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Representation: Counsel:
P Afshar and A Rizk (Defendant)
Solicitors:
Sadek Lawyers (Defendant)

File Number(s): 2023/00288890

Publication restriction: Nil

JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. By further amended notice of motion filed with leave on 26 June 2026, the plaintiff, Antonio Di Liristi (Mr Di Liristi) seeks orders restraining the defendant’s current solicitor, Wassim Sadek of Sadek Lawyers (Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers), from acting for the defendant in these proceedings.

2. The motion was originally filed on 22 May 2026 and also included additional relief to vacate the hearing date then listed for September 2026. That aspect of the motion was resolved between the parties, and the proceedings are now listed for hearing in November 2026.

3. The motion to restrain Mr Sadek and Sadek Lawyers was originally listed for hearing in early June 2026. That hearing was vacated. A further attempt to deal with the motion was made on 25 June 2026; however the hearing was not able to be completed on that day. The matter was stood over to 31 July 2026 to be heard following the conclusion of the Real Property List on that day.

4. Mr Di Liristi appears for himself in the proceedings and has appeared on the motion. Mr P Ashfar and Mr A Rizk appear for both the defendant and Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers on the motion.

5. For the reasons set out below, the motion should be dismissed. Mr Di Liristi has not established any proper basis upon which Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers should be restrained from acting for the defendant in these proceedings.

Overview of the proceedings

6. It is only necessary to give a brief overview of the proceedings. What is set out below is largely taken from an earlier interlocutory judgment I gave in the proceedings: see Di Liristi v Yosef [2026] NSWSC 436.

7. By way of general background, Mr Di Liristri currently occupies a property owned by the defendant at Bringelly. He commenced occupation in about August 2021. For some time, the defendant has been seeking to have Mr Di Liristi removed from the property and Mr Di Liristi is resisting.

8. There are two sets of proceedings before the Court.

9. The first being the 2023 proceedings, was commenced in the District Court by Mr Di Liristi on 23 August 2023. In those proceedings, Mr Di Liristi seeks damages against the defendant for what he contends are various breaches of a residential tenancy agreement between the defendant and Mr Di Liristi entered into in or about August 2021. An amended statement of claim was subsequently filed. They were transferred to this Court by order of Slattery J made 31 October 2025. In these proceedings Mr Di Liristi alleges that the residential tenancy agreement was for a period of 3 years.

10. The second, being the 2025 proceedings, was commenced by Mr Di Liristi in response to a lapsing notice served by the defendant on Mr Di Liristi in relation to a caveat that had been placed on the title to the Bringelly property by Mr Di Liristi. An order was made by Brereton J, sitting as Duty Judge, extending the operation of the caveat for a short period of time.

11. On 31 October 2025, Slattery J, having heard extensive argument, made the following orders:

12. REVOKE Order 1 of the orders made by Brereton J on 22 October 2025.

13. CAVEAT AU567074 is struck out.

14. ORDER the plaintiff to pay the defendant’s costs of the application today.

15. COSTS are payable forthwith.

16. GRANT leave to Mr Di Liristi to file an amended statement of claim by 21 November 2025 pleading relief in these proceedings by way of proprietary estoppel or any other relief he claims.

17. ORDER that District Court proceedings (2023/00288890) between these parties be transferred to this Court.

18. ADJOURN these proceedings into the Real Property List on 28 November 2025.

19. VACATE the listing of these proceedings in the Equity Duty List on Tuesday 4 November 2025.

20. ORDER the defendant to notify the plaintiff when the refinancing of the subject property is complete and ORDER the plaintiff not to file another caveat on the subject property prior to such notification by the defendant.

21. ORDERS to be entered forthwith.

22. His Honour’s judgment also provides a general background of the dispute between the parties: see Di Liristi v Shahata [2025] NSWSC 1325. Mr Di Liristi contended before Slattery J that he was promised a nine-year lease of the property, and as a result he invested in expenditure upon improvements on the property commensurate with a nine-year lease and that this expenditure was made on the faith of a promise of such a nine-year lease.

23. The 2025 caveat proceedings are largely inactive. The proceedings removed from the District Court (the 2023 proceedings) are the substantive proceedings between the parties.

24. The current pleading is a Further Amended Statement of Claim filed 20 May 2026. The defendant has filed a cross claim seeking to uphold her purported termination of the tenancy agreement. She seeks possession of the Bringelly property.

25. As set out above, the proceedings are now listed for hearing in November 2026.

Evidence on the motion

16. Mr Di Liristi relied on three affidavits made by him on 29 May 2026, 6 June 2026 and 20 July 2026 respectively. A number of objections were taken to those affidavits which I ruled on during the hearing. As a result, a number of paragraphs in each of those affidavits were treated as submissions. Mr Di Liristi also read in his own case an affidavit made by Mr Sadek on 2 June 2026. There was no objection to this course. Mr Di Liristi was not required for cross examination.

17. On 27 July 2026, Mr Di Liristi applied to me in chambers for leave to issue subpoenas requiring three persons to attend at the hearing, give evidence and produce documents. I refused that application primarily by reason of delay in making it. The issue had been discussed at the earlier attempts to hear the motion and yet, the application was not made until shortly before the resumed hearing. No satisfactory explanation was provided for the delay. There was also no evidence that the proposed recipients of the subpoenas would be able to comply with the subpoenas if issued. In those circumstances, I was not satisfied that it was appropriate to abridge the five day time period in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005: see r 33.3(8).

18. The defendant and Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers relied on an affidavit of Mr Sadek made 25 June 2026. Some paragraphs of that affidavit were not read.

19. Over opposition, I permitted Mr Di Liristi to cross examine Mr Sadek.

20. Mr Di Liristi made a number of submissions in closing to the effect that I should reject large aspects of Mr Sadek’s evidence. A significant aspect of this attack was based on differences between Mr Sadek’s affidavit of 2 June 2026 and his later affidavit of 25 June 2026.

21. I do not accept this attack.

22. Mr Sadek’s affidavit of 2 June 2026 was prepared purely from his recollection of events in 2020 and 2021 without access to any records. Mr Di Liristi then produced certain emails and other documents from the period which caused Mr Sadek to make his later affidavit. None of this causes me to question Mr Sadek’s integrity or honesty or the reliability of his evidence. Mr Sadek was careful in his evidence in cross examination to make it clear that he was giving his evidence to the best of his recollection based on events from a number of years ago in circumstances where he is no longer employed by that firm of solicitors where he was then employed, and has no access to the records from that time.

23. I accept Mr Sadek’s evidence.

24. I set out below my factual findings relevant to the determination of the motion.

25. The allegations made by Mr Di Liristi as to confidential information possessed by Mr Sadek centre on what occurred during the period between December 2020 to November 2021. At this time it is not in dispute that Mr Sadek was an employed solicitor at Darby Jones Lawyers Pty Ltd (Darby Jones Lawyers). At all material times, Osman Khanji (Mr Khanji) (now deceased) was the Principal Solicitor at Darby Jones Lawyers.

26. There was an issue as to when Mr Sadek left Darby Jones Lawyers to set up Sadek Lawyers. Mr Sadek’s evidence was that he left on 24 November 2021. In support of that evidence he produced email communications with the Law Society dated 24 November 2021, indicating that he had lodged documents with the Law Society to practice as a Principal from Monday, 29 November 2021. The Law Society also changed Mr Sadek’s email address to Sadek Lawyers on 24 November 2021.

27. In his submissions, Mr Di Liristi suggested that Mr Sadek did not leave on 24 November 2021 but must have left after that – he did not say precisely when. In support of that contention, Mr Di Liristi relied on an email which he sent to Darby Jones Lawyers, including Mr Khanji and Mr Sadek dated 26 November 2021 that appears to concern proceedings in the NSW Civil and Administrative Tribunal (NCAT) between Mr Di Liristi and the defendant concerning the Bringelly property. There is no evidence that Mr Sadek received this email. Mr Di Liristi did not give any evidence of any interactions with Mr Sadek on and after 26 November 2021. If there were any such dealings, Mr Di Liristi was in a position to give evidence about them.

28. The evidence of Mr Sadek is, in my view, likely to be more reliable, supported as it is by contemporaneous emails with the Law Society. In any event, for reasons I set out below, in the absence of any identified confidential information in the 26 November 2021 email, it is not necessary for me to determine the precise date that Mr Sadek left Darby Jones Lawyers.

29. During the period December 2020 to November 2021, Darby Jones Lawyers acted for Mr Di Liristi, it would appear on a pro bono basis, in several matters.

30. The documentary evidence tendered by Mr Di Liristi in this regard was as follows:

(a) A Notice of Appointment of Solicitor dated 17 December 2020 in the Supreme Court of New South Wales proceedings where Mr Di Liristi was the plaintiff and the Public Trustee was the first defendant. The proceedings apparently related to Mr Di Liristi’s parents; (b) Email correspondence between Mr Sadek and Mr Di Liristi dated 18 December 2020. In one email Mr Sadek attaches a Summons and 3 subpoenas; stating “settled by Messrs Auld, Khanji and myself”. Mr Auld is a barrister; (c) Email correspondence between Mr Sadek and Mr Di Liristi dated 18 December 2020 in which Mr Sadek stated to Mr Di Liristi “I have settled all your affidavits and I will send them to Mark for his approval”. This appears to relate to the Supreme Court Public Trustee proceedings; (d) A screenshot suggesting Mr Sadek sent over 20 emails to Mr Di Liristi in relation to the Public Trustee proceedings during the period 17 December 2020 to 17 September 2021. None of the emails were in evidence; (e) A costs agreement between Darby Jones Lawyers and Mr Di Liristi concerning appeal proceedings in the NSW Court of Appeal in a matter between Mr Di Liristi and Matautia Developments Pty Ltd. Mr Sadek is named in the letter as the Senior Solicitor Responsible. The letter does not provide any detail as to the nature of the matter; (f) A letter dated 29 June 2021 from Darby Jones Lawyers to the NSW Supreme Court in the Matautia matter attaching a Notice of Appeal to be filed with the registry and making an application for a fee waiver. The letter names Mr Sadek as the contact. The documents were also emailed to Mr Di Liristi earlier that day for his review; (g) Screenshots showing the number of emails on which Mr Sadek was copied in the Matautia proceedings. Again, none of the emails themselves were in evidence; (h) An email dated 26 November 2021 from Mr Di Liristi to Mr Khanji, copied to Mr Sadek and others headed “Termination proceedings in NCAT for Sarah Yosef …”. The email stated “Please find attached the Termination Proceedings in NCAT for Sarah Yosef …., can you get Wassim on to it ASAP and ask Wassim to let me know urgently”. The document attached to the email was not placed into evidence and Mr Di Liristi did not give any evidence as to its contents, although he made certain generalised assertions from the bar table as to the nature of the proceedings. It was not in dispute that Ms Yosef is the defendant and that, at the relevant time there were proceedings in NCAT between the two concerning the Bringelly property; (i) A screenshot recording phone calls which Mr Di Liristi says he had with Mr Sadek, including relevantly what he says was a 15 minute call on 18 December 2024; (j) An email from Sheila Kaur-Bains (Ms Kaur-Bains) (as her Honour then was) to Mr Khanji and Mr Di Liristi, copy to Mr Sadek, dated 17 August 2021 in the Public Trustee proceedings in relation to setting aside subpoenas in those proceedings; (k) An email from Ms Kaur-Bains to Mr Di Liristi and copied to Mr Sadek, providing advice on certain matters in relation to the Public Trustee proceedings. The email appears to be responding to matters raised by Mr Di Liristi; (l) An email from Mr Khanji to Christopher Habra and Mr Di Liristi, copied to Mr Sadek, dated 8 October 2021 in relation to the Matautia proceedings; and (m) An email dated 26 August 2021 from Mr Khanji to Mr Di Liristi, copied to Mr Sadek, providing advice to Mr Di Liristi in relation to what appears to be the Public Trustee proceedings. There is an earlier email chain on that day where Mr Di Liristi raised various matters in relation to the hearing that is to occur the next day.

31. Mr Di Liristi did not give any oral evidence of any particular discussions involving Mr Sadek or any particular confidential information which he contends was disclosed. His affidavit evidence was expressed in a conclusory way in this regard and I admitted it only as a submission.

32. Mr Sadek could not recall having any substantive involvement in any of Mr Di Liristi’s matters. His evidence was that his dealings with Mr Di Liristi were limited to brief and incidental exchanges of pleasantries at the offices of Darby Jones Lawyers when Mr Di Liristi attended. He did not recall ever being given confidential instructions by Mr Di Liristi or being told anything of a confidential nature concerning Mr Di Liristi or his affairs.

33. The emails set out above perhaps suggest that his involvement in Mr Di Liristi’s legal proceedings went beyond brief and incidental exchanges of pleasantries. Mr Sadek is not to be criticised in my view for not remembering the precise details as to what occurred on these matters over 5 years ago.

34. Mr Sadek gave evidence, which I accept, that he no longer has access to any documents from when he was at Darby Jones Lawyers. He was cross examined to suggest that he could have uploaded his work emails to his personal laptop while he was employed at Darby Jones Lawyers. I reject that suggestion.

35. Mr Di Liristi first raised his concerns with Mr Sadek about him acting in the proceedings for the defendant on 18 December 2024. Mr Di Liristi then caused a formal notice of objection to Mr Sadek acting to be sent to Mr Sadek dated 21 May 2026.

36. A number of other matters were raised with Mr Sadek by Mr Di Liristi in cross examination. The matters ranged from Mr Sadek’s knowledge of whether Mr Di Liristi spent four and a half years in gaol on remand for crimes he said he did not commit before the charges were withdrawn on the first day of the trial, to the companies of which Mr Di Liristi was apparently a director of, to whether Mr Sadek had arranged for an illegal drone to be flown over the Bringelly property so that photographs could be taken which were then provided to the local council by or on behalf of the defendant. I do not need to make any findings on any of these matters. In my view they can have no bearing on the relevant issues that I need to decide on the motion.

Principles

37. It is accepted that there are at least two bases on which a solicitor may be restrained from acting against a former client: see Cleveland Investments Global Ltd v Evans [2010] NSWSC 567 at [37] per Ward J (as the learned President then was).

38. In the present case, the application is based on ensuring the protection of confidential information.

39. The principles in this regard are well settled – I gratefully adopt the following summary of Gleeson JA in Jing Li v Jin Lian Group Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 479 (Jing Li) at [7]-[12]:

[7] The Court’s jurisdiction to restrain a legal practitioner from acting in proceedings is an exceptional one and discretionary. The jurisdiction must be exercised with appropriate caution and due weight must be given to the public interest in a litigant not being deprived of the legal practitioner of his or her choice without due or good cause: Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria (No 3) [2007] FCA 491 at [2] (Middleton J), citing Grimwade v Meagher [1995] 1 VR 446 at 452; Geelong School Supplies Pty Ltd v Dean [2006] FCA 1404 at [35] and [51].

[8] The Court must also be mindful that sometimes such applications may be misused or quite inappropriately pursued by a party to proceedings: Bahonko v Nurses Board of Victoria (No 3) at [3].

[9] Following a detailed review of the authorities in Kallinicos v Hunt (2005) 64 NSWLR 561; [2005] NSWSC 1181, Brereton J summarised the position as follows at [76] (omitting full case citations):

76 The foregoing authorities establish the following:-

• During the subsistence of a retainer, where the court’s intervention to restrain a solicitor from acting for another is sought by an existing client of the solicitor, the foundation of the court’s jurisdiction is the fiduciary obligation of a solicitor, and the inescapable conflict of duty which is inherent in the situation of acting for clients with competing interests [Prince Jefri Bolkiah].

• Once the retainer is at an end, however, the court’s jurisdiction is not based on any conflict of duty or interest, but on the protection of the confidences of the former client (unless there is no real risk of disclosure) [Prince Jefri Bolkiah].

• After termination of the retainer, there is no continuing (equitable or contractual) duty of loyalty to provide a basis for the court’s intervention, such duty having come to an end with the retainer [Prince Jefri Bolkiah; Belan v Casey; Photocure ASA; British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd; Asia Pacific Telecommunications Ltd; contra Spincode Pty Ltd; McVeigh; Sent].

• However, the court always has inherent jurisdiction to restrain solicitors from acting in a particular case, as an incident of its inherent jurisdiction over its officers and to control its process in aid of the administration of justice [Everingham v Ontario; Black v Taylor; Grimwade v Meagher; Newman v Phillips Fox; Mitchell v Pattern Holdings; Spincode Pty Ltd; Holborow*; Williamson v* Nilant; Bowen v Stott; Law Society v Holt]. Prince Jefri Bolkiah does not address this jurisdiction at all. Belan v Casey and British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd are not to be read as supposing that Prince Jefri Bolkiah excludes it. Asia Pacific Telecommunications Ltd appears to acknowledge its continued existence.

• The test to be applied in this inherent jurisdiction is whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that the proper administration of justice requires that a legal practitioner should be prevented from acting, in the interests of the protection of the integrity of the judicial process and the due administration of justice, including the appearance of justice [Everingham v Ontario; Black v Taylor; Grimwade v Meagher; Holborow*; Bowen v Stott; Asia Pacific Telecommunications Ltd*].

• The jurisdiction is to be regarded as exceptional and is to be exercised with caution [Black v Taylor; Grimwade v Meagher; Bowen v Stott].

• Due weight should be given to the public interest in a litigant not being deprived of the lawyer of his or her choice without due cause [Black v Taylor; Grimwade v Meagher; Williamson v Nilant; Bowen v Stott].

• The timing of the application may be relevant, in that the cost, inconvenience or impracticality of requiring lawyers to cease to act may provide a reason for refusing to grant relief [Black v Taylor; Bowen v Stott].

[10] As to the claim of breach of confidence, it is useful to recall some basic principles. The elements of an action for breach of confidence are: first, identification with specificity, and not merely in global terms, of the information claimed to be confidential; second, the information which forms the basis of the confidence must have the quality of confidentiality; third, the confidential information must be disclosed in circumstances which impose on the recipient an obligation to respect the confidentiality of the information; and fourth, there is an actual or threatened misuse of that information by the recipient, without the consent of the plaintiff: Smith Kline & French Laboratories (Aust) Ltd v Secretary, Department of Community Services & Health (1990) 22 FCR 73 (Smith Kline & French) at 87 (Gummow J), citing Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434 at 443. See also Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd (1969) RPC 41 at 47; Interfirm Comparison (Australia) Pty Ltd v Law Society of New South Wales [1975] 2 NSWLR 104 at 117.

[11] With respect to the obligation of confidence, it is relevant to enquire whether the information was disclosed or imparted for a limited purpose: Castrol Australia Pty Ltd v EmTech Associates Pty Ltd (1980) 33 ALR 31 at 46; Ackroyds (London) Ltd v Islington Plastics Ltd (1962) RPC 97 at 101 and 104. Where information has been imparted for a limited purpose, the obligation is not to use or disclose that information for any other purpose. The obligation of confidence is imposed where the circumstances show that the recipient knew or ought to have known that the information was imparted for a limited purpose: Smith Kline & French at 95-96; Half Court Tennis Pty Ltd v Seymour (1980) 53 FLR 240 at 255; Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd at 48; Mense v Milenkovic [1973] VR 784 at 801.

[12] One further matter should be mentioned. JLG drew attention to the remarks of Hayne J in Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd (in liq) v Mendall Properties Pty Ltd [1995] 1 VR 1 at 5 that:

Although it is necessary to be acutely conscious of the fact that the court is asked to interfere with the right of a litigant to be represented by the solicitor of the litigant’s choice, it is not necessary to conclude that harm is inevitable (or well nigh inevitable) before acting to restrain a possible breach of the duty that a solicitor owes to clients and former clients to keep confidential information given to the solicitor in confidence and not use that information against the interests of the client who gave it to the solicitor. …It is enough to say that I consider that injunction should go if there is a real and sensible possibility of the misuse of confidential information.

In Re IPM Group Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 240 at [33], Black J, after referring with approval to these remarks in Farrow Mortgage Services v Mendall Properties, went on to observe that the test of a real and sensible possibility of the misuse of confidential information was followed in Dealer Support Services Pty Ltd v Motor Trades Association of Australia Ltd [2014] FCA 1065 at [34] (Beach J). Mills Oakley and Mr Li did not dispute that this was the appropriate test in the present case.

(Emphasis added.)

40. In Porter v Dyer (2022) 402 ALR 659; [2022] FCAFC 116, Lee J, with whom Besanko and Abraham JJ agreed, stated at [74] and [75]:

[74] Irrespective as to whether the relevant obligation of confidence was legal or equitable, an injunction can run (in equity’s exclusive or auxiliary jurisdiction) if there is a real and sensible possibility of the misuse of confidential information. As the primary judge noted (at PJ [64], [77]), the test for restraining a legal practitioner on the basis of the possible misuse of confidential information may be dissected in a number of ways. Reflecting upon the authorities, his Honour proceeded to apply the relevant test (outlined at PJ [74]–[78]) by responding to the following sequence of questions:

(1) What is the relevant information?

(2) Is that information confidential?

(3) Does the legal practitioner have possession of that information?

(4) Is the legal practitioner proposing to act “against” the former client in the requisite sense?

(5) Is there a real risk that the confidential information will be relevant?

(6) Is there no real risk of misuse of the confidential information?

[75] It was also not in dispute on appeal that it was for the moving party to identify the relevant information with specificity (the first question) and to obtain an affirmative answer to the next four questions. If that occurred, the burden of establishing that there was no real risk of misuse (the sixth question) was on the resisting party. It was recognised by both the parties and the primary judge that these questions (drawn from Re Timbercorp Finance Pty Ltd (in liq) (2019) 137 ACSR 189; [2019] FCA 957 (Timbercorp) (at [62]–[64] per Anderson J)) were not a replacement for the test, but had utility as an analytical framework. On appeal, they continue to provide a useful structure for identifying, and then evaluating, the alleged errors of the primary judge (although it is convenient to deal initially with the first and third questions together and, in doing so, identify the key findings of the primary judge).

41. In Solve Legal Pty Ltd v All is 1 Pty Ltd (t/as Banga Legal) [2026] NSWCA 55, Payne JA (with whom Kirk and Adamson JJA agreed) emphasised two important matters. First, at [33] that the inherent jurisdiction to prevent a lawyer from acting for a client is an extraordinary one which should be used sparingly. Second, at [53] that where confidential information is said to be the basis of the restraint, there is a need for precise identification of that confidential information.

Determination

42. Mr Di Liristi provided written Opening Submissions, a Schedule of Documentary Evidence, an Outline of Key Documents, a Concise Chronology, Written Submissions, Further Written Submissions and also addressed me orally both in chief and in reply at the conclusion of the evidence on 31 July 2026. I have carefully considered all of the material and submissions provided by Mr Di Liristi.

43. In my view, the evidence falls well short of establishing a proper basis for restraining Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers from acting for the defendant in the present proceedings.

44. The motion fails at the outset by reason of the lack of any identified confidential information. As the authorities set out above make clear, this is an essential first step.

45. Mr Di Liristi made various submissions that the confidential information concerned “the Plaintiff’s affairs, litigation strategy, evidence and legal position”, and “litigation strategy, evidentiary issues, witness issues, settlement considerations, appellate strategy, personal circumstances, financial circumstances and matters involving the present Defendant”.

46. The evidence he adduced, however, did not prove what the alleged confidential information was. The evidence went no higher than that Mr Sadek was involved in various legal proceedings that Mr Di Liristi was involved in during the period between December 2020 to November 2021. No real detail was provided as to the nature of those proceedings, let alone what the involvement of Mr Sadek was and what confidential information, if any, was provided to him.

47. Whilst it may readily be accepted that a solicitor in the course of acting for a client in legal proceedings may receive confidential information, there is still a need to prove what the alleged confidential information is. The authorities I have referred to above make this clear. Absent such identification, it is difficult, if not impossible, for the court to assess the further matters that must be considered before taking the extraordinary step of denying a client the right to continue to use their chosen solicitor in legal proceedings.

48. Nothing was really said by Mr Di Liristi as to how there was a real risk that whatever Mr Sadek learnt in the course of acting for Mr Di Liristi in the proceedings other than the NCAT proceedings concerning the defendant, could be used against Mr Di Liristi in these proceedings.

49. I do not accept that Mr Sadek received the 26 November 2021 email and attachment on which Mr Di Liristi placed considerable reliance. I am satisfied that Mr Sadek had likely left Darby Jones Lawyers before that time.

50. In any event, even if the email was received by Mr Sadek, there was no evidence as to what was contained in the attachment to the email. It has not been proven that the attachment contained confidential information, let alone that there is a real risk that Mr Sadek may use that information against Mr Di Liristi in these proceedings.

51. Mr Di Liristi also placed great reliance on the fact that the defendant has not given evidence on the present motion. Mr Di Liristi asserted that the defendant has not given any evidence that she opposed Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers being removed as her legal representatives in the proceedings. He further contended that the court should draw a Jones v Dunkel inference against the respondents to the motion by reason of this failure.

52. I do not accept those contentions. Whilst it is clear that the defendant did not make an affidavit to the effect that she opposed the orders sought by Mr Di Liristi, there was no need for her to. It was clear from the moment the motion was filed that the defendant opposed the orders removing Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers, and instructed counsel to appear on her behalf to oppose the orders. When the motion was originally filed it did not name Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers as a respondent to it. The defendant opposed the relief sought.

53. Whilst there was no doubt in my mind of this fact, Mr Afshar confirmed on the hearing of the motion that he appeared for each of the defendant, Mr Sadek and Sadek Lawyers, and that each opposed the relief sought.

54. The respondents to the motion contended that, even if I was satisfied that there was a basis to restrain Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers from continuing to act for the defendant in these proceedings, I should refuse to exercise my discretion to restrain them from continuing to act by reason of Mr Di Liristi’s delay in bringing the application. Reliance was placed in this regard on what was said by Brereton J in Kallinicos v Hunt (2005) 64 NSWLR 561; [2005] NSWSC 1181 at [76] in a passage referred to by Gleeson JA in Jing Li, that I have extracted above.

55. Mr Di Liristi apparently first raised his concern with Mr Sadek in December 2024 but then did not formally object and file a motion until May 2026.

56. In circumstances where I am far from satisfied that there is a basis to restrain Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers, the issue does not arise for consideration. Had it arisen I would have been unlikely to refuse to restrain Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers by reason of the delay. Whilst there has, in my view, undoubtedly been delay in bringing the action, it was not suggested by the respondents that it would be impractical to require the defendant to change solicitors now. The hearing date is still more than 3 months away.

57. For these reasons I refuse the application to restrain Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers from acting for the defendant in these proceedings.

Conclusion and orders

58. Insofar as the further amended motion sought to restrain Mr Sadek/Sadek Lawyers from continuing to act for the defendant in these proceedings – being the claims in paragraphs 2 to 5 of the motion – it should be dismissed.

59. Whilst it seems to me that costs should follow the event in this regard, Mr Di Liristi sought an opportunity to make submissions on the costs of the motion on the basis that he contended that there were aspects of it on which he succeeded. The motion also dealt with moving the hearing date and compliance with a notice to produce served by Mr Di Liristi which I was informed had been resolved. I will direct the parties to confer as to the costs of the motion. If no agreement is reached, I will receive short submissions and determine the question of costs on the papers.

60. The Court orders that:

61. Paragraphs 2 to 5 of the further amended motion filed 26 June 2026 be dismissed.

62. The parties confer as to the costs of the further amended motion and provide any agreed orders as to costs to my Associate by 5pm on 18 August 2026.

63. If the parties are unable to agree orders as to costs of the further amended motion they are each to provide to my Associate by no later than 5pm on 18 August 2026, written submissions on the costs orders for which they contend of no more than 5 pages, whereupon I will determine the issue of costs on the papers.

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