Criminal Law - Appeal and new trial - Appeal against sentence - Grounds for interference - Sentence manifestly excessive or inadequate - Defendant raped female friend - Used force to overcome complainant's resistance and ignored protests - Defendant was 15 years old at time of offence - Defendant not sentenced until 18 years old due to delay - At 18 period of actual detention would be served in adult prison - Sentenced to home detention for 15 months and community corrections order - Flexibility needed when sentencing youth offenders - Delay caused limited appropriate sentencing options - Sentence imposed was within sentencing discretion - Appeal refused.

Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2005

Sentencing Act 1997

Youth Justice Act 1997, s 47, s81, s 107, s 125

Director of Public Prosecutions v JSP [2020] TASCCA 3

Director of Public Prosecutions v King [2020] TASCCA 8

Director of Public Prosecutions v NOP [2011] TASCCA 15

Director of Public Prosecutions v Oh Marris [2023] TASCCA 1

Director of Public Prosecutions v WLNH [2017] TASCCA 15

TAP v Tasmania [2014] TASCCA 5

Judgment Number: [2025] TASCCA 9

1. I agree with the reasons for judgment of Brett J and with his conclusion that the appeal should be dismissed.
2. The sentence under appeal is an individualised outcome for the particular circumstances of the case and, in my view, it should not be regarded as an indicative sentence for future cases. As stated by Brett J, a significant period of detention was an appropriate sentence in the circumstances of this case.
3. The reasons of Brett J identify the considerations in determining the absence of error: the breadth of the sentencing discretion; the need for flexibility in sentencing youth offenders, particularly those as young as 15 years; and the practical reality of this case being that at the time of sentencing, age-appropriate incarceration was not available. I wish only to add that it follows from these same considerations that young offenders are not immune from adult incarceration just because at the time of sentencing, as a result of delay, they have reached an age whereby they are no longer eligible for incarceration in a youth detention centre.

1. On 3 May 2024, a jury in Launceston found the respondent guilty of two counts of rape. On 16 October 2024, he was sentenced by the trial judge, Pearce J, to a home detention order with an operative period of 15 months, together with a Community Corrections Order which included a condition that he perform 105 hours of community service. An order was also made that he be placed on the register pursuant to the Community Protection (Offender Reporting) Act 2005 for a period of two years.
2. The Director of Public Prosecutions appeals the sentence. The sole ground of appeal is that the sentence is manifestly inadequate in all the circumstances of the case.

1. Both crimes were committed against a 15 year old female, whom the sentencing judge, for the sake of privacy, referred to as "V". I will also refer to her by that pseudonym. They were committed during a single episode on 22 February 2022. The respondent, whose date of birth is 12 May 2006, was also 15 years of age when he committed these crimes.
2. The factual basis was determined by the sentencing judge and recorded in his comments on passing sentence. His Honour's findings have not been challenged in this appeal by either party. The findings are in accordance with V's evidence at trial, which his Honour concluded must have been substantially accepted as truthful and reliable by the jury. This conclusion was inevitable, given that the respondent had given evidence in which he admitted that the alleged sexual acts had taken place, but claimed that V had been a consensual participant in those acts. Clearly, the jury rejected his claim of consent, and believed V about this. Further, the respondent's evidence left no room for a claim that he had been mistaken about the question of consent. He claimed that V had been an active and willing participant in the sexual acts. V's description of the relevant events was directly inconsistent with this claim.
3. V's version of relevant events was as follows. V and the respondent had been friends for some time. They knew each other through the respondent's sister and through school. At about 3.30 pm on the day that the crimes were committed, V visited the appellant at his house. This had been arranged during an online conversation between them. V was with his sister and the three of them spent time together in the respondent's room. V said in her police interview, which was conducted the day after the offending and placed in evidence during her evidence-in-chief, that she had made it clear to the respondent before she went to his house "that we were not going to do anything and that we were just friends and he swore that, like, we would not do anything, would not touch me like that". It was on that basis that she agreed to go there.
4. Upon arrival, the respondent's sister and V spent time with the respondent in his bedroom. At about 5pm, his sister left the house to go to work. The respondent's father was also present at the house. After the sister left, her partner, who was a friend of the respondent, arrived and spent some time with them. About the time that the sister left, V sent a message to a female friend to arrange for collection from the home and was told that the friend would be there "in 30 to 40 minutes". She then gave her phone, which had a low battery level, to the respondent to put on charge. After the offending, she found the phone hidden under his pillow. It had been placed on flight mode. The sentencing judge found that the phone had been hidden and placed on flight mode by the respondent.
5. The crimes were committed after this. His Honour's findings about these lead up events and what happened next are as follows:

"When the time came that you were together alone in your bedroom, you made a sexual advance to her. She had already made clear to you that she did not want to be anything more than your friend and she rejected your advance. She sent a phone message to a friend asking to be picked up. However, you continued with your sexual advances. You positioned yourself over and in front of her, pushed her back on the bed and, while you held her down either by pushing on her chest or by holding her hands, you pulled down her track pants and pulled down your own pants. You pushed her G-string aside and, after spitting on your hand, inserted your fingers in her vagina. You then inserted your penis in her vagina and continued with sexual intercourse until you ejaculated. Throughout this period she was asking you to stop and to get off her, but you continued despite her protests and overcame her resistance by force. You tried to kiss her but she avoided you by moving her head. Instead, you sucked on her neck leaving six very noticeable bruises. She was not otherwise physically injured."

1. His Honour found that after these events, V dressed herself, found her phone and left. She had to unlock the latch on the door of the bedroom to do so. Her friends who had come to collect her in response to her message had been waiting for her outside, but had left when they were unable to contact her by phone. V found numerous missed calls on her phone when she located it after the attack. However, after leaving the house, she was able to get in contact with them, and they picked her up from a nearby location. His Honour found that she was highly distressed and emotional when she met her friends. She underwent a sexual assault examination and was required to provide the details of what had happened to a number of persons. His Honour accepted "the largely undisputed evidence of the level of her distress after the rape".
2. His Honour was satisfied that the respondent had used force to overcome V's resistance. In her interview with police, V described the force used by the respondent:

"I said, 'We're not doing this', and I was, like, trying to scream as loud as I could. He put his hand, like, over my mouth and I was, like, screaming, I was trying to bite him - wouldn't really work. And then he put his dick inside me and just, like, kept going and had his hands up on my chest and when he had his hands, like, after he'd got - grabbed my hands again and put them up above and then I was just, like, lying there, I was just frozen. I didn't know what to say, what to think because the music was so loud no-one can hear us anyway. Like, and I was just lying there and he kept trying to kiss my lips and I just kept moving from side to side and he couldn't get my lips so he left all these marks on my neck and I got three hickeys on each side and I kept, like, moving, trying to get out. And then, it felt like between 10 and 15 minutes - it didn't go very long - it felt like forever but it didn't go very long...".

1. She also described how when he pulled her trackpants down she had tried to pull them back up again "so he pushed me down". She demonstrated how he had pushed her to the shoulders causing her to fall back. In cross-examination, she described how the respondent had grabbed her legs, pulling them towards him in order to force her onto her back. He was then on the top of her pushing her back down. She was unable to push him off because his weight was on top of her and he weighed more than her. She also described how she had yelled at him to get off and he had put his hand over her mouth to stop her yelling. At this point, she tried to bite him but was unable to do so.

1. The respondent was fifteen years and nine months at the time of the offending. He was 18 years of age at the time of sentence. The sentencing judge obtained reports from Youth Justice and a Home Detention Assessment Report. His Honour summarised the respondent's background, as detailed in these reports, as follows:

"You are now aged 18. You have no prior convictions. Your personal circumstances were described by your counsel and in the reports I have referred to. You are the youngest of seven siblings. You have a good relationship with them although your childhood was marred by neglect and instability. Your parents separated when you were about 5. You were in the care of your mother but she was affected by abuse of illicit drugs. In 2015, when you were 8 or 9, you were placed into the care of your maternal grandmother. A few years later you went to live with your father, after which your life became more settled. For the last couple of years you have lived in southern Tasmania with your brother and his partner. They, and other family members, are very supportive of you. Your education was affected by the matters to which I have referred, but for the last two and a half years you have maintained full time employment as a factory hand at a seafood processing plant in Dunalley. You drive to and from work every day from near Hobart. Your employer regards you as a diligent and capable employee and you are valued in the organisation. You have no physical or mental health concerns. You do not abuse alcohol or drugs. The author of the youth justice pre-sentence report assesses you as having low risks and needs."

1. On the hearing of the appeal, the Court was told that the respondent had not committed any further offences since sentence was imposed, has been wholly compliant with the home detention order and had continued in employment. He continues to be strongly supported by his family and employer. According to his counsel, he has good future prospects and remains free of negative influences such as substance abuse and other addiction.
2. The sentencing judge noted that the respondent was not entitled to the mitigation of a plea of guilty. Further, although his Honour did not comment on this, there was material in the reports which demonstrated a lack of insight and remorse on the part of the respondent. In the Youth Justice report, he told the reporter that conduct of this nature "won't ever happen again". However, his explanation for this was because he was now scared to enter a relationship, presumably because of his assertion that he had been wrongly accused of rape when the conduct was consensual. He refused to acknowledge that V had told the truth, or that there had been any impact from these events on her. He said that she had made up this story "because I hurt one of her friends. She did it as a way of getting back at me".

1. It is clear from his Honour's comments during the course of sentencing submissions, and his comments on passing sentence, that he was well aware of the difficult sentencing task which arose in this case, and in particular, the need to grapple with the countervailing sentencing considerations which invariably arise when serious sexual crimes are committed by a young person against another young person. On the one hand, the objective seriousness of the crimes and its impact on the victim required an emphasis on general deterrence, denunciation, punishment and vindication of the victim. On the other hand, the youth of the offender required consideration of the possibility of reduction in moral culpability arising from the offender's immaturity, and of course the need to place emphasis on rehabilitation. Inherent in the latter was the need to consider, in a case where incarceration was a likely sentencing alternative, the corrupting influence of prison, and the potential for such a sentence to have an adverse impact on a young person's development. The need to balance these factors when formulating a sentence in respect of serious sexual offending by a young person has been considered and discussed by this Court in a number of recent cases TAP v Tasmania [2014] TASCCA 5 at [23]- [29], Director of Public Prosecutions v JSP [2020] TASCCA 3, Director of Public Prosecutions v Oh Marris [2023] TASCCA 1, see in particular discussion by Pearce J, with whom Marshall AJ and I agreed, at [35]-[39].
2. The sentencing judge referred to these considerations and the resultant balancing exercise required of him. His Honour referred to the respondent's personal circumstances, in particular his young age, lack of prior convictions, difficult upbringing and good past and current employment record. However, his Honour noted that the respondent was not entitled to the mitigation of a plea of guilty. His Honour considered the objective seriousness and aggravating factors relevant to the offending itself, noting that rape "is a grave crime ... inherently violent and a gross violation of the victim". It was noted that in this case, the respondent had used force to overcome V's resistance, that he prevented her from communicating with her friends by phone, and that he ejaculated inside her and did not use a condom thereby exposing her to a risk of pregnancy and transmission of sexual disease. He noted the very significant impact on V, and the understanding of the Court that crimes of this nature can have profound and perhaps life long psychological impact.
3. His Honour made clear that he regarded the sentencing exercise as a balance of these factors. His Honour then said this:

"In this case I have determined that all of those conflicting sentencing aims should be addressed by the making of a home detention order combined with a community service order. I regard your case as somewhat different than Oh Marris, which has been referred to, primarily because of the difference between your age and his. You have been assessed as suitable for the making of a home detention order. That order will impose a significant restriction on your liberty for a considerable time, which will be difficult for a young man, while allowing for continuation of your employment and avoiding the damaging and corrupting effect of prison for a person who seems to be making good progress in life, and who was 15 at the time of the relevant criminal acts."

1. The appellant acknowledges the wide sentencing discretion conferred on the learned sentencing judge, and further that it cannot succeed on the sole ground of appeal unless this Court is satisfied that the sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust, so that it is demonstrative of an undefined error in the exercise of the sentencing discretion. Further, it is acknowledged that as a prosecution appeal, the primary purpose of this Court's determination is to provide guidance for sentencing courts and ensure public confidence in the administration of justice. These principles are well settled, and the appellant correctly acknowledges them.
2. The appellant's submissions focus on the objective seriousness of the crime of rape generally, and as it was committed in the circumstances of this case. The submissions note the aggravating factors, all of which were acknowledged by the sentencing judge. These include the use of force, the deliberate and persistent nature of the respondent's conduct, and the fact that he did not wear a condom and ejaculated into the complainant's vagina. The appellant submits that the respondent's youth does not significantly reduce his moral culpability in the sense noted in the cases, for example, on the basis that his youth and immaturity resulted in a decision that was ill considered or that he did not properly appreciate the criminality of his conduct. His conduct was deliberate, persistent and calculated. The appellant also noted the significant distress experienced by the victim, which was observed in the immediate aftermath of the commission of the crimes and continued "in the hours and days following the crime". By way of mitigation, the appellant concedes the youth of the respondent, his lack of prior convictions and other factors relevant to rehabilitation. However, it is submitted that the need for general deterrence and denunciation outweighs these factors. Ultimately, it is submitted that a home detention order was a manifestly inadequate response in the circumstances of this case. The appellant submits that a sentence falling short of actual immediate imprisonment is appropriate for the crime of rape only in the most exceptional circumstances and has informed the court of various sentences which it would assert support this submission.

1. His Honour's reference to Oh Marris bears further examination. In that case, the offender was aged 19 and the female victim aged 17, at the time of commission of the crimes. The criminal conduct was constituted by a rape and an indecent assault committed while the offender was visiting the victim at her home. He raped her by penetrating her vagina with his penis, continuing until he ejaculated and he was not wearing a condom. The sentencing judge found that this occurred despite repeated communication from the victim that she did not consent to the sexual acts. The sentencing judge also concluded that the offender had been mistaken as to the issue of consent and that the mistake was honest but not reasonable. It was not reasonable because it was one "he would not have made had he not been intoxicated": s 14A(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.
2. The Court concluded in that case that a sentence of home detention for the rape was manifestly inadequate, notwithstanding that it was combined with a suspended sentence for the related crime of indecent assault. It determined that the only possible sentence was one of actual imprisonment. The Court's reasoning is summarised in the following passage:

"For those reasons, when all matters relevant to sentence are taken into account, imposition of a home detention order, even when combined with the other sentencing orders made by the learned sentencing judge, was not an appropriate sentence. The rape committed by the respondent was so serious that it required a sentence of actual imprisonment so as to adequately serve the need for punishment, general deterrence, denunciation and vindication of the victim. Potential offenders, including young men, must understand that committing the crime of rape will result in severe punishment, which will in most circumstances involve time in prison. It may be accepted that there are countervailing and competing sentencing objectives. In most cases, incarceration will not assist and may be positively harmful to the offender's rehabilitation. However, in our view, the inherent seriousness of the crime of rape, and the gravity of the criminal conduct in this case, required that the considerations of general deterrence and denunciation be given more weight than the respondent's youth and rehabilitation. In the circumstances of this case, this required a sentence of actual imprisonment. A sentence which fell short of requiring actual imprisonment fell outside the range of sentences reasonably open to his Honour and was manifestly inadequate."

1. The Court refused to exercise its residual discretion, on the basis that the "particular need for guidance to sentencing courts" did not "come at too high a cost in terms of injustice to the respondent".
2. In this case, it is clear that the sentencing judge determined that the younger age of the respondent was a significant point of distinction from Oh Marris, and justified an approach that placed greater emphasis on rehabilitation in the balancing process. In Oh Marris, the Court considered that the objective seriousness of the offending required emphasis to be placed on general deterrence, denunciation and vindication of the victim, thereby reducing the emphasis to be placed on rehabilitation and youth, and that this required the imposition of an immediate sentence of imprisonment. Those factors are also present in this case. The only possible view of the offending in this case is that it was a serious crime of rape aggravated by various aspects of the respondent's conduct. These include the deliberate and sustained force used to overcome the victim's resistance, and the contrived nature of the offending, demonstrated by placing V's phone on flight mode and hiding it before commencing the attack. The circumstances of the offending left no room for a claim that the respondent's age materially contributed to a lack of understanding or reduced insight into the serious nature of his conduct. As already noted, the ejaculation and failure to wear a condom were aggravating factors. The respondent was not entitled to the benefit of a plea of guilty and I have already made comment concerning his demonstrated lack of acceptance of responsibility and insight into the impact of his actions on V.
3. On the other hand, as the sentencing judge observed, the respondent's age did distinguish this case from Oh Marris. Of course, the relevance of age, as with any other sentencing factor, will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. While general observations can be made concerning the developmental stage typical of various age groups, the actual maturity, state of development, psychological, emotional and intellectual condition and needs of each individual will vary from one defendant to another. Hence, an individualised approach in respect of sentence is important when sentencing youthful offenders. The discretion of a sentencing judge must contain sufficient flexibility to permit such an individualised response to the particular case. Because the balance between sentencing considerations is differently weighted when dealing with youthful offenders, compared with an offender who is older, such flexibility is critical to the sentencing of such offenders, in particular offenders who commit crimes when they are aged under 18 years. The principles and sentencing guidance provided in respect of cases of serious sexual offending laid down in Oh Marris, must be read in the context of the specific facts of that case. In my view, the learned sentencing judge correctly identified that distinction.
4. These observations lead to consideration of another critical aspect of this case, in particular the impact of delay on the sentencing task. The delay has particular significance when regard is had to the age of the respondent. The offending was reported to police and investigated almost immediately. The indictment which charged the respondent with two counts of rape was not filed until 19 January 2023. The trial commenced on 30 April 2024 and sentencing took place on 16 October 2024. Counsel for the appellant was not able to explain the delay between the reporting of the crime and trial. In particular, the delay in charging the respondent was not explained, nor the time that it took after charging for the case to progress through the court system to a trial. It does not appear that the case was expedited on the basis of the youth of the respondent or the complainant. Both were exposed to the stress of a pending trial for a lengthy period. There is no suggestion that the delay was, in any respect, attributable to the respondent. The delay between trial and sentencing can be attributed to the time necessary for the preparation of the pre-sentence reports.
5. The critical impact of the delay in this case is that by the time the trial judge came to sentence the respondent, he was 18 years of age. He was 15 years old when he committed the crimes. The delay in sentence had significant implications with respect to the options realistically available to the sentencing judge. The crime of rape is a prescribed offence under the Youth Justice Act 1997 if committed by a youth who is 14 years or older. Hence, such a crime cannot be dealt with summarily by the Magistrates Court (Youth Justice Division) under the Youth Justice Act, and must be prosecuted on indictment in the Supreme Court. The sentences available are those prescribed by the Sentencing Act 1997, which include, of course, both imprisonment and home detention. However, in such a case, s 107 of the Youth Justice Act empowers the Supreme Court to exercise sentencing alternatives available under that Act in addition to or instead of sentences available under the Sentencing Act. Such sentences include a period of actual detention in a detention centre for a period of up to 2 years: ss 47 and 81 of the Youth Justice Act. Although a detention order involves the actual deprivation of liberty of the offender, there are features built into the legislation which are clearly intended to facilitate and emphasise rehabilitation and reduce some of the more harmful aspects of adult imprisonment. For example, a youth serving a sentence under a detention order must be released on a supervised release order after serving one half of the period of detention, and of the Act. Further, there are provisions under the Act concerning the treatment of a detainee which are commensurate with the overall approach adopted by the legislation in respect of youthful offenders. See for example , Div 3 of the Act.
6. It follows, therefore, that if the respondent had been sentenced closer to the date of offending, when he was 15 or 16 years of age, a period of actual detention under the Youth Justice Act would have been a viable sentencing option and if imposed would have been served in a detention centre. This would also be the case if he was 17, depending on the length of the detention order and taking into account the implications of supervised release orders. While the sentencing judge would still have been authorised to make a detention order in respect of the respondent as an 18 year old person, his Honour was informed during the sentencing proceedings, and it was made clear to this Court, that any period of detention imposed on a person of that age would be served in an adult prison. This result arises as a matter of administrative determination under s 125 of the Youth Justice Act, and the Court cannot alter or affect that outcome. I assume that, for this purpose, the adult prison is declared to be a detention centre under s 123 of that Act. Even if the respondent had been sentenced to imprisonment under the Sentencing Act, there are administrative arrangements that would have permitted the sentence to be served in a youth detention centre if the sentence was to conclude before he reached 18 years of age. The legislation makes clear that a person serving either a period of detention or a term of imprisonment in a detention centre, as would be the case if the sentence is being served before that person reaches 18 years of age, is subject to the relevant provisions of the Youth Justice Act, whereas if serving the period in adult prison, as occurs in either case in respect of an offender who is 18 or older, the applicable legislative regime is that imposed on adult prisoners under the Corrections Act 1997. See s 146A(3) of the and of the In the latter case and if the sentence is a detention order, that outcome will apply unless determined otherwise by the Director of Corrective Services.
7. The consequence of the delay, therefore, is that by the time the sentence was imposed, an effective and appropriate sentencing option had, as a matter of practical reality, been removed from those available to his Honour. A discussion between defence counsel and his Honour during the sentencing proceedings makes it abundantly clear that his Honour was well aware of this, although he did not express or discuss this issue in the course of his sentencing comments. The imposition of a significant period of detention could be viewed as a particularly appropriate sentence in the circumstances of this case. It would have enabled the sentencing judge to impose age appropriate incarceration, which is designed under the Youth Justice Act to strike an acceptable balance between punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation. However, because the passage of time between the commission of the crime and sentence effectively removed this option, the sentencing judge's alternatives in respect of incarceration were limited to a period of detention or imprisonment which would be served in an adult prison, or home detention.
8. Home detention, of course, is regarded "as a type of imprisonment", notwithstanding that it "is obviously less onerous than being in prison". Per Blow CJ in Director of Public Prosecutions v King [2020] TASCCA 8. In the same case, Wood J noted the capacity of this sentencing option to achieve a balance between punishment and rehabilitation:

"The punitive impact of a home detention order and the extent to which it curtails the behaviour and lifestyle of an offender will vary depending on the offender's particular circumstances. If the offender is in employment, or is permitted to leave his or her home for an approved purpose, it allows scope for mobility and community interaction, and ameliorates the burden of home detention: R v Filipponi [2016] SASCFC 148, 126 SASR 464 at [31].

Home detention orders provide the option of a sentence which is both punitive and also promotes rehabilitation and enables the offender to maintain the continuity of personal, employment and family relationships. It avoids the harm of incarceration and promotes the best interests of the community and the offender.

It is reasonable to expect that home detention will have efficacy as a general deterrent. Home detention is a tangible sentence with consequences that are visible, especially if the detail of the conditions are known, such as electronic monitoring. Home detention is likely to be perceived by the community as a real punishment although, correctly, seen as significantly less punitive than imprisonment_._ The Sentencing Advisory Council in its Phasing out Suspended Sentences, Final Report No 6, March 2016 at 62-68 noted that home detention does have appropriate deterrent effect and is not a 'soft' option."

1. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that the imposition of a lengthy period of home detention, coupled with the requirement that the respondent perform a period of community service was within the sentencing discretion of the learned sentencing judge and the sentence imposed was not manifestly inadequate. In arriving at this conclusion, I should not be taken as suggesting that home detention was the only sentencing option available to his Honour in this case, nor that a sentence of actual imprisonment should never be imposed for the crime of rape on a 15 year old offender. It is apparent from cases to which we were referred by counsel for the appellant that such sentences have been imposed on frequent occasions. See also the analysis of sentences imposed on young persons of that age for the crime of rape by Evans J, with whom Tennent and Wood JJ agreed in Director of Public Prosecutions v NOP [2011] TASCCA 15, although it should be noted that all of the cases referred to in that case preceded the introduction of home detention as a sentencing option. There is no question that rape is properly regarded as a serious crime and will generally warrant a severe sentence. It can also be acknowledged that in keeping with the court's better appreciation of the significant long term impact of sexual offending on victims that sentences for rape and sexual crimes generally have increased in recent times. See my comments in Director of Public Prosecutions v WLNH [2017] TASCCA 15 at [32]. However, I reiterate the point that particularly with offenders who are under the age of 18, a considerable degree of flexibility should be afforded to sentencing judges. The need for such flexibility, in my view, increases the younger the age of the offender. This flexibility is consistent with the legislative purpose of the expanded powers conferred on the Supreme Court when sentencing young persons for crimes committed when they were under 18 years of age by s 107 of the Youth Justice Act. In this case, the effective removal of an important and appropriate sentencing option limited the sentencing judge's options in a manner that significantly reduced this flexibility. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that his Honour's sentencing discretion included the sentence imposed by him.
2. Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated that the sentence was manifestly inadequate. It follows that the sole ground has not been made out and the appeal should be dismissed.

1. I agree that this appeal should be dismissed for the reasons given by Brett J. I have also read and agree with the additional comments made by Wood J.