) earlier. However, the Authority observed that the delegate was persuaded on the evidence before him that the applicant was arrested on the date claimed and detained for a period in a particular camp and accepted those claims.
2. Having regard to overall context, the Authority was unable to believe the applicant's claims that having been constantly harassed and interrogated by Q-Branch about having Sea Tigers connections, he returned to Sri Lanka in 2007 through the Colombo airport on a travel document issued by Sri Lankan authorities in India. Nor could the Authority identify why the applicant would not have disclosed that his brother had gone missing while attempting to flee through the airport, nor that he had been taken to the CID's infamous Fourth Floor office or that the authorities have been searching for him, particularly when the delegate made it clear to the applicant he was having difficulty understanding why the applicant considered he would still be of interest, almost 10 years after being released from the camp referred to in the preceding paragraph by the court and legally leaving the country (CB 219 at [20] to [21]). Overall, the Authority found that the new information did not align with the applicant's other evidence and is unsupported by the documentary evidence provided (CB 219 at [18]).
3. The Authority obtained new information from the United Kingdom (UK) Home Office, the United States' State Department (USSD) and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).[1] Specifically from those reports it obtained information on the treatment of Sri Lankans of Tamil ethnicity and those suspected of LTTE links, Christians and persons of minority religious groups and citizens who have departed Sri Lanka and sought asylum abroad. The Authority observed that the reports had been published recently, after the delegate's decision, by sources it considered authoritative. The delegate had relied on earlier versions of the reports and the other reports specifically over significant developments affecting minority religious groups in Sri Lanka. For those reasons, the Authority was satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering that new information.

1. The applicant's claims before the Authority can be summarised as follows (CB 220 at [25]):

(a) he was born and grew up in Jaffna District, Sri Lanka;

(b) around 20 November 2005 the LTTE abducted a Navy person. The authorities cordoned off and searched the area. He managed to leave and return home but from then on he kept a low profile, staying mostly at home and not going fishing;

(c) in a wide ranging security operation many young people from the North and East were arrested, including himself. He admitted to the police and CID that his older brother was in the movement and had died in 1996;

(d) he was detained in a camp for several weeks (the camp) during which time he was severely tortured and continuously (around every 30 minutes) interrogated about whether he was linked to the LTTE;

(e) while he was held in the camp, his sister made a complaint to the HRCSL;

(f) on 23 December 2007 he was taken to the CID office and severely tortured and interrogated by the CID about whether he had previously been involved with the LTTE;

(g) his sister was worried for him and helped arrange for him to leave Sri Lanka. In April 2008 he departed Sri Lanka for Malaysia. He was recognised as a refugee by the UNHCR in Malaysia but came to Australia before he was resettled; and

(h) he fears that if he were to return to Sri Lanka now, he would still be suspected of LTTE involvement and would be harmed by the authorities due to their previous interest in him, his ethnicity, his scars, his brother's involvement in the LTTE, because he would be returning as a failed asylum seeker and because all his brothers have left Sri Lanka. He also fears being harmed by Buddhists and Muslims on account of his Christian religion.

1. The Authority accepted the applicant's claims as they related to his identity and nationality. It also accepted that he was Sri Lankan, Tamil and Catholic, and that Sri Lanka is his receiving country (CB 222 at [26]).
2. The Authority was satisfied that the applicant's brother was an LTTE member killed while fighting with them in 1996, that the applicant was briefly taken into custody in 2005 with many others following a navy officer's abduction in Delft, and that in 2007 he was arrested and detained for several weeks in the camp (CB 226 at [45]).
3. The Authority was satisfied that, while the applicant was briefly detained, he was not a person of ongoing interest in relation to a navy officer's abduction in 2005. The Authority noted that the applicant was arrested as part of a large scale sweep in 2007, but was released. In the subsequent four to five months that he remained in Sri Lanka he was never formally arrested, charged, detained again or sent for rehabilitation and was able to obtain a passport and was permitted to leave the country. The Authority was satisfied that he was not of any real interest to the authorities when he departed the country. It did not accept that his family have been approached and questioned or threatened by the authorities or anyone in relation to him since his departure (CB 226 at [46]).
4. The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of harm at the time of decision or in the reasonably foreseeable future on the basis of his Tamil race, his origins from a particular place[2], his brief time in custody in 2005, the events of 2007 in which he was detained, harmed and then subject to monitoring and reporting after his release, nor because of his scarring from the injuries sustained while being interrogated, his gender, age, connection to his LTTE member brother nor his other siblings who reside overseas (CB 226 at [47]).
5. The Authority took into account that he would be returning on a temporary travel document and as such he would be identifiable to authorities at the airport as a failed or returning asylum seeker from Australia (CB 226 at [48]). Based on the information provided by DFAT in 2017 and 2018, upon arrival in Sri Lanka, the applicant will be processed in groups with other returnees and the whole process may take several hours. However, it found that he was no longer of adverse interest at the time he departed the country and considered that he may be questioned and subjected to some investigation beyond the perfunctory (CB 227 at [50]).
6. The Authority accepted that the applicant may be visited by Sri Lankan authorities upon his return, but was not satisfied that he would be considered to be an LTTE member or sympathiser, nor a threat to the state and was not satisfied he would be considered to be associated with any politically sensitive issues which typically attract monitoring. It was satisfied the applicant would be returning to an area where he still has family and where he previously earned a livelihood through fishing (CB 228 at [55]).
7. The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant would face any serious harm arising from investigation or questioning at the airport or any subsequent monitoring (CB 228 at [56]) and that that the chance that the applicant would face discrimination and other harms as an ordinary member of the Christian (or specifically Catholic) community or that he would be otherwise unable to freely practise his faith is more than remote (CB 229 at [60]).
8. The Authority noted that at his 2013 Entry Interview the applicant indicated he received weekly injections for a heart problem (CB 229 at [62]).
9. The Authority concluded that apart from some low-level societal discrimination and routine monitoring (which would not amount to serious harm) it was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real chance of harm now or in the reasonably foreseeable future on the basis of his Tamil race, his origins, his scarring, his gender, age, connection to his LTTE brother and his siblings overseas, and even his previous detention and monitoring, and his asylum application in Australia. Nor was it satisfied that the applicant's life experiences, and health conditions are such that he would suffer serious harm, even when his claims were considered cumulatively, it did not accept the applicant had a well-founded fear of persecution (CB 229 at [63]) and the applicant did not meet requirements as defined in ss 5H(1) or 36(2)(a) of the Act.
10. As to the complementary protection criterion, the Authority found that there were not substantial grounds for believing that, as a necessary and foreseeable consequence of being returned from Australia to a receiving country, there was a real risk that the applicant will suffer significant harm. The Authority therefore found that the applicant did not meet s 36(2)(aa) of the Act.

1. The applicant commenced these proceedings on 29 June 2018 by an application to show cause, at which time he was unrepresented. The proceedings were initially docketed to another Judge of this Court (first primary Judge). On 23 July 2018, the parties appeared before a Registrar who made procedural orders (2018 orders). By the 2018 orders, the applicant was granted leave to file any amended application by 3 September 2018, with the proceedings next to be listed for a callover before a Registrar on 18 June 2019.
2. On 4 September 2018, a Notice of Address for Service was filed for the applicant which reflected that he had retained legal representation. An Amended Application was filed for the applicant on 10 October 2018, outside of the time of the grant of leave in the 2018 orders.
3. On 18 June 2019, the parties appeared before a Registrar for callover on which occasion the proceedings were to be stood over either for a callover before a Registrar, or for final hearing before the first primary Judge. The nature and date of the next hearing were on a date to be advised administratively to the parties. The proceedings were later placed in the central migration docket where they remained until when, on 5 June 2025, they were docketed to me and I made orders on that date listing them for hearing.
4. On 11 August 2025, the applicant's solicitors filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Lawyer. The applicant has been unrepresented since that time. Despite orders which required the applicant to file and serve written submissions 14 days before the hearing, he did not do so. The first respondent filed submissions as ordered.
5. The parties appeared before me this afternoon, with the applicant assisted by an interpreter in the Tamil language, who interpreted the first respondent's written submissions to him before I ascended the bench.
6. The applicant confirmed that he wished to rely on the proposed Amended Application referred to at [28] above. That application was not the subject of a grant of leave, nor do I consider it to have been cured by later (prospective) grants of leave which allowed the applicant to amend. In circumstances where the first respondent has addressed the grounds (in the proposed Amended Application, and only those grounds), I will make an additional order today granting the applicant leave to rely upon the Amended Application filed on 10 October 2018.
7. Counsel for the first respondent sought to tender the Court Book. The applicant asserted that he had never received the Court Book and then opined that it might have been sent to his lawyer. However, based on an Affidavit of Service read for the first respondent, and also the time at which the applicant became represented, I am satisfied that the Court Book was served on the applicant at the address for service provided by him in his originating application, and at a time prior to his having obtained legal representation. In any event, none of the documents in the Court Book are new to the applicant, and I am satisfied there is no prejudice to him in the Court receiving it into evidence. Further, the applicant did not object to its tender. Accordingly, the Court Book was marked as Exhibit "1R".

1. Having regard to the Amended Application, the grounds of review which arise for consideration are as follows:
   1. That the second respondent acted without and in excess of its jurisdiction in failing to have regard to additional information provided by the applicant:
      1. In deciding not to have regard to the additional information, the second respondent undertook an assessment of veracity of the new information and an assessment of its consistency with the other evidence presented by the applicant, in doing so, the second respondent had regard to an irrelevant consideration; and
      2. The approach taken by the second respondent misunderstood the statutory test set out in s 473DD of the Migration Act.
   2. That the second respondent acted without and in excess of its jurisdiction in finding [28] that the applicant's brother was a low ranking LTTE member only in that there was no evidence to support that positive finding.
      1. The absence of any evidence of rank cannot allow a finding to be made that the brother was a low ranking LTTE Member; and
      2. This finding, was a critical fact in the reasoning of the second respondent finding that the applicant did not have an LTTE profile.
   3. That the second respondent acted without and in excess of its jurisdiction in finding at [46] that the authorities' interest with the applicant was low level at the time of his departure in circumstances where there was no evidence to support that finding.
   4. That the second respondent acted without and in excess of its jurisdiction in finding at [67] that despite finding that the applicant may be returning processing beyond was it considered perfunctory and that his detention is likely to be no more than a few hours in circumstances where:
      1. There was no evidence to support that finding; and/or
      2. The finding is otherwise unreasonable, irrational, and illogical.
   5. That the second respondent acted without and in excess of its jurisdiction failing to find that the applicant did not have an imputed LTTE profile
      1. Having accepted amongst other matters:
         1. That the applicant was detained in 2007 and 2008 and mistreated by Sri Lankan authorities which may have amounted to torture;
         2. Following the applicant's departure that it was not implausible that the applicant's siblings were subject to suspicion and to the claimed treatment towards the end of the war;
         3. That the applicant has scarring from the 2007 interrogations;
         4. That the Sri Lankan authorities would be aware of the applicant's history and the death of his brother while serving with the LTTE; and
         5. That the authorities may be visit upon his return.

The finding of the second respondent was unreasonable, illogical or irrational.

1. Each of the grounds were interpreted to the applicant in turn, and he was given the opportunity to address them.

1. In essence, this ground alleges error constituted by the Authority undertaking an assessment of the veracity of information and its consistency with the other material before it.
2. When asked what the applicant wished to say in support of ground 1, he responded that he had nothing to say.
3. The ground takes issue with the manner in which the Authority considered information provided to it, and there was a strict regime by which the authority had to consider that information under s 473DD of the Act. The information itself was identified at [8] to [10] (CB 216 to 217) of the Authority's decision. While the Authority accepted that one document may be credible, it otherwise had concerns about other documents, which it set out at [20] to [21] (CB 219) of its reasons for decision.
4. As Counsel for the first respondent submits today, there is no particular error in the Authority assessing the information in context of the review material that it already has before it: see _Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Service and Multicultural Affairs v BTW1_7 [2020] FCAFC 159; (2020) 294 FCR 150 at [72], per Besanko J, Mortimer J (as her Honour then was) and Jackson J where the Court said:

Just as when a Tribunal decides whether to receive evidence or information, the exercise of these powers can and should occur in the context of the review material already before the Authority, and on which according to the primary rule it should conduct its review. Whether to invite a person to an interview, whether to "get" new information of its own motion, or whether to accept "new information" proffered to it by a visa applicant - in all these circumstances the Authority is entitled to reflect on and assess the review material already before it - but for the purpose of deciding whether to depart from the primary rule and, importantly, bearing in mind its function of considering the protection visa application afresh and for itself. Assessing the proposed new material (or interview) in this context will assist the Authority in assessing relevance, in assessing how critical the additional information is to its review, and in assessing whether the preconditions laid out by Parliament can be established. To take an obvious example from the suite of provisions - in order to decide if new information could have been put before the delegate, the Authority is likely to have to consider what was put before the delegate.

1. I also accept the submissions of Counsel for the first respondent that the Authority can, of course, go too far and conduct an assessment of the truth of information as though it were assessing the evidence substantively. However, notwithstanding that acknowledgement, I also accept the submission that, in the present case the Authority used language which showed a high level of disbelief, for example its use of the words, "I am also unable to believe," at the beginning of [20], as well as the language around the information that an agent had facilitated the applicant's departure from Sri Lanka as not being believable, and its use of the term at [21], of "not credible".
2. The first respondent submitted that, while the Authority used a variety of language, it is clear it approached the task as to whether or not the new information was capable of being believed. Assessed against its anterior factual findings, and that this approach was open to the Authority on the material that was already before it, I accept those submissions.
3. The new information which the applicant sought to provide contained both new claims, and information in support of those claims. These new claims are recorded at [8] to [9] of the Authority's reasons (CB 216). The applicant presented a new claim about how he had fled to India in December 2006, faced constant harassment in India from Q-branch officers accusing him of having LTTE membership, and being interrogated by the CID upon return to Sri Lanka in October 2007. He claimed the CID accused him of having Sea Tiger involvement. He claimed that his departure to Malaysia in 2008 was facilitated by an Agent, and that his passport might not have been genuinely issued. The applicant made additional new claims about his brother, about having been named as an LTTE terrorist in various newspapers, and having been taken to the Fourth Floor headquarters of the CID. The applicant also claimed that he was being searched for following his departure from the country, and his family had been under constant harassment and interrogation. The Authority also noted three documents the applicant had provided in support of the new claims at [10] (CB 217).
4. I accept the submissions of the first respondent that the Authority's cumulative conclusion was that it was not satisfied there were exceptional circumstances justifying consideration of the new information at [22] (CB 219). The Authority's approach under s 473DD was orthodox and aligned with AUS17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2020] HCA 37; (2020) 269 CLR 494, in which the plurality said the following at [11]:

Logic and policy therefore demand that the Authority assess such new information as it might obtain from the referred applicant first against the criteria specified in both s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) and only then against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If neither of the criteria specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, the Authority is prohibited from taking the new information into account in making its decision on the review. Further assessment of the new information against the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) is redundant. If either the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) or the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) is met, that is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a). If both the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(i) and the criterion specified in s 473DD(b)(ii) are met, that too is a circumstance which must be factored into the subsequent assessment of whether the new information meets the criterion specified in s 473DD(a) and which must heighten the prospect of that criterion being met.

1. The Authority considered the applicant's explanations for not having made these claims earlier (CB 217 at [11] to [12]) and was of the view that the applicant had sufficient opportunities to raise the new claims earlier in the visa application process (CB 218 to 219 at [16] to [19]). Having regard to the broader context, the Authority also took the view that the new claims were unsupported by the existing documentary evidence, and found them to not be believable. Prior to expressing its conclusions as to whether there were exceptional circumstances pursuant to s 473DD(a) which justified their consideration, the Authority assessed, whether:

(a) the information could have been, but was not, provided to the delegate (s 473DD(b)(i)); and

(b) whether the information was "c_redible personal information_" (s 473DD(b)(ii)).

1. Insofar as the applicant contends the Authority misconstrued the requirement in s 473DD(b)(ii) that the information be "credible personal information" as explained in CSR16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 474, I accept the submissions of the first respondent that the allegation is not made out.
2. I am also satisfied that on a fair and contextual reading of the Authority's reasons for decision, in particular at [20], it did not engage in a final, deliberative consideration of the new claims. The Authority's reasons reveal that its concern was that the new claims were at odds with the applicant's earlier claims, and that he had failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for having not raised the new claims earlier. I am satisfied that it was open to the Authority, on that basis, to conclude that the information was "not believable".
3. However, even if the Authority had misapplied the requirement in s 473DD(b)(ii), I am satisfied it would have been immaterial because, even if it had found the new information satisfied s 473DD(b)(ii), it would have inevitably made the same substantive assessment that the information was not credible, and come to the same ultimate conclusion. That is, regardless of whether the Authority found the new information to not be credible at the preliminary or substantive stage, I am satisfied it would still have come to the same conclusion see: ABH18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 620 at [45] and CDJ19 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCA 345 at [39] to [41].

1. In respect of ground two, the applicant also said he had no oral submissions to make at the hearing before me today.
2. Ground two takes issue with findings of the Authority in respect of the applicant's brother whom the Authority accepted had died in 1996 while serving as a low-ranking member of the LTTE. Counsel for the first respondent submits today that, contrary to what is alleged by the ground, the finding of the Authority was not based on an absence of evidence, but rather on reasons which were given in [28] of its findings, that the expression in [28] that the findings premised on the evidence must also be read with the evidence about the applicant's ability to obtain a passport and depart from Sri Lanka without incident. Paragraph [28] of the Authority's decision is as follows:

I accept the applicant's eldest brother died in 1996 while serving with the LTTE however he stated in the TPV interview that he was very young at the time, had never seen this brother and had only heard about him through his mother. The applicant stated he knew very little about him and did not know anything about his role in the LTTE and the martyr's death certificate indicates only that his death was heroic; it does not indicate the applicant's brother held a particular rank. On the evidence, I am satisfied his brother was a low-profile LTTE member only and that the applicant was not of any adverse interest to the authorities in his area on account of his brother's LTTE involvement prior to his death in 1996.

1. I accept that, in the context of those findings, the Authority's conclusion was justified. On a fair reading of the reasons for decision, the Authority did not find that the applicant's brother was a low-level LTTE member simply because there was no evidence indicating that he was a higher-level member. Rather, the Authority in its reasons referred to the evidence indicating that the applicant did not know anything about his brother's role in the LTTE, and that the brother's death certificate did not indicate any particular rank. Further, it was sceptical about the applicant's claims that the Sri Lankan authorities' interest in his family arose from his brother's membership of the LTTE in the early 1990s (CB 222 at [31]). Further, the Authority observed that the applicant had been released by the Sri Lankan army in 2007 despite their awareness of his history (CB 226 at [46]).
2. I am satisfied that no error is established by ground 2.

1. In respect of ground three, the applicant again said that he had nothing further he wished to submit at hearing. The ground takes aim at [46] of the Authority's reasons for decision (CB 226) and asserts that the Authority made findings without sufficient evidence.
2. Counsel for the first respondent submits that the Authority was again required to determine the facts based on the material that it had before it. At [46], the Authority explained the basis for its conclusions about the applicant's profile, referring to his having never been formally arrested, charged, detained nor sent for rehabilitation, and also that he had been permitted to leave the country. This was all notwithstanding the Authority found that the authorities in Sri Lanka "would be aware of all this history", including that the applicant's brother fought and died with the LTTE in the 1990s.
3. I accept the submissions of the first respondent that this ground is truly a challenge to the merits of the Authority's findings, which as I indicated to the applicant at the outset of the hearing, I have no jurisdiction to assess.
4. No error is made out by ground 3.

1. It is convenient to address grounds four and five together. Each alleges that the findings of the Authority in various respects were unreasonable, irrational and illogical.
2. The test for unreasonableness is "necessarily stringent": see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW [2018] HCA 30; (2018) 264 CLR 541 at [11] per Kiefel CJ and Gagler J. It does not involve the Court re-making the decision according to its own view of reasonableness: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Eden [2016] FCAFC 28; (2016) 240 FCR 158 at [59] per Allsop CJ, Griffiths and Wigney JJ. Rather, the question is "whether a decision-maker could reasonably come to the conclusion" reached: see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1 at [21] per Allsop CJ). Further, in respect of the allegation in ground four, an allegation of no evidence has traditionally meant "not a skerrick" of evidence: see Australian Retailers Association v Reserve Bank of Australia [2005] FCA 1707; (2005) 148 FCR 446 at [575] per Weinberg J, quoting Aronson, Dyer and Groves, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action", 3rd ed, 2004, p 239.
3. As Counsel for the first respondent submitted this afternoon, it is a high bar indeed to establish legal unreasonableness, irrationality or illogicality, and that the Authority expressed its reasons with astute clarity and made no error. I accept that submission.
4. The Authority's consideration of the processes that the applicant might encounter on return to Sri Lanka were set out in its reasons at [48] to [53] (CB 226 to 227). This included reference to country information about those processes. The Authority considered how the applicant might be screened upon return, including the agencies that might perform that screening at [49] (CB 226 to 227). Contrary to the applicant's contention, the Authority found that the applicant may be subjected to a "more thorough screen beyond that which is perfunctory" and that it might constitute "several hours that group processing generally takes" [53] (CB 227). These findings were open on the evidence referred to in the reasons.
5. Ground four is not made out.
6. By ground five, the applicant says that the Authority erred in finding that the applicant did not have an imputed LTTE profile, and that this conclusion was unreasonable, illogical or irrational in light of other findings made by the Authority.
7. The ground does not establish error. The Authority explained the basis for its conclusions on the applicant's profile. It was not satisfied the applicant had a profile that would place him at particular risk at [46] (CB 226). It also considered evidence of changes to the situation for Tamils in Sri Lanka at [41] (CB 225). I accept that submissions of the first respondent that the Authority's reasons were open based on the evidence to which it referred. No error is made out.

1. I am satisfied that none of the grounds have established jurisdictional error. Satisfied as I am that the decision is free from jurisdictional error, it is a privative clause decision, and the application as amended must be dismissed, and I will so order.
2. Consequent upon my dismissal of the application, Counsel for the Minister seeks an order that the applicant pay the Minister's costs fixed in the sum of $7,328, which is the amount for a proceeding commenced between 4 August 2017 and 4 August 2018 under what would have been Part 2 of Schedule 2 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) despite there being authority of this Court that the Minister is not so limited.[3]
3. Rule 25.14 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) (Rules) provides (excluding notes):

Costs

(1) When the Court determines that a party is entitled to costs in a proceeding to which this Part applies, the party may seek costs and disbursements up to, and including, the amounts specified by Division 1 of Part 3 of Schedule 2, together with the amount of any filing or Court fees paid in relation to the proceeding.

(2) The Court may order costs in excess of those specified in Division 1 of Part 3 of Schedule 2 if, in the Court's opinion, there is sufficient reason and it is in the interests of justice to do so.

(3) The Court may by order specify the maximum costs that may be recovered as between party and party.

(4) If:

(a) the applicant files a notice of discontinuance in a proceeding in which a respondent has sought costs in the response; and

(b) the applicant does not file with the notice an application as to costs;

the Court may, without hearing the parties, make an order in Chambers in accordance with Division 2 of Part 3 of Schedule 2 for the respondent's costs.

(5) This rule does not limit a party's right to apply, under Part 32, for an order as to costs of the application.

1. The amount sought by the first respondent is less than the amount currently specified by Division 1 of Part 3 of Schedule 2 to the Rules. I am satisfied in this matter that costs should follow the event, which is to say that, for the purposes of r 25.14 of the Rules, I have determined that a party is entitled to costs of the proceedings. The amount sought by the first respondent being less than the current scale amount and being advanced as representing a fair indemnity of his costs in these proceedings, I am satisfied that an order in that among is appropriate.
2. In reaching that decision I have considered the applicant's submissions about the fact that he is not working, and he has had certain health problems that would prevent him from working. However, as I explained to him, those are not bases upon which a party would not be ordered to pay the costs. It remains for the applicant to discuss with the first respondent's Department their recovery of those costs from him.

I certify that the preceding sixty-seven (67) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Given.

[1] United Kingdom (UK) Home Office, "Country Policy and Information Note - Sri Lanka: Minority Religious Groups", March 2018; USSD, "Sri Lanka 2017 International Religious Freedom Report", May 2018; USSSD,

"Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017 - Sri Lanka", 20 April 2018, OGD95BE927333, "DFAT Country Information Report - Sri Lanka", 23 May 2018, CIS7B839411064

[2] Not named in these reasons in an effort to not identify the applicant

[3] See AHE18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2023] FedCFamC2G 257 at [12]