Director-General of Social Services v Hales, Jeanette Shirley [1983] FCA 81

Federal Court of Australia|1983-05-05|Before: Sheppard JJ, McGregor J

Appeals Tribunal - Overpayment of supporting mother's benefit - Jurisdiction of Tribunal - Whether relevant

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 ss, 3, 14, 15 I5A, 44

Social Services Act 1947 s.140 Audit Act 1901, s.70c

DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL SERVICES v.° JEANETTE SHIRLEY

HALES

" ON APPEAL FROM THE' ADMINISTRATIVE "APPEALS TRIBUNAL :

BETWEEN: DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCTJAL SERVICES Applicant AND

This is an appeal by the DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL

SERVICES ("Director-General") from the whole of the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal made 23 April 1982 in

proceedings wherein JEANETTE SHIRLEY HALES ("respondent") had

sought a review of a decision of a Delegate of the Director-General. The precise formulation of what was the decision and on what grounds she had sought review have been matters of some discussion. To these matters I shall return

later. But first, in order to understand the matter, 1t is

On 16 August 1973 the respondent lodged a claim for a "benefit" appropriate to a "supporting mother" within the meaning

of s.83AAA of Part IVAAA of the Social Security Act 1947 ("the

Act"). In her application she stated that she was employed by the Postmaster General Revenue Section and that the gross amount

she had earned over the last twelve months had been $3,533.00.

On 7 September 1973 respondent was advised that payment of supporting mother's benefit had been approved at a fortnightly rate of $13.80 commencing from 3 July 1973. She was at the same time told that she was required to notify the Department if, in addition to her Social Security Benefit, she received income in excess of $72.25 per week in any period of two weeks, such notification to be within fourteen days of the expiration of that

On 15 January 1974 the respondent wrote to advise her

wage had increased to $166.76. This was a reference to a fortnightly payment. She asked that her pension be adjusted. By letter dated 7 February 1974 she was advised her pension had been varzred from $17.80 to $6.60 commencing from 12 February 1974. She was again told that she was required to notify the Department if, in addition to her social security benefit, she received income in excess of $83.38 per week in any period of two weeks such notification to be within two weeks cf the expiration of that

On 4 July 1974 the respondent received a form headed "Income and Property Statement - Age, Invalid & Widows' Pensions". Under her name it was stated "Pensions are reviewed each year to ensure that the correct rate of pension 1s being paid. If this form is not returned the pension may be

On 15 July 1974 she completed that form including stating that her earnings for a fortnight were $173.06 and returned it to the Department which received it on 26 July 1974. A questionnaire was also sent to the then Postmaster-General's Department where she worked. On 17 September 1974 she _ was informed by letter that her benefit had been reviewed and altered, that her fortnightly rate was varied from $22.60 to $15.80 commencing from 24 September 1974. She was advised again of the requirement mentioned above, this time that if she

received income in excess of $90.25 per week she should notify

Later it was ascertained that since 15 February 1975 her wage had been in excess of $90.00 per week. By letter dated 10 May 1978, respondent was asked, if her income was in excess of what was last nota fied, to complete and return a section on the form. On 13 May 1978 she did so, advising of a "take home pay" of $312.77. This was received by the Department on 29 May 1978.

On 22 June 1978 she was advised by letter that the benefit would

no longer be payable because of the amount of her income.

By letter dated 28 March 1980 and following calculations made, the respondent was requested to refund $3,564.30 to the Collector of Public Monies, Department of Social Security at the earliest convenience. The respondent appealed to a Social

Security Appeals Tribunal. It considered that the appeal should

in that the overpayment should not be recovered beyond 29/5/78 when Miss' Hales notified per SA100;" this last mentioned date, as I have said, being the date when the

Department received the information supplied to 1t in response to

On 2 April 1981 the First Assistant Director-General Legislation and Review of the Department of Social Security wrote advising respondent that a Deputy Director-General of the Department, being a delegate of the Director-General, had concluded, apparently about February 1981, that she had failed to notify the Department of increased earnings received on 13 November 1974 by 27 November 1974; that all supporting parent's benefits paid to her from the following payday, viz. 3 December 1974, was an amount which should not have been made; but that in view of the fact that she had notified her increased earnings on 29 May 1978 the excess payment after payday 25 May 1978 was due to administrative processes and should not be recovered. The amount claimed to be due was said to have been recalculated at

$3,632.70 for the period from 3 December 1974 to 25 May 1975.

She was advised of her right to apply for a review of the

Decision to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT).

It 2s common ground that there was an overpayment of $3,632.70 and that there had been a failure by the respondent to

It 1s accepted and this matter proceeded upon the basis that the respondent did apply to the AAT for a review of a decision. There is not in existence, so far as appears or we have been told, the form referred to in s.29 of the

Administrative Appeals Trabunal Act 1975 and Schedule 1 of the

In the s.37 documents the "decision" 1s referred to thus -

",...a decision of a delegate of the DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SOCIAL SERVICES, affirming a decision of an officer made under the Social Services Act 1947 which decision was reviewed by a Social Security Appeals Tribunal, that she had been paid a total amount of supporting mother's and supporting parent's benefit of $3632.70 more than she was entitled to be paid and that this amount was recoverable from her as a debt due to the Commonwealth."

oe ea decision of a delegate of the Director-General of Social Services ("the respondent") seeking to recover monies paid to the applicant for supporting mother's benefit in the sum of $3,632.70 pursuant to

sub-section 140(1) of the Social Services Act 1947."

In argument, senior counsel for the Director-General

"....decision to seek to recover monies being an amount agreed as $3632.70 paid without warrant to the applicant purporting to be a supporting mother's benefit"

though without conceding there had been a decision to which s.25

of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 or s.15A of the Act applied.

Senior counsel for the respondent agreed with the above formulation but submitted there should be added after "seek to recover moneys", the phrase -

"pursuant to the provisions of s.140(1) of the Act." He submitted that a decision to debit respondent in the Department's records is an anterior decision but only part; the

decision was to do that and to proceed with recovery proceedings.

In its Reasons of 23 April 1982 the AAT substituted its own view as to what was the "proper course" in respect of payments made to the respondent for the period from 3 December 1974 to 25 May 1978 and directed her to refund overpayments attributable to the first pension year after 17 September 1974

but not for subsequent years. The Reasons for Decision include

"Nevertheless on the facts of this matter the Department knew from the beginning that the

applicant was actually informed that pensions were reviewed each year "to ensure that the correct rate of pension 1s being paid". It seems from the s.37 statement that the Department did not ain fact rely on the information supplied under s.74 but sought its own information as to the applicant's wages. I accept that it was the applicant's genuine belief that the manner of review would be instituted by the Department. On these facts the applicant was given to understand that there would be departmental review annually. In my view it is proper to regard the failure of the Department to perform its functions as the substantial or dominating cause of the overpayment. The applicant's failure can best be regarded as a contributory cause but not the effective cause.

Even if I am wrong in this conclusion there are in this case other factors which warrant the exercise of a discretion against substantial recovery from this applicant. There would be, in my view, extreme hardship to the applicant and to her 16 year old invalid pensioner daughter. There would also be scant chance of action of recovering the monies being effective.

subsequent years which should have been ' disclosed to the respondent by the annual

review which the applicant understood on good ' grounds, would be conducted."

Against that decision the Director-General has appealed to this Court. By Amended Notice of Appeal dated 24 September 1982 the following Orders were sought -

That in lieu thereof there be substituted orders -

(a) That the said decision of the applicant be confirmed.

(b) That the respondent has been overpaid by way of supporting mothers benefit and supporting parents benefit an amount of $3,632.70 recoverable by the applicant in a Court of competent jurisdiction as a debt due to the

That the decision of the Tribunal and the reasons of the Tribunal for making the said decision were contrary to and wrong in law.

That the Tribunal should have affirmed the decision of the applicant that the

respondent had received an overpayment of $3,632.70.

That the Tribunal should have held that in consequence of a failure or omission by the respondent to comply with the provisions of the Social Services Act 1947 an amount of $3,632.70 had been paid to the respondent by way of supporting

mothers benefit and supporting parents benefit which would not have been paid but for the failure or omission.

failed to apply the provisions of section 140 of the said Act.

to apply or to apply correctly the provisions of Part 11 and Part 1VAAA and Part 1X of the said Act.

That the Tribunal erred in law in holding that section 140 of the said Act only applied if the failure or omission of the respondent to notify the applicant of an increase in her income was the effective and not merely a contributory cause of an overpayment.

That the Tribunal erred in law in finding or holding that the failure or omission of the respondent to notify the applicant ef an increase in her income was not the effective cause of an overpayment.

That the Tribunal erred in law in finding or holding that a failure of the Department of Social Security to perform its functions was the substantial or dominating cause of the overpayment to the respondent.

That the Tribunal erred in law in holding that when an overpayment of pension, allowance, endowment or benefit had been made as a consequence of a failure or omzssion to comply with any provisions of the said Act the applicant had a discretion to recover all or none of the overpayment.

That the Tribunal erred in law in deciding that the applicant made a decision within the meaning of section 25 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to recover the amount of the overpayment to the respondent.

That the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application to the Tribunal by the respondent.

section 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 or otherwise to direct

whole of the amount of the overpayment to the respondent.

That if (which is denied) the Tribunal had power to direct the applicant not to seek recovery of the whole of the amount

of the overpayment to the respondent, then the Tribunal erred in law in so

determining that the applicant or the Department of Social Security failed to perform its functions in relation to the respondent.

Did the applicant make a decision within the meaning cf section 25 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 to recover the amount of the overpayment to the respondent?

Did the Tribunal have jurisdiction under section 25 or any other provision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975

to entertain the application to the Tribunal by the respondent?

What 1s the proper meaning and effect of section 140 of the Act?

Further to question 3, but without limiting the generality thereof,

(a) Does sub-section 140(1) confer upon the Director-General or any other person a power or discretion to determine whether or not to recover overpayments of pension in circumstances in which there is in fact an overpayment that 1s recoverable in law?

(b) What 1s the meaning and effect of the expressions "but for" and "in consequence of" in sub-section 140(1)?

(c) Does the failure of the recipient to comply with a provision of the Act have to be an "effective" and not merely "contributory" cause of an overpayment before the amount of the overpayment is recoverable under sub-section 140(1)?

What is the meaning and effect of section 43 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975?

Further to question 5, but without in any way limiting the generality thereof, did the Tribunal have the power to direct the applicant not to seek recovery of the whole of the amount of the overpayment to the respondent?

If the Tribunal had a discretion or power to direct the applicant not to seek recovery of the whole of the amount of the overpayment to the respondent did it err in law in determining so to direct the applicant?"

"15. A person affected by a determination, direction, decision or approval of an officer under this Act (except a determination, direction, decision or approval of the Director-General) may, within such time (2f any) as 1s prescribed, appeal to the Director-General and the Director-General may affirm, vary or annul the determination, direction, decision or approval.

15a. (1) Where the Director-General has, on or after 9 September 1980 1n pursuance of section 14 or 15, made a decision affirming, varying or annulling a determination, direction, decision or approval of an officer, being a determination, direction, decision or approval that has been

reviewed by a Social Security Appeals Tribunal, then, subject to section 29 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, an application may be made to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal for review of the decision of the Director-General.

(1) In thas Part, unless the contrary intention appears -

"widow" includes - (a) a dependent female; (b) a deserted wiife;

(e) a woman whose husband has been convicted of an offence and is imprisoned and has been imprisoned for a period of not less

than 6 months, including any pericd of imprisonment prior to and continuous with

a period of imprisonment following upon the conviction,

but does not include a woman who 1s living with a man as his wife on a bona fide domestic basis although not legally married to him.

(1) Where the average weekly rate of income, other than pension, received in any period of 8 consecutive weeks by a pensioner who 1s not in receipt of an allowance under section 65A is higher than $20 per week and is higher than the average weekly rate of the income last specified by her in a claim, statement or notification under this Part, the pensioner shall, within 14 days after the expiration of that period, notify a Director

of the amount of the income received by her in that period.

within the meaning of this Part, by reason that she -

woman referred to in paragraph (e) of the definition of "widow" in sub-section 59 (1); or

(121) commences to live with a man as his wife on a bona fide domestic basis although not legally married to him;

(b) a child ceasing to be in the custody, care or control of a pensioner;

(ba) a person who, by virtue of section 59A, is to be treated as a child in the

custody, care and control of a pensioner - (1) ceasing to be wholly or

59(4) applies ceasing to be maintained by a pensioner; or

the pensioner shall, within fourteen days after the occurrence of the event, notify a Director accordingly.

Australia without first giving to a Director notice of her intended departure from Australia.

Penalty: $40" We were told that a provision since repealed, s.74(2), initially provided for repayment. But since 1976 the relevant section 1s 74(1). It ius agreed nothing turns on the difference in

expression between the former s.74(2) and the present s.74(1).

(b) by reason of the failure of a pensioner to comply with section 73 or 74; or

the Director-General considers that the pension which is being paid to a pensioner should be cancelled or suspended, or that the rate of the pension which is being paid to a pensioner 1s greater or less than 1t should be, the Director-General may cancel or suspend the pension, or reduce or increase the rate of the pension, accordingly.

83AAG. (1) Section 61 and Divisions 3A, 4, 5 (other than section 68), 6 and 7 of Part

1V apply in relation to a beneficiary as if the beneficiary were a widow for the purposes of that Part.

(2) For the purposes of the application, by virtue of sub-section (1) of this section, of section 75 in relation to a beneficiary, the reference in that section to

section 59AA shall be read as a reference to section S3AABA.

(b) obtain payment of a pension, allowance, or benefit under this Act, or of an instalment of such a pension, allowance, or benefit, which is not payable;

140 (1) Where, 1n consequence of a false statement or representation, or in consequence of a failure or omission to comply with any provision of this Act, an amount has been paid by way of pension, allowance, endowment or benefit which would not have been paid but for the false statement or representation, failure or omission, the amount so paid shall be recoverable an a court of competent jurisdiction from the person to whom, or on whose account, the amount was paid, or from the estate of that person, as a debt due to the Commonwealth.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act (other than sub-section (3) of this section), where, for any reason, an amount has been paid by way of pension, allowance, endowment or benefit which should not have been paid, and the person to whom that amount was paid is receiving, or entitled to receive, a pension, allowance or benefit under this Act (other than a funeral benefit under Part IVA), that amount may, if the Director-General in

his discretion so determines, be deducted from that pension, allowance or benefit.

(3) An amount referred to in sub-section (2) that has been paid otherwise than by way

of "family" allowance under Part Vi shall not be deducted from family allowance payable under Part Vl."

The Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 provides -

(3) A reference in this Act to a decision includes a reference to -

(a) es eeee (b) ..eee (c) eee (d) ..eee (e) making a declaration, demand or requirement; (£) «2... (g) ..eee

(1) An enactment may provide that applications may be made to the Tribunal -

(a) for review of decisions made in the exercise of powers conferred by that enactment; or

exercise of powers conferred, or that may be conferred, by another enactment having effect under that enactment.

(1) An application to a Tribunal for a review of a decision -

(b) may be made ain accordance with the prescribed form;

(d) if the terms of the decision were recorded in writing and set out ina

document that was furnished to the applicant or the decision 1s deemed to be

made by reason of the operation of sub-section 25(5) + shall be lodged with the Tribunal within the prescribed time.

that is the subject of an application for a review by the Tribunal shall, within 28 days

(a) a statement setting out the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which

those findings were based and giving the reasons for the decision; and

The submission of senior counsel for the Director-General included that the Director-General had not made

a positive "decision" within the meaning of s.15A of the Act or s.25 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, though he did not wish to rely on that argument finally to decide this matter. He described what had happened as being a "step in the process of getting the money back"; the decision may have been

that a debit be raised and that 1t be recovered or pursued. He argued also that any Gecision taken to sue would not be one under

Senior counsel for the Director-General submitted that

the "decision" by the Director-General that an amount of money was recoverable was not one which was reviewable, so that there

was no jurisdiction in the AAT; even 1f£ there had been a decision subsequently to recover the overpayment; that if the

stage had been reached where somebody intended to do something

about the matter, that "decision" nor even any subsequent "decision" to 1ssue a summons was not reviewable; the "decision" that moneys were recoverable could not properly be described as a "decision under" the Act. Such decisions, made under ss. 14 or 15 of the Act by the Director-General, are, by s.15A of the Act, subject to review by the AAT. All that had been done here was by a public servant in that capacity looking after the revenue of the Crown, rather than performing an exercisable power under the

Act. He referred to R. v. Clyne; ex parte Harrap (1941) V.L.R. 200; Evans v. Friemann (1981) 35 ALR 428; Deputy Commissioner of

Patents v. Board of Control of Michigan Technological University (1979-80) 28 ALR 551; Collector of Customs (N.S.W.) v. Brian

Lawlor Automotive Pty. Ltd. (1979-1980) 24 ALR 307. Counsel

preferred, however, to rely on a more general submission that the AAT's decision was fundamentally wrong. Referring specifically to s.140, he submitted that the AAT' had accepted that the respondent thought the Department would send her a notification each year which she would then complete thus giving it the necessary information; that since the Department did not do this that therefore her failure to comply with the Act was not the

effective cause of the overpayment. He argued that what the AAT

had been concerned with was the cause of what had happened rather than a more specific consideration of the language of s.140; and even 1f£ "cause" does equal "consequence", the AAT failed to ask the real question of itself, viz., whether the overpayment was a consequence (cause) of the failure to notify. He submitted the section really asks, if there was an omission (failure by respondent to notify) was it in consequence of that that an amount was paid which except for the omission would not have been paid. He submitted that the AAT was in error in interpreting s.140(1) as requiring a failure to comply with the Act to be an effective and not merely a contributory cause; whereas, to entitle recovery under that section 1t was sufficient to show that overpayment followed on from the omission in circumstances where there is a connection between the two. He contended that "in consequence of" extended to cover things that follow on something else and have connection therewith. He referred to

McIntosh v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1979) 25 ALR 557.

The use of the words "but for", he suggested, made 1t plain that there had to be a connection, not merely

temporal; and only in that sense would causation be implied.

He drew attention to sections of the Act which require pensioners to provide information, 1.e. being an offence 1f they do not; presupposing that information will be supplied capable of being relied upon by the department. The scheme of the Act

was, he contended, to put very squarely on pensioners the onus of

telling the department facts which may effect the entitlement to pension; whereas the Director-General had power to enquire as to

a pensioner's wages but no positive statutory duty to do so. J

As an alternative, he submitted that 1f one had to find the respondent's omission was the effective cause of Overpayment, 1t was not open to the AAT to find the failure not an effective

Further, he contended that there was no basis upon which the (implicit) finding that the Department had failed to perform 1ts function could have been made; there was no duty on the department to check wages or advise pensioners. He submitted there was no way in which any discretion to sue to recover the

overpayment could be controlled by the AAT; that the

Director-General was bound to sue unless he followed Audit Act

1901 ("the Audit Act") s.70C procedures giving power in the Minister to write off moneys. In fact, there was a delegation under s.70A of the Audit Act to the Director-General to perform that function in respect of the Act. As a separate argument he

contended that if there was a discretion in the AAT to forgive or excuse repayment, 1t had not been properly exercised anyway in that e.g. public money had been paid out; hardship on the pensioner was therefore not the only consideration when one exercised a discretion. There was, he said, no balancing exercise carried out by the AAT ~- this being essential in any

He summarised his argument that if there was a decision

being considered by the AAT it was not a decision to which the

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 applied, not being one

under the Act. If there was a decision which could be reviewed, findings were made which were wrong and if there was a discretion the way in which the Tribunal found it ought be exercised was

wrong and made without regard to significant factors.

Senior Counsel for the respondent submitted that there had been a relevant "decision" (outlined earlier above) which was an administrative decision; that this Court should say that it was Open to the AAT to find and direct as it did. He submitted it was an essential part of the administration of the Act to make decisions as to whether overpayments ought be recovered; s .140 limits the circumstances of recovery; so decisions to recover

He referred to Re Gee and Director-General of Social

Services (1980-81) 3 ALD 132 (Gee) Matteo and Director-General of

Social Services, (1981-1982) 4 ALD 398 (Matteo); Forbes and

Director-General of Social Services, unreported, delivered on 24

December 1981 (Forbes); Re Buhagiar and Director-General of

He submitted there had been a decision that respondent

owed the money and also to seek to recover 1t. Part of that

decision or anterior to it was one to raise an overpayment or

He argued that the "decision" of the Director-General to seek recovery of the overpayment was one taken in the exercise of

a discretion, which could be subject of review by the AAT; that

this Court should say, as a matter of construction of the Act, that it was within the competence of the AAT to review the exercise of that discretion. He submitted that on a proper analysis of the Act 1t might be expected that the recipients of pensions might be given some statutory direction as to what they must do; that it would be "highly desirable" if there had been

some proper explanation as to why no action was taken.

He argued that having regard to the obligations on the Director-General, including one not to overpay, and having regard to all the circumstances, it was proper to say the Department had failed to perform its function in the relevant period; that it was an abdication of responsibility to simply rely upon the notification under sections of the Act such as s.74; that its

Counsel also made submissions as to the construction of s.140; that the legislature was trying to set a test involving the overpayment having been caused as the responsibility or the action or inaction of the pensioner; that the intention then was

that recovery ought not to have been effected unless the

pensioner's behaviour really had brought about the situation of overpayments having taken place. He submitted that the words "but for" implied a higher degree of causative connection than "in consequence of". The effect of this argument was that for the pensioner to be liable her conduct must have gone beyond being merely an action which might lead to a consequence. So, he argued, the overall approach of the AAT can be justified logically when it said, in effect, for the first year, but for the pensioner's inaction, the overpayment would not have occurred. Thereafter there were other supervening factors

referring, it seems, to the alleged inaction of the Department of Social Services; that by the end of the first year the Department

must have known it was overpaying; that it was the duty of the Director-General to fix pensions at an appropriate level the obligation on the pensioner being ancillary to that of the

Director-General. He referred to Gee, to Matteo and to Frederick

Braby and Company, Limited v. Bedwell (1926) 1 K.B. 456 (Braby).

First it is necessary to consider what "decision" was being reviewed. In the circumstances, I consider, having regard to the terms of s.37(1)(a) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, it should be accepted that the" decision" under review was that set out in the documents lodged pursuant to that section. To do otherwise would be to entertain an appeal against

a notional review of other than the actual decision taken. It

may be that the AAT in 1ts Reasons quoted earlier was doing no more than in a short hand way referring to what was so set out rather than attempting to set out explicitly the "decision" it

was to review. It appears to me to be reasonable so to assume.

As to what is a "decision", Director-General of Social Services v. Chaney (1980) 31 ALR 571 is of assistance, though the circumstances were different. There a widow's pension had been sought and refused. She sought to have a decision whether she was entitled to a widow's pension for which provision 1s made in Part 1V of the Act. There was a preliminary hearing before the President of the Tribunal. He held the Tribunal had jurisdiction to review. There was an appeal to the Full Federal Court against this. Deane J., one of the majority in the judgment, said at

"The word "decision" 1s a word of indeterminate meaning. In some contexts, it can refer to the mental process of making up one's mind. In the context of judicial or administrative proceedings, the word will ordinarily refer to an announced or published ruling or adjudication. In such a context, the word "decision" may be apt to include the determination of any question of substance or procedure, including, for example, rulings on procedural questions such as whether particular evidence should be received, or the meaning of the word may be limited to a determination effectively resolving an actual substantive issue. When the word "decision" has the last-mentioned limited meaning, 1t can refer to any such determination whether final

or intermediate (see, e.g. Registrar of Workers' Compensation Commission v FAI Insurances Ltd (1977) 1 NSWLR 422 at 448) or be lamited to referring only to a

(1933) NZLR 289 at 295; Penniel v Driffill (1980) WAR 30 at 32)."

"The provisions of s.3(3) would seem more apposite to define a reference to the substantive "decision" of the original decision maker than to confine the scope of a reference to a "decision" of the Tribunal upon review. Subject to that qualification, the specific activities mentioned in the definition in s.3(3), which are in the nature of effective action rather than intermediate "decision" on the path to such action, provide some indication that a reference to "decision" aun the Act is, prima facie, a reference to the ultimate or operative determination rather than a reference to an adjudication or determination of issues arising in the course of making such an ultimate or operative determination."

"In its general sense the meaning of the word "decision" appearing in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary is: "The action of deciding (a contest, question, etc.); settlement, determination; (with a and pl) a conclusion, judgment: esp one formally pronounced in a court of law 1552": see also Re Kent County Council and Council of Dover (1891) 1 QB 725 and Reidy v. Herry (1897) 23 VLk 508, where at p-.510 Williams J said: "Now I take it that an adjudication or decision of justices is something which 1s announced but not what is passing in the minds of the justices. It isa decision announced in open court. That is their decision or adjudication.""

At a glance

Court

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Before

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Source

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Judgment (647 paragraphs)

Cases Cited (4)

Cited By (2)