1. Had moved to [address omitted] New South Wales; and
2. He was not coming back to Melbourne, Victoria; and
3. That he would sign and send back to the Applicant a form for the termination of the Agreement.

8. In the period 29 June 2021 to 21 July 2021, further unsuccessful attempts were made to contact the Respondent to confirm whether the termination form had been sent by the Respondent to the Applicant.

9. On 18 August 2021, the Applicant filed an application under section 91ZG of the RT Act that the Premises are abandoned.

10. By way of order dated 23 August 2021 the principal registrar rejected the Director of Housing's application under section 71(1) of the Act (Order). Relevantly, the Applicant was informed that "If at the time an application is made a party resides interstate then the application will be rejected."

11. In Burns v Corbett[1] the High Court held that federal jurisdiction can only be exercised by an institution of a State that is a 'court of a State' and that there is an implied constitutional prohibition that prevents a State law from conferring jurisdiction on a tribunal that is not a 'court of a State' such that it cannot decide any of the matters in ss 75 of the Constitution in the exercise of State adjudicative authority. In this regard the plurality observed as follows:

Chapter III of the Constitution provides for the authoritative adjudication of matters listed in ss 75 and 76 by federal courts and by State courts co-opted for that purpose as components of the federal Judicature. The provisions of Ch III exhaustively identify the possibilities for the authoritative adjudication of matters listed in ss 75 and 76. Adjudication by an organ of State government other than the courts of the States is not included within those possibilities and is therefore excluded from them. While s 77(ii) contemplates the possibility that, unless and until the Commonwealth Parliament legislates under s 77(iii), the courts of the States may continue to exercise their existing adjudicative authority, if any, finally to resolve such matters, it does not contemplate that this authority - the authority characteristically exercised by courts - will be exercised by agencies of the executive government of the States.[2]

12. In Meringnage v Interstate Enterprises Pty Ltd[3] the Supreme Court of Appeal of Victoria held that the Tribunal is not a court of the State. Accordingly, the Tribunal will not have jurisdiction to hear any matter within section 75(iv) of the Constitution, including those matters:

1. Between States
2. Between residents of different States
3. Between a State and a resident of another State

13. The balance of the matters in section 75 and section 76 of the Constitution are not relevant to this proceeding.

8 Section 9(2) of the Housing Act provides:

The Director of Housing and his or her successors in office shall, subject to this Act, be a body corporate under the name of the "Director of Housing" and shall, by that name, have perpetual succession and a corporate seal and be capable in law of suing and being sued and of acquiring, holding and disposing of real and personal property and of doing and suffering all such acts and things as bodies corporate may by law do and suffer and that are necessary for or incidental to the purposes of this Act.

9 The Applicant is not a resident for the purposes of section 75(iv) of the Constitution, because it is a body corporate.

10 The extent to which a body corporate similar to the Applicant ought to be characterised as a resident was considered by the High Court in the matter of Crouch v Commissioner for Railways (Queensland) and Another (Crouch).[4] The High Court there held, in relation to the word "resident" as it appears in section 75 (iv), that this term refers to natural persons only.

11 The Applicant is not the State of Victoria. Section 38 of the Interpretation of Legislation Act 1984 (Vic) defines - for the purposes of Victorian legislation - 'Crown' as meaning 'the Crown in right of Victoria'. And Section 9(4) of the Housing Act provides that the Applicant 'shall not be regarded as 'representing the Crown in any capacity whatsoever'.

12 This case is distinguishable from Crouch. There, the term 'State' was given broad application in the context of a different statute. In the present matter, as submitted for the Applicant:

1. The statutory text of section 9(4) takes precedence in that it defines whether in fact the Applicant can be representative of the State in any capacity. Given the clear words of that provision that the "Director shall not, for the purposes of any Act, be regarded as representing the Crown in any capacity whatsoever.", it cannot be said that the Applicant represents the State in any capacity.
2. The interpretation of the word State in Crouch v Commissioner for Railways (Queensland) and another relied in part on the statutory provision defining the scope of the Commissioner for Railways (Queensland) remit which was that the "Commissioner, as such corporation, for all the purposes of any Act, shall have and may exercise all the powers, privileges, rights and remedies of the Crown".

1. A proceeding between States;
2. A proceeding between residents of different States; or
3. A proceeding between a resident and a State.

14 The Abandonment Application is properly characterised as being between a landlord which is a body corporate and a resident in another state (who once resided in Victoria).

15 I am satisfied the Tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with it, and have directed the Principal Registrar to accept the Abandonment Application.

[1] (2018) 92 ALJR 423.

[2] Burns v Corbett (2018) 92 ALJR 423 at 430.

[3] [2002] VSCA 30.

[4] (1985) CLR 159.